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[1985] SLR (CA) 19Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

HAYFRON vs. EGYIR [1984-86] 1 GLR 682

24 June 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 22 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 19
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OSCOLAHAYFRON v EGYIR [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 [1985] SLR (CA) 19
APAHAYFRON v EGYIR [1984-86] 1 GLR 682, [1985] SLR (CA) 19 (Ghana).
BluebookHAYFRON v EGYIR [1984-86] 1 GLR 682, [1985] SLR (CA) 19 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from decision of the High Court, Sekondi in favour of the respondent in an action for declaration of title to a piece of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Apaloo CJ.

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf (with him Bentsi-Enchill) for the appellant.

Kwame Tetteh (holding Ebow Dawson’s brief) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO CJ.

The appellant, who was born in or about 1908, lives in Sekondi. She is the daughter of the late Peter Awoonor Renner who died in 1938. The deceased was a barrister. The appellant is, in a sense, fortunate to have been the daughter of a lawyer. This is because she was able to meet the case raised against her by written records dating back to 1900. Her father’s knowledge of conveyancing stood her in goodstead.

The evidence placed before the judge below, shows that on 17 August 1900 one Kuow Djonfia, head chief of Dutch Sekondi, sold and conveyed to one Hendrick Vroom a piece of land measuring 600 feet by 200 feet in Sekondi. The land was fully described in a deed of indenture which was executed to evidence the sale. On 22 February 1910 the said Vroom, for his part, sold and conveyed the identical land to the appellant’s father for the consideration named in the deed. These two deeds of indenture were duly stamped and registered in the Lands Department. Copies of both documents were tendered in evidence. The originals were apparently not available and the copies produced in evidence were supplied from the official records of the Lands Department.

There is no question about their genuineness or authenticity. Indeed, the appellant’s father’s document was tendered by the respondent-curious as it seems! That document recited the 1900 conveyance. During the hearing of the suit, that document was apparently not available. On the hearing of the appeal, we granted leave to the appellant to tender a cetified copy authenticated by the Lands Department. This new evidence could not have caused any surprise to the respondent because he himself tendered, without objection, the 1910 document in which the earlier conveyance of 1900 was recited.

The evidence shows that the appellant’s mother was anxious that the late Lawyer Awoonor Renner provide some patrimony for his daughter. So at her request, Renner made a gift of a portion of the land

[p.685] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 he bought from Vroom to the appellant. This gift was, as to be expected, evidenced by a deed. The statutory declaration of Mrs Mercer, the appellant’s mother made in June 1977, nearly two years before the writ was issued out in this case, shows that she handed the deed to her brother one Frank Krakue for stamping and registration. This was not done before the latter’s death and the deed could not be traced. The deed was not delivered to the appellant herself because she was apparently a minor.

It seems clear that Mrs Mercer showed the appellant the land and put her in possession. The evidence is not altogether precise when in point of time this was. What is clear, however, is that the appellant entered into her patrimony and enjoyed and otherwise exercised acts of ownership on the land openly and practically undisturbed for at least 40 years before this litigation was launched. She did not only clearly mark the confines of her land with corner pillars, but erected wooden structures on it. These she let out.

She rented a portion of it to fishmongers. She herself utilised the land by making a vegetable garden and planted sugar-cane on a portion of it. She also planted coconut, palm trees and banana on it. A few years before the writ issued in this suit, she fenced the entire land with bamboo. I need hardly say that the evidence of the appellant’s long possession and acts of ownership on the disputed land, were weighty and impressive.

Indeed, the respondent who sought to oust her from the land was obliged to concede that the appellant not only erected structures on the land but derived income from them. As the respondent himself put it: “I have seen some houses on the land. I know that those persons on the land pay rent to Mrs Hayfron, the defendant.”

An obviously senior member of the respondent’s family, a pensioner called Kwabena Kaah who claimed to know the traditional history of the land, when questioned about the appellant’s 40 years’ uninterrupted possession, said the family came by its knowledge of its ownership of the disputed land only recently. When it was put to him that the appellant had been on the land for over 40 years, he gave this curious reply. He said: “But we did not know that the land belonged to our family. As soon as we got to know this, we claimed it.”

The family’s knowledge of its ownership of this land which is said to be in a built-up area of Sekondi, was apparently locked in the bosom of the respondent’s immediate predecessor-in-office, a man called Kweku Azariah. It was said by the respondent that when Azariah was very ill he sent for him and imparted to him the information on which the action was mounted. The respondent swore that Azariah, the then head of the family, told him that some time ago, the appellant sought permission from him to make a grant of the land to her “to enable some

[p.686] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 fisherfolks to dry their nets there.” Azariah allegedly granted this permission and he mandated the respondent to reclaim the land for the family in the event of his death. Azariah departed this life in 1978 and this suit was launched in March 1979 in apparent fulfillment of his bidding.

The appellant resisted this action, denied that she obtained permission and said she was in possession of the land by virtue of her right as owner. She traced her root of title from Vroom’s deed of 1900, through her father’s own conveyance of 1910 and a gift to her by her father which was recited in her mother’s statutory declaration of 1977. She then gave evidence of her long undisturbed possession and the various acts of ownership she performed on the land. With regard to the alleged grant of a permission to her by Azariah to enter the land, she said it was untrue.

For her part, she counterclaimed against the respondent and sought damages for trespass. To sustain this, she related how the respondent or his agents entered the land and caused destruction. She said for instance, the respondent entered the land, removed her corner pillars and fixed his own. This much, the respondent admits. The appellant fenced the land with bamboo. This was destroyed by a man called Faawah obviously on the respondent’s authority. She also gave evidence of how some time shortly before the suit, the respondent and members of his family entered the land and performed some rituals there. She believed the object of that was to invoke curses on her. There can be no doubt that her possession was invaded. The respondent committed these acts because he claimed that as owner of the land he had a better right to possession. It must follow that if he failed to establish the right in which he did these acts, the appellant’s claim to damages for trespass cannot legally be answered. The respondent’s claim to ownership was sustained by the court below, and conformably with this holding, the judge ordered that the respondent do recover the disputed land from the appellant.

The appellant invites us to say that the judgment of the court below was wrong and prays that it be reversed. One thing is clear in this case, namely that the appellant was in long undisturbed possession of this land. In so far as any principle of law is relevant and should be borne in mind in the determination of this suit, it is that the person in possession is deemed to be the owner and her possession is good against the whole world except the true owner. That is what the respondent claimed to be. There can be little doubt that on the proved and admitted facts of this case, he bore a heavy onus indeed. He sought to discharge that and substantiate his disputed claim to ownership by three pieces of evidence, namely (a) traditional evidence, (b) acts of ownership, and (c) permission to a third party and the appellant to enter upon the land.

[p.687] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682

The respondent’s family which conceded that they did not know that they owned the land until about 1978, however produced two witnesses to relate how their ancestors acquired the land. According to the respondent, their ancestral home was in Cape Coast. They were Methodists. Between 1850-60 they migrated from Cape Coast to Sekondi and his ancestors found and settled on the land which was apparently vacant and without an owner. Kwabena Kaah a pensioner and elder member of the family was told a rather different story about the origin of this land. According to his account, his ancestors lived at the old harbour site in Sekondi. When the Europeans arrived in the Gold Coast, they apparently dispossessed them, so they moved to settle on this land, which he implied, was vacant and ownerless.

Neither the respondent nor Kaah disclosed to the court how they came by this permissible hearsay evidence called tradition. They must have been told the original acquisition by two different ancestors. One ancestor could not have told senior members of the family different accounts of the origin of this land. If the tradition is accurate, no explanation was put forward why these two witnesses diverged so much on the true origin of the land. If they were honest historical stories told them by two honest forbears, then it at least shows how unreliable traditional history per se can be in proof of ownership. It is the more so if the fact is borne in mind that Kaah said they did not know that the land in dispute was theirs until as recently as 1978. So whoever told them the history did not relate it to the actual land in dispute. The learned trial judge accepted this unreliable traditional history without noticing the very significant difference between the two stories. He seems to have considered that these two different accounts were buttressed by acts of ownership performed on the land by the respondent’s family. The question is, what acts of ownership did they prove? Such acts, to have any probative force, must be open and uncontested. The respondent claimed that they made grants to the Methodist Mission on which that church’s building now stands. They did not put in any representative of that mission to confirm this story. They did not say whether the grant was oral or written. One thing is clear about Sekondi. That is knowledgeable persons there would not content themselves with an oral grant. A grant made as long ago as 1900 to Vroom was evidenced by deed and an authenticated copy was produced in evidence. Would the Methodist Mission be content with an oral grant? The probabilities are that they would want a grant reduced into writing as an insurance against bad faith and treacherous memory. Both Vroom and Awoonor Renner did just that. Would a body like the Methodist Church be reasonably expected to do any less? At least they

[p.688] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 cannot be said to be “natives” who would content themselves with an oral customary grant. And the evidence of the grant rests only on the traditional testimony of two witnesses who were told two divergent stories about the ancestral history of the land. I think the so-called grant to the Methodist Mission was not established. The fact that the appellant had herself no independent evidence to contradict this story is immaterial. It did not relieve the respondent of proving the grant by the type of evidence that would, if the story were true, be ordinarily available.

The other grant the respondent alleged his family made was to James Mercer, barrister-at-law. Again this witness was not called to confirm the grant. It would have been the easiest thing in the world to call Mercer to testify as to when the grant was made, whether it was oral or in writing and if the latter, the nature of interest conveyed to him. But the respondent himself produced evidence which shows that at least four years before they came by their knowledge of his family’s ownership of the disputed land, Mercer obtained by deed, a grant of a portion of the land in dispute from a person other than the respondent’s family.

Apparently, shortly after issuing the writ, the respondent applied to the Lands Department for a search of his so-called ancestral land. He attached to the request a site plan describing the land edged red as his family property. The result of the search communicated to him in writing dated 8 June 1979 and produced by him (exhibit A) shows that Mercer’s land was granted to him by a Mrs J Cross Cole by deed dated 4 March 1974, and forms part and parcel of the land which the respondent described as his family land. This evidence shows that somebody other than the respondent’s family exercised ante litem motam, a right of alienation over the land.

Although the respondent asserted that he made the grant to Mercer and thus enabled him to enter upon the land, the other evidence led by him shows that Mercer entered upon the land and commenced the erection of a building without any reference to the respondent’s family. Presumably he was acting on the authority of the grant from Mrs Cross Cole. The respondent appeared to have challenged him and got Mercer to pay him ¢300 and a bottle of drink. The respondent then said he then “allowed Mercer to continue building on the land.” The respondent again asserted: “I say the land in dispute belongs to my family. We have not sold it to anybody.” In other words, they permitted Mercer to continue his building but they did not sell the land to him. He did not elaborate what was the nature of the grant they made to him. That is why counsel for the appellant suggested that Mercer must have paid him the paltry sum of ¢300 to buy his peace. That is how the matter struck me quite independently. A possible land suit against Mercer,

[p.689] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 meritorious or not, with the likelihood of an interim injunction being granted to prevent him from continuing his building, will have a great nuisance value. In the circumstances, it would be politic for Mercer to pay up. This is, of course, speculation which is not entirely without evidential basis but often the dividing line between reasonable speculation and legitimate inference is not easily drawn. But the onus was on the respondent who was seeking to establish an act of ownership by a grant to Mercer, to prove it. Having failed to call Mercer or to provide any particulars of the alleged grant to him, the respondent cannot complain if speculation unfavourable to his cause is made. I think, insofar as the respondent claimed that he performed acts of ownership by making grants of portions of the land in dispute to the Methodist Mission and James Mercer, that evidence is, to say the least, extremely tenuous and has hardly any probative value.

The next acts of ownership the respondent allegedly made, were two in nature, namely first, the grant of permission for fetish to be settled on the land and secondly, the alleged permission Azariah granted to the appellant.

With regard to the first, the evidence is that in 1962 when the Sekondi naval base was in the course of construction, the expatriate contractors felt that a fetish on the site was’ obstructing their work. They therefore sought its removal and placement on another site. The respondent claimed it was placed on a portion of the land in dispute with his family’s permission.

The appellant’s version was that some time in 1962, the Oman fetish was brought and settled on her land. This was without her permission. She therefore made an issue of this with the Omanhene. The latter asked her to see the head of the fishermen. The fetish seems to be of particular value to the fishermen. She saw their head and reached an accommodation with them. She provided them customary drink. With this, they poured libation and thereafter acknowledged her title to the land.

In the context of this case, this fetish episode has very little weight. If the respondent’s family in truth granted the permission for the resettlement of the fetish on the land in dispute, they obviously could not have done so with the appellant’s prior knowledge. When she saw the fetish on the land, she asserted her title to the land and got the fishermen to concede it. It was not anything like an open and uncontested act of ownership by the respondent on the land. The learned judge held this “an important act of ownership.” It certainly was not. Granting permission to a stranger to use land behind the back of the owner, can only be of value, if when the owner on becoming aware of it, took no steps to assert her night. That is just what has not happened.

[p.690] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682

The more seemingly important “permission” the respondent’s family claimed they granted, was to the appellant herself. The permission was allegedly granted her to enable her permit fishermen to dry their nets on the land. The appellant vehemently denied it. The only evidence of it was from the respondent who said Azariah on his sick bed told him this. Nobody was apparently present. The terms of the licence were not given. The only member of the family who knew about this permission, ie Azariah, was no more and he could not be questioned about it.

But how reasonable is this story? If fishermen went to the appellant to seek permission to dry their nets on the land, they must have learnt, at least by reputation, that she was the owner of the land. The appellant had been on the land for the best part of half a century. She knew that the land was her own – being a gift from her father. Does it make sense that an owner in possession of land whose permission is sought for its use would herself turn to a stranger to obtain permission in order to enable her in turn to grant permission for the use of her own property? Anyone with a nodding acquaintance of dealing with land in this country, would not scruple in rejecting that evidence. That story is, in any case, opposed to commonsense and is inherently incredible. There is justice to the living as well as to the dead and it would be great travesty of justice if a living person were to lose his property because a man on his sick or death bed mandated his relatives to claim such property as his or his family’s own whether or not he was in his right mind or was under some sort of hallucination. The learned trial judge seems to have accepted that story and said “the very act of granting permission to the defendant to settle fisherfolks on the land would constitute a recent fact or act which lends to the traditional history, a high degree of probability.” That evidence is unworthy of credence and the learned judge was a trifle credulous in accepting it.

My analysis and evaluation of the nature and quality of evidence led by the respondent in proof of his title, satisfied me that he not only woefully failed to prove his title to the land, but did not even begin to do so. I think, therefore, that the judgment decreeing title in his favour and ordering the ejectment of the appellant, was wholly wrong and ought to be set aside. Mr Dawson, counsel who persuaded the judge below to arrive at the conclusion he did, never appeared on appeal to support the judgment. It therefore fell to the lot of Mr Kwame Tetteh to defend this indefensible judgment. With characteristic candour and in the best tradition of the profession, counsel said quite frankly, that having read and considered the evidence, he felt himself unable to support the judgment in his client’s favour.

[p.691] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682

The appellant for her part, counterclaimed for damages for trespass. As she was ex concessis in possession and as she gave evidence of the substantial invasion of her possession by the respondent and his agents, Mr Kwame Tetteh was apprehensive that his concession to the appellant on the issue of ownership may be taken as an admission of liability to pay damages for trespass. He was apparently not prepared to throw in the towel on that aspect of the case. So, he sought to meet the appellant’s counterclaim for trespass be an argument which was not entirely disingenious. He submitted that in so far as the counterclaim is concerned, the parties switched roles and that the appellant became the plaintiff with the resultant onus of establishing her claim. That onus, counsel argued, was to prove title. In the contention of counsel, she failed to show that, because the original title deed from which she traced her title showed the land as rectangular but her present claim for trespass relates to land which is irregular in shape.

This contention is easily answered on basic principles. It is trite learning that trespass is a wrong to possession. That is the wrong of which the appellant complained. She is not only entitled to compensation for the invasion of her possession, but could have regained her possession if she had been dispossessed by the respondent. There is no warrant for the proposition that she cannot have the possessory remedy of damages unless she proved title. At p 294, para 60 of Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed) captioned “Possessory Remedies”, the learned author says:

“In English law possession is a good right of title against anyone who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself . . . Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession.”

One of the known remedies for trespass, is damages. I cannot doubt that the appellant has shown herself entitled to recover damages from the respondent for this undoubted trespass. The only real question is: on the facts of this case, what quantum would be reasonable? Counsel for the appellant says he leaves that to our discretion. It cannot be otherwise. It is not a case of special damages, but general damages. This species of damages is normally said to be at large and its quantification is peculiarly within our province. We have asked ourselves the question: what will be a fair and reasonable compensation to award to the appellant for this somewhat vexatious trespass committed against her? I have already related the particulars of the trespass

[p.692] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 of which she gave evidence, namely the destruction of her corner pillars, the destruction of her bamboo fence and a vegetable garden, the entry on the land by the respondent and his family and the performance by them of rituals obviously designed to scare her off the land. She herself sought, by way of damages, ¢5,000. Every member of this court, independently felt that the sum claimed was entirely reasonable. It is even possible to think of that figure as being slightly on the low side. Accordingly, the appellant will have ¢5,000 by way of damages for the trespass.

Before I am done, I think it right to make an observation of a general policy nature. One of the known drawbacks of conveyancing in this country is the absence of written records of land alienation. Where a sale takes place, proof is generally offered by oral testimony of witnesses who were present when a customary ceremony called “guaha” is performed. The absence of written records makes “investigation of title particularly difficult. One of the main policy objectives of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD 175) was to make the investigation of title and the eventual proof of land alienation less difficult to intending purchasers by the imposition of a requirement of a written record. The memorandum to NRCD 175 says:

“. . . The intention is to require a recording in the Register of a District Court of transfers of interests in land, and to make such a recording a condition of validity in the same way as the traditional “guaha’ was essential.

In this way a permanent record will be progressively substituted for the indispensable but evanescent memory of witnesses to the `guaha’ transaction…”

That is the clearly stated policy of the law. On the facts of this case, Awoonor Renner and others like him anticipated this law over 70 years earlier. Renner made sure that the land he bought in 1910 was evidenced by deed. This provided a permanent record of the transaction. That it is a reliable and trustworthy record is shown by the fact that the deed was preserved and produced by the Lands Department. That it is authentic is shown by the fact that both parties tendered identical copies. Yet the learned judge preferred the doubtful and conflicting traditional evidence of two witnesses. He said he attached no probative value to the deed. As he put it in Egyir v Hayfron [1984-86] 1 GLR 510 at 518 ante:

“It ought to be vehemently emphasised that a document of title per se does not confer ownership of land.

Ownership must be proved by facts. Even in the instant case, there has not been before this court any document evidencing the grant or sale of the land by Chief Djonfia and his elders to Vroom. One would have

[p.693] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 expected that Vroom would pass that document onto the defendant’s father. No explanation whatsoever.

This coupled with the fact that no person has been called from the stool of Dutch Sekondi to dispute the title makes me doubt the authenticity of the document on which the defendant relies. I do not attach any probative value to it either.”

That criticism shows that the judge was merely looking for a stick to beat the appellant with. Neither of the parties had in his possession the original deeds. The appellant’s original root of title dating back to 1900 was recited in her father’s conveyance. An authenticated copy of it was tendered before us without objection. It seems somewhat unreal for the judge to expect that a living person who witnessed the transaction in 1900 should be called to testify before him in 1982. His whole approach to this matter shows his preference for oral traditional evidence to a written record. That approach run counter to the policy of the enacted law. The appellant did not rest her claim to ownership on the production of her father’s and his vendor’s title deeds alone. She led evidence of long undisturbed possession and open and unchallenged acts of ownership on the disputed land for the best part of 50 years. The judge gave nothing like a valid reason for impugning the authenticity of ancient documents, 82 and 75 years old respectively. At all events, section 146 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) takes care of the less than tenable criticisms of the judge by providing that:

“146. Authentication or identification of a writing may be by evidence that the writing-

(a) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity;

(b) was in a place where, if authentic, it might be expected to be; and (c) is at least 20 years old at the time it is offered.”

Every one of those statutory requirements were met by the evidence produced in this case. Thus, the learned judge’s conclusion, is a set-back to the development of an enlightened and progressive conveyancing practice in this country. I venture to hope that none of my learned brothers will feel attracted by the negative attitude to conveyancing adopted by the judge in this case.

In view of my holding on the various matters debated in this appeal, my conclusion must be self-evident. And it is that the appellant succeeds in this appeal and is entitled to have the judgment against her vacated. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and set aside the

[p.694] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 682 judgment appealed from. In lieu of it, I would dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the defendant on the claim and counterclaim. I would award in favour of the defendant against the plaintiff, ¢5,000 damages for trespass with costs here and below.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU JA. In concur.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE I also entirely concur.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

MCN-N

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