IBRAHIM vs. ABUBAKARI [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v High Court, Kumasi; Exparte Abubakari (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 904.

(2) Moshiehene, In re; Abdulrahman v Abubakari [1999-2000] 1 GLR 180, SC.

(3) MacGregor v Clay and Carminuda (1888) 4 TLR 715.

(4) Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex parte Laryea Mensah [1998-99] SCGLR 360.

[p.543] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540

(5) Heaton’s Transport (St Helens) Ltd v Transport and General Workers Union [1973] AC 15; [1972] 3 WLR 431; [1972] 3 All ER 101, HL; reversing [1972] 2 All ER 1214 at 1247, CA.

(6) In re Effiduase Stool Affairs (No 2); Republic v Numapau, President of the National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Ameyaw II (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639.

(7) Agbleta v The Republic [1977] 1 GLR 445, CA.

(8) Armah v Addoquaye [1972] 1 GLR 109, CA.

APPLICATION by the plaintiff in the High Court for leave to issue a writ of attachment to attach the defendant for contempt of court on the grounds that the latter, in flagrant disregard of an order of the Supreme Court, repeatedly represented himself as the chief of the Moshie community in Kumasi. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

Somuah-Asamoah for the plaintiff-applicant.

Charles Agbanu for the defendant-respondent.

Kanyoke J. From the affidavits filed in this application the following material facts are not in dispute: On or about 1 September 1995 the plaintiff-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) caused a writ of summons to be issued against the defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) claiming the following reliefs:

“(1) A declaration that the plaintiff is the substantive Kumasi Moshie community head.

(2) An order of perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant whether by himself, his agents or servants from representing himself as the Kumasi Moshie community head or purporting to act as such.

(3) An order of perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant whether by himself, his agents, servants or whomsoever from interfering in the plaintiff’s performance of his duties as the substantive Kumasi Moshie community head.”

The respondent did not only resist the applicant’s action but he also

[p.544] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 counterclaimed for:

“(1) A declaration that the defendant is the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi who has been duly selected and installed and recognised by Otumfour the Asantehene.

(2) Perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff from styling posing, representing himself as the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi.”

On 31 July 1996 this High Court, then presided over by Piesare J, gave judgment in favour of the applicant for the reliefs claimed in the endorsement to the writ and dismissed the respondent’s counterclaim. Subsequently, the respondent was served with a filed notice of judgment after trial. Then on 6 August 1996 the respondent filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of this court at the Court of Appeal but for reasons best known to him he discontinued that appeal on 20 October 1997. Subsequently the respondent filed at the Supreme Court an application for an order of certiorari and prohibition to quash the judgment of this High Court and on 13 May 1998 the Supreme Court in a three-two majority decision granted the order of certiorari and prohibition in Republic v High Court, Kumasi; Ex parte Abubakari (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 904. Not satisfied with that, on 9 June 1998 the applicant filed in the Supreme Court an application for a review of the three-two majority ruling of the Supreme Court of 13 May 1998. On 15 December 1999 a seven member panel of the Supreme Court in a six to one majority decision in In re Moshiehene of Kumasi; Abdulrahman v Abubakari [1999-2000] 1 GLR 180, SC overturned the three to two majority ruling of 13 May 1998 and restored the full judgment and orders of this court of 31 July 1996. On 17 February 2000 a notice of entry of the judgment of the review bench of the Supreme Court was served on the respondent. This in brief is the corpse case of the applicant.

The applicant has now brought this application under Order 44 rr1 and 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) praying court “for an order granting leave for a writ of attachment to issue to attach. . . the respondent for contempt of court” on the ground that “The defendant has, however, continually engaged in conduct which flouts the order of the High Court” and has continued to “pose as the Moshiehene of Kumasi in flagrant disregard of the judgment of [p.545] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 the High Court and the Supreme Court itself.” The conduct of the applicant complained of in this application has been particularised in a 36-paragraphed supporting affidavit. I shall return to the salient parts of these affidavits shortly. But let me remark here that even though the respondent filed a twelve paragraphed affidavit on 27 October 2000 in opposition to the application, following leave granted to his counsel to amend only paragraph (11) of the affidavit in opposition by inserting the word “not” between the words “I am” and “the” in that paragraph, learned counsel for the respondent took opportunity to virtually amend the whole of the affidavit in opposition on 27 October 2000 by filing a new sixteen-paragraphed affidavit in opposition on 21 November 2000 titled “Corrective affidavits in opposition to the applicant’s application.”

Order 44, rr 1 and 2 of LN 140A under which this application is brought provides:

“(1) A writ of attachment shall have the same effect as a writ of attachment issued out of the Supreme Court has heretofore had.

(2) No writ of attachment shall be issued without the leave of the Court or a Judge, to be applied for on notice to the party against whom the attachment is to be issued.”

In arguing the application, learned counsel for the applicant referred to exhibit 1B 111 (ie the certified true copy of the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi dated 31 July 1996 and attached to the supporting affidavit) and contended that the respondent has disobeyed the orders of perpetual injunction imposed on him by that judgment, hence the basis of this application. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the respondent has not denied knowledge of exhibit 1B111 and exhibit 1B111B (that is, the entry of judgment of the review bench of the Supreme Court). He submitted therefore that by disobeying these judgments and exhibiting conduct as particularised in paragraphs (2)–(33) of the supporting affidavit and further supported in the supplementary affidavit, the respondent is guilty of contempt of court so he should show cause why he should not be attached for contempt.

In responding to the arguments of learned counsel for the applicant, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the respondent is not in contempt of court because: (1) since contempt is a quasi-criminal offence it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt but this

[p.546] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 the applicant has failed to discharge; (2) the applicant is not a chief. He contended that both the High Court and the review bench of the Supreme Court in their respective judgments in exhibits 1B111 and 1B111A were emphatic that the applicant is not a “chief.” Therefore these judgments did not confer any enforceable rights on the applicant; (3) since the applicant is not a chief, his action before the High Court was personal to him and consequently the orders of perpetual injunction made by the High Court in exhibit 1B111 were ineffectual since the respondent has not been shown by the original proceedings, the review proceedings or his present application to be a member of any society or community of which he is the head. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the applicant is claiming to be the head or “Moshiehene” of the Moshie community in Kumasi but the respondent cannot be compelled to belong to the Moshie community otherwise that is tantamount to an infringement of his rights under article 21(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1992. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the use of the word “Moshiehene” in the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi (exhibit 1B111) and queried “what is the meaning of “Moshieman”, and submitted that since it has not been shown by the proceedings of the High Court, the proceedings of the review bench of the Supreme Court and this present application that the respondent has infringed any laws and rules of the country or any society to which both the applicant and the respondent belong, the action at the High Court, Kumasi by the applicant was frivolous; (4) since the applicant has no copyright in the name “Moshie” or “Kumasi Moshie community” he cannot claim to have an exclusive use of those names; and (5) since the action at the High Court, Kumasi was one which the applicant knew he could not lose unless he was challenged on the basis of his chiefship, which by his own admission he was not, no contempt could be committed in a situation in which the applicant had no standing. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the case of MacGregor v Clay and Carminuda (1888) 4 TLR 715 in support of that submission.

With the permission of the court, learned counsel for the applicant addressed the court on the points raised by the corrective affidavit in opposition. He said that the corrective affidavit had raised matters not originally raised in the affidavit in opposition. In any case, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the corrective affidavit in

[p.547] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 opposition and the submissions or arguments of learned counsel for the respondent are seeking to put the judgments of this High Court and the review bench of the Supreme Court to the test but, according to counsel for the applicant, this is not the forum for that because this court is not sitting on appeal on those judgments. According to learned counsel for the applicant, the issue in this application is whether there are specific orders of the High Court which have been disobeyed by the respondent. In the view of the counsel for the applicant, the High Court made orders to the effect that the respondent should not hold himself out or represent himself as Moshiehene or head of the Moshie community and these orders were confirmed by the review bench of the Supreme Court especially in the leading judgment of Acquah JSC. These orders are therefore enforceable. He said even in the High Court the respondent counterclaimed for the same reliefs the applicant was claiming, so he cannot now dispute that there is a position known as Moshiehene or head of the Moshie community in Kumasi. On the issue of proof of the conduct of the respondent, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the respondent has not specifically denied the depositions in the supporting and supplementary affidavits and the exhibits attached therein so the applicant has proved his case beyond all reasonable doubt.

The application before me is for leave to issue a writ of attachment for contempt against the respondent. The gist of the application is that the respondent has disobeyed an order of the High Court, Kumasi. As recently as in 1998 the Supreme Court, in the case of Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex parte Laryea Mensah [1998-99] SCGLR 360 held as appears in the headnote that:

“a person commits contempt and may be committed to prison for wilfully disobeying an order of court requiring him to do any act other than payment of money or to abstain from doing some act and the orders sought to be enforced should be unambiguous and must be clearly understood by the parties concerned. The reason is that a court will only punish as contempt a wilful breach of clear court order requiring obedience to its performance . . .”

This point was emphasised in the case of Heaton’s Transport (St Helens) Ltd v Transport and General Workers Union [1972] 2 All ER 1214 at 1247, CA where Lord Denning MR said:

[p.548] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540

“Disobedience to the orders of the court is an offence of a criminal character. . . The disobedience must, therefore, be a conscious disobedience to the order of the court or, at any rate, turning a blind eye to it.”

Again in the Supreme Court case of In re Effiduase Stool Affairs (No 2); Republic v Numapau, President of the National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Ameyaw II (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639, the Supreme Court (per Acquah, Atuguba and Akuffo JJSC—Charles Hayfron-Benjamin and Ampiah JJSC dissenting) elaborated on the classification of contempt of court as stated in the headnote at 641 as follows:

“(1) . . . contempt of court was constituted by an act or conduct that tended to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with, or prejudice parties, litigants, or their witnesses in respect of pending proceedings. And contempt of court might be classified either as direct and indirect or civil and criminal. Direct contempts were those committed in the immediate view and presence of the court (such as insulting language or acts of violence) or so near the presence of the court as to obstruct or interrupt the due and orderly course of proceedings.

Indirect or constructive contempts were those arising from matters not occurring in or near the presence of the court, but which tended to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice, such as failure or refusal of a party to obey a lawful order, injunction or decree of the court laying upon him a duty of action or forbearance. Civil contempts were those quasi-contempts consisting in failure to do something which the party was ordered by the court to do for the benefit or advantage of another party to pending proceedings; while criminal contempts were acts done in respect of the court or its process or which obstructed the administration of justice or tended to bring the court into disrespect.”

In the instant case, the contempt complained of is indirect contempt or constructive contempt; therefore, for the acts of the respondent to amount to contempt of court he must be found to be guilty of a wilful disobedience or to have wilfully violated a specific order of the court. The applicant must establish that the court made a specific order

[p.549] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 requiring the respondent to do or not to do something and that the respondent was fully aware of and clearly understood that specific order but wilfully disobeyed that specific order of the court. Disobedience which is found not to be wilful cannot be punished. Thus, in Agbleta v The Republic [1977] 1 GLR 445 at 447, CA Azu Crabbe CJ stated that:

“It seems to follow from the authorities that wilful disobedience of the order of the court must be established before a person can be held to be guilty of contempt. With all due respect to the learned judge, this court thinks that it is one thing to find unsatisfactory the appellant’s explanation of his conduct, and quite another to infer wilful defiance from his conduct.” rd See also Halsbury’s Laws of England (3 ed), Vol 8, para 46 at pp 25-26 and Oswald’s Contempt of rd Court (3 ed) at p 6.

The undisputed facts of this case are that on 31 July 1996 this High Court gave judgment in favour of the applicant whilst it dismissed the respondent’s counterclaim: see exhibit 1B111 attached to the supporting affidavit. At p12 of exhibit 1B111 the High Court concluded its judgment in these words: “His [ie the respondent’s] counterclaim is therefore dismissed. Judgment is accordingly entered for the plaintiff against the defendant for the reliefs sought in the writ of summons. And the plaintiff is accordingly granted an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents, servants etc from representing himself or holding himself out as the Moshiehene of Kumasi; and from interfering in the plaintiff’s performance of his functions and duties as the substantive Moshiehene of Kumasi.”

By this judgment, therefore, the respondent was perpetually restrained from: (1) representing himself or holding himself out as Moshiehene of Kumasi; and (2) from interfering with the applicant’s performance of his functions and duties as the Moshiehene of Kumasi. Since contempt of court is quasi-criminal and punishment for it might include a fine or imprisonment, the applicant must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the respondent wilfully represented himself or posed or held himself as the Moshiehene or head of the Moshie community of Kumasi or that he interfered with the applicant in the

[p.550] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 performance of his functions and duties as Moshiehene of Kumasi. In other words, the applicant must first of all make out a prima facie case of contempt before this court could proceed to consider the defences, if any, put up by the respondent. In paragraph (21) of the supporting affidavit, the applicant in his bid to prove these acts of misfeasance or disobedience to the order of perpetual injunction, has deposed that the respondent, despite the order of perpetual injunction has after the order was made continued to pose as the Moshiehene of Kumasi by (1) attending a marriage ceremony on 9 April, 2000 of one Alhaji Ayuba, head of the Gruma community at Alabar, Kumasi and posed as the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi; (2) by attending the final funeral rites of one Umaru Morei at Sawanba on 10 April 2000 and posed as the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi and declared that he is the one and only head; (3) by going to the Manhyia Palace in Kumasi on 30 April 2000 and posing as the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi; (4) that on 31 April 2000 the respondent appeared on Fontonfrom Television and said that he is the only Moshie chief in Kumasi; (5) on 2 April 2000 the respondent went to Accra Town for the final funeral rites of Alhassan Kabore and purported to install a Moshie man and represented there that he is the Moshiehene of Kumasi; (6) that the respondent attended a ceremony to welcome Chief Busanga of New Zongo and posed and represented himself as the Moshie chief of Kumasi; (7) that the respondent has represented himself to a group calling itself as the council of Zongo chiefs of Kumasi as the head of the Moshie community or the Moshiehene of Kumasi and got his name published as such on 16 January 2000. A copy of the publication is exhibited as exhbit 1B111C; (8) that on the eve of the final funeral rites of the late Otumfuo Opoku Ware, the respondent said on OTEC FM station that he is the Moshie chief of Kumasi and would be announced as such on the microphone upon his arrival at the funeral grounds; (9) that in another interview at Capital FM the respondent proclaimed that he is the only Moshie chief of Kumasi; (10) that on 31 April 2000 the respondent also attended the twentieth anniversary celebrations of Chief Adarawa at Asawasi and posed as the Moshiehene of Kumasi; and (11) that on 4 June 2000 the respondent went to the enstoolment of Busanga elders at the house of Chief Busanga at a special guest of Alhaji Amudu Abubakar, Chief Moshie: see paragraph (22)–(33) of the supporting affidavit.

[p.551] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540

It is however significant to note that nowhere in the supporting affidavit has the applicant deposed that the respondent had at any time after 31 July 1996 interfered with him (the applicant) in the performance of his functions and duties as the Moshiehene of Kumasi. I find therefore that the respondent has never after 31 July 1996 and the ruling of the review bench of the Supreme Court interfered with the applicant in the performance of his functions and duties as the Moshiehene of Kumasi.

In his affidavit in opposition the respondent deposed in paragraphs (3) and (4) as follows:

“(3) That I deny all the allegations made against me and would ask for strict proof of the allegations.

(4) That I have never held myself out or represented myself as the Moshiehene of Kumasi, neither have I interfered in anyway with the functions of the applicant.”

But then having made these general denials or traverse the respondent went on to depose in paragraph (11) of the affidavit in opposition thus:

“(11) That of course, there are still persons who recognise me as the Moshiehene and whenever I attend a function they recognise me as such. I have myself told them that I am not the Moshiehene and I cannot stop them from exercising their right to call me whatever they want. A chief may be destooled but there are people who would still recognise him as such and call him so. I still have followers and supporters; it is not my fault that they still recognise me.”

In paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of the supplementary affidavit in support of the application the applicant deposed as follows:

“(5) That in utter and contumacious contempt of the judgment of this honourable court the respondent got himself elected as an executive member of a body which describes itself as the ‘Council of Zongo Chiefs’ for which purpose he described and got himself described as the Moshie chief (Moshiehene) of Kumasi.

(6) That exhibited as exhibit 1B111D is a list published by the

[p.552] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540

Kumasi ‘Council of Zongo Chiefs’ on which the respondent allowed his name to be placed as the Moshie Chief.

(7) That the respondent has neither complained nor protested against the use of his name and the description of him on the list.

(8) That on Tuesday, 12 September 2000 the Pioneer newspaper on page eight published the election of the respondent as an executive member of the Council of Zongo Chiefs in confirmation of exhibit 1B111D.

(9) That a copy of the publication in the Pioneer is exhibited as exhibit 1B111E.”

The respondent did not respond to the depositions in the supplementary supporting affidavit. It seems to me that paragraphs (22)–(33) of the supporting affidavit and paragraphs (5)–(9) of the supplementary supporting affidavit clearly establish a prima facie evidence of contempt against the respondent for there is no doubt that if the conduct of the respondent deposed to in these paragraphs sufficiently show that if they are true, then they are clearly tantamount to a wilful disobedience to the order of the High Court perpetually restraining the respondent from representing himself or posing as the Moshiehene of Kumasi. I think therefore that the applicant has sufficiently raised a prima facie case and a rebuttable presumption of contempt for which the respondent will have to offer a defence.

Paragraphs (22)–(33) of the supporting affidavit and paragraphs (5)–(9) of the supplementary supporting affidavit have deposed to specific acts of conducts on the part of the respondent that required specific defences by the respondent. Like pleadings, affidavits depose to facts or material facts. Thus, Order 38, r 3 of LN 140A provides in no uncertain terms that: “Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the witness is able of his own knowledge to prove . . .” Like a statement of defence, therefore, if the respondent in his affidavit in opposition does not deny specifically a specific allegation of fact contained in a supporting affidavit or denies generally or does not answer the point of substance in the supporting affidavit, he will be deemed to have admitted that fact: see Armah v Addoquaye [1972] 1 GLR 109, CA. It is not enough therefore to depose to a general traverse to such specific allegations of fact in such circumstances. In

[p.553] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 the instant case, the applicant has deposed to specific facts or instances of misfeasance on the part of the respondent which were allegedly done in breach of the order of the High Court forming the basis of this application. The respondent therefore ought to have denied these specific allegations specifically or he ought to have specifically answered the points of substance. Having not so specifically denied these specific allegations in the supporting affidavit, the respondent is deemed to have admitted them.

In any case the respondent ought to have shown that he complained or in any way protested against the use of his name and the description of him as the Moshie chief or Moshiehene in exhibits 1B111C, 1B111D and 1B111E attached to the supporting and supplementary affidavits. The corrective affidavit filed by the respondent has also not specifically denied these specific acts of breach of the orders of the High Court. The overall effect of all this is that the specific acts of breach of the order of perpetual injunction imposed on the respondent by the judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996 stand unchallenged or not seriously challenged and are deemed therefore to be true. Besides, the deposition in paragraph (11) of the affidavit in opposition, in my view, shows the defiant attitude of the respondent and the contempt he has for the judgment of the High Court. Nowhere in his affidavit in opposition has the respondent deposed that he did anything to stop or restrain his so-called supporters from holding him out as the Moshiehene of Kumasi. He did not depose that he ever turned down those invitations.

The way and manner learned counsel for the respondent also attacked the judgment of the High Court in his submissions further enhances my view that the respondent never intended to respect and obey that judgment. In fact in his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent tried to show that the judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996 is useless, or worthless and that it is unenforceable. The short comment I wish to make about the submissions of learned counsel for the respondent is that his whole submission, in my view, is mere cosmetic dressing. Whether the judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996 is worthless or not is not for me to say because I am not sitting on appeal on that judgment. In any case, the review bench of the Supreme Court did not only in its ruling accept that judgement but it also confirmed it. The legal position therefore is that the

[p.554] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996 remains valid and effective for all intents and purposes. If the Supreme Court which is the highest and final court of the country has accepted and confirmed the judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996, it is not open to me to question that judgment.

It is true that both the High Court and the review bench of the Supreme Court in their respective judgments were unanimous that the headship of the Moshie community of Kumasi is not that of a chief properly so-called within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution, 1992 and the Chieftaincy Act, 1970 (Act 370). Despite this, in its judgment, the High Court, Kumasi granted the applicant’s reliefs endorsed on the writ of summons, namely that: (1) the applicant is the substantive Kumasi community head or Moshiehene; and (2) the High Court imposed an order of perpetual injunction on the respondent restraining him, his agents or servants from representing himself as the Kumasi Moshie community head or purporting to act as such and also restrained him from interfering in the applicant’s performance of his duties as the substantive Kumasi Moshie community head. It is interesting to note here that the respondent counterclaimed for the same reliefs at the High Court. A careful perusal of the judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996 shows that the judge used the words “Head of Kumasi Moshie community” and Moshiehene” interchangeably in his judgment. The word “Moshiehene” therefore simply means in the context of that judgment “head of the Moshie community in Kumasi.”

In any case, I am not being called upon by this application to interpret the judgment of the High Court or to sit on appeal on that judgment. My task simply is to determine whether the judgment made any specific order or orders capable of being enforced or executed. I am satisfied that the High Court in its judgment dated 31 July 1996 did make a specific order or perpetual injunction requiring the respondent not to do certain acts. In my view, that specific order of perpetual injunction is an executable or enforceable order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Disobedience to that specific order of perpetual injunction therefore, in my view, is tantamount to contempt of court provided that disobedience is proved to be wilful. The specific order of perpetual injunction imposed on the respondent requiring him to abstain from representing himself as the Moshiehene

[p.555] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 or the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi was unambiguous and was clearly understood by the respondent as well as the applicant. In any case, there is nothing in the affidavit in opposition and the corrective affidavit in opposition to show that the respondent did not understand that specific order of perpetual injunction. On the contrary, the entire affidavit evidence before me shows that the respondent fully understood and appreciated the full import and effect of the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi; hence he at first filed a notice of appeal against it which he subsequently abandoned and then applied to the Supreme Court to have it quashed.

Learned counsel for the respondent’s contention that the applicant knew from the inception of the case that he was fighting for nothing because he knew that the position of the leadership of the Moshie community is not that of a chief, does not impress me in any way. The gist of the writ of summons and the counterclaim which was an action in itself was that both the applicant and the respondent were fighting in court for one and a common thing, namely to be declared as the substantive head of the Moshie community in Kumasi though both of them believed and thought the proper label for that headship is “chief.” No doubt, it was for this reason and belief that the respondent applied to the ordinary bench of the Supreme Court to have the entire proceedings at the High Court quashed for the reason that the dispute was a chieftaincy matter and therefore under the Constitution, 1992 the High Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter. Both the High Court and the review bench of the Supreme Court rejected that belief and contention. Nevertheless, the High Court went ahead to declare the applicant as the head of the Moshie community (Moshiehene) of Kumasi. The review bench of the Supreme Court did not question the use of that word or phrase but rather accepted and confirmed that declaration made by the High Court. Therefore if after the judgment of the review bench of the Supreme Court, the applicant or the respondent or any Moshieman for that matter goes anywhere and describes himself as the “chief” of the Moshie community, instead of the head of the Moshie community or Moshiehene, that description will have no legal significance and effect because of the judgments of the High Court and the review bench of the Supreme Court, even though for practical purposes and a more dignified and public acceptance that person prefers to call himself as a chief to show a self-

[p.556] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 aggrandisement. For example, I know that amongst the Akans, when a man is able to beget ten or more children with one woman, for purposes of respect and to emphasise that respect, his family may choose to call him “Nana” meaning “chief” even though he is not a chief or a “Nana”, in the strictest sense of that word. What the applicant claimed at the High Court was for a declaration that he was the substantive head of the Moshie community in Kumasi and that was what he got. In my view, therefore, the case of MacGreggor v Clay and Carminadu (supra) cited by learned counsel for the respondent is not applicable in the circumstances of this instant case. For even though the applicant might not have been or is not a “chief” within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution, 1992 and Act 370 what he was fighting for and what he claimed in his writ of summons was the headship or Moshiehene of the Moshie community in Kumasi. The respondent knew that there is such a position amongst the Moshie community in Kumasi hence he also counterclaimed to be declared as such instead of the applicant.

To sum up my conclusion therefore, I find and hold that in its judgment dated 31 July 1996 the High Court, Kumasi made a specific and enforceable order of perpetual injunction requiring the respondent to henceforth abstain or refrain from representing himself or posing as Moshiehene of the Moshie community in Kumasi or as the head of the Moshie community in Kumasi. That was an order that was capable of being enforced or executed and which ought to have been obeyed by the respondent. On the affidavit evidence and the exhibits attached thereto, I am satisfied that the respondent disobeyed that specific order of the High Court which was accepted and confirmed by the review bench of the Supreme Court when he engaged in or allowed himself to be engaged in the acts specified in paragraphs (22)–(33) of the supporting affidavit filed on 10 October 2000 and in paragraphs (5)–(9) of the supplementary affidavits filed on 24 October 2000 that breached the order of perpetual injunction. I find and hold that the applicant has established beyond all reasonable doubt that the respondent conducted himself in a manner that amounted to a disobedience to the specific order of the High Court dated 31 July 1996. I further find and hold that the respondent wilfully disobeyed the order of perpetual injunction imposed on him by the judgment of the High Court dated 31 July 1996.

[p.557] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540

I hold therefore that the respondent committed contempt of court, and must therefore be attached for contempt. Accordingly, leave will be and is hereby granted to issue a writ of attachment against the respondent for contempt and is hereby attached for contempt. In short, I am satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the respondent is guilty of contempt. His conduct amounted to a wilful disobedience to the specific order of the High Court requiring him to abstain or refrain from representing himself or posing as head (or Moshiehene) of the Moshie community in Kumasi. The respondent has not been able to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt.

I now come to the question or sentencing. As I indicated already, the respondent has shown by his paragraph (11) or his affidavit in opposition that he has always looked on the judgment of the High Court, Kumasi dated 31 July 1996 and the ruling of the review bench of the Supreme Court with contempt. He does not therefore appear to be apologetic for his conduct after the delivery of the judgment and ruling. That behaviour is deplorable to say the least. It is now a matter of common and public notoriety that because of the contempt the respondent and his supporters have always shown to the judgment of the High Court and the ruling of the review bench of the Supreme Court, three of his supporters are now languishing in prison for murder. I think there is a need for peace and tranquility among the residents of Kumasi in general and amongst the Moshie community in Kumasi in particular. I think it will do a lot of good to the entire Moshie community in Kumasi if the respondent recognises and accepts the decision of the High Court dated 31 July 1996 and obeys it accordingly. One thing the respondent must note is that the injunction placed on him is a perpetual one so the more frequently he disobeys it the more frequently he will be cited for contempt. It is therefore better for him to let sleeping dogs lie and comport himself properly henceforth. I think therefore that a sentence that will serve as a deterrent and at the same time be lenient and liberal could operate as a warning to the respondent and his supporters that the law is supreme and that the law is no respecter of persons. The authority and dignity as well as the respect and reputation of the courts must be maintained. The decisions of the court should therefore be respected and obeyed no matter how bitter the result might be. It is my hope that the respondent will not commit any such offence again and that he and his supporters [p.558] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 540 will endeavour to accept the verdict of the High Court and the review bench of the Supreme Court in order that peace and unity may once again return to the Moshie community in Kumasi. In all the circumstances therefore I will sentence the respondent to three weeks’ (21 days) imprisonment with hard labour. He is also fined ¢5 million or in default serve another three months imprisonment with hard labour. He is given seven days within which to pay the fine. The applicant is awarded costs of ¢1 million. Application granted.

AD