IBRAHIM vs. AMALIBINI [1978] GLR 368
5 June 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 75 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 3Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Penin v. Duncan (1869) Sar.F.C.L.118.
(2) Asumah v. Khair [1959] G.L.R.353, C.A.
(3) Yaotey v. Quaye [1961] G.L.R. (Pt.II)573.
(4) Sackitey’s Caveat, Re [1962] 1 G.L.R. 180.
(5) Afrifa v. Class-Peter [1975] 1 G.L.R.359, C.A.
(6) R. v. Dima (Xavier), High Court, Tamale, 28 March 1938, unreported.
(7) Hollis’ Hospital Trustees and Hague’s Contract, Re [1899]2 Ch.540;68 L.J Ch.673;81 L.T.90;47 W.R.691; 43 S.J.644.
(8) Akrofi v. Akrofi [1965] G.L.R.13.
(9) De Francesco v. Barnum (1890)45 Ch.D.430; 60 L.J.Ch.63; 63 L.T. 438;39 W.R.5;6 T.L.R.463. (10) R. v. Brew (1878)1 Ren.34.
(11) Damptey (Kweku), In re; Kodieh v. Affram (1930)1 W.A.C.A.12.
(12) Wood v. Thompson (1909) Earn.15.
(13) Abangana v. Akologo [1977]1 G.L.R.382.
(14) Johnson v. Clark [1908]1 Ch.303; 77 L.J.Ch.127;98 L.T.129; 24 T.L.R. 156; 52 S.J.115. (15) Ginbuuro v. Kaba [1971] 2 G.L.R. 416.
(16) Republic v. Akosah [1975]2 G.L.R. 406.
(17) Gray v. Gray [1971]1 G.L.R.422.
(18) Beckley v. Beckley [1974]1 G.L.R.393.
(19) Braun v. Mallet [1975]1 G.L.R. 81.
(20) Nyarkoa v. Mansu [1967]G.L.R. 523.
(21) Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate Court; Ex parte Papafio, High Court, Accra, 13 February 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C.53.
(22) Southern Rhodesia, In re [1919] A.C.211, P.C.
(23) Ahima v. Kuma (1916) D.C.A.L.199.
(24) R. v. Nash (1883)10 Q.B.D.454; 52 L.J.B.Q. 442; 48 L.T.447; 31 W.R.420, C.A. (25) Barnardo v. McHugh [1891]A.C.388; 61 L.J.Q.B.721;65 L.T.423; 55 J. P.628; 40 W.R.97; 7 T.L.R.726, H.L.
(26) Humphrys v. Polak [1901]2 K.B.385; 70 L.J.K.B. 752; 85 L.T. 103;49 W.R. 612, C.A. (27) Angu v. Attah (1916) P.C. ‘74-’28, 43.
(28) Amissah v. Krabah (1936)2 W.A.C.A.30,P.C.
(29) Mate v. Amanor [1973]1 G.L.R.469.
(30) Yerenchi v. Akuffoo (1905)1 Ren. 362.
(31) Amoah v. Appau alias Amoah [1977]2 G.L.R.159.
(32) Tanor v. Koko (Akosua) [1974]1 G.L.R.451.
(33) Nkrumah v. Manu [1971]1 G.L.R. 176.
(34) B. (an infant), Re, English High Court, 27 July 1961, unreported.
(35) Adoption Application No.41/61, Re [1963] Ch. 315; [1962] 3 W.L.R.997; [1962]3 All E.R. 553;
126 J.P. 511; 106 S.J.649;60 L.G.R. 478, C.A.
(36) R. v. Soper (1793) 5 Term Rep. 278; 101 E.R.156.
(37) O. (an infant), Re [1965]Ch.23; [1964]2 W.L.R.840; [1964] 1 All E.R. 786; 108 S.J.117; 62 L.G.R.267, C.A.
(38) Republic v. Adomako; Ex parte Andoh [1978]1 G.L.R. 255.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of a district court granting custody of a child born out of wedlock to the putative father. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Mumuni Bawumia for the appellant.
R. I. Alhassan for the respondent.
[p.371] of [1978] GLR 368
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
This is an appeal involving the customary law of the Nankanse. As Captain Rattray points out at p.232 of his book on the Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, Vol. 1 the Nankanse are popularly known to Europeans as “`Frafra’ – from the supposed sound of the word which they use as salutation or in thanks, i.e. fura fura.” The plaintiff and the defendant at the court below are both “Frafras”.
The claim of the said plaintiff in the court below, now respondent herein, against the defendant who is the appellant before the court is endorsed on his writ of summons as follows:
“The plaintiff seeks judicial relief against the defendant for the return of his wife by name Alahiri Akataba who was given to the plaintiff for marriage by the defendant after he has performed marriage custom and has stayed with the said wife for two years five months and his child Dantini Atambiri aged one year three months whom the defendant is keeping despite repeated persuasion.”
The case, which the plaintiff put forward at the trial before the District Court Grade II at Tamale, was that in contemplation of marrying the niece of the defendant he gave the said defendant eight guinea-fowls, cola and tobacco towards the performance of the customary rites. The nature of the appropriate customary rites was not indicated in his evidence but he conceded in evidence that the customary rites were not completed although what was needed to complete them was equally not shown. His evidence was that the customary rites were not completed because the defendant said the parties should wait until a senior sister of the proposed bride got married. In spite of this he said the defendant nevertheless gave the lady in question, Alahiri Akataba, to him in marriage. The further evidence of the plaintiff is that they cohabited and a male child, Dantini Atambiri, was born to them. An uncle of the plaintiff who gave evidence said he registered the said birth and obtained a birth certificate which was tendered in evidence as exhibit A. In that birth certificate which was issued on 31 October 1975 ostensibly under the provisions of section 11 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1965 (Act 301), it is stated that a child Dantini Atambiri born at Tamale on 27 October 1975 is the male child of Atambiri Amalibi a national of Ghana and Alahiri Yabinga also a national of Ghana. I shall consider later in this judgment the significance and relevance of this certificate in these proceedings.
The case of the defendant is that the lady being claimed by the plaintiff as his wife became pregnant while attending school. He said she stopped school and came to put up with him and that while thus pregnant and living with him, she started apparently flirting with the plaintiff who then brought fowls to him and claimed to be responsible for the pregnancy. His evidence is that he told him that he was not responsible for the pregnancy and he asked him to go and see the lady’s father if he wanted to marry her. Apparently after the lady had delivered she continued to live with the plaintiff but the defendant’s evidence is that the plaintiff insulted [p.372] of [1978] GLR 368 him and as he had not performed the customary marriage rites he asked the lady, his niece, to leave the plaintiff and she left taking her child with her. The said lady gave evidence in which she supported the evidence of her uncle, the defendant, that she was pregnant before she met the plaintiff. She said also that the plaintiff took her to his hometown and left her there. She was shocked and decided to discontinue living with him. She said when she met the plaintiff she was three months pregnant and that the pregnancy was the result of her flirting with two boys and so she could not know which of the two boys made her pregnant. In evidence she gave her name as Laadi Akukula and it was never suggested to her that she is also called Alahiri Akataba.
On 24 October 1977 after the last witness for the defendant had given evidence at the district court grade II, the district magistrate grade II there and then gave a brief judgment as follows:
“From the evidence on record there are two important issues to be considered. First, is the claim of Alahiri Akataba, the supposed wife of the plaintiff, and the second issue is the claim of the child by name Dantini Atambiri. The success of the plaintiff in his claim for Alahiri Akataba, his supposed wife, depends on his ability in adducing sufficient evidence to establish the existence of effective customary marriage between Alahiri Akataba. This he failed to establish and even went to the extent of telling the court that he only performed part of the customary rites in relation to the marriage. This therefore shows that there has never been an effective customary marriage between the plaintiff and the daughter of the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff’s claim for Alahiri Akataba must fail. The second issue stems from the claim of the child. The inconsistencies in the evidence by the defendant and his second and third witnesses as to the date of pregnancy and the birth of the child tend to make it difficult if not impossible for me to believe the witnesses.
Further, the defendant’s second witness admitted in court that she was put in a family way by three men but was unable to mention their names in court. But she was able to admit one fact that it was the plaintiff who registered the child with the Registrar of Births and Deaths as exhibit A shows.
For the above reasons judgment is entered for the plaintiff in part for Dantini Atambiri to be handed over to the plaintiff with immediate effect. Costs of ¢20.00 awarded against the defendant.”
It is against this judgment that the defendant-appellant has appealed to this court on two grounds: (1) That the judgment is against the weight of evidence; and (2) That the plaintiff-respondent is not the father of the child claimed.
The jurisdiction of the district court grade II to entertain this suit can only be founded on a true construction of sections 37 (1) (f) and 38(1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). By virtue of section 37(1)(f) the district court grade II has jurisdiction: “in divorce and other matrimonial
[p.373] of [1978] GLR 368 causes or matters and actions for paternity and custody of children where the law applicable is exclusively customary law.”
The claim of the plaintiff is twofold. The mother of Dantini Atambiri is his wife; she had been persuaded by the defendant to leave him and he wants a court order compelling the defendant to return his wife to him. Secondly, the child Dantini Atambiri is his child by his alleged wife and so he wants the custody of the said child. The defendant maintains and the alleged wife supports him that no marriage took place and so the mother of the child is not his wife. Further the defendant supported by the mother of the child denies his claim of paternity and resists his claim to custody.
In the district court grade II, the fact that no marriage under customary law took place was overwhelmingly established by the evidence of the defendant and supported by evidence from the plaintiff’s own witness and so the magistrate held that the claim for the return of the alleged wife failed. The language of the judgment however founds the ratio decidendi on the failure of the plaintiff to establish the marriage. The inference inevitable from a reading of the judgment is that if the marriage had indeed been established the court would have been obliged to grant the relief claimed and would have ordered the return of the wife; in other words, the district magistrate would have made an order compelling the girl to continue cohabitation against her will.
In this appeal the plaintiff although he is not the appellant would seem to maintain that he did establish some marriage of a sort and the woman is therefore his wife. In any case, he said he is the person responsible for the pregnancy and thus he is entitled to the wife and the child. Arguments were advanced as to the essential characteristics of Frafra marriage according to custom; no authorities were cited in support of the custom, but since the plaintiff’s own witness concedes and agrees with the defendant that the marriage custom was not performed, I do not think it is necessary really in this particular appeal to canvass the essentials of a valid marriage under Frafra customary law in order to show that the respondent is or is not married under the said custom. In any case, it would seem that the evidence led shows that the consent of the bride’s family was also not obtained.
Be that as it may, it is the jurisdiction to make an order returning the wife to the husband which has given me much concern. If I deal, as I intend to, with the essentials of the custom, it will be merely for the sake of finding out whether it tolerates the making of such order although since the plaintiff, in spite of the evidence of his own witness, continues to insist that he is married it will also serve a marginal purpose of sustaining or repudiating his claim.
I have a number of civil appeals pending before me in which orders of this type have indeed been made by the district court grade II and it seems to me that the rationale behind the orders, their customary law foundation and their validity in our present legal system need to be examined.
[p.374] of [1978] GLR 368
The second claim of the plaintiff succeeded because the district magistrate held that he was the natural father of the child and was therefore in effect entitled to be given custody as against the mother and her family. In so arriving at this conclusion the magistrate was influenced by two matters, the first is the conflict in the evidence of the defendant’s second witness, the alleged wife, and his third witness as to the date of the pregnancy. I think this first matter is irrelevant because the evidence of the defendant’s third witness on the matter is hearsay and if it conflicts with that of the defendant’s second witness, the evidence of the defendant’s second witness prevails. The second matter is the magistrate’s view that the alleged wife “the defendant’s second witness was able to admit one fact that it was the plaintiff who registered the child with the Registrar of Births and Deaths as exhibit A shows.”
The first objection to this line of reasoning is that it completely misconceives the evidence and misreads the record. In the first place it was not the plaintiff Atambiri Amalibini who registered the birth. In his evidence the plaintiff said nothing about the registration of the child. Secondly, it was in fact as the record shows Maligbin Frafra, an uncle of the plaintiff, who said he registered the birth. Besides, the alleged wife the defendant’s second witness did not make any admission whatsoever in regard to exhibit A. She said she knew nothing about exhibit A and had never seen it before. It is noteworthy that the certificate exhibit A gave the names of the parents of the child registered as Atambiri Amalibi and Alahiri Yabinga. The plaintiff’s name is Atambiri Amalibini and the name of the alleged wife as he gave it is Alabiri Akataba and as the lady herself gave it is Laadi Akukula. The certificate therefore does not contain the names of the plaintiff and the alleged wife. It is therefore not indicated on the face of the certificate whether it is the birth of the child claimed which was being registered. What the certificate purports to register is the birth of a child called Dantini Atambiri, a male child, the parents of whom are one Atambiri Amalibi and Alahiri Yabinga. Atambiri Amalibi and Alahiri Yabinga have not been identified and the certificate is therefore not a document supporting the claim of the plaintiff.
The legal effect of the certificate can be gauged by considering the provisions of section 34 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1965 (Act 301), which provides as follows:
“34. Every certificate purporting to be issued under this Act shall be admissible in any court as prima facie evidence of the facts certified to be recorded, and every certified copy purporting to be issued under this Act shall be so admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts recorded therein; and it shall not be necessary to prove the signature or official position of the person by whom the certificate or certified copy purports to be signed.”
Since no evidence was led to explain or connect Atambiri Amalibi with the plaintiff or Alahiri Yabinga with Laadi Akukula it seems the certificate
[p.375] of [1978] GLR 368 must be taken as not corroborative of the case of the plaintiff. Furthermore the evidence on behalf of the defendant, and this was not challenged, is that when the plaintiff approached the family of the girl in order to marry her while she was pregnant, he was told in unmistakable terms that “the pregnancy was not for him.”
In view of this it seems to me that for the birth certificate to be valid the registration needed to have the support of the mother. This is provided for in section 9 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1965 (Act 301), which is as follows:
“9. Where the paternity of any child is in doubt – (a) no person shall as the putative father of the child be required to give information concerning the birth of the child; and (b) the Registrar shall not enter the name of any person as father of the child except at the joint request of the mother and the person acknowledging himself to be the father of the child, and that person shall in that case sign the register together with the mother:
Provided that if the mother should be dead the entry in the register may be made on the request of the person acknowledging himself to be the father.”
Obviously in a case like this where the paternity of the child is in doubt and is in dispute, it is against the clear provisions of section 9 of Act 301 for the alleged putative father alone to register or clandestinely cause someone to effect the registration of the child without the knowledge of the mother. It seems to me that it was never established on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff is the father of the child particularly in view of the evidence of the mother which was not challenged in cross-examination that she met the plaintiff when she was already pregnant through her indiscretion with two boys.
Assuming, however, that I am wrong in the view I have taken of the evidence and that the plaintiff’s insistence that he was in fact the person responsible for the pregnancy that resulted in the birth is well founded, this will mean on the said evidence of the plaintiff that the child is indeed his natural child conceived and brought forth outside marriage. Who is entitled to the custody of such a child under customary law? Is it the mother and her family or the putative father? Once again I have so many cases on appeal before this court in which this issue calls for determination. I intend therefore in this judgment to examine the customary law position in the context of our present legal system, but before that I propose to deal with the first issue, namely, whether in a customary law marriage if the wife were to leave the husband with or without the persuasion of any person, the husband is entitled as a matter of law in a case where the marriage is still subsisting to obtain a court order for the return of his wife.
[p.376] of [1978] GLR 368
The parties in this case are all Frafras. Captain R.S. Rattray in his invaluable book, The Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, Vol.1 at pp.139-157, 177-179 and 278-287 has given in some considerable detail the marriage custom of the Frafras. The Reverend Father J. Awiah in his short monograph in the Tamale Regional Library entitled Tongo Festivals, Dances and Marriage Customs also has given a very useful description of the said customs. The most detailed and exhaustive exposition however was made by Dr. M. Fortes in his Memorandum on Marriage Law among the Tallensi, an original copy of which is at the Regional Archives, Tamale. In the original memorandum Dr. Fortes has substituted Tallensi for Frafra and his work covers the three tribes, namely, the Tallensi, Nankanse and Namnam which occupy the Zuarungu area of Northern Ghana and probably because Frafra is really a nick-name for the Nankanse as I have already pointed out. A very careful study of the customs as is revealed by the researches of Captain Rattray, the Reverend Awiah and Dr. Fortes does demonstrate that substantially the essentials of a valid marriage under Frafra customary law are:
(1) The agreement of the parties to live together as man and wife.
(2) Consent of the families of the parties to the marriage.
(3) The performance of the essential part of the customary rites. According to Rattray, among the Frafras the said customary rite is known as the “sandono” ceremony (lu lokala sandono) what the Reverend Awiah called “tindaan luor” and Dr. Fortes called “lu sendaan.”
(4) Consummation by cohabitation.
The plaintiff did not comply with requirements (2) and (3) and his witness was therefore right in agreeing with the defendant that the marriage custom was not completed.
There is also the question of bride price (sulle) but this is not essential to validate the marriage. The non-payment of the bride price means curiously that although the children are the legitimate children of the husband yet on the break-up of the marriage he may not be able to obtain legal custody until he pays at least part of the bride price. I shall have occasion to discuss this matter again when I consider later the question of custody of the child as is dealt with by Dr. M. Fortes. These essential characteristics are not peculiar to the Nankanse who as I have already said are popularly known to Europeans and other Ghanaians as Frafra. Southern Ghana cases spanning a period of over 100 years like Penin v. Duncan (1869) Sar.F.C.L.118; Asumah v. Khair [1959] G.L.R. 353, C.A.; Yaotey v. Quaye [1961] G.L.R. (Pt.II) 573; Re Sackitey’s Caveat [1962] 1 G.L.R.180 And Afrifa v. Class-Peter [1975]1 G.L.R.359, C.A. show that the marriage custom is in essential details the same all over Ghana and indeed as J.N.D. Anderson in the book edited by him on Family Law in Asia and Africa at pp. 16-19 shows, these essential features would seem to be generally a recurring customary marriage requirement in almost all of Africa.
[p.377] of [1978] GLR 368
As can be seen, one of the basic characteristics of Frafra marriage at least in cases not involving child brides as practised by the Konkombas of Northern Ghana, is the consent of the bride. Contrary to what is often thought by foreigners to be the case there are no recorded modern cases of forced marriages among the Frafras whatever the practice may have been in the remote past. There is a very good reason for this as will appear later in this judgment.
In this respect it is instructive to examine the Colonial Government’s study and appraisal of forced marriages among, inter alia, the Frafras in curious circumstances which have been fortunately preserved in the Regional Archives at Tamale.
In 1936 a girl named Kekwe in Tanganyika was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment for the manslaughter of a man alleged to have been chosen by her parents to marry her against her will. As a result of this case questions were directed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, The Right Honourable W. Ormsby Gore in the House of Commons by Miss Rathbone M.P. on 22 July 1936. The questions were calculated to cause him to take in the questioner’s words: “steps to prevent the forced marriages of African girls.” In answer to the question the Secretary of State said inter alia and this was in 1936 that: “In most African tribes the old idea of coercion is completely eradicated.” However in view of the importance of the problem and the public outrage aroused by a letter in the Manchester Guardian of 22 July 1936 from the Archdeacon W.E. Owen of Kavirando in East Africa, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a despatch No.656 to the then Gold Coast Colonial Government. The despatch is as follows:
“Downing Street 17 August, 1936.
GOLD COAST NO. 656 Sir, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a question recently addressed to me in the House of Commons by Miss Rathbone, M.P., concerning action which, she suggests, should be taken by the Government of the British Dependencies in Africa with the object of preventing the forced marriage of African girls. A copy of the reply which I returned to her question is also enclosed. I realise that it would be rash to generalise on a question of this kind; that conditions may well vary widely between tribes in a single Dependency, and that the extent and evil of the pressure which may be exercised on African girls to marry against their will are capable of exaggeration. At the same time, I should be obliged if you would be good enough to forward such information as is possible on the following points:
[p.378] of [1978] GLR 368
(a) Whether cases of real coercion (involving perhaps some physical coercion) are considered to be at all frequent:
(b) Whether in cases of attempted coercion, women are free to bring such cases to the notice of the District Officer or to other appropriate authorities, and whether, in point of fact, such a right is freely exercised:
(c) What action is normally taken in the event of such complaints being received:
(d) Whether you are satisfied that the present practice is sufficient to prevent serious abuse; and (e) Whether, if the answer to (d) is in the negative, you consider that other measures (e.g. the compulsory registration of marriages, by a tribal or other authority) would be desirable and practicable . . .
I have, the honour to be . . .
(Sgd) W. ORMSBY GORE.”
A copy of the Secretary of State’s letter was forwarded to the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories on 22 September 1936 and he in turn on 2 October 1936 forwarded a copy of the despatch to his political officers in the Northern Region, namely, all the district commissioners and assistant district commissioners in the Northern Territories. The letter Ref. No. 3003/14/1931 reads as follows:
“NO. 3003/14/1931 CHIEF COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, TAMALE – N.T.
2ND OCTOBER, 1936.
I have the honour to forward, herewith, a copy of a despatch from the Secretary of State on the subject of the prevention of forced marriages of African girls and to ask that you will submit a report on the situation in so far as * is concerned and let me have your views as to the measures suggested for the prevention of forced marriages, assuming that they occur.
2. Please let me have an early reply.
(Sgd.) W.J.A. JONES Chief Commissioner THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS, MAMPRUSI DAGOMBA AND GONJA AND ASST. D.C. TAMALE AND NAVRONGO.”
It is not necessary to study the individual replies from the said officers. The Chief Commissioner on receiving all the replies correlated them and sent one composite reply which was forwarded to the Secretary of State. It is as follows:
[p.379] of [1978] GLR 368
“C.S. NO.287 CHIEF COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE NO.3225/14/1931 TAMALE.
21 October, 1936.
Sir, With reference to my letter No.3003/14/1931 C.S.273 dated the 2nd October, 1936, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the observations by the District Commissioners, Mamprusi, Dagomba and Gonja and the Assistant District Commissioner Navrongo on the Secretary of States despatch No.656 of the 17th August, 1936, on the question of forced marriages of African girls. Their replies hold good in regard to other parts of the Protectorate and the Mandated Territory and may be summarised as follows:
2 Whatever may be the state of affairs in Kenya — and I have no right to impugn Archdeacon Owen’s veracity — it can truthfully be said of the women in this Administration that they now enjoy only slightly less freedom of choice with regard to their husbands than that to which their sisters in more civilized countries are entitled. And I personally question whether at any time coercion was as flagrant here as apparently it is in Kenya and productive of such tragic results as those described by Archdeacon Owen. The social system evolved among the tribes in the Protectorate has as its main object their preservation and expansion and this widespread coercion, using the word in its strongest sense, would definitely have prevented. In the opinion of Dr. Fortes, who has made a close study of the Tallense, native society would rebel against the existing system of marriage were it harmful in its results.
3 From the replies of the Commissioners it will be seen that marriages are sometimes arranged by the parents of girls, but that if they prove unsatisfactory to them there are means available for their annulment to which the girls are not slow to resort. Coercion, amounting to permanent bondage, is not attempted except by the Konkomba. This answers the Secretary of State’s first question.
4 The reply to the second question is in the affirmative. The people, including women, are fully aware of their right to present their grievances to the District Officers and generally speaking they do not hesitate to exercise this right. In support of this contention I would mention that of the twenty-five appeals made against the decisions of the native Courts no fewer than twenty-one occurred in the Mamprusi District where the people are less advanced and therefore might be thought to be more ignorant of their right of approach to the District Officers than the inhabitants of other parts.
[p.380] of [1978] GLR 368
5 If a woman seeks to have her marriage dissolved, it is almost certain that she is contemplating another. In that event the new husband would be called upon to compensate the former husband, which he is generally given ample time to do. In the opinion of some officers the native law on divorce is too lax and operates to the advantage of the woman rather than that of the man.
6 I consider that the present practice is sufficient to prevent serious abuses and question (e) does not, therefore arise. I propose, however, to ascertain from the native authorities their opinion as to the advantages, if any, to be derived from the registration of marriages. Such registration might assist to prevent disputes as to the amount of the dowry paid to be refunded.
I have the honour to be Sir, Your obedient servant.
(Sgd.) W.J.A. JONES Chief Commissioner THE HONOURABLE, THE COLONIAL SECRETARY, VICTORIABORG, ACCRA.”
It is clear therefore that as far as text writers and the research of political officers are concerned the consent or agreement of the bride is an essential feature of a Frafra marriage. Turning now to the courts, in the unreported case of R. v. Xavier Dima, a bigamy case decided here in Tamale by Woolhouse Bannerman J. on 28 March 1938, a record of which is at the Regional Archives at Tamale, Chief Awogza, the Bolga Naba, Chief of Bolga who was the chief of the Frafras gave evidence which was accepted by the High Court as to the requirements of a valid Frafra customary law marriage. He said:
“I am the chief of Bolga. I know the custom which appertains to valid native marriage. The custom is a follows: Before a young man contracts a marriage with a young woman, the two of them will meet and come to an understanding. The young man will then take the young woman to his house. The young man’s father will then go and see the girl’s father and ask her hand for the son. He would take along with him one ball tobacco, one guinea fowl and one fowl. People would accompany the young man’s father. The girl’s father will then give his consent and name the dowry. The dowry consist of 4 cows. This then fulfils the contract. If the 4 cows are not produced the marriage is not perfect.”
In my view Frafra customary law does not favour or permit forced marriages or the continuation of marriages by force. Assuming that I am wrong and Frafra customary law does permit forced cohabitation, in my
[p.381] of [1978] GLR 368 respectful opinion a custom that a particular wife who no more wants to cohabit with her husband must nevertheless be compelled to do so violates demonstrably fundamental concepts of our law and cannot exist in the legal system.
The whole corpus of our law under the benign influence of progressive trends has undergone tremendous changes. Statutes have been passed and constitutional provisions have been promulgated which have given new dimensions and irreversible directions to the course of our social and legal development. The old principles of our customary practices cannot remain unaffected by the fundamental tenor of these winds of change. As Byrne J. said In re the Trustees of Hollis’ Hospital and Hague’s Contract [1899]2 Ch. 540 at p.552; “New statutes and the course of social development give rise to new aspects and conditions which have to be regarded in applying the old principles.” In the light of this, how can an order compelling a wife to cohabit and thus, inter alia, have sexual intercourse with her husband against her will be reconciled with the modern coercive apparatus of the criminal law against rape and our gradual achievement within the global movement of women’s liberation. Must our courts now aid and abet the ravishing of our women! The order is so outrageously discriminatory merely on grounds of sex that I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by Sowah J., as he then was, in Akrofi v. Akrofi [1965] G.L.R. 13 at p.16, where he said:
“I am of the view that if there be such a custom … whereby a person is discriminated against solely upon the ground of sex that custom has out-lived its usefulness and is at present not in conformity with public policy.”
The custom, as I understand it, is that it is the wife only who can be so judicially compelled and not the husband. The remedy of compulsorily returning to a spouse is not mutual. This unequal treatment must also be considered together with the general principles at the foundation of the machinery of the modern court for enforcing obedience to its orders, particularly in its equity jurisdiction. It creates so many problems in the legal system! How is obedience to be enforced? Will the sanction for disobedience be imprisonment or a fine? And will the courts of this land which have inherited the equity jurisdiction which frowns on specific performance of contracts of personal service lacking mutuality now assume jurisdiction to order specific performance of cohabitation in the intensely private and personal domain of matrimonial relationship? How can the order be supervised if ever controversy arises as to whether it is or is not being carried out by the unfortunate wife?
Speaking of contracts of service Fry L.J. said in De Francesco v. Barnum (1890) 45 Ch.D.430 at p.438 that “the Courts are bound to be jealous, lest they should turn contracts of service into contracts of slavery.” I am afraid I see in this kind of order the spectre of a new species of slavery made incongruous by the consistent repudiation by our courts as a matter of principle of slavery and everything that savours of slavery ever
[p.382] of [1978] GLR 368 since slavery was abolished in this country in 1874: see R. v. Brew (1878) 1 Ren.34; In re Kweku Damptey; Kodieh v. Affram (1930)1 W.A.C.A. 12. In Wood v. Thompson (1909) Earn. 15 at p.17, Earnshaw J. said:
“Any native law or custom depending on slavery . . . must at once be regarded with suspicion; and if . . .
`repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience’ . . . then this Court is not compelled, and indeed ought not, to enforce it.”
In Abangana v. Akologo [1977]1 G.L.R.382 at p. 387 Edward Wiredu J. faced with a similar situation said of the kind of order we are dealing with:
“The principle of the law relevant here as I understand it is that equity does nothing in vain. If therefore the trial court found as a fact that there was no love between the plaintiff and his wife . . . then its order asking the woman to go back to the plaintiff was, with respect, wrong and cannot be sustained on appeal.”
I think the ratio decidendi, though apt and adequate to do justice in the case it actually dealt with, is in my respectful opinion rather too narrow. It suggests probably inadvertently that there may very well be situations not covered by the case in hand where this type of order can be sustained on appeal. Although sweeping assertions or generalisations ought as a general proposition to be avoided in deciding cases, in the instant case I am willing to make an exception and to take the risk: In my humble opinion love or no love as long as the lady is unwilling to cohabit, I cannot, speaking for myself, see any conceivable situation under which the court can assume jurisdiction to make this sort of menacing order on an unwilling spouse. It strikes at the root of our modern notions of legality as I have shown above and violates the spirit even of the surviving provisions of our suspended Constitution. In Johnson v. Clark [1908] 1 Ch. 303, Parker J. at p.311 said:
“a custom to be valid must be such that, in the opinion of a trained lawyer, it is consistent, or, at any rate, not inconsistent, with those general principles which, quite apart from particular rules or maxims, lie at the root of our legal system.”
A general principle of our legal system is that an order for restitution in specie as this order is, is only associated with chattels and other things sui generis capable of being owned. It is significant that the order is not to be directed at the woman as a rational being. Indeed she is not a party to the proceedings and one of the parties therefore is by the order to obtain possession of the woman and then hand her over like a chattel to the person who covets possessing her body against her wishes. As Koranteng-Addow J. said of a similar order made by the district court grade II in Ginbuuro v. Kaba [1971]2 G.L.R.416 at p.420, “The order made for the return of the wife . . . would seem to be blind to the fact that the wife is not a mere chattel but a human being with rights equal to those of the
[p.383] of [1978] GLR 368 husband.” When human beings are being detained against their will, the proper machinery is habeas corpus and the remedy is to set them free. The district courts have no jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and a jurisdiction to order the return of a woman is in effect treating the woman as a chattel. It degrades the status of women and detracts from their dignity and worth as human beings in direct contradiction of the fundamentally specific provision of article 17(1) (b) of the Constitution 1969, a provision which in my view is a rule of law which survived the suspension of the said Constitution after the revolutionary events of 13 January 1972: see my opinion in Republic v. Akosah [1975]2 G.L.R. 406 at p.408. The article provides:
“No person shall be subjected to . . .
(b) any other condition that detracts or is likely to detract from his dignity and worth as a human being.”
I have discussed this matter at considerable length because as I said earlier many of the grade II district courts have assumed jurisdiction to make those orders. And as I have been at pains to show in this judgment, there is in fact no jurisdiction at all to make the said orders and so the decision of the magistrate not to make the order is right but not for the reason he gave. The true reason in my view is that there is no jurisdiction whether the marriage was subsisting or not to make the order.
I cannot pretend that actions have not been commenced before our native tribunals in which rulings or so-called orders for the return of a married woman to her customary husband have not been made by the local courts and the native tribunals before then as they continue to be made by our district courts: see Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) p.53. These so-called orders are and have been of course in my opinion as I hope to show presently null and void, but it is necessary to understand the reason for, and the background to these so-called orders.
The customary laws of practically all the tribes in Ghana frown on divorce and take a stand that everything must be done if possible to preserve the union. The result is that any divorce case whether before the members of the families or the tribal tribunal is seen as an arbitration in which reconciliation pervades all the proceeding. N.A. Ollennu in an article “The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana” in (1971)15 J.A.L. 155 puts the matter admirably when he said:
“Ghana customary law does not look favourably upon dissolution of marriage. Since the marriage establishes a permanent relationship between the families of the parties to it, the success or failure of the marriage is the concern of the two families as it is the concern of the parties themselves. The elders of the two families, both by separate and combined efforts, do all in their power to reconcile the parties in the case of misunderstanding or dispute. It is only in cases where all efforts at reconciliation break down, or else in very exceptional circumstances, i.e., where dissolution is the only measure which may
[p.384] of [1978] GLR 368 preserve harmony and ensure happy family relationship that divorce is resorted to.
Following from that attitude of the customary law to divorce is the general principle that divorce under customary law should always be preceded by efforts at reconciliation.”
In this passage lies the answer to these so-called orders. The so-called orders are no orders at all. They are merely advisory opinions, consistent with the practice of the elders in arbitral proceedings whereby they urge that the woman ought to return to her husband and try to make the marriage work. The newly created colonial native tribunals in attempting to give expression to this ancient practice of the elders misdescribed it as “order.” It is in a sense of malapropism. That they are no orders is made clear by the fact that if the woman refuses to return it is well-known by all concerned that there will be no sanction against her to compel her to return and at a subsequent hearing after a reasonable lapse of time the court will no doubt take the view that in the circumstance the marriage has completely broken down beyond reconciliation or salvage and grant divorce. That this is the true position can be gleaned from the “Report on Marriage by Native Custom amongst the Kassena-Nankani and Builsa Tribes” which the Assistant District Commissioner of Navrongo whose jurisdiction at the relevant time covered the Frafra area sent to the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories Mr. W.J.A. Jones on 13 October 1936 in reply to his letter of 2 October 1936 and I only set down the relevant paragraphs:
“REPORT ON MARRIAGE BY NATIVE CUSTOM AMONGST THE KASSENA-NANKANI AND BUILSA TRIBES Girls are usually given in marriage by their fathers but sometimes a girl is taken by her sister to help in the house of the latter’s husband, she may then, when of marriageable age, be given to the husband in marriage by her sister. The difference between the two methods is that in the latter case no dowry need be paid but the husband has no claim on the girl if she chooses to leave him at any time …
5. In my opinion the divorce laws are almost too lax and it is questionable whether they are sufficiently strong to preserve the bonds of family life.
6. The usual order of the Native Courts in an action brought by a man for the recovery of his wife who has been taken by another is that the woman should be returned to the husband. Frequently no notice is taken of this order or else the woman will return to the husband for a few days and will then desert him again for the lover. The Court will then try again by a similar order to induce the woman, who may have small children by her rightful husband, to return to him. If the Court fails again it will make an order for the dowry to be repaid to the husband. When this is done the lover has the right to
[p.385] of [1978] GLR 368 marry the woman, this he will always do. The divorce is then complete and the woman marries the man of her choice. She may tire of him also and she will then get a second divorce in the same way or even a third. Such situations frequently occur and it would not be too much to say that more than 50 per cent of the women of these tribes have had at least two husbands in their lifetimes.
7. From this it will be seen that the Native Courts and, before they were instituted, the family heads endeavour to preserve the bonds of family life but where a woman insists upon divorce nothing can prevent her getting it.
8. No case of actual coercion to force a girl to marry against her will has ever come to my notice. Had there been such cases complaints would undoubtedly have been brought to the Commissioner…”
(Sgd.) …………………..
Asst. District Commissioner NAVRONGO, N.T.S.
13 October, 1936.”
The rational behind the advisory opinion is thus vividly portrayed by this letter and it shows that under native customary law, as Ollennu rightly points out in the passage to which I have already made reference, divorce is only resorted to when the marriage has irretrievably broken down beyond salvage. This has been the customary law position with regard to practically all our ancient native states from time immemorial and it continues to be the position even now. It is only recently in 1971 that the British apparently copied and adopted our system of decreeing divorce when the marriage has irretrievably broken down.
It is obvious therefore that this ancient advisory device forged by the jurisprudence of our traditional laws in a worthy effort calculated to preserve our customary marriage was transposed into the modern judicial system which followed the pacification of our native states by the British. That device it would seem had no counterpart in the nomenclature of the coercive tribunals which emerged, used as these tribunals were to “orders.” The attempt to contain the ancient measure in the pigeon hole of what was thought to be the remedial process of the new legal system has resulted in the dichotomy of daubing the “advisory opinion” as “order” with all the consequences which order entails. The result has been that instead of advising the spouses in the spirit of section 67 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), in order to promote reconciliation, the district courts by their so-called orders have been exacerbating the disputes of spouses but as Shakespeare puts it a rose by any other name will smell as sweet and I should think an advisory opinion by any other name will still be an advisory opinion. As I have been at pains to show in this judgment the power to make “orders” in the sense in which “orders” are known to our present law, decreeing that a married woman must return or be returned to her husband is non-existent and it is unlawful for any
[p.386] of [1978] GLR 368 district court to make such an order. It is in conflict with, and violates the wife’s customary right to desert her husband when necessary. If the district court decides to be faithful to the reconciliatory remedial process of our traditional jurisprudence and wishes therefore to have recourse to the ancient technique of the advisory opinion that the wife should return to the husband it can do so by praying in aid the provision of section 67 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which provides as follows:
“67. (1). Any Court having jurisdiction in a civil case, and its officers, shall as far as there is proper opportunity, promote reconciliation among persons over whom the Court has jurisdiction, and encourage and facilitate the settlement in an amicable way without recourse to litigation, of matters in difference between them.
(2) When a civil suit or proceeding is pending, any Court having jurisdiction in that suit may promote reconciliation among the parties thereto and encourage and facilitate the amicable settlement thereof.”
I now turn to the second question raised in this appeal, namely, the order of the district court grade II by which it was decreed that the child be handed over to the putative father. In so ordering the district magistrate grade II took the view that although the putative father was not married to the mother of the child he was the person who actually fathered the child. Of course I have held that the admissible evidence adduced by the putative father, the respondent in these proceedings, to establish that he fathered the child is on a balance of probability unsatisfactory and the evidence of the defendant-appellant supported as it is by the evidence of the mother of the child shows on the contrary that he is not the father of the child. With this holding it seems to me that the basic foundation of the order of the district court grade II disappears and the order cannot stand unless it can be supported on other grounds. I cannot see on what possible ground the order can be supported since it will in effect be like permitting a complete stranger to deprive a mother and her family of the custody of their child. The customary law does not sanction that.
Assuming however that I am wrong in the view I take of the evidence and that the respondent is indeed the genital father of the child conceived outside customary marriage. His fatherhood must be considered together with the unchallenged evidence that the mother is not and has not been married to him even now and that the mother and her family refused and still refuse to acknowledge him as the father of the child or as having any relationship with their family. In such circumstances It is necessary to consider specifically and with some depth what the status of the child is under customary law vis-a-vis the putative or genital father and the consequential position of such a father with regard to custody. Having thus determined the said position of the said father the further question will arise as to whether there is any rule of positive law or public policy which will make inapplicable the rule of customary law involved.
I have adverted my attention to this aspect of the problem because in Abangana v. Akologo [1977] 1 G.L.R. 382 at pp. 387-388 which was strongly pressed on me by counsel for the respondent, Edward Wiredu J.
[p.387] of [1978] GLR 368 found himself unable to give effect to a Frafra custom somewhat similar to the one which has arisen in this case on ground that it is repugnant to equity, good conscience and natural justice.
In that case also involving the custody of a child, a man had had an adulterous association with a married woman and had had the child by the said woman. Under Frafra customary law, a well-known law which all authorities I have come across have noted, the right to the custody of such child and indeed the legal father of the child is conclusively presumed to be the husband and the adulterer is given no rights whatsoever. The district court grade II, having regard to the custom, gave judgment for the plaintiff, the husband. Edward Wiredu J. accepted the custom as established but he nevertheless reversed the decision and gave judgment for the adulterer and in effect repudiated the custom. In the course of his judgment at p. 386 he said quite categorically:
“the question as to the existence or content of any rule of customary law is one of law, the court becomes the final arbiter and is not bound to follow the expert opinion if in the court’s considered view, the particular custom is unreasonable, obsolete or is repugnant to principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice, or is contrary to decisions of superior courts or not in step with modern notions.”
Quoting as authorities the case of Gray v. Gray [1971]1 G.L.R. 422; Beckley v. Beckley [1974]1 G.L.R. 393 and Braun v. Mallet [1975]1 G.L.R. 81, he said further at pp. 387-388:
“The sole question to resolve in this appeal is whether a custom which deprives a person of his or her natural child is repugnant to principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice as to be rejected …
The order that the defendant should hand over his two children to the plaintiff, a stranger to the union that brought them into being, solely on the basis of a customary rule of practice is not only repugnant to principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice but also contrary to the accepted principle which our courts have accepted as paramount in considering granting custody of infants, namely, the welfare of the children.”
I wish merely to note without meaning any disrespect whatsoever that the specific principles of equity, natural justice and good conscience which persuaded my learned brother were not expostulated or even indicated. I would have thought with the greatest respect that the equitable maxim that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands will rather be a bar to the claim of the defendant in that case. I cannot, speaking for myself, imagine the defendant in the Abangana case going to a court of equity and saying with any semblance of good conscience: “I had sexual intercourse with a married woman, she has delivered, give me the custody of the child, the product of my adultery.” So outrageous a demand can hardly be made to a court of equity. Indeed I think the demand will
[p.388] of [1978] GLR 368 rather be against equity and good conscience; and as for natural justice, its principles like the principles of equity have now been long established and circumscribed: but unfortunately as I have pointed out the precise rule of natural justice breached was also not shown.
I doubt however whether the Abangana case was fully argued before Edward Wiredu J. Apart from the fact that Nyarkoa v. Mansu [1967] G.L.R. 523 was not cited, the very relevant case of Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate Court; Ex parte Papafio decided by Archer J.(as he then was) at the High Court, Accra, on 13 February 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C.53 was also not considered. That case related to Grunshie custom which is the same as the Frafra custom in this case and Archer J. with characteristic depth said:
“The question [in this case] is whether according to Grunshie custom, an adulterer is entitled to institute proceedings to claim the child of the adulterous union. I must confess that I have no knowledge on this point.
What I know is that in Akan custom an adulterer is likened unto a thief and he is not allowed to take away the child of the adulterous union. See Dr. Danquah’s Cases on Akan Customary Law. In civilised countries, any child born in lawful wedlock is presumed to be the legitimate child of the union until one party raises the matter in matrimonial proceedings. Party in this sense means either the husband, the wife or the party cited.
But I have yet to come across a case where there are no matrimonial proceedings yet an adulterer has mustered all the courage in him with his eyes totally shut to his scandalous sin and has instituted an action in a court of law claiming the child of a marriage still in subsistence where both spouses acknowledge the child to be that of the marriage.
Such an action by an adulterer is no doubt contrary to public morality and decency but I would venture to suggest that if the categories of public policy are not yet closed, such an action is clearly contrary to public policy that unashamed adulterers should be permitted by the courts to demonstrate without any sense of compunction their acts of immorality although the spouses have reconciled and have decided to forgive each other.
Ghana is a civilised country and I do not think that although the Courts Decree has conferred jurisdiction on district courts grade I in paternity suits, it was the intention of the Decree to encourage adulterers to institute proceedings to embarrass spouses. Such a jurisdiction was never contemplated and could never have been intended.
In the name of decency, public morality and public policy, I hold that the district court grade I had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.”
It is extremely doubtful whether the Abangana case would have been decided the way it was if the judge had had the benefit of this decision.
[p.389] of [1978] GLR 368
In my opinion having regard to the public policy aspect referred to by Archer J. (as he then was) in the Ex parte Papafio case, it would have been well nigh improbable that “equity, natural justice and good conscience” could have been resorted to, to give respectability to the adulterer’s claim.
I am rather sceptical about the legality of applying these criteria, namely, equity, good conscience and natural justice as yardsticks for invalidating custom in modern Ghana for reasons which I shall give presently and my general inclination in this judgment in the view I take of the law, will be conditioned by the approach of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] A.C. 211 at pp. 233-234 where Lord Sumner delivering the opinion of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on 29 July 1918 said:
“The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law and then to transmute it into the substance of transferable rights … as we know them … On the other hand, there are indigenous peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently developed, are hardly less precise than our own. When once they have been studied and understood they are no less enforceable than rights arising under English law.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
I propose first of all to elicit from the authorities such as my limited research has enabled me to gather the Frafra customary law on the right to custody of an infant and the position of the infant in these proceedings.” I shall then consider whether there are any legal impediments to the operation of the said customary law.
Doctor Fortes, who studied the Frafras, has a chapter in his book already referred to dealing with “Bride price and ownership of children.” I think “ownership” is an unhappy word and rather ill-chosen a much more neat and appropriate expression illustrative of the true legal position will be “the legal right to custody” of children. Dr. Fortes writes at pp.1617:
“`BRIDE PRICE AND THE OWNERSHIP OF CHILDREN’: The paramount interest of the bridegroom’s family is the children that may be born of the marriage. The Tallensi distinguish clearly between legitimate fatherhood and legal fatherhood. There are two kinds of illegitimate children:
(1) Those born to unmarried girls, in their father’s home, who take lovers.
(2) Those born to the wife of a sterile man. Such a woman takes a lover or lovers often with the consent of her husband `in order to bear children for her husband.’ These children whether
[p.390] of [1978] GLR 368 their physiological fathers are known or not, legally `belong’ to the girl’s father and husband, respectively.
Apart from these cases, legal `ownership’ of children is conferred by the payment of bride-price; but – a very important point – it is not necessary for one full bride-price to be paid up. If a woman has born children to one man, and then leaves him to marry another, her first husband `owns’ the children born to him but to establish this legal right he has to pay only one cow however many children there may be. If he has already paid up the bride-price he is entitled to the repayment of three cows.
Again, if a woman has been married to two men successively and has born a child to the first husband, his claim to the child will not be allowed unless he pays one cow. If, on the other hand, the first husband has paid some of the bride-price, and the second husband has never been accepted as son-in-law (i.e. allowed to make placation) by the girl’s guardian, any children she might bear to the second husband legally belong to the first husband, in virtue of the cows he has paid.
One characteristic qualification to this principle must be noted applying particularly to males. The physiological legitimate son of one man may grow up as the legal son of another and may ostensibly be treated on an equal footing with his other sons. But family quarrels are bound to occur; and the true sons abuse the intruder as a `bastard’ and he runs away to his physiological legitimate father’s home. There is never any difficulty about his being accepted by his father’s people; but a cow must be paid to his mother’s family, to redeem him as it were. Cases occur of men in middle age returning thus to their own father’s home, and themselves paying the cow to their mother’s family.”
Although Dr. Fortes refers to “two kinds of illegitimate children,” in my view his use of the word illegitimate in a customary law setting is confusing and inappropriate. The said children may be illegitimate by English law, they are not illegitimate by the customary law because by the customary law they have a legal father and a legal mother as a close reading of the passages from Dr. Fortes clearly show.
The Reverend Father Awiah writes at p.18 in his book already referred to:
“Whenever a girl is taken by stealth, the parents of the man plead and persuade her parents to agree and let the marriage be regularized. Sometimes her parents refuse for the marriage to be regularized and the girl may remain with the man for months or even years. The danger in this is that the girl’s parents if they can get their daughter back someday even after ten years can marry her lawfully away to anybody else and keep all the children she might have in her state of unlawful marriage.”
[p.391] of [1978] GLR 368
Captain Rattray in his book on the Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, Vol. 1, pp. 153 and 161-162, confirms the position that a lover who is not married to the mother with whom he has children “has no claim over the woman or the children.” Ollennu who has obviously made some penetrating study of the customary laws of Ghana writing in (1971) 15 J.A.L. 132 at pp. 156-157 on “The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana,” observed:
“Under customary law, once paternity is acknowledged or proved, all the rights and obligations of a father vis a vis his child attached. To this general principle there are two exceptions; (i) where by custom a particular child, usually the first child of a woman belongs to her paternal family and (ii) where the family of a woman refuse to acknowledge the genital father, as the father, or to recognise him as having any relationship with their family. In either of these cases, the father or a brother of the woman assumes all the rights and obligations of father to the child, and the child takes the mother’s paternal family name.”
To the two exceptions mentioned by Ollennu, I think there are others: For instance there is also the custom of the Frafra referred to by Captain Rattray at p. 131 footnote 3 of his book by which “An impotent husband will often allow his wife freedom to have intercourse with other men in order to raise up seed for him.” The custom is known as galsego or tua. It is noted in the passage from Dr. Fortes dealing with “Bride price and Ownership of children” referred to already in this judgment. Furthermore there is also the custom recognised in Abangana v. Akologo (supra) by which the child of an adulterous union belongs to the husband and not the adulterer. This of course is a common customary practice particularly in all the Akan areas of Ghana. Dr. Danquah in his Akan Laws and Customs at p. 186 states:
“where, for instance, Kwaku had kept Ya, a married woman, in a state of concubinage for a period of four years or five years, having two or three children as issue of the connexion, Kofie the real husband of Ya, would be quite in his right to lay claim to the children.”
This is supported by the Akim Abuakwa case of Ahima v. Kuma (1916) reported at p. 199 of Danquah’s Cases in Akan Law. This customary practice was also noted by the Rt. Rev. Peter Sarpong, the Catholic Bishop of Kumasi in his invaluable little and informative book, Ghana In Retrospect at pp. 80-81 where he said:
“it is clear that it can happen that the biological father of a child is not regarded as the child’s father. The distinction between biological parenthood (Genitor) and sociological parenthood (Pater) is of cardinal importance in Africa. The Ashanti, for example, have this proverb: okromfoo nwo ba (the thief does not give birth to a child).
[p.392] of [1978] GLR 368
The issue of an adulterous union is the child of the legal husband of the adulterous woman and not of the adulterous man (appropriately referred to here as a ‘thief’) who may physically have been responsible for the child’s conception. The latter cannot legally have a child with a woman with whom another man has entered into a marriage contract through the payment of bride-wealth.”
“In Nyarkoa v. Mansu [1967] G.L.R. 523 at p. 535 Archer J., as he then was, accepted this customary law fully. He said:
“I agree … that according to customary law a father is entitled to the custody of his children, and I may add, whether the children are legitimate children of the marriage or children born during the marriage through the adulterous activities of the mother.”
Although unlike the Rt. Rev. Peter Sarpong who would seem to have appreciated the reason for the customary practice, Archer J., as he then was, confessed that he found it rather difficult to appreciate the rationale of the customary law, nevertheless he did not consider it offensive to any canons of equity, good conscience and natural justice.
Before I consider whether the customary laws of Ghana in the present state of our law must still undergo and satisfy the imperialist test of non-repugnancy on the hallowed grounds of “equity, natural justice and good conscience,” I propose to consider firstly whether the Frafra customary law which gives legal custody to the father’s family of an unmarried woman as against the putative father can be said to be irreconcilable “with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society” to use the Privy Council expression in In re Southern Rhodesia (supra). I also intend to take up the Privy Council suggestion of briefly studying and trying to understand the said customary law for the purpose of finding whether it is “no less enforceable than rights arising under English Law” to borrow, once again the expression used by the Privy Council in In re Southern Rhodesia (supra).
With our colonial past and used as we have been to British ideas and concepts, it will not be amiss to make a comparative study of the British approach to the problem. At least, it is I think accepted that the British are “civilized” whatever that word connotes. By British standards a child of an unmarried mother is illegitimate. R. v. Nash (1883) 52 L.J.Q.B. 442, C.A. is authority for the proposition that such a child is legally filius nulius, i.e. no one’s child, and consequently at common law no one had a strict legal right to his custody, not even the mother: see also Barnardo v. McHugh [1891] A.C. 388, H.L. and Humphrys v. Polak [1901] 2 K.B. 385, C.A. Of course the mother has a natural right to its custody. Under the Frafra customary law however such a child is not illegitimate. He is the legal child of the father of the mother and her family and the father of the mother and his family have the legal right to custody. In the circumstances I would have thought that by the canons of common sense
[p.393] of [1978] GLR 368 and on grounds of humanity, equity and natural justice the Frafra customary law, which does not reject the child and which refrains from bastardising the infant, an innocent person, who does not deserve to be repudiated by society, is by all conceivable standards superior and more enlightened than the so-called civilised system by which a baby who had no part to play in the adult indiscretion that produced him, is condemned and saddled by law with senseless disabilities. In my respectful opinion, the Frafra customary law has a better moral claim to legal validity and therefore to be in accordance with good conscience than the British common law position and if the British are a civilised society, then the Frafra custom on the matter passes with flying colours and in accordance with notions in civilised societies, the test propounded by the Privy Council in In re Southern Rhodesia (supra). A brief study of the custom by which the natural son of one is deemed the legal son of another can shed some light on the rational foundation of the Frafra customary law. The Frafras are a patrilineal tribe. It is to them a great tragedy if a married man fails to have sons. As a close reading of Rattray’s book reveals, it means the man’s compound is doomed and his lineage has come to an end. Further-more in the tribal set-up a son has customary sacrifices which he makes at the shrine of his dead father and his ancestors. When a man therefore has only daughters and faces the calamity of dying without a male heir to continue his line, the customary law permits him to let one of his daughters produce a son for him before she marries. The daughter takes a lover. At p. 153 of his book Rattray writes:
“The method of seeking a wife and seeking a lover are the same, the only difference is that you cannot marry a zaba (lover), and you do not give hoes (or cows), and that children born of such unions belong to the girl’s parents.”
The children of such union are yie-bie, etc. meaning house child or To bi meaning sister’s child. If a man has no daughter or son and he is impotent he may have recourse to the galsego or tua custom for the wife to give him a son. Clearly the customary law procedure is akin to a form of adoption, its peculiarity is that it seeks the adoption of a child related to the father by affinity or consanguinity; it must be noted that adoption although known to Roman law and many ancient and modern legal systems was unknown to English law until 1926. Even then adoption under English law proceeds on no such basis and a perfect stranger can be adopted.
Having regard to the purposes which the customary law was designed to serve, I think it will not be right to regard the rights and obligations which it creates as invalid and I should think “they are no less enforceable than rights arising under English law,” as the Privy Council put it in In re Southern Rhodesia (supra).
As I have already noted in this judgment Archer J., as he then was, in Nyarkoa v. Mansu (supra) accepted fully the Akan custom by which the natural child of a person is considered to be the legal child of another; and in Abangana v. Akologo (supra) Edward Wiredu J. refused to accept a similar Frafra custom on the grounds that it is repugnant to the rules of
[p.394] of [1978] GLR 368 natural justice, equity and good conscience. I think it is essential to have uniformity in the application of legal criteria in evaluating the customary law since they are all entitled to parity of treatment. In this regard it is important to observe that Archer J., as he then was, did not consider it necessary to ignore the custom and was completely silent as to whether the custom can or cannot be rejected on the said grounds. These two decisions are High Court decisions but since they are in conflict, I consider it necessary in the interest of uniformity to examine the question in some detail particularly as the Abangana v. Akologo case (supra) has been strongly pressed on me by Mr. R. I. Alhassan, counsel for the respondent, as representing good law. He submitted that “the court should invoke the provision of the law that the custom must be reasonable and that in the circumstance it is in the child’s interest that the natural father should always remain the father in accordance with the principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice.”
It seems to me that the conflict represented by the opposing views of Archer J. and Edward Wiredu J. raises the question as to how far we are entitled now to measure the validity of our customary laws by the yardsticks of equity, natural justice and good conscience? I think in order to answer this question and appreciate the relevance of the said yardsticks it may be necessary to consider the statutory provisions which have regulated the content of our customary laws by going backwards into their history beginning from the period before the Republican Constitutions and moving forward to the present day.
Now before 1 July 1960 the content of our customary law was specifically spelled out in section 87 (1) of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), as follows:
“87. (1) Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Courts of the right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit, of any native law or custom existing in the Gold Coast, such law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any ordinance for the time being in force.”
This provision was repealed on the coming into force of the Republican Constitution of 1960. It is clear however that under this provision, which was in consonance with a similar provision in our Courts Ordinance of 1876, the customary laws of our various native states were only to be taken judicial notice of in the courts if they are not “repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any ordinance for the time being in force.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It seems to me therefore that there may very well be two types of customary laws in the corpus of our law. The first set being the customary laws which were proved in our courts between 1876 and 1960 and of which judicial notice was taken after they had passed the repugnancy test. The
[p.395] of [1978] GLR 368 second lot is the customary laws of which judicial notice was not taken during the colonial and pre-Republican times. Must this second lot undergo the repugnancy test? To answer this I think we must study the sequel to the repeal of section 87 (1) of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.) After the repeal of section 87 (1) of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), new provisions were promulgated under sections 66 and 67 of the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9). The new provisions are as follows:
“66. (1) Subject to the provisions of any enactment other than this subsection, in deciding whether an issue arising in civil proceedings is to be determined according to the common law or customary law and, if the issue is to be determined according to customary law, in deciding which system of customary law is applicable, the court shall be guided by the following rules, in which references to the personal law of a person are references to the system of customary law to which he is subject or, if he is not shown to be subject to customary law, are references to the common law:- Rule 1. Where two persons have the same personal law one of them cannot, by dealing in a manner regulated by some other law with property in which the other has a present or expectant interest, alter or affect that interest to an extent which would not in the circumstances be open to him under his personal law.
Rule 2. Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of a transaction the parties to which have agreed, or may from the form or nature of the transaction be taken to have agreed, that such an issue should be determined according to the common law or any system of customary law effect should be given to the agreement.
In this rule `transaction’ includes a marriage and an agreement or arrangement to marry.
Rule 3. Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of any unilateral disposition and it appears from the form or nature of the disposition or otherwise that the person effecting the disposition intended that such an issue should be determined according to the common law or any system of customary law effect should be given to the intention.
Rule 4. Subject to the foregoing rules, where an issue relates to entitlement to land on the death of the owner or otherwise relates to title to land –
(a) if all the parties to the proceedings who claim to be entitled to the land or a right relating thereto trace their claims from one person who is subject to customary law, or from one family or other group of persons all subject to the same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;
(b) if the said parties trace their claims from different persons, or families or other groups of persons, who are all subject to the same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;
[p. 396] of [1978] GLR 368
(c) in any other case, the issue should be determined according to the law of the place in which the land is situated.
Rule 5. Subject to Rules 1 to 3, where an issue relates to the devolution of the property (other than land) of a person on his death it should be determined according to his personal law.
Rule 6. Subject to the foregoing rules, an issue should be determined according to the common law unless the plaintiff is subject to any system of customary law and claims to have the issue determined according to that system, when it should be so determined.”
“67. (1) Any question as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the Court and not a question of fact.
(2) If the Court entertains any doubt as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law relevant in any proceedings after considering such submissions thereon as may be made by or on behalf of the parties and consulting such reported cases text-books and other sources as may be appropriate, the court shall adjourn the proceedings to enable an inquiry to take place under the next subsection.
(3) The inquiry shall be held as part of the proceedings in such manner as the Court considers expedient, and the provisions of this Act relating to the attendance and testimony of witnesses shall apply for the purpose of the tendering of opinions to the Court at the inquiry, but shall apply subject to such modifications as may appear to the Court to be necessary:
Provided that— (a) the decision as to the persons who are to be heard at the inquiry shall be one for the Court, after hearing such submissions thereon as may be made by or on behalf of the parties;
(b) the Court may request a House of Chiefs, State Council or other body possessing knowledge of the customary law in question to state its opinion which may be laid before the inquiry in written form.”
The Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), was itself repealed by the Courts Decree 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), but paragraphs 64 and 65 of the said N.L.C.D. 84 replaced sections 66 and 67 of the repealed C.A. 9 without any alteration in the form and substance of the said sections. So that after the coming into force of the Republican Constitution of 1960 in the wake of the repeal of section 87 (1) of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4, the principle that the customary laws of this Republic are questions of fact and not law was legislatively repudiated and our customary laws became part of the general law of the land. No doubt they emanate from different tribal sources and no doubt some may be in conflict one with another, nevertheless they are all entitled to equal treatment and acceptance by all our courts. The
[p.397] of [1978] GLR 368 principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Angu v. Attah (1916) P.C. `74 – `28, 43 and Amissah v. Krabah (1936) 2 W.A.C.A.30, P.C. by which they had to be proved as facts by evidence was also statutorily rejected. The yardsticks of equity, natural justice and good conscience used in the colonial and pre-Republican days for measuring their validity were not re-enacted after their repeal. Obviously our Republican legislature must have considered these colonial yardsticks as an affront to the integrity of our customary laws and not in keeping with the dignity of a modern sovereign state. As a result after 1 July 1960, the customary laws of the various tribal communities became part of the law of the country and the only test for their validity is whether they fulfil those conditions which under the general law of Ghana must be satisfied by all customary laws. They were no more subject to the imperial repugnancy provision of equity, natural justice and good conscience.
The Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), was itself repealed by the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), on 22 September 1971 and paragraphs 64 and 65 of the said N.L.C.D. 84 were replaced by sections 49 and 50 of the said Act 372. The new provisions contained in the said sections 49 and 50 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which are now the enabling subsisting provisions are as follows:
“49. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, the Court when determining the law applicable to an issue arising out of any transaction or situation, shall be guided by the following rules in which references to the personal law of a person are references to the system of customary law to which he is subject or to the common law where he is not subject to any system of customary law:
Rule 1. An issue arising out of a transaction shall be determined according to the system of law intended by the parties to the transaction to govern the issue or the system of law which the parties may, from the nature or form of the transaction be taken to have intended to govern the issue.
Rule 2. In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to any issue arising out of the devolution of a person’s estate shall be the personal law of that person.
Rule 3. In the absence of any intention to the contrary the law applicable to an issue as to title between persons who trace their claims from one person or group of persons or from different persons all having the same personal law, shall be the personal law of that person or those persons.
Rule 4. In applying Rules 2 and 3 to disputes relating to titles to land due regard shall be had to any overriding provisions of the law of the place in which the land is situated.
Rule 5. Subject to the foregoing Rules, the law applicable to any issue arising between two or more persons shall, where they are subject to the same personal law, be that law; and where they
[p.398] of [1978] GLR 368 are not subject to the same personal law, the Court shall apply the relevant rules of their different systems of personal law to achieve a result conformable to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
Rule 6. In determining any issue to which the foregoing Rules do not apply, the Court shall apply such principles of the common law, or customary law, or both, as will do substantial justice between the parties, having regard to equity and good conscience.
Rule 7. Subject to any directions that the Supreme Court may give in exercise of its powers under article 107 of the Constitution, in the determination of any issue arising from the common law or customary law the Court may adopt, develop and apply such remedies from any system of law (whether Ghanaian or non- Ghanaian) as appear to the Court to be efficacious and to meet the requirements of justice, equity and good conscience.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, such rules of law and evidence (including the rules of private international law) as have hitherto been applicable in proceedings in Ghana shall continue to apply, without prejudice to any development of such rules which may occur.
50. (1) Any question as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the Court and not a question of fact.
(2) If the Court entertains any doubt as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law relevant in any proceedings after considering such submissions thereon as may be made by or on behalf of the parties and consulting such reported cases, text-books and other sources as may be appropriate, the Court may adjourn the proceedings to enable an inquiry to take place under the next subsection.
(3) The inquiry shall be held as part of the proceedings in such manner as the Court considers expedient, and the provisions of this Act relating to the attendance and testimony of witnesses shall apply for the purpose of the tendering of opinions to the Court at the inquiry, but shall apply subject to such modifications as may appear to the Court to be necessary;
Provided that— (i) the decision as to the persons who are to be heard at the inquiry shall be one for the Court, after hearing such submissions thereon as may be made by or on behalf of the parties;
(ii) the Court may request a House of Chiefs, or a Divisional or Traditional Council or other body possessing knowledge of the customary law in question to state its opinion which may be laid before the inquiry in written form.”
From the above provisions it is clear that with regard to the customary law in these proceedings rules 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 do not apply and that where
[p.399] of [1978] GLR 368 two persons are subject to the same personal law, as was the case of Nyarkoa v. Mansu (supra), Abangana v. Akologo (supra) and in the present case, the law applicable is the said personal law as is indicated in rule 5 of section 49 of the said Act 372.
In applying the said personal law under the said rule 5 there is no legislative directive that it should be subject to any test as to whether it is repugnant to “natural justice, equity or good conscience.” The trinity natural justice, equity and good conscience” are the ghosts of the colonial era and no judge in modern Ghana can now minister to their pretensions, as arbiters of the contents of our customary laws. When they infiltrate into our law with imperialist airs and challenge the validity of our customary laws they must be exorcised for as Abban J. rightly pointed out in Mate v. Amanor [1973]1 G.L.R. 469 at p. 476, the application of the customary law under rule 5 of section 49 of Act 372 is now mandatory! It is only where the parties before a court are not subject to the same system of personal law that the court is enjoined to “apply the relevant rules of their different systems of personal law to achieve a result conformable to natural justice, equity and good conscience.”
Clearly therefore when two or more different systems of customary law are involved in a case the legislature seeks to provide for the internal conflict of laws and is concerned that the two or more systems should be so amalgamated as to achieve results conformable to natural justice, equity and good conscience. Whereas under the colonial and pre-Republican process, the repugnancy provision, if successfully resorted to, results in the repudiation of the customary law, the position is not so now. The legislature has deliberately dropped the word “repugnant.” Indeed after the judicial exercise the respective customs remain unimpaired. It is only in the ad hoc application to the particular case of conflicting or different customary laws that an amalgamation is resorted to in order to contain and resolve the conflict and the differences of the customary laws. The adjudicating process now is not concerned as such with repugnancy because strictly speaking all the customary laws are entitled to parity of treatment and it will be rather undignified for a custom which a tribal community has accepted and practised for years without its validity being impugned even by the colonial power to be all of a sudden declared invalid on grounds of repugnancy so late in the day. As Griffith C.J. with commendable foresight warned so long ago in Yerenchi v. Akuffoo (1905) 1 Ren. 362:
“It is a serious thing to refuse to accept a custom which may have existed for ages or on the other hand to put a judicial hallmark upon a custom.”
The only other relevant provision which introduces the concepts of natural justice, equity and good conscience is rule 7, but that rule as can be seen from a careful reading of its provisions is concerned not with the content of the customary law or with repugnancy on the grounds of
[p.400] of [1978] GLR 368 those concepts but with the creative task of forging new remedies conformable to those concepts apparently for the purpose of modernising the customary law as would seem to have been done by Owusu-Addo J. in Amoah v. Appau alias Amoah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 159 at p. 163. I suppose under the said rule 7, the ancient remedy of recanting by carrying oturbiba in an action for slander under Fante customary law can be replaced as it has already been replaced by the payment of damages or apology: see Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.), p. 114.
From this brief survey of the history of the statutory provisions which regulate and have regulated the content of our customary laws, I am of the opinion that the decision of Archer J. in Nyarkoa v. Mansu (supra) with regard to his acceptance of the content of customary laws without question represents the true modern legal position. Mr. Alhassan, counsel for the respondent, has however pressed me quite vigorously to be guided by the decision of Abangana v. Akologo (supra). If I do so I will be permitting the ghosts of the colonial repugnancy provisions to continue to apply in Ghana. I recall that in Tanor v. Akosua Koko [1974] 1 G.L.R. 451, the Court of Appeal was invited to repudiate a custom on the ground that it violates the said repugnancy provision. The court declined the invitation and at p. 464 Archer J.A. rightly observed, “Whether the custom should be abolished or not, is not a matter for the courts.” In view of the points I have discussed in this judgment I entirely share his views on the matter as representing the modern law. As I said in Nkrumah v. Manu [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176 at p. 187, the judicial mind is highly conservative for as can be seen sixteen years after the legislature has deliberately repealed the repugnancy provision it was nevertheless applied in Abangana v. Akologo (supra) and it has been pressed on me in these proceedings. With respect therefore in so far as the colonial repugnancy provision which had been repealed was applied to repudiate the Frafra customary law, the decision in Abangana v. Akologo (supra) must be taken to have been given per incuriam and I am therefore unable to follow it. I prefer to follow the decision of Archer J. for the reasons I have already given.
I must say though that Edward Wiredu J. is not the first common law judge to be bewildered by this rule of law and to have expressed dissatisfaction at the said rule of law which denies custody to a putative father able and willing to look after his natural child. In Re B. (an infant) a decision of Pennycuick J. of 27 July 1961 which is unreported a putative father applied for custody to the county court. The court in a well-reasoned judgment having regard to the law, refused the application. Pennycuick J. reversed this decision on appeal before him and like Edward Wiredu J. did in the Abangana case, he gave custody to the putative father holding in effect that the law had placed a putative father as regards his illegitimate child in the same position as the father of a legitimate child to his lawful child. However in the subsequent case of Re Adoption Application No.41/61 [1962] 3 All E.R.553, the Court of Appeal criticised this view and although the case was not before them, they did not mince words in
[p.401] of [1978] GLR 368 observing that Pennycuick J.’s view was wrong. At page 558 Danckwerts L.S. said:
“Before the passing of the Legitimacy Act, 1959, the putative father was liable to be made to provide maintenance for the child under the bastardy laws, but he had no more right to interfere with the affairs of the infant than a stranger.”
Diplock L.J. (as he then was) at p. 562 quoting R. v. Soper (1793) 5 Term Rep. 278 in delivering a dissenting judgment agreed with the majority view that at common law a father had no right to the custody of his illegitimate child.
The sequel to this, is that in Re O. (an infant) [1964] 1 All E.R. 786, C.A., a similar application came again before Pennycuick J. Having regard to the strictures of the Court of Appeal in regard to his earlier stand in Re B. (an infant) (supra) he reluctantly abandoned his said earlier stand but nevertheless observed in language which echoes and would no doubt have found favour in the reasoning of Edward Wiredu J. in the Abangana case, as quoted in the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Re O. (an infant) (supra) at p. 788: “I find it abhorrent to deprive a father, responsible and able to look after his child, of that child.” At the Court of Appeal however Lord Denning M.R. set his qualms at rest. He observed at the same page, inter alia, quite firmly that “The natural father is not in the same position as a legitimate father.” The reluctant decision of Pennycuick J. refusing custody to the putative father able and willing to look after the child was unanimously upheld by the Court of Appeal.
I have drawn attention to this English approach because the criteria of equity, good conscience and natural justice can only be a value measure within the context of either the common law or the customary law. It is clear that the customary law accepts the custom and the yardsticks are therefore not customary law norms to be applied. The common law also in view of the decision in Re O. (an infant) (supra) would seem to tolerate such a customary practice and therefore the said criteria cannot be normative by the common law standard. It follows therefore that even if the repugnancy provisions are a subsisting measure of the validity of the customary law on the matter, they will nevertheless be inapplicable since there will be no operative objective standards which will warrant their application. A subjective standard as it were varying from judge to judge will be reminiscent of the days when equity varied with the Chancellor’s foot – a retrogressive step unbecoming any modern system of law.
I have already pointed out that the customary laws are entitled to parity of treatment. To uphold one customary law among one tribe as valid and to deny validity to a similar custom among another tribe is disruptively so discriminatory as to destroy the unitary system of our law and the painful process of amalgamation which is elaborately enjoined on our traditional authorities and set down in Part VII of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).
[p.402] of [1978] GLR 368
In my view in the particular state of our present law if a particular custom is thought to be unsatisfactory it is no part of the judicial function to reject it. A recommendation can be made to the relevant regional house of chiefs in terms of the spirit of the provisions of section 43 of the Chieftaincy Act. 1971 (Act 370), which provides as follows:
“43. (1) A Regional House of Chiefs may either after receiving representations from a Traditional Council or on its own initiative, and shall if so requested in writing by the National House of Chiefs, draft a statement of alterations it thinks desirable in any customary law rule in force in its region or any part thereof.
(2) A draft prepared under subsection (1) of this section shall be submitted to the National House of Chiefs and if the said House is satisfied after consultation with the Regional House of Chiefs concerned, that effect should be given to the draft, either as submitted or with such modifications as it considers necessary, it shall submit a request in writing to the President to the effect that that statement of the rule as modified by the draft be given effect in the area in question.
(3) The President may, upon receiving a request made by the National House of Chiefs under subsection (2) of this section and after consultation with the Chief Justice make a legislative instrument giving effect to the recommendations submitted to him by the said House under the said subsection (2) and providing that the rule shall have effect within the area in question in the form set out therein.”
It follows from what I have been at pains to canvass in this judgment, that the Frafra custom in this case is a valid applicable customary law. I hold that the order of the district court grade II ignoring the customary law and giving custody of the infant to the plaintiff on the ground merely that he is the natural father is erroneous in law. I agree of course with the conclusion which Archer J. came to, after an exhaustive and praiseworthy examination of the authorities in Nyarkoa v. Mansu (supra) that in regard to custody the welfare of the infant is, inter alia, the paramount consideration. In applying this test relating to the welfare of the infant, however I am of the opinion that our courts must be realistic. In this regard I venture to say that although the welfare of the infant may very well be paramount, nevertheless it is not exclusive of all other considerations as I tried to show in the Republic v. Adomakoh; Ex parte Andoh [1978] 1 G.L.R. 255. Surely the person claiming custody must have, inter alia, some prima facie right to custody before the welfare of the infant is additionally considered to buttress his claim. This is the rationale of my decision in Republic v. Adomakoh; Ex parte Andoh (supra), but in a case like this where in fact custody is being claimed solely on the basis of paternity and where the question as to whether the child will fare better with the plaintiff or the defendant has not been canvassed in the proceeding I am afraid the claim of the plaintiff who by my decision and in contemplation of the customary law is in fact a complete stranger to the child cannot be sustained as against those who by customary law are entitled to custody. I must point out also
[p.403] of [1978] GLR 368 that although it is clear that the district court grade II has jurisdiction in actions for the custody of children in terms of sections 37 (1) (f) and 38 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971, where the law applicable is exclusively customary law, an action for the return of a child wrongly in the hands of a defendant as the claim of the plaintiff is, is strictly speaking not a custody suit. This is because the question really is not who is entitled to custody as between the plaintiff and the defendant. The question simply is whether the plaintiff at the relevant time had legal custody and has been wrongfully deprived of that legal custody by the defendant. It is in effect a habeas corpus application. As is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. II, para. 57 at pp. 33-34:
“A parent, guardian, or other person who is legally entitled to the custody of a child can regain that custody when wrongfully deprived of it by means of the writ of habeas corpus. The unlawful detention of a child from the person who is legally entitled to its custody is, for the purpose of the issue of the writ, regarded as equivalent to an unlawful imprisonment of the child.”
“Furthermore the defendant-appellant before this court is the uncle of the mother of the child. By the customary law as I have endeavoured to show, the child is presumed to be the child of the mother’s father and his family. By the order of the court the uncle is to take the child away from its lawful customary law parent and hand him over to the respondent although the lawful customary father is not a party to the proceedings and has therefore not had an opportunity of being heard. I think the uncle has been wrongfully made a defendant as far as the lawful custody of the child is concerned and for this reason also the order of the district court grade II is wrong.”
For the reasons I have advanced in this judgment, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the district court grade II is set aside and judgment is given in favour of the defendant-appellant. The order that the infant child should be handed over to the plaintiff-respondent is hereby quashed.
As I have not had assistance from counsel for the appellant, there will be no order as to costs. DECISION Appeal allowed.
K.T.
