IMANI CENTRE FOR POLICY & EDUCATION & ANOR vs. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – AD.2026

CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING)

LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC

PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC

ASIEDU JSC

GAEWU JSC

KWOFIE JSC

ACKAAH-BOAFO JSC

WRIT

NO. J1/10/2024

3RD JUNE, 2026

IMANI CENTRE FOR POLICY & EDUCATION ………. PLAINTIFFS

PROF. KWESI ANING

VRS

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ………. DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

GAEWU, JSC:

Before this Court stands a Constitutional invocation of our original jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs, Imani Center for Policy and Education (a juristic person registered under laws of the Republic of Ghana) and Prof. Kwasi Aning (a citizen of the Republic of Ghana), have approached this apex Court by a way of a Writ issued pursuant to Articles 2 and 130 of the 1992 Constitution, seeking against the defendant the following reliefs:

“1. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the President of the Republic of Ghana has no authority to terminate the appointment or remove from office of a person occupying the office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service, unless only upon proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour established against these office holders, or incapacity to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of mind or body, or death, or retirement, or upon resignation of the office holder.

2. A further declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 207(2), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the President of the Republic of Ghana upon assumption of office does not have the power to make a fresh appointment to the office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller of Immigration Service unless the immediate holder of the office is deceased, retired, or incapable of performing functions of the office by reason of infirmity of the body or mind, or resignation or dismissed upon proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour established against the office holder.

3. Another declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 207(2), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, upon a change of government, the newly appointed President of the Republic of Ghana has no authority or power to terminate the appointment of persons occupying the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless the office holder is deceased, retired, or incapable of performing functions of the office by reason of infirmity of the body or mind, or upon proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour, or upon resignation.

4. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, upon a change of government, the newly appointed President of the Republic of Ghana has no authority or power to appoint new persons to occupy the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless the offices are vacant by reason of the death, resignation, or retirement of the immediate office holder; or the current office holder is incapable of performing functions of the office by reason or infirmity of the body or mind; or upon dismissal of the immediate office holder upon proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour.

5. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 12(2), 17, 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1) 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199, 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the practice of the termination or removal from office of persons occupying the positions of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service who are members of the public services upon assumption of a new government by the President of the Republic in the absence of resignation, retirement, death, proven stated misbehaviour or misconduct, or incapability to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind by the immediate occupants of the offices is unconstitutional.

6. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 12(2), 17, 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1) 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199, 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the practice of the appointment of persons to take over from the occupants of the offices of Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service who are members of the public services, upon the assumption of a new government by resignation, death , proven stated misbehaviour or misconduct, or incapability to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind by the current occupants of the offices, is unconstitutional.

7. A consequential order to restrain or prevent the President of the Republic from dismissing or removing or attempting to dismiss or remove, the appointment of persons occupying the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless only in cases of proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour established against such person, or upon retirement, or resignation, or death, or incapability to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind.

8. Any further order(s) or direction(s) as this honourable court may deem necessary.”

The Case of the Plaintiffs

The case of the plaintiffs, as formulated, is anchored on the proposition that the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana establishes the Fire Service, the Police Service, the Immigration Service, and the Prison Service as Public Services under the overarching framework of Article 190(1) thereof. The plaintiffs submit that, supplemental to Article 190(1), Articles 200 and 205 of the Constitution explicitly establish the Police Service and the Prisons Service, respectively. Furthermore, they draw attention to Article 202(2) & (3), which provide for the appointment and authority of the Inspector-General of Police, as well as Article 207(1) & (2), which similarly govern the appointment and authority of the Director-General of Prisons. It is argued that these constitutional provisions vest the power of appointment for both the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prison Service in the President of the Republic, acting in consultation with the Council of State.

The plaintiffs acknowledge that the specific statutory mechanisms for the appointments of the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of Immigration are not explicitly contained within the text of the Constitution, but are instead derived from Acts of Parliament which vest said appointing authority in the President. Nonetheless, they contend that although neither the Constitution nor the respective enabling statutes articulate specific grounds upon which these four high-ranking state officials may be removed from office, they must be properly characterized as public servants. Consequently, the plaintiffs argue that their removal from office must be subject to the strictures of Article 191 of the Constitution. Article 191 of the Constitution 1992 is reproduced as follows:

“Article 191: A member of the Public Services shall not be – victimised or discriminated against for having discharged his duties faithfully in accordance with this Constitution; or dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause”.

In support of their case, the plaintiffs advert to historical precedents within this jurisdiction where a President removed a Chief Fire Officer, an Inspector-General of Police, a Director-General of Prisons, or a Comptroller-General of Immigration from office without just cause. They argue that these removals which routinely occur in the wake of a change in government, and without any established wrongdoing or justifiable reason preferred against the affected official constitute a clear infraction of Article 191 of the 1992 Constitution. The plaintiffs firmly maintain that these administrative heads can legally be removed from office only for “just cause,” such as misconduct, incapacity, death, retirement, or resignation.

The plaintiffs further submit that by virtue of their special status under Article 190, and more particularly as heads of the security services of the country, their removal must be governed by Article 191(b) in order to insulate their security of tenure. This protection, they argue, is necessary to command their institutional loyalty to the State rather than to the fleeting administration of the day. They contend that because these heads are invariably appointed from a pool of senior officers of a particular rank, their positions as Chief Fire Officer, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons, or Comptroller-General of Immigration represent promotional ranks within their respective services, thereby entitling them to security of tenure. Given the foundational importance of the security services to the realm, the plaintiffs assert that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended for these heads to be subject to removal at will by successive Presidents, but intended them to serve the enduring interests of the State.

The plaintiffs urge this Court to find that the prevailing lack of textual clarity regarding the removal of these critical security heads generates an unconstitutional state of professional insecurity. Accordingly, they seek a declaration from this Court clarifying the issue by holding that the removal of these four heads of service is strictly subject to the protections enshrined in Article 191 of the Constitution.

The Defendant’s Case

Conversely, the case of the defendant is that the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prison Service do not fall within the category of public servants contemplated by the plaintiffs. The defendant submits that the appointments of the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prison Service are distinct constitutional acts executed pursuant to Articles 202(1) and 207(1) of the 1992 Constitution, respectively. It is the contention of the defendant that the specific procedure designed for the appointment of these two institutional heads sets them apart from the general body of public servants envisioned under Article 195 of the Constitution which reads:

“Article 195(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or to act in an office in the Public Services shall vest in the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the governing Council of the service concerned given in consultation with the Public Services Commission”.

The defendant argues that since the constitutional mode of appointing the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of Prisons is substantially and structurally different from the standard appointment mechanisms provided under Article 195, these two officials cannot be classified among the public services subject to the “just cause” protections of Article 191(b) of the 1992 Constitution.

Regarding the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service, the defendant submits that their appointments are governed by ordinary legislation specifically, Section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) and Section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 907), respectively. Consequently, the defendant argues that it is these enabling statutes, rather than the general provisions of the Constitution, that dictate the terms and conditions of their employment. The defendant notes that these Acts explicitly provide that the heads of these institutions hold office on the terms and conditions stipulated within their respective letters of appointment. On this basis, the defendant submits that where specific statutory provisions have been enacted to govern the tenure of particular offices, it is an error in law to seek to apply general constitutional provisions to them, and prays that the plaintiffs’ action be dismissed.

Joint Memorandum of Agreed Issues

Pursuant to rules 50(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 16), the parties filed a joint memorandum of agreed issues setting out the following issues for determination:

1. Whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been properly invoked to entertain the instant suit.

2. Whether the phrase “just cause” as provided under Article 191(b) of the 1992 Constitution is applicable to the dismissal or removal from office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service.

3. Whether the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration cannot be dismissed or removed from office by the President of the Republic unless upon situations of resignation, retirement, death proven stated misbehaviour or misconduct, incapacity to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind of serious violations of the 1992 Constitution.

4. Whether the practice of the termination or removal from office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of the Prisons Service ad Comptroller of immigration Service by the President of the Republic in the absence of a just cause within the meaning of Article 190(1)(b) of the 1992 Constitution is unconstitutional.

5. Whether or not the President of the Republic of Ghana pursuant to Articles 202 and 207 of the 1992 Constitution, Section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act,1997 (Act 537) and Section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016, has the legal authority to remove from office the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service without recourse to Article 191 of the 1992 Constitution.

6. Whether or not Article 191(b) of the Constitution 1992 also applies to the category of heads mentioned in Article 202(1), 207(1) of the Constitution, Section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) and Section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908).

Upon reviewing the six issues set out in the joint agreed memorandum of issues above, we find that the entire case turns on Issues 1, 2, and 3. The Defendant does not deny the factual claim that Presidents regularly replace these officials without giving reasons. Instead, it defends this practice as a valid executive power, arguing that Article 191 simply does not apply to them. Because a decision on the first three issues will naturally decide the case, Issues 4, 5, and 6 are absorbed into our analysis, and we shall proceed accordingly.

Issue 1: Has the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Been Properly Invoked?

A primary and overriding issue for determination by this Court is whether its exclusive original jurisdiction has been properly invoked by the Plaintiffs to entertain the instant action.

It is a well-settled principle of our jurisprudence that a court must first satisfy itself of its competence before proceeding to adjudicate upon a matter. As Acquah, JSC (as he then was) succinctly observed in Attorney General (No 2) v. Tsatsu Tsikata (No 2) [2001-2002] SCGLR 220 at 646:

“It is therefore trite knowledge that the first duty of every judge in any proceedings is to satisfy himself that he has jurisdiction in the matter before him.”

The exclusive original jurisdiction of this Court is a creature of the Constitution, specifically anchored on Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution, 1992. These constitutional provisions empower this Court to entertain actions seeking either the interpretation or the enforcement of the Constitution, or both.

Article 2(1) of the Constitution 1992 provides as follows:

“2. Enforcement of the Constitution

A person who alleges that –

An enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment; or

Any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.

Article 130(1) further provides:

“130 – Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in Article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction –

(a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and

b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.

The standard for determining whether a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement has arisen was laid down by the Court of Appeal, sitting as the Supreme Court, in the locus classicus of Republic v. Special Tribunal, Ex-parte Akorsah [1980] GLR 592. In evaluating Article 118(1) of the Constitution, 1979 which is in pari materia with the current Article 130(1) of the Constitution, 1992.

Article 118(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution provided that:

“118(1) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided, in Article 35 of this Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this Constitution; and where a question arises whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred upon Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution”.

Anin, JA (as he then was), delivering the judgment of the Court in Ex-parte Akorsah, synthesized the applicable rules as follows:

“Summary of the Case Law on Enforcement or Interpretation

From the foregoing dicta, we will conclude that an issue of enforcement or interpretation of a provision of the Constitution under Article 118(1)(a) arises in any of the following eventualities:

Where the words of the provision are imprecise or unclear or ambiguous. Put in another way, it arises if one party invites the court to declare that the words of the Article have a double meaning or are obscure or otherwise means something different from or more than what they say;

Where rival meanings have been placed by the litigant on the words of any provision of the Constitution;

Where there is a conflict in the meaning and effects of two or more articles of the Constitution, and the question is raised as to which provision shall prevail;

Where on the face of the provisions, there is a conflict between the operation of particular institutions set up under the Constitution and thereby raising problems of enforcement and of interpretation.

On the other hand, there is no case of ‘enforcement or interpretation’ where the language of the article of the Constitution is clear, precise and unambiguous…he should certainly not invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 118”.

This test has consistently received judicial endorsement and has been applied by this Court across a long line of authorities, including: Republic v. High Court, (Fast Track Division) Accra, Ex-parte Electoral Commission (Mettle Nunoo & Ors – Interested Parties) [2005-2006] SCGLR 514, Republic v. Adusei (No. 2) v. Attorney General [1998-1999] SCGLR 753; and Republic v. Court of Appeal, Accra; Ex-parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612.

This traditional approach remains robust, as evidenced by its application in modern constitutional actions such as Justice Abdulai v. Attorney General Suit No. J1/7/22 (unreported judgment delivered on 9th March 2022); Michael Ankomah Nimfa v. James Gyakye Quayson, Suit No. J1/11/22 (unreported judgment delivered on 17th May 2023), and Alexander Afenyo-Markin v. Speaker of Parliament and Anor. Suit No. J1/1/2025 (unreported judgment delivered on 12th November 2024).

In the case before us, the Plaintiffs invite this Court to interpret the phrase “members of the Public Services” under Article 191 of the Constitution, 1992 to comprehensively include:

The Inspector-General of Police appointed pursuant to Article 202(1);

The Director-General of Prisons appointed pursuant to Article 207(1);

The Chief Fire Officer appointed under Section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537); and

The Comptroller-General of Immigration appointed under Section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908).

The Plaintiffs contend that upon such an interpretation, the tenure of these heads of institutions would be insulated by Article 191(b), meaning the President cannot remove them from office without assigning “just cause.” The Plaintiffs further urge this Court to interpret “just cause” to mean gross misconduct, physical or mental incapacity, incompetence, or the attainment of the statutory retirement age.

Conversely, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs’ writ discloses no cause of action. The Defendant argues that the constitutional provisions are plain, unambiguous, and require no interpretation. In their substantive response, the Defendant submits that the Inspector-General of Police and the other specified heads of services belong to a distinct, high-level category of public officers to whom the protections of Article 191(b) do not apply. Consequently, the Defendant maintains that these officials serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority and may be removed by the President without any requirement to assign “just cause.”

An analysis of the competing arguments reveals a classic case of genuine dispute regarding constitutional text. The parties have placed fundamentally divergent, rival meanings on the scope of “members of the Public Services” under Article 191 as it relates to positions established under Articles 202(1) and 207(1), as well as Acts 537 and Act 908.

This dispute necessitates a definitive judicial interpretation to ascertain whether these specific heads of services fall within the protective ambit intended by the framers of the Constitution under Article 191.

The Defendant’s objection that our jurisdiction has not been properly invoked must fail. It is well established that this Court’s exclusive interpretive authority extends across the entire text of the Grundnorm. As stated in Adjei Ampofo (No. 1) v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly & Anor. [2007-2008] SCGLR 611, this Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution applies to all its provisions, including the human rights provisions under Chapter 5.

See also Republic v. High Court (General Jurisdiction, Accra) Ex-parte Dr. Zanetor Rawlings (Ashitey and National Democratic Congress – Interested Parties), [2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 92. The same position was reached by the court in the case of Michael Ankomah Nimfa v. Gyakye Quayson & 2 ors. (supra) when this court speaking through Amegatcher JSC, (as he then was), noted as follows:

“However, if parties raise rival positions regarding the meaning and application of the text of the Constitution or the words of a constitutional provision are imprecise, unclear or ambiguous, then the exclusive jurisdiction of this court is properly invoked for the resolution of the proper interpretation to place on the relevant provisions under Article 130. See the off-cited decision in Republic v. Special Tribunals; Ex-parte Akorsah [1980] GLR 592. Again, if there is a breach of the Constitution, the enforcement jurisdiction of this court conferred in Article 2 is rightly invoked”.

Consequently, guided by the robust and long-standing constitutional jurisprudence of this Court, we find that the rival arguments presented by the parties raise real and substantial issues of constitutional interpretation and therefore of the opinion that the original jurisdiction of this court has been properly and rightfully invoked by the plaintiffs.

Issue 2: Does Article 191(b). of the Constitution “Just Cause” Protection Apply to These Security Chiefs?

The core issue for determination before this Court is whether the phrase “just cause” as provided under Article 191(b) of the Constitution, 1992 is applicable to the dismissal or removal from office of the Inspector-General of Police, the Director-General of the Prisons Service, the Chief Fire Officer of the National Fire Service, and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service.

For a comprehensive evaluation of this issue, the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions must be examined textually and structurally:

Article 190(1)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the Constitution, 1992 establishes and categorizes the public services:

“190. The Public Services of Ghana

(1) The Public Services of Ghana shall include:

a) the Civil Service the Judicial Service the Audit Service the Education Service the Prisons Service, the Parliamentary Service the Health Service, the Statistical Service, the National Fire Service, the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service. the Internal Revenue Service, the Police Service, the Immigration Service; and the Legal Service; (emphasis mine) public corporations other than those set up as commercial ventures; public services established by this Constitution; and such other public services as Parliament may by law prescribe.

2. Protection of Public Officers

Article 191(b) provides the baseline security of tenure for public servants:

“191. Protection of Public Officers

A member of the public services shall not bedismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause.

3. Appointments, Etc of Public Officers

Article 195(1) and (2) outlines the standard mechanism for appointments within the public services:

“195. Appointments, etc. of Public Officers

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or to act in an office in the public services shall vest in the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the governing council of the service concerned given in consultation with the Public Services Commission.

2) The President may, subject to such conditions as he may think fit, delegate some of his functions under this article by directions in writing to the governing council concerned or to a committee of the council or to any member of that governing council or to any public officer.

4. Implied Powers

Article 297(a) codifies the rule regarding implied disciplinary and removal powers:

“In this Constitution and in any other law – (a) the power to appoint a person to hold or to act in an office in the public service shall include the power to confirm appointments, to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in any such office and to remove the persons from office”

5. Specific Provisions for the Head of the Police Service

Article 202 (1) (2)(3) and (4)

The Inspector-General of Police and Appointment of Members of Police Service:

(1) The Inspector-General of Police shall be appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State.

(2) The Inspector-General of Police shall be head of the Police Service and shall, subject to the provisions of this article and to the control and direction of the Police Council, be responsible for the operational control and the administration of the Police Service.

(3) Subject to the provisions of this constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or to act in an office in the Police Service shall vest in the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Police Council.

(4) The President may, subject to such conditions as he thinks fit, delegate some of his functions under this article by directions in writing to the Police Council or to a committee or to a member of the Council.

6. Specific Provisions for the Head of the Prisons Service

Article 207. (1)(2)(3) and (4)

Director-General of Prison Service and Appointment of Members of Service

(1) The Director-General of the Prisons Service shall be appointed by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State.

(2) The Director-General of the Prisons Service shall, subject to the provisions of this article and to the control and direction of the Prisons Service Council, be responsible for the operational control and the administration of the Prisons Service.

(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or to act in an office in the Prisons Service shall vest in the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prisons Service Council.

(4) The President may, subject to such conditions as he thinks fit, delegate some of his functions under this article by directions in writing to the Prisons Service Council or to a Committee or a member of the Council.

7. Statutory Framework for the National Fire Service

Section 18(1) and (2) of Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537)

Chief Fire Officer

There shall be appointed by the President in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution, a head of the service who shall be designated the Chief Fire Officer

The Chief Fire Officer shall hold office on the terms and conditions specified in the letter of appointment.

8. Statutory Framework for the Immigration Service

Section 14 of Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908) provides:

The Comptroller-General

The President shall in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution appoint the Comptroller-General who is the head of the Service.

The Comptroller General shall hold office on the terms and conditions specified in the letter of appointment.

Analysis

A review of the pleadings indicates there is no joinder of issue regarding the legal definition or elements of “just cause.” Had this been an action brought by an aggrieved individual challenging the factual or legal validity of reasons assigned for their removal, defining “just cause” would be a live, justiciable issue.

Instead, the Defendant raises a structural objection: they contend that the protection of “just cause” under Article 191(b) is inapplicable to the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of Prisons due to their distinct constitutional classification, and that the removal of the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of Immigration is governed strictly by the terms of their respective statutory appointments.

Consequently, the precise question before this Court is whether heads of services appointed through specialized constitutional mechanisms fall within the protective ambit of Article 191(b).

This Court established the framework for categorizing public officers in Theophilus Donkor v. The Attorney General (Writ No. J1/8/2017, unreported judgment dated 12th June 2019), where it held:

“Upon a true and proper interpretation, a public service officer appointed in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution and may not be removed save in accordance with the terms and conditions of his/her contract of engagement or in the absence of such, for “just cause” pursuant to Articles 191 and 195 of the Constitution”.

This court further distinguished other public officials, stating:

“Members of governing boards of statutory boards and corporations appointed in accordance with Article 70(1)(d) (iii) of the Constitution are not members of the public service and their tenure is not governed by Articles 191 and 195 of the Constitution. As such, they can be removed at will by the President”.

This decision was arrived at after the court analysed statutes regulating some public bodies including the University of Ghana Act, the National Pension Authority Act, the Securities Industry Act and the National Petroleum Authority Act.

The jurisprudence in Theophilus Donkor (supra) establishes three distinct categories of public officers under the Constitution, 1992:

Constitutional Officers with Explicit, Detailed Protections: This elite category includes superior court judges, whose precise grounds and removal steps are written directly into the constitutional text.

Ordinary Members of the Public Service: These are career public servants recruited through the standard Article 195 track. While the Constitution does not outline a specific removal process for them, it protects them from political firings by requiring a “just cause” under Article 191.

High-Level Executive and Council Appointees: This group includes members of governing boards and councils who serve at the pleasure of the Executive and may be removed without the state needing to prove a “just cause”.

The Defendant relies on Theophilus Donkor (supra) to argue that the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service are political/special appointments who sit outside the category of “ordinary members of the public services.”

We find substantial merit in this textual and structural argument. Article 195(1) sets forth the default mode of appointment for ordinary public servants, requiring the President to act “in accordance with the advice of the governing council… given in consultation with the Public Services Commission.”

By contrast, the constitutional text creates a distinct, specialized mechanism for the heads of the Police and Prisons services. Articles 202(1) and 207(1) explicitly mandate that the President shall appoint the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service acting “in consultation with the Council of State.”

By separating the appointment methodology of these heads of services from the general provisions of Article 195(1), the framers indicated that these positions are not ordinary public service tenures. The language of Articles 202(1) and 207(1) is in pari materia with Article 70(1)(d)(iii), which governs the appointment of members of governing bodies of public corporations.

Because this Court determined in Theophilus Donkor (supra) that positions under the Article 70(1)(d)(iii) regime can be removed by the President without recourse to Article 191, the same legal reasoning applies to Articles 202(1) and 207(1).

By applying the principle of parity of reasoning, it is clear that by providing a specialized appointment process involving the Council of State, the framers intended to exclude the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service from the scope of the “just cause” protections found in Article 191(b).

We shall now comment on the case concerning the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller of Immigration. The plaintiffs in their statement of case did not say anything regarding the provisions of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) on the process of appointment and removal of the Chief Fire Officer. Again, no reference was made by them to the provisions of Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908) regarding the appointment and removal of the Comptroller General of Immigration. As we have noted supra, a different structural analysis applies to the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service. The Constitution, 1992 does not contain explicit provisions defining the tenure, appointment, or removal of these two positions. Instead, their legal status is governed by Acts of Parliament: Section 18 of Act 537 and Section 14 of Act 908, respectively. Both statutory provisions state that these heads of services are to be appointed by the President “in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution” and shall hold office “on the terms and conditions specified in the letter of appointment.”

Because these positions are creatures of statute rather than direct constitutional creation, their rights, obligations, and terms of removal must be determined by interpreting their respective statutory frameworks and individual letters of appointment. The interpretation of statutory provisions falls within the general jurisdiction of the High Court, not the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

A constitutional issue regarding these statutory officers would only arise if a provision within Act 537 or Act 908 were alleged to be inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution under Article 2(1). The Plaintiffs make no such claim. Instead, they invite this Court to read a universal requirement of “just cause” into these statutory offices through Article 191(b).

Notwithstanding the zeal of the plaintiffs, that claim, as rightly argued by the defendant, is of a personal nature and can only be properly entertained if it were made by an individual aggrieved by their actual removal as Chief Fire Officer or Comptroller General of Immigration who alleges that their removal was not for “just cause”.

As noted in Theophilus Donkor (supra), officers appointed under an Article 195 framework are bound by the specific terms and conditions detailed in their contracts of engagement. In the absence of express contractual terms governing termination, they may be removed for “just cause.” Because the Defendant admits that the removal of these two statutory officials is regulated by their letters of appointment and, where silent, subject to just cause, there is no live, adverse dispute between the parties on this point. The Plaintiffs’ claim is abstract and hypothetical; it does not present a ripe controversy for this Court to exercise its exclusive interpretative or enforcement jurisdiction.

Issue 3: Can the President Remove These Security Chiefs Without Proving a “Just Cause”?

The Plaintiffs urge us to limit the President’s removal powers, arguing that locking in tenure for these four securities heads would allow them to perform their roles more independently. They contend that allowing the President to dismiss them at will forces their loyalty to the political administration rather than to the state, which harms democratic governance.

However, this argument conflicts with the reality of how executive power is structured in Ghana. Article 58 of the Constitution explicitly concentrates the executive authority of the Republic in the President, who is responsible for enforcing the law and ensuring national stability:

“58 – Executive Authority of Ghana

The Executive authority of Ghana shall vest in the President and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

The Executive authority of Ghana shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and all laws made under or continued in force by this Constitution,

Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the functions conferred on the President by clause (1) of this Article, may be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him.

Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution or by a law not inconsistent with this Constitution, all executive Acts of Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President.

A constitutional or statutory instrument or any other instrument made, issued or executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated by the signature of a Minister and the validity of any such instrument so authenticated, shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not made, issued or executed by the President.

In deciding whether the President should be restricted in the removal of a person such as the Inspector General of Police or the Director General of Prisons, we have taken account of the language of the above provisions. When regard is had to the fact that Ghana under the 1992 Constitution opted for Executive Presidential system of government in a unitary state, then these provisions are not peculiar to Ghana. Ghana’s 1992 Constitution explicitly chose an Executive Presidential system within a unitary state. Under this model, the President bears personal responsibility for the security of the nation. To fulfill this duty, Article 83 places the IGP and DGP at the heart of the National Security Council:

Article 83 of the Constitution which provides as follows:

“The National Security Council

83(1) There shall be a National Security Council which shall consist of –

The President; the Vice-President; the Ministers for the time being holding the portfolios of foreign affairs, defence, interior, and finance and such other Ministers as the President may determine;

The Chief of Defence Staff and two other members of the Armed Forces;

The Inspector General of Police and two other members of the Police Service, one of whom shall be the Commissioner of Police responsible for Criminal Investigation Department.

The Director General of the Prison Service

The Director General of External Intelligence

The Director General of Internal Intelligence

The Director of Miliary Intelligence.

The Commissioner of Customs, Excise and Preventive Service; and

Three persons appointed by the President.

2. The President shall preside at meetings of the National Security Council and in his absence the Vice President shall preside.

3. The President, may, acting in consultation with the National Security Council, invite such persons as he considers necessary for any deliberations of the Council.

4. A person invited to participate in the deliberations of the Council under clause (3) of this Article shall not vote on any matter for decisions before the Council.

5. The National Security Council shall the procedure at its meetings.

6. The Secretary to the Cabinet shall be the Secretary to the National Security Council.

From the above provisions, the composition of this Council shows that the President must have the complete loyalty and trust of these commanders. They handle highly sensitive national security details and execute urgent orders to maintain public order. To demand that the President provide a formal “just cause” before replacing a security chief would disrupt this relationship of trust.

If we applied Article 191 to these positions, any presidential decision to change security leadership would be subject to public litigation and judicial review. National security strategies and executive relationships are not matters that should be micromanaged by the courts. Having elected a President and handed them the responsibility of protecting the state under Article 58, we must give them the latitude to select a security team they trust to do the job.

Issue 4: whether the Practice of Termination or Removal of These Security Chiefs by the President in the absence of a “Just Cause” is Unconstitutional?

Given our finding that Article 191(b) does not apply to the IGP or the DGP, we decline the invitation to interpret “just cause” in a vacuum. The Plaintiffs did not seek a standalone definition of “just cause” in their reliefs, and we will not interpret constitutional phrases when there is no live case of a public servant contesting an actual dismissal. As this Court held in Bilson v. Attorney General [1993-1994] 1 GLR 104:

“The judicial authority of which this court is the beneficiary or endowed with is essentially a jurisdiction to deal with real and substantial dispute which affect the legal right or obligations of parties who appear before us, and whose interests are adverse to each other”.

In the circumstances, we reject the invitation to interpret “just cause” in a vacuum when there is no joinder of issue of its interpretation.

With issues 5 and 6 ( Whether the President has the legal authority to remove from office Security Chief without recourse to Article 191of the 1992 Constitution and Whether Article 191(b) of the Constitution 1992 applies to the Security heads mentioned in Article 202(1), 207(1) of the Constitution, Section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) and Section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 90), these two issues are deemed resolved in line with our reasoning above. Per our analysis, our opinion is that under Article 58, the President holds the executive authority of Ghana and must have the discretion to manage the nation’s security architecture. He must remain free to choose security chiefs he trusts to protect the Republic.

For these reasons, we find no legal merit in the Plaintiffs’ case, and we dismiss all the reliefs claimed.

(SGD.) E. Y. GAEWU

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) G. PWAMANG

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) PROF. H.J.A.N MENSA-BONSU (MRS)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) H. KWOFIE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

CONCURRING OPINION

ACKAAH-BOAFO, JSC:- i. Introduction/Overview:

[1] My Lords, this case raises, in both constitutional and practical terms, a significant question concerning the scope and limits of executive authority under the 1992 Constitution: namely, whether the President may remove the heads of the nation’s security institutions, including the Police Service, the Prisons Service, the Immigration Service, and the Ghana National Fire Service, without assigned cause, or whether that power is constitutionally constrained by the requirement that any such removal be founded upon justifiable cause consistent with the principles of constitutional governance.

[2] At its core, the dispute engages the broader constitutional balance between effective executive control over national security institutions and the imperative of safeguarding constitutional democracy by ensuring that the exercise of public power remains subject to legality, reason, and accountability. The matter, therefore, transcends the tenure of individual officeholders and calls for a determination of the deeper constitutional question whether, in a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, heads of security institutions holding public office may lawfully be removed without assigned reasons to the public.

[3] This action was commenced by a Writ filed on 11th March 2024, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Honourable Court pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution. The Plaintiffs, namely IMANI Centre for Policy and Education, a civil society organisation registered under the laws of this country and engaged in public interest advocacy, and Professor Kwesi Aning, a security expert and academic, seek declaratory and consequential reliefs challenging the constitutionality of the longstanding practice whereby sitting Presidents remove, without just cause, the heads of the nation’s security services, namely the Ghana National Fire Service, the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Prisons Service, and the Ghana Immigration Service.

[4] My Lords, the Plaintiffs have invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 2 and 130(1) of the Constitution and Rule 45 of the Supreme Court Rules, C.I. 16 (as amended by C.I. 24, 1999), and pray for the following reliefs:

“a. A declaration that, upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the President of the Republic of Ghana has no authority to terminate the appointment or remove from office of a person occupying the office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service, unless only upon proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour established against these office holders or incapacity to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of mind or body or death or retirement or upon resignation by the office holder. b. A further declaration that, upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the President of the Republic of Ghana upon assumption of office does not have the power to make a fresh appointment to the office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless the immediate holder of the office is deceased; retired, or incapable of performing functions of the office by reason of infirmity of the body or mind or resignation or dismissed upon proven stated misconduct or misbehaviour established against the office holder. c. Another declaration that, upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, upon a change of government, the newly appointed President of the Republic of Ghana has no authority or power to terminate the appointment of persons occupying the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless the office holder is deceased; retired, or incapable of performing functions of the office by reason of infirmity of the body or mind or upon proven stated misconduct or misbehavior or upon resignation. d. A declaration that, upon a true and proper interpretation of the letter and spirit of Articles 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, upon a change of government, the newly appointed President of the Republic of Ghana has no authority or power to appoint new persons to occupy the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless the offices are vacant by reason of the death, resignation or retirement of the immediate office holder; or the current office holder; or the current office holder is incapable of performing functions of the office by reason of infirmity of the body or mind or upon dismissal of the immediate office holder upon proven stated misconduct or misbehavior. e. A declaration that, upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 12(2), 17, 200, 202(1), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the practice of the termination or removal from office of persons occupying the positions of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service who are members of public services upon the assumption of a new government by the President of the Republic in the absence of resignation, retirement, death, proven stated misbehavior or misconduct, incapability to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind by the immediate occupants of the offices is unconstitutional. f. A declaration that, upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 12(2), 17, 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), 190(1), 191, 196, 199 and 296 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the practice of the termination or removal from office of persons to take over from the occupants of the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service who are members of public services upon the assumption of a new government by the President of the Republic in the absence of retirement, resignation, death, proven stated misbehavior or misconduct, incapability to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind by current occupants of the offices is unconstitutional. g. A consequential order to restrain or prevent the President of the Republic from dismissing or removing or attempting to dismiss or remove the appointment of persons occupying the offices of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service; Inspector-General of Police; Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service unless only in cases of proven stated misconduct or misbehavior established against such persons or upon retirement or resignation or death or incapacity to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind. h. Any further orders(s) or direction(s) as this Honourable Court may deem necessary”.

[5] My Lords, the central constitutional question presented by the Plaintiffs is whether, upon a true and purposive construction of the letter and spirit of Articles 190, 191, 195, 196, 199, 200, 202, 205, 207, 296, and 297 of the 1992 Constitution, the President of the Republic possesses the authority to terminate the appointments of the heads of the aforementioned security services in the absence of just cause. The Plaintiffs contend that the holders of these constitutional offices enjoy protection against arbitrary or capricious removal, whereas the Defendant maintains that the relevant constitutional provisions are plain, clear, and unambiguous and, consequently, disclose no genuine issue of constitutional interpretation warranting the invocation of this Court’s interpretative jurisdiction. ii. Background Facts:

[6] The Plaintiffs recount the undisputed constitutional position that the 1992 Constitution establishes a number of public services under Article 190, including the Police Service, the Ghana National Fire Service, the Prisons Service, and the Immigration Service. Each of these institutions is headed by an officer whose appointment is regulated by specific constitutional and statutory provisions.

[7] The Inspector-General of Police is appointed by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State, pursuant to Article 202(1) of the Constitution. Likewise, the Director-General of the Prisons Service is appointed by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State under Article 207(1). The Chief Fire Officer of the Ghana National Fire Service is appointed pursuant to section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537), in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution. Similarly, the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service is appointed pursuant to section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 907), also under the framework of Article 195.

[8] The gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ case is what they describe as the entrenched practice of successive governments from Presidents Kuffour, Prof. Atta Mills, President Akuffo Addo, and now President Mahama, all terminating the appointments of the heads of these security services upon assumption of office, without assigning any reason or establishing just cause. According to the Plaintiffs, that practice is unconstitutional, in that it undermines the security of tenure guaranteed to members of the public services under Article 191(b) of the Constitution and offends the requirements of due process, fairness, and the proper exercise of discretionary power contemplated under Articles 296 and 297.

[9] The Plaintiffs further contend that, in several instances, such removals have been effected before the affected officers attained the statutory retirement age. They argue that this recurring pattern of removal at the pleasure of the President erodes the institutional independence and operational stability of the security services, which according to them constitute an integral part of the State’s security architecture.

[10] The Defendant, however, contends that the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of Prisons do not fall within the category of ordinary public servants, having regard to their distinct mode of appointment under Articles 202(1) and 207(1) of the Constitution, respectively, as opposed to appointments made under the general provisions of Article 195. The Defendant further maintains that the appointments of the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service are governed principally by their respective enabling enactments and the terms contained in their letters of appointment, and not by the tenure protections embodied in Article 191(b) of the Constitution. iii. Summary of Parties’ Case:

Plaintiffs’ Submissions:

[11] The Plaintiffs’ first submission in the statement of case filed on March 10, 2024 is that they possess the requisite capacity to institute the present action. In support of this contention, they place reliance on Article 2(1)(b) of the Constitution, which confers standing on any person alleging that an enactment, act or omission is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, a provision of the Constitution, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for declaratory relief. They further rely on Article 130(1)(a) of the Constitution, which vests in the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of the Constitution, subject only to the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 33 in respect of the enforcement of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

[12] In further support of their capacity to maintain the action, the Plaintiffs rely on the decision in New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 729 as authority for the proposition that both natural and juristic persons may properly invoke the constitutional review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They also cite Bimpong-Buta v General Legal Council & Attorney General [2003-2005] 1 GLR 738, together with other authorities, as establishing the capacity of litigants to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction in matters of constitutional interpretation and enforcement.

[13] The Plaintiffs further contend that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been properly invoked in the instant matter, which, they submit, transcends a mere dispute concerning termination of employment. According to the Plaintiffs, the Court is being called upon to interpret the meaning and scope of the phrase “just cause” as employed in Article 191(b) of the Constitution; to determine the application of that constitutional standard to the dismissal or removal of the identified heads of the public services; and to enforce the Constitution against executive action alleged to be inconsistent with Articles 190, 191, 199, 296 and related constitutional provisions.

[14] On the question of mootness, the Plaintiffs anticipate the objection that the instances relied upon concern past events. They accordingly rely on decisions such as Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice v Attorney-General and Baba Kamara [2011] DLSC4125, Amidu v Kufuor [2001-2002] 2 SCGLR 86 and J. H. Mensah v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 320 for the proposition that the Court may properly determine constitutional questions of a recurring nature, particularly where the impugned practice is alleged to possess the tendency to erode the rule of law.

[15] On the substantive matter, the Plaintiffs further submit that Article 190(1) of the Constitution expressly classifies the Prisons Service, the Ghana National Fire Service, the Police Service, and the Immigration Service as constituent elements of the Public Services of Ghana. They contend that the constitutional architecture of the public services admits of several categories, including the Civil Service, independent constitutional bodies, specialised services such as the Education Service, Audit Service, Police Service, Prisons Service, Immigration Service, and National Fire Service, public corporations not established as commercial ventures, and statutory public services subsequently created by law.

[16] With specific regard to the Police Service, the Plaintiffs submit that Chapter Fifteen of the Constitution establishes the Service under Article 200(1), with its principal mandate being the maintenance of law and order. Counsel further submits that Article 202(2) designates the Inspector-General of Police as the head of the Police Service, whilst Article 202(1) provides that his or her appointment shall be made by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State. Reliance is also placed on section 3 of the Police Service Act, as reproduced in the Plaintiffs’ statement of case, to demonstrate that the office of Inspector-General of Police constitutes the apex rank within the Police Service, followed by Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, and such other ranks or offices as may be established.

[17] Counsel for the Plaintiffs accordingly contends, with considerable emphasis, that a person who has attained the rank and office of Inspector-General of Police cannot lawfully be removed without justifiable cause, since removal from that office has the practical effect of prematurely terminating that person’s career within the Public Service. Counsel submits that analogous considerations apply with equal force to the heads of the Prisons Service, Immigration Service, and National Fire Service.

[18] The Plaintiffs further contend that Article 191 affords constitutional protection to members of the Public Services against victimisation and against dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, or other punishment except for just cause. Counsel further relies on Article 199, which fixes the compulsory retirement age for public officers at sixty years, subject to stated exceptions, whilst permitting voluntary retirement from the age of forty-five years. The Plaintiffs therefore submit that the combined effect of these constitutional provisions is that a public officer serving within the relevant services is entitled to remain in office until retirement, resignation, incapacity, death, or lawful removal founded upon proven misconduct or misbehaviour.

[19] In support of their position, the Plaintiffs rely on the decision in Hormeku v Director of Prisons [1982–83] GLR 354, wherein the Court construed the antecedent constitutional equivalent of Article 191(b) as a safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, and underscored the requirement that “just cause” must be established through a process affording the affected person an opportunity to answer the allegations made against him. Counsel also places reliance on the Report of the Committee of Experts, which associated the effective implementation of governmental programmes with stability in the public administration and cautioned against the arbitrary and summary removal of public officers, including security heads.

[20] The Plaintiffs further rely on Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board v Agbettoh [1984–86] 1 GLR 122, where the Court of Appeal treated compulsory retirement, which deprived a person of the office from which he earned his livelihood, as constituting removal from office.

[21] The Plaintiffs concede that the President possesses the constitutional power to remove the identified heads of the security services. Their contention, however, is that the exercise of that power is constitutionally circumscribed by Article 191(b). In this regard, Counsel submits that whilst Article 297 recognises the existence of the power, Articles 191(b) and 296, together with the requirements of due process, regulate the lawful manner and permissible grounds for its exercise.

[22] Counsel also refers to the decision in Theophilus Donkor v Attorney-General (Writ No. J1/08/2017), where it was held that Chief Executive Officers and Directors-General of public boards or corporations do not automatically cease to hold office upon the assumption of office by a new President where such cessation would contravene Articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution.

[23] Counsel further argues that the President, like every other constitutional actor, remains subject to the Constitution and cannot arrogate unto himself powers not conferred by the Constitution or by statute. It is therefore submitted that any statute, executive practice, or administrative action inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency.

[24] The Plaintiffs ultimately conclude that the framers of the 1992 Constitution did not intend to vest in the President an unfettered or unreviewable discretion to terminate the appointments of heads of the security services in the absence of justifiable cause.

[25] Based on the foregoing submissions, together with the additional matters canvassed in the Statement of Case, the Plaintiffs respectfully pray this Honourable Court to grant the reliefs endorsed on the writ.

Defendant’s Submissions:

[26] In answer to the Plaintiffs’ case, the Defendant, the Attorney-General, in its Statement of Case filed on 30 May 2024, first dealt with the jurisdiction question and submits that the Plaintiffs have failed properly to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs must demonstrate, from both the writ and the reliefs endorsed thereon, that the action raises a genuine and substantial issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement. In support of this proposition, the Defendant relies on the unreported decision in Dynamic Youth of Ghana v Ofori Atta, (Writ No. J1/04/2018, judgment dated 5 May 2020, wherein the Court restated the principles articulated in Republic v Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah (1980) GLR 592, namely, that the interpretative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is engaged where constitutional language is imprecise, unclear, or ambiguous; where competing interpretations are placed on constitutional provisions; where constitutional provisions appear to conflict; or where constitutional institutions established under the Constitution conflict in their operation.

[27] The Defendant submits that none of the foregoing circumstances arises in the present action. According to the Defendant, the constitutional provisions implicated in this suit are plain, clear, and devoid of ambiguity. It is therefore contended that the Plaintiffs’ case discloses no real or genuine issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement warranting the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution. In further support of this contention, the Defendant also places reliance on Bimpong-Buta v General Legal Council & Attorney General (supra).

[28] The Defendant further argues that the Plaintiffs’ action discloses no cause of action, inasmuch as no question properly arises for the interpretation of the expression “just cause” as employed in Article 191 of the 1992 Constitution. In the view of the Attorney-General, the Plaintiffs merely seek to invite this Court to render an opinion on the constitutional provisions in issue.

[29] The Defendant accordingly submits that no action lies for the interpretation of constitutional provisions whose meaning is plain and unambiguous. Reliance is placed on Kor v Attorney-General & Justice Douse [2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 114 in support of this submission.

[30] Additionally, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs’ case is predicated largely on past events, including alleged removals of heads of the security services by previous Presidents. On that basis, the Defendant invokes Bilson v Attorney-General [1993-94] 1 GLR 104 for the proposition that the Supreme Court does not exercise an advisory jurisdiction or render advisory opinions.

[31] In response to the Plaintiffs’ main submissions, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs have erroneously assimilated all four offices in issue to ordinary Article 195 public service appointments. While conceding that the Ghana Police Service and the Ghana Prisons Service form part of the Public Services of Ghana, the Defendant argues that the heads of those services are appointed through a distinct constitutional mechanism under Articles 202(1) and 207(1), namely, by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State. This, Counsel submits, is materially different from the procedure under Article 195, which involves appointment on the advice of the governing council of the relevant service, acting in consultation with the Public Services Commission.

[32] On that basis, the Defendant submits that the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service fall within a special category of public office holders. Reliance is placed on Theophilus Donkor v Attorney-General (supra) to draw a distinction between ordinary career public servants and office holders occupying constitutionally designated leadership positions. The Defendant further invokes authorities relating to Article 70 office holders, including Appiah-Ofori v Attorney-General [2020] SCGLR 484 and Ayine v Attorney-General (Writ No. J1/05/2018, unreported), to support the broader proposition that the Constitution contemplates differentiated classes of public office with distinct incidents of tenure and removal.

[33] The Attorney-General accordingly contends that, upon appointment to the headship of their respective services, the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service cease to hold office in the Article 191(b) sense applicable to career public officers, and instead assume the character of non-career public office holders within a constitutionally distinct category. On that footing, the Defendant argues that the requirement of “just cause” under Article 191(b) is inapplicable to their removal. Their tenure, it is said, is governed by the terms of their respective letters of appointment, and any removal must be effected in accordance with those stipulated terms.

[34] The Defendant places considerable reliance on Article 297(a), which it submits vests in the appointing authority an implied concomitant power of removal. While acknowledging that such power is constrained by Article 296, which prohibits arbitrary, capricious, or biased exercise of discretion and imports requirements of due process, the Defendant maintains that this does not extend the procedural safeguards of Article 191(b) to special-category appointments made under Articles 202 and 207.

[35] By way of analogy, the Defendant refers to the position of the Judiciary. The Attorney-General submits that although the Judicial Service forms part of the Public Services of Ghana under Article 190, a Justice of the Supreme Court is not removed under Article 191, but rather under the specific constitutional regime set out in Article 146. It is therefore contended that Article 191 cannot be construed as a universal removal provision applicable to all public officers or all presidential appointments, as the Constitution envisages different removal regimes for different offices.

[36] With respect to the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service, however, the Defendant advances a different position. It refers to section 18 of Act 537 and section 14 of Act 908, which provide that those officers are appointed in accordance with Article 195 and hold office upon the terms and conditions specified in their letters of appointment. The Defendant relies on Holding 2 in Theophilus Donkor v Attorney-General (supra) for the proposition that a public service officer appointed under Article 195 may only be removed in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment, or, where such terms are absent or silent, for just cause under Articles 191 and 195.

[37] In that regard, the Defendant concedes, at least in principle, that Article 191(b) may become relevant in respect of the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service where the governing instruments do not prescribe removal conditions. It nevertheless maintains that where valid letters of appointment exist and expressly stipulate the terms of removal, those contractual terms constitute the governing framework.

[38] Finally, the Defendant submits that any complaint arising from the alleged wrongful termination of an Article 195 appointment is, at its highest, a personal right enforceable by the affected office holder in the High Court, and does not properly found the invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in matters of public interest. In support, the Defendant relies on Sam (No. 2) v Attorney-General [2000] SCGLR 305, Adjei Ampofo (No. 1) v Accra Metropolitan Assembly and Attorney-General [2007–2008] SCGLR 611, as well as Bilson v Attorney-General (supra) and Dafeamekpor v Attorney-General (Writ No. J1/19/2023), contending that the present proceedings amount, in substance, to an impermissible request for an advisory opinion.

[39] Based on all of the above and other submissions stated in the Statement of Case, the Attorney-General submits that the Plaintiffs have not shown sufficient basis for the enforcement and interpretation of the term “just cause” as used in Article 191(b). Consequently, the Defendant submits that the Plaintiffs’ case has no merit and should be dismissed. iv. The Issues for Determination:

[40] Subsequent to the filing of the Statements of Case by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, the parties, in compliance with Rule 50 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16), filed a Joint Memorandum of Issues on 30 August 2024. By that Memorandum, the parties agreed on six issues for determination, all of which were adopted by the Court at the hearing held on 16 December 2025. The issues, as settled by the Court for determination, are as follows:

1. Whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been properly invoked to entertain the instant suit.

2. Whether the phrase “just cause” as provided under Article 191(b) of the 1992 Constitution is applicable to the dismissal or removal from office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service.

3. Whether the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service cannot be dismissed or removed from office by the President of the Republic unless upon situations of resignation, retirement, death, proven stated misbehaviour or misconduct, incapacity to perform the functions of the office by reason of infirmity of body or mind or serious violations of the 1992 Constitution.

4. Whether the practice of the termination or removal from office of the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director–General of the Prisons Service and Comptroller General of the Immigration Service by the President of the Republic in the absence of a just cause within the meaning of Article 190(1)(b) of the 1992 Constitution is unconstitutional.

5. Whether or not the President of the Republic of Ghana pursuant to Articles 202 and 207 of the 1992 Constitution, section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) and section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 has the legal authority to remove from office the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire Service, Inspector-General of Police, Director-General of Prisons Service and Comptroller General of Immigration Service without recourse to Article 191 of the 1992 Constitution.

6. Whether or not Article 191(b) of the 1992 Constitution also applies to the category of Heads mentioned in Article 202(1), 207(1) of the Constitution, section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) and section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908). v. The Law, Analysis & my Opinion:

[41] My Lords, my understanding of the issues raised and set out above is that, save for Issue 1, which concerns jurisdiction, the central question in this matter is whether the President possesses the constitutional authority to remove the heads of Ghana’s principal security services at pleasure, or whether such officers enjoy constitutional security of tenure and may only be removed for “just cause.”

[42] Issues 2, 3, and 6 collectively require the Court to determine the scope and applicability of Article 191(b) of the Constitution, particularly whether officers such as the Inspector-General of Police, the Chief Fire Officer, and the Comptroller-General of Immigration qualify as protected public officers whose removal must be grounded on recognised constitutional causes such as misconduct, incapacity, incompetence, resignation, retirement, or death.

[43] Issue 4 raises the question of the constitutional validity of removals effected without the existence or assignment of just cause, and whether such removals are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

[44] Issue 5 concerns the extent of the President’s powers under Articles 202 and 207 of the Constitution, together with the relevant statutory enactments, namely, the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537), and the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908), and whether those provisions confer an unfettered power of removal or remain subject to the protections afforded under Article 191(b).

[45] Fundamentally, therefore, this case calls for a determination of whether the heads of Ghana’s major security institutions enjoy constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure, or whether they serve solely at the discretion and pleasure of the appointing President.

[46] My Lords, the obvious starting point of this opinion ought to be the first issue set down, namely, whether this Court’s jurisdiction has been properly invoked. The parties have advanced divergent arguments on the matter. This Court’s jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the Constitution is conferred by Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution. In establishing their capacity to institute the present action, the Plaintiffs aver that the first Plaintiff is a Centre for Policy and Education, a civil society organisation registered under the laws of this country and engaged in public interest advocacy, while the second Plaintiff is a Ghanaian citizen, security expert, and academic.

[47] The jurisprudence of this Court on the capacity to invoke its exclusive original jurisdiction under Articles 2 and 130(1) has been firmly settled in a number of decisions of this Court, including Bimpong-Buta v General Legal Council and Others (supra), Sam (No. 2) v Attorney-General [2000] SCGLR 305, and Adofo and Others v Attorney-General & Cocobod [2005-2006] SCGLR 42.

[48] Based on the materials filed and the arguments advanced, it is my considered opinion that the Plaintiffs, who are not seeking to enforce personal fundamental human rights, possess the requisite capacity to maintain this action without demonstrating any personal interest in the outcome of the suit. Contrary to the Defendant’s contention that no genuine issue of constitutional interpretation arises, and that the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the High Court, the instant suit is, in my view, properly maintainable before this Court. This is because the Plaintiffs’ case is not one for the enforcement of fundamental human rights, the forum for which is the High Court pursuant to Article 33 of the Constitution.

[49] The Plaintiffs seek the interpretation of Articles 190(1), 191, 196, 199, 200, 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 205, 207(1), 207(2), 207(3), and 296 of the 1992 Constitution, specifically as to whether the President possesses the constitutional authority to remove the heads of Ghana’s principal security services without reasons, or whether such officers enjoy constitutional security of tenure and may only be removed for “just cause.”

[50] The Plaintiffs have accordingly invoked the interpretative jurisdiction of this Court to ascertain the meaning and effect of the aforementioned constitutional provisions, with a view to discerning both the subjective and objective purposes underlying them. My Lords, based on the case presented by the parties, it is my view that a genuine issue of interpretation arises for determination and the Plaintiffs have properly invoked our jurisdiction. My reasoning is based on the applicable principles comprehensively discussed in the oft-cited decision of Republic v Special Tribunal; Ex Parte Akosah [1980] GLR 592, which are as follows:

“(a) Where the words of the provision were imprecise or unclear or ambiguous. Put in another way, it would arise if one party invited the court to declare that the words of the article had a double meaning or were obscure or else meant something different from or more than what they said;

(b) Where rival meanings had been placed by the litigants on the words of any provision of the Constitution;

(c) Where there was a conflict in the meaning and effect of two or more articles of the Constitution and the question was raised as to which provision should prevail; and

(d) Where on the face of the provisions, there is a conflict between the operation of particular institutions set up under the Constitution, and thereby raising problems of enforcement and of interpretation.”

[51] My Lords, I note that the traditional position articulated in Osei Boateng v National Media Commission [2012] 2 SCGLR 1038, where the majority held that this Court could not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction unless such enforcement necessarily involved constitutional interpretation, thereby rendering the two jurisdictions conjunctive, has since been modified. In the unanimous decision in Kor v Attorney-General and Another (supra), this Court held that its enforcement jurisdiction is distinct from, and independent of, its interpretative jurisdiction, as made clear under Article 130(1)(a) of the Constitution.

[52] Having carefully considered the materials filed and the arguments advanced in the respective statements of case, I am satisfied that, applying the principles set out in Republic v Special Tribunal; Ex Parte Akosah (supra), the Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of constitutional interpretation concerning the true meaning of the phrase “just cause” under Article 191(b), and whether that provision applies to the heads of the four security services, namely the Fire Service, the Police Service, the Prisons Service, and the Immigration Service. Consequently, I hold that our jurisdiction under Article 130 of the Constitution has been properly invoked to entertain the instant suit.

[53] As indicated elsewhere in this opinion, the central question underlying Issues 2 to 6 is whether the heads of the country’s principal security institutions enjoy constitutionally protected security of tenure, or whether they hold office solely at the pleasure and discretion of the appointing President. In view of the common constitutional theme running through these issues, I consider it both convenient and appropriate to address them together.

[54] My Lords, after carefully considering the arguments advanced by the parties, together with a close examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, I am of the considered opinion that Article 191 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana is, both by its text and underlying constitutional purpose, a provision intended to secure the protection of public officers. This conclusion is apparent, first, from the heading of Article 191 itself, namely, “Protection of Public Officers.” Under the established principles governing constitutional interpretation in Ghana, the heading of a constitutional provision, though not conclusive, constitutes a legitimate aid to interpretation and may properly be taken into account in ascertaining the object and purpose of the provision.

[55] In that regard, section 15 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) provides as follows: “Titles placed at the head or beginning of a subdivision of an enactment and notes and references placed before the beginning of a provision are intended for convenience of reference only but may be used as an aid to construction of the enactment.” Accordingly, the heading of Article 191 is not to be regarded as a mere descriptive label. Rather, it expressly proclaims the constitutional purpose of the provision, namely, the safeguarding of public officers against arbitrary interference with the security of their tenure.

[56] Secondly, the historical context underlying the 1992 Constitution lends further support to this protective purpose and to the view expressed above. The Report of the Committee of Experts (Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana), which substantially informed the framing of the Constitution, reveals a deliberate constitutional policy aimed at insulating officers within the public service from arbitrary removal and political interference. The Committee recognised that the effective implementation of governmental programmes necessarily depends upon the stability, continuity, and institutional independence of the public administration. It accordingly cautioned against the practice, prevalent under earlier constitutional dispensations, whereby public servants were subjected to arbitrary and summary dismissal upon changes in political leadership. In the Committee’s considered view, such practices fostered insecurity of tenure, weakened institutional professionalism, and engendered a culture of servility and political dependence within the civil and public services. It is against this historical and constitutional backdrop that Article 191(b) was enacted as a safeguard intended to restrain the arbitrary exercise of executive power over public officers and to secure the independence and integrity of the public service.

[57] The text of the Constitution, as set out under Article 190(1), clearly and unequivocally makes all four institutions whose heads are the subject of this suit part of the Public Services. For the avoidance of doubt, I consider it necessary to reproduce the constitutional provision verbatim, as follows:

190. THE PUBLIC SERVICES OF GHANA.

(1) The Public Services of Ghana shall include—

(a) the Civil Service, the Judicial Service, the Audit Service, the Education Service, the Prisons Service, the Parliamentary Service, the Health Service, the Statistical Service, the National Fire Service, the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Police Service, the Immigration Service; and the Legal Service; [Emphasis Mine].

[58] The question, however, is whether Article 191(b), which provides as follows:

191. PROTECTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.

A member of the public services shall not be—

(b) dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause. [Emphasis Mine], applies to all institutions listed under Article 190, including the Fire Service, the Police Service, the Prisons Service, and the Immigration Service, and their heads such that officers and heads of the institutions may not be dismissed, removed from office, reduced in rank, or otherwise punished except for “just cause”.

[59] My Lords, the phrase “just cause” is not defined in the Constitution, but in my opinion, its ordinary and natural meaning, as informed by the constitutional context in which it appears, denotes a legitimate, rational, and demonstrable reason grounded in the conduct or capacity of the officer or person concerned.

[60] In ordinary and practical terms, “just cause” requires some form of stated misconduct, proven misbehaviour, incapacity, or other objectively justifiable ground, consistent with the standards applicable under the employee’s manual or the service regulations of the relevant public service. Further, the requirement of “just cause” implies that the affected officer must be afforded an opportunity to know the case against him and to respond to it, an elementary requirement of natural justice and due process.

[61] The question whether Article 191(b) extends to the heads of the institutions whose removal constitutes the subject matter of this suit is of considerable importance. This is so because, in Theophilus Donkor v Attorney-General (Writ No. J1/08/2017) delivered on 12 June, 2019, a decision to which both parties referred in their respective statements of case, this Court addressed the standing of public officers appointed under Article 195 to whom Article 191(b) applies, as distinct from those officers to whom the Article is inapplicable.

[62] Again, for the avoidance of doubt, I reproduce verbatim Article 195(1) of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

195. APPOINTMENTS, ETC. OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or to act in an office in the public services shall vest in the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the governing council of the service concerned given in consultation with the Public Services Commission.

[62] This Court in the Theophilus Donkor v Attorney-General (supra), speaking through Kotey JSC, classified persons appointed under Article 195 of the Constitution into the public service as public officers, and observed as follows:

“The overwhelming majority of staff of public corporations and authorities would be members of the public service as described by article 190 of the Constitution. Such staff must, in accordance with article 195 of the Constitution, be appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the governing board of the corporation given in consultation with the Public Services Commission. Such persons are public officers and therefore governed by article 191 (b).”

[63] Again, the Court, in its analysis, drew a clear distinction between persons appointed into the public service pursuant to Article 195(1) of the Constitution and those appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State under Article 70. In elaborating upon this distinction, the Court observed as follows:

“Members of governing bodies of public corporations are appointed by the President, acting in Consultation with the Council of State pursuant to article 70(1)(d)(iii) and the constitutive Act of a particular corporation. The permanent staff of public corporations, on the other hand, are public officers appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the governing board of the corporation concerned given in consultation with the Public Services Commission, pursuant to article 195(1) and the constitutive Act of the public corporation concerned.”

[64] My Lords, the decision in Theophilus Donkor v. Attorney General (supra) bears direct relevance to the instant matter. It is significant to observe that the heads of the four security services are not appointed by the Head of State through a uniform constitutional process. In the case of the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service, their appointments are made by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State pursuant to Articles 202(1) and 207(1) of the Constitution respectively. By contrast, the appointments of the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service are made under their respective enabling enactments in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution.

[65] My Lords, the appointments of the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of the Immigration Service are specifically governed by section 18 of the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537) and section 14 of the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908), respectively. These provisions stipulate that such officers are appointed in accordance with Article 195 and hold office on the terms and conditions specified in their respective letters of appointment. Consequently, it is my opinion that, in relation to these two heads of security services, and based on the decision in Theophilus Donkor v Attorney-General (supra) although both institutions fall within the public services pursuant to Article 190(1), their appointments are made under Article 195. However, they hold office subject to the terms and conditions contained in their respective letters of appointment and may only be removed in accordance with those terms.

[66] Upon a careful consideration of the arguments advanced by both parties, together with a close examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and the applicable decisional authorities on the subject, I am firmly of the view that Article 191(b), though applicable to members of the Public Services generally, cannot be construed as imposing upon the offices presently under consideration the same rigid tenure protections applicable to ordinary public servants. In my respectful opinion, the phrase “just cause,” as employed therein, must be interpreted contextually, having regard to the special constitutional and security-sensitive character of the offices in question.

[67] My view, therefore, is not that the heads of the Police Service, Prisons Service, Immigration Service, and Fire Service fall altogether outside the scope of Article 191(b). Rather, it is that the constitutional content of “just cause,” when applied to such offices, must necessarily reflect the operational, command, and national security responsibilities attached to them. These offices are not merely administrative appointments; they are positions of executive confidence within institutions central to the preservation of public order, internal security, and constitutional stability.

[68] As stated earlier, the phrase “just cause” is not defined in the Constitution. Therefore, in my opinion, the interpretation of the phrase “just cause” in Article 191(b), in relation to the public service pursuant to Article 190(1), and the security chiefs in particular ought to be as observed by Date-Bah JSC in Asare v. Attorney-General [2003–2004] 2 SCGLR 823, wherein he stated as follows:

“What interpretation is to be given to the words should depend upon the Court’s perception of the purpose of the provision and the context of the words, rather than on their dictionary meaning”. [Emphasis Mine].

[69] I am of the view that, in this context, “just cause” should not be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, but should instead be construed in light of the purpose and functions of the various categories of public service under Article 190(1). In the same way as this Court held in Theophilus Donkor v. Attorney-General that Article 191(b) does not apply uniformly to all public servants, I am of the opinion that “just cause,” as used in Article 191(b), and interpreted consistently with its text, context, and purpose, does not admit of a single, rigid definition applicable in every case. The Constitution is not a rigid code but a living instrument, and its provisions must therefore be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the diverse functions and responsibilities of different categories of public officers. Accordingly, the concept of “just cause” must be understood as encompassing a range of legitimate grounds for removal, the precise content of which may vary according to the nature of the office and the constitutional responsibilities attached to it.

[70] The offices presently under consideration are not ordinary administrative posts. The Inspector-General of Police is the constitutional head of the Police Service. The Director-General of Prisons is the constitutional head of the Prisons Service. The Comptroller-General of Immigration and the Chief Fire Officer are likewise heads of security-sensitive statutory services. These offices occupy the point at which public administration, internal security, executive policy, institutional command, and public order intersect. They are, therefore, public service offices, but offices of a special constitutional and functional character.

[71] In my respectful opinion, the offices presently under consideration belong to a narrow category of constitutional offices which, though situated within the broader public services, nevertheless constitute offices of executive confidence and operational command. Such offices derive their distinct constitutional character not merely from the fact of presidential appointment, but also from the nature of the responsibilities attached to them. Their holders are required, on a continuous basis, to coordinate directly with the Executive on matters touching upon national security, public order, internal stability, and emergency response. The Constitution could not have intended that officers occupying such sensitive command positions remain wholly insulated from the Executive’s assessment of institutional confidence, operational effectiveness, and security coordination. To hold otherwise would risk producing a constitutional structure in which responsibility for national security is vested in the Executive, whilst effective control over the operational leadership of the security services is constitutionally fragmented.

[72] In my respectful opinion, that special character is decisive. Article 191(b) provides that a member of the Public Services shall not be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank, or otherwise punished without just cause. That provision protects public officers from victimisation, punishment, arbitrary removal, and capricious executive action. It is an important constitutional guarantee. But it does not follow that the phrase “just cause” bears one rigid meaning across all categories of public office. A clerk in a ministry, a career immigration officer, a police constable, a member of the Judicial Service, a Chief Director, an Inspector-General of Police, and a Justice of the Supreme Court do not occupy the same constitutional position merely because they all serve the Republic.

[73] In the case of the heads of the security services, just cause must be sufficiently broad to encompass considerations rationally connected to institutional discipline, operational effectiveness, public confidence, national security, lawful executive policy, the integrity of the service, and the President’s constitutional responsibility for the effective governance and security of the Republic.

[74] The distinction must be maintained between removal from the public service as a form of punishment and removal from the headship of a security institution as an incident of constitutional command and executive responsibility. Where a security chief is dismissed from the public service, reduced in rank by way of punishment, or otherwise subjected to disciplinary sanction, Article 191(b) and the applicable disciplinary procedures assume their full force. However, where the President, acting within constitutional limits, withdraws confidence in a person serving as the operational head of a security service and appoints another person to lead that institution, the matter ought not to be treated as an ordinary disciplinary dismissal. Rather, it is a question of constitutional command, executive confidence, and the administration of public security.

[75] The President is the Head of State and Head of Government under Article 57 and exercises the executive authority of the State under Article 58. He also bears constitutional responsibility for the preservation of the State and the effective execution of lawful government policy. The security services in issue are central to public order, internal security, border control, custodial security, emergency response, and national stability. It would be constitutionally incoherent to impose ultimate political and constitutional responsibility for these matters upon the President while denying him meaningful authority to ensure that the persons leading these institutions are individuals in whom the Executive can repose the requisite confidence.

[76] In my view, in construing “just cause” under Article 191(b) with regard to the heads of the security services, the proper test ought to be whether the removal is rationally connected to the nature of the office and to a constitutionally legitimate purpose. Such a purpose may include incompatibility with lawful security policy, intelligence-based security concerns, inability to implement lawful executive directives, a breakdown in confidence between the Executive and the head of the service, or any other reason reasonably related to the effective performance of the security institution.

[77] I would therefore state the governing principle as follows: the heads of the Police Service, Prisons Service, Immigration Service, and Ghana National Fire Service are public officers within the constitutional architecture of the Public Services, but they are not ordinary public servants enjoying an immutable right to remain as heads of their respective institutions until retirement. The President possesses constitutional authority to remove or replace them as heads of service where there exists a reason rationally connected to national security, operational confidence, lawful executive policy, or the proper functioning of the service concerned.

[78] This is not to suggest that the requirement of “just cause” is thereby diluted or rendered illusory in relation to these officers. Rather, it is to affirm that the concept is sufficiently broad to encompass a ground of removal rooted in the President’s assessment, upon assuming office or while in office and on the basis of intelligence and other relevant security information available to him, that the continued tenure of a particular head of service poses a risk to, or is otherwise incompatible with, the national security interests of the State. The President, acting on such information, may accordingly relieve such an officer of his or her position for the just cause of safeguarding the national security of the country.

[79] In my respectful opinion, any interpretation that substantially impairs the State’s defensive capacity may undermine the very constitutional order the courts are sworn to protect. It would therefore be constitutionally incongruous to impose responsibility upon the President for national security while simultaneously depriving the President of effective control over the leadership of the security institutions at the centre of this case.

[80] The Court must avoid an interpretation of Article 191(b) that produces what this Court, speaking through Date-Bah JSC in Ransford France (No. 3) v Electoral Commission & Attorney-General [2012] 1 SCGLR 705, described as a “nuclear meltdown” of government. A Constitution must not be interpreted in a manner that separates responsibility from authority. If the President is to be answerable to the people for the safety, security, and effective governance of the Republic, he must possess sufficient constitutional authority to ensure that the leadership of the security services is consistent with that responsibility.

[81] The President swears an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. That obligation is neither ceremonial nor passive; it imposes an affirmative constitutional duty to respond to threats against the State. Where intelligence available to the President indicates that a security chief no longer commands confidence, poses a security risk, has compromised operational integrity, or is otherwise incapable of effectively discharging the functions of office, the President must retain sufficient constitutional latitude to act swiftly and decisively.

[82] To that extent, it is my opinion that a judicial interpretation requiring the demonstration of “just cause” in such circumstances may, in effect, compel the President to retain in office an individual whom the President, on the basis of confidential intelligence, reasonably regards as unsuitable for continued command. Such an approach risks constraining the President’s constitutional duty to secure the State and safeguard national security.

[83] My Lords, I am persuaded by the argument advanced and the analogy drawn by the Attorney General with the Judicial Service. As provided under Article 190(1), the Judicial Service forms part of the Public Services of Ghana. However, Justices of the Superior Courts are not removed under Article 191(b) but rather under Article 146, which prescribes a distinct procedure grounded in stated misbehaviour, incompetence, or inability to perform the functions of office.

[84] In my respectful view, it may be contended that the existence of Article 146 does not place judges beyond the reach of the requirement of just cause, as Article 146 itself embodies and gives concrete expression to that principle. In my view, the framers of the Constitution deliberately provided for the removal of the Chief Justice and other Justices of the Superior Courts under Article 146, notwithstanding that the judiciary forms part of the public service.

[85] To that extent, it is also my opinion that it was an equally deliberate omission by the framers of the Constitution not to provide similar removal provisions for the Police Service, headed by the Inspector-General of Police under Chapter Fifteen, and for the Prisons Service, headed by the Director-General of the Prisons Service under Chapter Sixteen.

[86] In my respectful view, these structural choices reflect a conscious constitutional design that recognises the distinct institutional roles of these services and the authority of the appointing power, namely the President, within the broader framework of his constitutional duty to uphold and protect the Constitution.

[87] I am of the view that the framers of the Constitution deliberately chose not to set out a detailed procedure akin to Article 146 for the removal of security chiefs, because they recognised that decisions concerning the command, coordination, and confidence structures of security institutions fall within the core of executive competence. Consequently, in my view, a court which, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, restrains the President from removing a security chief by requiring ‘just cause’ based on the ordinary meaning of the phrase risks venturing into the forbidden terrain of executive administration and security management.

[88] My Lords, while on the subject of deliberate choice by the framers of the Constitution, a review of the Plaintiffs’ arguments, as contained in the statement of case, shows that they referred to the Committee of Experts’ Report and contended that, in drafting Article 191(b) of the Constitution, the framers intended that there should be “stability and continuity” in the public service, such that persons who hold office ought to be treated in a decorous manner and without discrimination. I note, however, that the Plaintiffs’ arguments fail entirely to recognise that the security heads, whose positions are the subject matter of this suit, are not mere public servants, but persons appointed to assist the President in the maintenance of national security and the defence of the Constitution.

[89] In further support of their argument, the Plaintiffs, at point 5.58 of the statement of case, submit that “there is guidance from other jurisdictions such as Kenya. My Lords, just as in Ghana, the Office of the Inspector-General of Police for the Republic of Kenya is a creature of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. However, unlike Ghana, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya specifically sets out the circumstances that may warrant the removal of the Inspector-General of Police. These instances are all instances founded on just cause.”

[90] It is interesting to note that the Plaintiffs make reference to the framers of the Constitution having been guided by the lessons of our history when they drafted Article 191(b). In like manner, could it also be that the framers of the Constitution, being mindful of our history of coups d’état, deliberately chose not to provide elaborate circumstances and procedures in the Constitution for the removal of a security chief that would fetter the discretion of a President or government to work with a security head where intelligence suggests that such a person ought not to remain in office?

[91] In any event, it is my considered view that, if the Kenyan model is to be adopted into our constitutional framework, it ought to be done through constitutional amendment process, and not by way of judicial interpretation under the guise of judicial activism.

[91] Finally, my Lords, it cannot be denied that it is a settled principle that where the Constitution vests in the President the power of appointment, such a grant is understood, whether expressly stated or by necessary implication — to carry with it, in appropriate cases, an incidental power of removal, particularly in relation to sensitive executive offices, save where the Constitution has clearly circumscribed that authority. The effect is that the conferment of the power of appointment on the President necessarily implies a corresponding power of removal. This accords with the well-established maxim qui potest destituere potest instituere, upon which the Defendant places reliance under Article 297(a). That Article provides that where power is conferred on any person to do, or to secure the doing of, any act, there shall be deemed to be included all such incidental and ancillary powers as are necessary to enable the effective discharge of that mandate. Accordingly, the power of removal of a security head is properly to be regarded as incidental to, and implied within, the power of appointment by the President. vi. Conclusion & Disposition:

[92] My Lords, as stated in paragraphs 42 to 44 of this opinion, I understand that the issues raised by the parties, particularly Issues 2, 3, and 6 — require the Court to determine the scope of applicability of Article 191(b) of the Constitution, specifically whether security chiefs such as the Inspector-General of Police, the Director-General of Prisons, the Chief Fire Officer, and the Comptroller-General of Immigration qualify as protected public officers.

[93] I also understand Issue 4 as questioning the constitutional validity of removals effected in the absence of, or without the assignment of, just cause. Issue 5 concerns the extent of the President’s powers under Articles 202 and 207 of the Constitution, together with the relevant statutory enactments, namely the Ghana National Fire Service Act, 1997 (Act 537), and the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908), and whether those provisions confer an unfettered power of removal or remain subject to the protections afforded under Article 191(b).

[94] Based on the analysis in this opinion, I hold that all four institutions, the heads of which are at the centre of this suit, form part of the public service of Ghana. To my mind, the applicability of Article 191(b) is distilled from this Court’s decision in Theophilus Donkor v. Attorney General to the effect that a public service officer appointed under Article 195 may only be removed in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment or, where such terms are absent or silent, for just cause under Articles 191 and 195. The Court also held that public servants or staff employed by institutions recognised as part of the public services under Article 190 of the Constitution, and whose appointments were made in accordance with the advice of the governing board of the corporation given in consultation with the Public Services Commission, are public officers and are therefore governed by Article 191(b). In respect of such public officers, it is my opinion that they cannot be removed without just cause.

[95] It is also my opinion that Article 191(b) is not applicable to the Chief Fire Officer and the Comptroller-General of Immigration by reason of the mode of their appointment, as was held in Theophilus Donkor v. Attorney-General. In the case of the Inspector-General of Police and the Director-General of the Prisons Service, whose appointments are made by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State pursuant to Articles 202(1) and 207(1), Article 191(b), though applicable, must be construed within the purpose and context of their appointments and their roles within the security architecture of the State. This is because they are not mere public servants as ordinarily understood under Article 190(1), although the institutions they head fall within the public services. To the extent that these security heads are not mere public servants, it is my view that the interpretation of “just cause” must be anchored in legitimate national security considerations, which are, by their nature, within the peculiar knowledge of the appointing authority, namely the President.

[96] On Issues 4 and 5, I am of the opinion that, while the President does not possess an unfettered power of removal, being subject to the Constitution and therefore unable to remove the head of a security institution arbitrarily or capriciously, the interpretation of “just cause” under Article 191(b) must always be construed in furtherance of the President’s constitutional duty to secure the State and safeguard national security. To that extent, no head of a security institution can be said to enjoy a fixed tenure insofar as the framers of the Constitution did not expressly provide for one.

[97] The concept of “just cause,” which lies at the centre of this suit, is, in my view, not confined to misconduct or misbehaviour in the narrow disciplinary sense or retirement as argued by the Plaintiffs. In its application to the heads of the security services, “just cause” must be interpreted purposively so as to encompass legitimate national security interests. The President of the Republic, as Commander-in-Chief and as the constitutional authority primarily charged with responsibility for the security of the State, is entitled to determine, on the basis of intelligence and security information available to him, that the continued tenure of a particular head of a security service is incompatible with the national security interest. Such a determination, in my respectful view, constitutes “just cause” for removal within the meaning of Article 191(b).

[98] My Lords, in conclusion, I wish to emphasise that, in constitutional democracies, liberty and security must coexist in careful balance. While the courts, particularly this apex court, unquestionably bear the solemn duty of preventing arbitrariness, illegality, and abuse of power, that duty must be exercised with equal recognition of the constitutional responsibilities entrusted to the Executive in matters of national security.

[99] Accordingly, where the Constitution vests executive authority in the President to preserve public safety and defend the constitutional order pursuant to Article 58 of the Constitution, the courts, in interpreting the Constitution, must exercise appropriate judicial restraint and decline to impose rigid limitations that would inhibit the President from removing a security chief on the basis of confidential intelligence assessments, particularly where judicial intervention would impair the effective discharge of the Executive’s constitutional responsibility for national security and the preservation of the constitutional order.

[100] While I find the Plaintiffs’ case to be a bold attempt to ensure that the heads of our security services serve until their mandatory retirement ages, and I commend them for it, I am not persuaded they are entitled to the reliefs sought, for the reasons set out in the analysis above. I will therefore dismiss the suit in its entirety. I so hold and declare accordingly.

(SGD.) K. T. ACKAAH-BOAFO

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

KOFI BENTIL ESQ. FOR PLAINTIFFS WITH PAA JOY AKUAMOAH ESQ. AND DORIS LARTEY ESQ.

ADWOA O. ABENG (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY) FOR THE DEFENDANT WITH NANCYNETTA TWUMASI ASIAMAH (PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY) AND AFRAKOMA BOATENG (STATE ATTORNEY)