IMPRAIM vs. BAFFOE [1980] GLR 520
19 September 1980 · OKUNOR J · ≈ 10 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 6Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Hill v. Curtis (1865) L.R. 1 Eq. 90; 35 L. J. Ch.133; 13 L. T. 584; 12 Jur. N. S. 4; 14 W.R. 125.
(2) Atkinson, In re; Pybus v. Boyd [1918] 2 Ch. 138; [1918-19] All E.R. Rep. 1043; 87 L.J. Ch. 505;
119 L.T. 235.
(3) Lybbe (Decd.), In re; Kildahl v. Bowker [1954] 1 W.L.R. 573; 98 S.J. 215; sub nom. Lybbe’s Will Trusts, Re Kildahl v. Bowker [1954] 1 All E.R. 487.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the plaintiff on an originating summons for the determination of the rights of beneficiaries of a will. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
J. D. Hammond for the plaintiff.
G. K. Acquah for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF OKUNOR J.
This is an originating summons taken under Order 54, r. 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), on 8 February 1977 requesting the court to determine two specific issues endorsed on the summons.
The facts which led to this action are that the late Thomas Marshall made a will dated 28 May 1937 before his death. In the will he devised his house “Jehova Villa”, inter alia, to certain named individuals, and further directed: “that both themselves (names mentioned above) and their children may enjoy and occupy the dwelling house ‘Jehova Villa’ as Family House.” Further down the will (and I presume the part on which the argument of the defendant is mainly hinged) the testator directed: “My dwelling house ‘Jehovah Villa’ referred to in this will should not be sold for any purpose but be a family house.”
It is the complaint of the plaintiff that all went well until all the executors died. Then the defendant stepped in in 1959, and argued that the house in question was a family house and since he was head of the testator’s family, he had the right to manage and control the house; he has since that time collected all rents accruing from the house to the detriment of the plaintiff who is the sole survivor of the specifically named beneficiaries in the will. Upon these facts, and in these circumstances, the plaintiff requested the court to determine the following questions:
Whether “Jehova Villa” is for the whole family of Thomas Marshall (deceased) by virtue of his will dated 28 May 1937.
(b) If the defendant and other family members have an interest in the “Jehova Villa” that is the extent of their interest.
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It must first of all be noted that the interpretation, construction or implementation of a will really amounts to finding out the intentions of the testator at the time he wrote the will, and those intentions must be gathered, as far as is practicable, from the actual words used in the will by the testator.
In fact, this is one of the main reasons why the law insists that a will should be in writing. Where the intention is not easily ascertainable from the words as used, resort may then be had to the rules devised by law for the purpose. Secondary, in construing a will – indeed any document – the clauses should be read with reference to each other, unless it is quite clear from all the circumstances that they were meant to be independent of each other. Thirdly, a person construing a will is denied the luxury of conjecture though not precluded from making necessary inferences.
This last will and testament of Thomas Marshall of Elmina and Apam made on 28 May 1937 by which will he expressly revoked all wills and testamentary instruments heretofore by him made, read:
“This is the last will and testament of me, Thomas Marshall of Elmina and Apam and now residing at Cape Coast in the Gold Coast Colony and by divine grace, priest and founder of the National Church of Christ Mission, West Africa (Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone).
I hereby revoke all wills and testamentary instruments heretofore by me made.
I appoint my uncle James Andrew Noonoo Senior of Sekondi, Harry Ghansah and Joe Ghansah (Cousins) of Beulah Lane, Cape Coast, Gold Coast, to be the executors of this my will. I direct my executors to see that my just debts and funeral and testamentary expenses are paid by my sister Effuah Nyaniba alias Johanna Marshall, my nephew Hymond Edmund Anfom and my two legitimate daughters Araba Asiaba alias Catherine Thomasina Marshall and Effuah Takyiwah alias Mrs. Charlotte Marshall Impraim and my wife Christina Neizer alias Mrs. Christina Marshall.
I give and bequeath to my sister Effuah Nyaniba alias Johanna Marshall, my nephew Hymond Edmund Anfom and my two legitimate daughters Araba Asiaba alias Catherine Thomasina Marshall and Affuah Takyiwah alias Mrs. Charlotte Marshall Impraim and my wife Christina Neizer alias Mrs. Christina Marshall share and share alike, all my real and personal property of what nature of kindsoever as well as any money I may have including my freehold dwelling house named ‘Jehova Villa’ on the part of the plot of land No. 33, situate lying being at Jukwa Road, Cape Coast with its land measuring 200 feet by 74 feet (two hundred by seventy-four feet) where the
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school stands bequeath to the National Church of Christ Mission by me and that both themselves (names mentioned above) and their children may enjoy and occupy the dwelling house ‘Jehova Villa’ as Family House together with the other properties referred to in this will but their husbands or wives they may marry shall have no power whatsoever or control over the same.
At the same time should any of my relatives in both maternal and paternal side be in need of residence he or she may be given a room to occupy. My dwelling house ‘Jehova Villa’ referred to in this will should not be sold for any purpose but be a family house.
Regarding my mission “National Church of Christ Mission” of West Africa (Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) I hereby appoint and depute my right nephew Hymond Edmund Anfom to be the General Superintendent to manage and control and supervise the same with the assistance of all the ordained ministers ordained by me in the mission in Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone and the General Superintendent (Bishop) so appointed by me shall be entitled to all the Bishop’s fund due to the Bishop to be paid by all the stations for his support and general oversight of the work vide para. (35) section 3, page 15 of our Church Constitution.”
As I have already indicated, the awkward section is the penultimate clause beginning with the words “I give and bequeath … “and ending with the words “My dwelling house ‘Jehova Villa’ referred to in this will should not be sold for any purpose but be a family house.”
I think the first point which hits anyone confronted with looking for the intention of the testator, and which incidentally turns out to be the answer to the first issue endorsed on the summons is that the testator did not intend to leave the enjoyment of the house “Jehova Villa” in the hands of all and sundry in this family either immediate or outer.
He achieved this in two ways: Firstly, he named the specific individuals who together with their children shall occupy and enjoy the property; the fact that the individuals mentioned are members of his family does not to my mind, automatically confer any rights on the family as a whole. Secondly, he expressly stipulated the interest if “interest” it may be called – which all other members of his family may have in the property. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius; the fact that he expressly identified members of his family who should benefit from his property is proof that the other members of the family are excluded especially when he went on and expressed in no uncertain terms what the interest of all other members of his family should have in that part of his will which read: “At the same time should any of my relatives in both maternal and paternal side be in need of residence he or she may be given a room to occupy.”
My specific answer therefore to the first question endorsed on the summons, namely “Whether the ‘Jehova Villa’ is for the whole family of Thomas Marshall (deceased) by virtue of his will dated 28 May 1937” is “No!” It is not. To the second question, i.e. “If the defendant and other family members have an interest in the ‘Jehova Villa’ what is the nature and extent of their interest?” The answer is that the interest which other members have in the property has been clearly stated in the passage quoted above in the will itself, namely “… should any of my relatives [and by ‘relatives’ the testator could a only have meant members of his family] in both maternal and paternal side be in need of residence he or she may be given a room to occupy.” Beyond this, no member of the family outside the category stipulated has any interest whatsoever in the house.
As regards the defendant, in particular, he does not even appear to qualify for the gratuitous offer made in the passage quoted above. In his affidavit in opposition filed on 12 May 1977 he describes himself as living at Agona Abrem and in paragraph (7) stated: “That I am not myself staying in the said house neither am I deriving any interest from my management of the said house.” If defendant is living at Agona Abrem, then I presume he is not “in need of residence” and consequently he has absolutely no interest in “Jehova Villa” at least for the moment.
As to his own confession that he has been managing the house since the death of the executors, that only makes him liable as an executor de son tort ( i.e., of his own wrong). Any person who, not having been appointed executor of a will, either expressly or by implication, intermeddles with the goods of the deceased in such a manner as to show an intention of exercising the authority of an executor, may make himself liable as an executor de son tort.
Very slight acts of intermeddling will make a person executor de son tort, for example, receiving debts due to the estate. The defendant confesses to collecting rents due to the estate. The executor de son tort is liable to be sued by the rightful executor or administrator or by a legatee. He must account to the personal representative and will thus put an end to his liability except as regards outstanding legal actions: see Hill v. Curtis (1866) L.R. 1 Eg. 90.
Mr. Acquah, counsel for the defendant, draws the attention of the court to the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the will in which the testator directed that the “property in question, i.e. ‘Jehova Villa’ should not be sold for any purpose but be a family house” and argued that that meant that the testator intended that on the death of the last of the children of the named beneficiaries the house must remain to the benefit of the whole family because the last surviving child is specifically forbidden from selling it which he
[p.526] of [1980] GLR 520
would otherwise have the power to do. Assuming that this was the true intention of the testator, it is not part of the case of the defendant that the last surviving child of the specifically named beneficiaries is dead which should enable the defendant as head of the testator’s whole family to take over for the benefit of the testator’s family. In any case, I do not share Mr. Acquah’s interpretation of the situation.
I have already indicated that the clause of a will must be interpreted with reference to one another, and what the testator meant by “family house” was made quite clear earlier in the will when he said the named beneficiaries and their children should use the property as “family property” and not his own family of which the defendant claims to be head. The defendant’s claims as head of the testator’s family affords him no benefit in the enjoyment, immediate, future or contingent, of the property in dispute because the property was not devised by the testator to the testator’s family. Who then are the members of the devisee family? Or as Mr. Acquah put it: ‘What happens to the property when the last of the surviving children dies without the power to alienate?”
As a general rule, the expression “children” means immediate descendants and does not include grandchildren: see In re Atkinson; Pybus v. Boyd [1918] 2 Ch. 138. It may however appear on the construction of a particular will that the testator used the word “Children” in a wider sense so as to include grandchildren and remoter issues and this may appear in the context of the will itself: see In re Lybbe (Decd.), Kildahl v. Bowker [1954] 1 W.L.R. 537. In the will under consideration, the testator obviously a man of a respectable level of education and a minister of religion excluded his family, and devised the property to a devisee family and decreed that the house should never be sold.
In such a context the word “children” can only make sense and give expression of his intention if it is construed to include remoter issues of the specified beneficiaries. But one thing it does not, in my view, do; it does not let in either the defendant or the entire family of the testator of which the defendant is head. The beneficiaries specified in the will, would therefore take as purchasers and their descendants according to law would on the death of the last surviving child take by descent ad infinitum.
DECISION
Order accordingly.
S. O.
