IN RE ADJANCOTE ACQUISITION; KLU vs. AGYEMANG II [1982-83] GLR 852
15 December 1982 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 17 min read
[1982] SLR (CA) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Yaw v. Atta [1961] G.L.R. 513.
(2) Beng v. Poku [1965] G.L.R. 167, S.C.
(3) Commissioner of Lands v. Adagun (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 206.
(4) Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336.
(5) Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana Family [1959] G.L.R. 362, C.A.
(6) Adjeibi-Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 3. W.A.L.R. 257, P.C.
(7) Summey v. Yohuno [1962] 1 G.L.R. 160, S.C.
(8) Ankrah v. Botoku, Re; Accra Industrial Estate Acquisition [1966] G.L.R. 119, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellant from the decision of the lands tribunal wherein the respondent was adjudged to be entitled to be paid monetary compensation for land acquired by the government. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Edward Wiredu J.A.
COUNSEL
Tagoe (with him Chinnery) for the appellant.
Ohene-Ampofo for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.A.
The dispute in this case is about title to a piece of land described by the name Adjancote. This land was acquired some time ago by the Government of Ghana for the purpose of building a television station for the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation.
[p.855] of [1982-83] GLR 852
The present appeal before us is the result of the determination by the lands tribunal of rival claims for monetary compensation arising out of the said acquisition submitted to the government by three claimants each claiming to own the acquired area.
The lands tribunal in its judgment dated 26 February 1976, expressed satisfaction with the case presented by and on behalf of the first claimant and found for him, rejecting the cases of the second and third claimants.
The three claimants before the lands tribunal were the Berekusu stool as the first claimant; the Nuumo Nmashi family of Teshie comprising the Krobo, Klu and the Agbawe quarters as the second claimant, and the Nii Dowuona family of Osu as the third claimant.
Both the second and third claimants appealed from the judgment in favour of the first claimant but the third claimant failed to prosecute his appeal having withdrawn his application for variation of the judgment.
For the purpose of easy identification, the two parties to this appeal would simply be referred to as the respondent (the first claimant) and the appellant (the second claimant).
One main ground of appeal was originally filed by the appellant who expressed an intention to file additional grounds later. This ground reads: “(a) The judgment is against the weight of evidence.” Later two additional grounds of appeal were filed on his behalf. These read:
“(1) The trial court erred in preferring the traditional evidence of the first claimant to the traditional evidence of the second claimant without assigning reasons therefor.
(2) The trial court erred in finding that ‘despite all these tribal wars, the first claimant’s ancestors held tenaciously to the top of the hill’ without regard to facts in recent years as established by the evidence.”
It must be mentioned in passing that when the appeal first came before us an objection was taken on behalf of the respondent affecting its propriety but we became satisfied that the appeal was properly before this court after hearing learned counsel for the appellant on the objection. We therefore acceded to an application for leave by learned counsel for the respondent to withdraw the objection. Arguments before us by learned counsel for the appellant were based on the two additional grounds filed.
In the course of the hearing of the appeal it became necessary to order a plan in order to identify the various villages named in the proceedings in relation to the acquired area. A Mr. Lassey, a licensed surveyor of Ho, was by consent appointed to undertake the survey and exhibits CA la and CA 1b are the results of the survey work
[p.856] of [1982-83] GLR 852
undertaken by him. He testified before us on 22 November 1982. His evidence shows that (a) all the villages within the vicinity of the acquired areas were occupied by members of the appellant’s followers: see exhibit CA la, and (b) there were no established villages within the acquired area itself: see exhibit CA 1b. This evidence formed the additional materials placed before us for the hearing of the appeal.
Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant were largely elaboration of the matters raised in the additional grounds of appeal filed. The pith of his submission was that had the tribunal considered the undisputed facts in the case and the traditional evidence which were supported by the admitted facts as required by law it would have rejected the case put forward by the respondent and found for the appellant whose followers were undisputedly in possession of the villages established around the disputed area as the more probable story. He said, the finding by the tribunal that the appellant’s people founded the villages within the neighbourhood of the disputed area by a grant from the respondent without assigning any reason was wrong in law. He referred to the cases of Yaw v. Atta [1961] G.L.R. 513 and Beng v. Poku [1965] G.L.R. 167, S.C. to support his contention.
For the respondent, Mr. Ohene-Ampofo submitted that the tribunal found the respondent as the original settlers who admitted the appellant’s people into occupation and rejected the latter’s claim to ownership in their own right. This finding according to learned counsel, was borne out by the overwhelming evidence on record. He contended therefore that the judgment was sound and ought not to be disturbed.
The first apparent finding which the tribunal made which I entirely indorse is the finding that the whole evidence produced at the trial was traditional. The tribunal also appeared to have approached the case by forming the view that each claimant was a plaintiff and therefore assumed the onus of proving his case. I have no quarrel with this approach except for the particular facts of this case where one party admits the possession of another but asserts that he granted and permitted the possession of his opponent. Under such situations, I think different considerations arise as to who assumes the onus of proof.
We shall first examine how the tribunal treated the traditional evidence produced by the parties, then the method of approach adopted with regard to the onus assumed by each of them to see how its conclusions can be supported.
In this connection, the first question that may be asked arising out of the finding that the whole evidence tendered was traditional is: To what extent have our courts treated and accepted oral traditional evidence as sufficient to establish title to land?
[p.857] of [1982-83] GLR 852
My researches in this regard have revealed that the present attitude of our courts on the matter is gathered mostly from case law, from which the following guiding principles emerge:
(1) Oral evidence of tradition is admissible in the courts of West Africa and may be relied upon to discharge the onus of proof if it is supported by the evidence of living people of facts within their own knowledge: see Commissioner of Lands v. Adagun (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 206.
(2) Where it appears that the evidence as to title is mainly traditional in character on each side and there is little to choose between the rival conflicting stories the person on whom the onus of proof rests must fail in the decree he seeks: see Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336 and Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana family [1959] G.L.R. 362.
(3) Where there is a conflict of traditional history, the best way to find out which side is probably right is by reference to recent acts in relation to the land: see Yaw v. Atta [1961] G.L.R. 513.
(4) Where claims of parties to an action are based upon traditional history which conflict with each other, the best way of resolving the conflict is by paying due regard to the accepted facts in the case which are not in dispute, and the traditional evidence supported by the accepted facts is the most probable: see Beng v. Poku [1965] G.L.R. 167.
(5) Where the whole evidence in a case is based on oral tradition not within living memory, it is unsafe to rely on the demeanour of the witnesses to resolve conflicts in the case: see Adjeibi-Kojo v.
Bonsie (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 257, P.C.
To the above may be added the following legal principles as to the onus of proof.
(6) Where the admission of one party establishes that the other party has been in long undisturbed possession and occupation of the disputed land, the party making the admission assumes the onus to prove that such possession is inconsistent with ownership. The law is that such a person in possession and occupation is entitled to the protection of the law against the whole world except the true owner or someone who can prove a better title: see Abakam Effiana Family v. Mbibado Effiana Family (supra).
(7) In a claim for title to land where none is able to show title because of want of evidence, or that the evidence is confusing and conflicting, the safest guide to determining the rights of the parties is by reference to possession: see
[p.858] of [1982-83] GLR 852
Summey v. Yohuno [1962] 1 G.L.R. 160 at p. 167 per van Lare J.S.C.
With the above as guiding principles, I shall proceed to examine the evidence in this case to see how far the appellant’s complaint against the judgment appealed from is made out.
As earlier observed, I indorse the finding by the tribunal that the whole evidence in the case is traditional. It is, however, not clear from the tribunal’s judgment what impelled it to prefer the traditional story of the respondent to that of the appellant. I myself have found it difficult after carefully considering the whole evidence to choose between the two rival traditional evidence produced by the two. I consider them evenly balanced.
None of the witnesses who testified in the case had personal knowledge of the matters he testified about. Following the principles laid down in such cases as Beng v. Poku (supra) and Adjeibi-Kojo v. Bonsie (supra), as enunciated above, I am of the view that the safest guide which the tribunal should have adopted in resolving the conflicts in the case presented by the parties was by paying due regards to the accepted facts in the case which were not in dispute and the traditional evidence supported by the accepted facts. Failing the above, the tribunal should rely on possession.
Now what are the undisputed and admitted facts in the instant case? These are (a) that the appellant’s people own and occupy all the villages very close to the acquired area; and (b) the admission by the respondent that Ojo Ablorh, the first witness for the respondent, who on the undisputed evidence is a member of the appellant’s followers, is farming in the acquired area: see exhibit CA 1b. It is true that this witness testified to support the respondent’s case but the question is how far is his evidence reliable or was accepted by the tribunal to justify any reliance on it? This witness in my estimation was the most inconsistent, unreliable and discredited witness in the whole proceedings. He is from the Teshie Agbawe family.
He is described by the tribunal as someone who used to be the chief of Akporman. He testified that the land on which he farmed within the acquired area was sold to his ancestors by the respondent’s ancestors and that Akporman village was founded by his ancestors. This village is in the neighbourhood of the acquired area, a distance of about three-quarters of a mile from it. The witness claimed to have been told this by his father. He was the ninth person in succession to the Akporman stool. He has no personal knowledge about how his people came to the area except what he was told by his father. He swore positively that according to his father the land was sold to his ancestors by the respondent’s ancestors.
When pressed in cross-examination this is what he had to say:
[p.859] of [1982-83] GLR 852 “MR. ABLORH: You have been at Akporman all your life?
OJO ABLORH: Yes, I have been living there throughout my life.
MR. ABLORH: And you have been giving evidence here that you bought Akporman land from the Berekusu people?
OJO ABLORH: I was not talking about the village, I was talking about the hill. As for the village I did not know whether it was bought by our ancestors from the ancestors from Berekusu.
CHAIRMAN: You said the other day at this tribunal that Akporman was bought by your ancestors from ancestors from Berekusu. Are you denying it?
OJO. ABLORH: I did not say so, I did not remember saying so.
MR. ABLORH If you do not remember having said anything about from whom Akporman was purchased then from whom was it purchased?
OJO ABLORH: If you are now asking me then I would consult my elders.
CHAIRMAN: Answer the question.
OJO ABLORH: I would ask my elders first.
MR. DUA SAKYI: Do you know from where your people acquired Akporman?
OJO ABLORH: I do not know.
MR. ABLORH: You told this court last week that when Osu came you took them to Boi Lakpa.
OJO ABLORH: That was what I was told by my elders.
MR. ABLORH: Are you still saying at this tribunal that your people bought land from Berekusu people?
OJO ABLORH: Yes.
MR. ABLORH: So you have admitted that you said so?
OJO ABLORH: Yes.
CHAIRMAN: Nii Ojo Ablorh, is it true that Akporman was bought from Berekusu people?
OJO ABLORH: Yes.
CHAIRMAN: You have not been truthful to this tribunal.”
Witness admitted not being on good terms with his elders. He denied a suggestion that a meeting was held by his elders at which meeting he was rebuked and destooled for going to see the respondent
[p.860] of [1982-83] GLR 852
about the acquisition. He further said he did not know why his elders were not on good terms with him. The significant points here are that in his evidence-in-chief he said his knowledge about the grant was through his father, in cross-examination he says through his elders, and the chairman of the tribunal found him an untruthful witness.
Contrary to what the tribunal found, he denied having engaged a lawyer in connection with the acquisition, yet in cross-examination, this is what he had to say.
“MR. ABLORH: You said you discussed it with a lawyer but you do not know the name of the lawyer?
NII OJO ABLORH: As he was hired by the chief of Berekusu I did not know his name but he took me to his office and I narrated what I know to him.
MR. ABLORH: Is it not correct that it was the Teshie mantse who got the lawyer for you?
NII OJO ABLORH: None of the chiefs in Teshie has ever hired any lawyer for me.
MR. ABLORH: I am putting it to you finally that you have not been helping this tribunal but you decided to tell consistent lies.
NII OJO ABLORH: That is not correct.
MR ABLORH: I am further putting it to you that you have been destooled by your people and you are no longer the chief of Akporman.
NII OJO ABLORH: I have not been destooled; we are fighting over it.”
Further evidence which shows the unreliability of the testimony of the witness can be found where in cross-examination he denied that gong-gong was always beaten in the name of the chief. Back to the acquired area, this is what the witness said in cross-examination despite his assertion in his evidence-in-chief that the acquired area was in the exclusive possession of the respondent.
“MAJOR BROWN: Are you telling us that the top of the hill where the TV station is now and the subject-matter of this case belongs to Adjetey Nkpa?
NII OJO ABLORH: He farmed up to the portion of the site but the other portion does not belong to him.
CHAIRMAN: So that you are saying that the portion at the top where the TV station is belongs to your brother?
[p.861] of [1982-83] GLR 852 NII OJO ABLORH: He farmed up to the top of the hill where he formed boundary with the Gble people.
CHAIRMAN: So part of the land on the top of the hill belongs to your brother?
NII OJO ABLORH: Yes.
CHAIRMAN: Who succeeded your brother Adjetey Nkpa?
NII OJO ABLORH: Adjetey Fio succeeded Adjetey Nkpa but he is also dead.
CHAIRMAN: Who succeeded Adjetey Fio?
NII OJO ABLORH: I succeeded Adjetey Fio.
CHAIRMAN: Why did not you put in a claim for that small portion at the top.
NII OJO ABLORH: My Lord, from the beginning I did not know that there was a dispute about that portion of the land and it was later that I got to know.
MR. DUA-SAKYI: That is why you have taken a lawyer?
MAJOR BROWN: Are you saying that part of the hill on which the TV station stands belongs to you by inheritance?
NII OJO ABLORH: I am claiming that portion to be mine because I inherited my elder brother and succeeded my father.
MAJOR BROWN: So you are claiming the whole of the TV station or half?
NII OJO ABLORH: I am claiming half.
MR. DUA-SAKYI: You are the witness for Gble people here?
NII OJO ABLORH: Yes.
MAJOR BROWN: Are you here to give evidence that the whole of the top of the hill belongs to Gble people or part of the top or that part belongs to them?
NII OJO ABLORH: I am trying to show that half of the portion belongs to me and the other half belongs to Gble people.
MR. DUA-SAKYI: The chief of Gble is claiming the whole land on the top, do you agree with him?
NII OJO ABLORH: If he is claiming the whole portion of the land then he has stolen part of my land.
MR. DUA-SAKYI: But the chief is claiming the whole land and what do you say?
NII OJO ABLORH: I do not agree with him if he is claiming the whole land in dispute.
MR. DUA-SAKYI: You have now made it clear to us that although you are here as a witness for the
[p.862] of [1982-83] GLR 852
chief, part of the land belongs to you. Do you know of any other people claiming that they also have land at the top of the hill as Teshie or Osu people are saying?
NII OJO ABLORH: As for Teshie people I alone have a land there but in the case of Osu people, I do not know whether Gble people have given them any land.”
A close examination of the whole of the evidence of this witness, whom, on exhibit CA 1b, the respondent admits has possession of the acquired area, seems to lend some credence to the allegation of his collusion with the respondent. First, by his contact with the respondent without reference to his elders; and secondly, his testimony-in-chief that the acquired area belongs to the respondent contrary to his answers in cross-examination that he owned half of the acquired area. He belongs to the Agbawe branch of the Teshie people. His claim to own half portion of the hill exclusively to his family cannot be true.
The admission by the respondent of possession and occupation by a member of the appellant’s followers of a portion of the acquired area and the founding of the villages established by them within its vicinity throw a very heavy burden on the respondent who claims to have granted and permitted these possessions and occupation to show that such possession and occupation are not in their own right. This is especially so in view of the stand taken by the appellant who deny his control over areas occupied by his followers including the acquired area.
This burden the respondent was unable to discharge. He was unable to show either that any of the appellant’s followers paid tribute or do homage to his stool. The evidence is to the contrary. It shows that the appellant’s followers hold the villages they have established around the hill in their own right and have since time immemorial been in undisturbed possession and control.
This possession by the appellant’s followers has statutory recognition. The State Property and Contracts Act, 1960 (CA 6), raises a rebuttable presumption of ownership in favour of a person in possession of land.
The evidence by the respondent that the land which the appellant’s followers occupy were sold to them by his stool as supported by Ojo Ablorh cannot be accepted in view of the inability of the respondent who asserts the sale to prove the extent of the land sold, for an ill-defined area cannot be priced. In like manner, would the admission by Ojo Ablorh that the area was sold not help him either, for, if it is accepted it would mean that the respondents ceased to have any interest in any portion of the lands occupied by the appellant’s followers.
[p.863] of [1982-83] GLR 852
It was held by the Supreme Court in Re Accra Industrial Estate Acquisition; Ankrah v. Botoku [1966] G.L.R. 119, S.C. that in an acquisition case, as against the government, each party claiming to be an owner of the land must succeed on the strength of his own title. It seems clear from the detailed examination of the evidence I have made, that the appellant has shown a better claim to title to the land acquired than the respondent. The latter, apart from bare assertion of ownership, has not shown any vestige of title. At all events, as it is clear on the evidence that the appellant and his grantees and licensees are in possession of the land and villages almost contiguous to the acquired land as owners it is reasonable to conclude that they are in possession of the acquired hill as well. That being so, they should “be deemed to have been lawfully entitled to such lands unless the contrary be shown.” The respondent attempted to show the contrary but failed to do so.
In my opinion, had the tribunal applied the proper principles of law to a determination of this case and made an objective examination of the evidence, they would have had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the appellant established a better claim to the land. I hold that he has done so. Accordingly, I judge him entitled to the compensation payable for its acquisition by the government. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from and I would declare that the second claimant, representing the Nuumo Nmashi family, is entitled to the compensation in respect of the land acquired for the TV station at Adjancote.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
I agree and have nothing to add.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A I also agree.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
