IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II vs. ABUDULAI (NO. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
17 December 1986 · SOWAH CJ · ≈ 72 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Kosia v Nimo (1950) DC (Land), ‘48-’51, 239.
(2) Bima v Barfi (1951) DC (Land) ‘48-’51, 371.
(3) Adjomoa v Amargyei [1961] GLR 170, SC.
(4) Nyamekye v Tawia [1979] GLR 265, CA (full bench).
(5) Praka v Ketewa [1964] GLR 423, SC.
(6) Asibey III v Ayisi [1973] 1 GLR 102, CA.
(7) Logs and Lumber Ltd v Oppong [1977] 2 GLR 263, CA.
(8) Eku alias Condua III v Acquaah [1968] GLR 412, CA.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeal (see [1984-86] 2 GLR 189, CA) setting aside all the recommendations of the Ollennu Committee Report and the government’s white paper accepting the recommendations and findings of the committee in a suit to determine the Namship of Yendi. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Sowah CJ and Adade JSC.
COUNSEL
Nana Otoamfom Bekoe (Peter Adjetey) (with him Ibrahim Mahama) for the appellant.
E. O. Appiah for the respondent
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH C.J.
Sowah C.J. delivered the judgment of himself, Taylor and Francois JJSC and of Osei-Hwere, Amua-Sekyi and Ampiah JJA. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (see In re Yendi Skin Affairs; Abudulai v Yakubu II [1984-86] 2 GLR 189, CA) which set aside all the findings and recommendations of the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee established under the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry Instrument, 1972 (EI 74 of 1972), and the white paper on those recommendations accepted by government. The membership of the committee comprised: the Hon Mr Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu, Chairman; Nana Sir Tsibu Darko X, member; Nana Atakora Amaniampong II, member; and Togbe Adja Tekpor VI, member.
The terms of reference of the committee were as follows:
(a) to ascertain the correct custom and customary procedure for the nomination, selection and enskinment of a Ya-Na including the correct list of candidates;
[p.244] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 (b) to inquire into the circumstances leading to the enactment of the Declaration of Customary Law (Dagomba State) Order, 1960 (L.I. 59), and its subsequent revocation and the advisability or otherwise of its reinstatement;
(c) having regard to sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph to inquire whether or not the purported deskinment of Ya-Na Andani III was justifiable;
(d) to inquire whether or not the method adopted in declaring and enskinning Mahamadu Abudulai as Ya-Na after the acceptance of the recommendations of the Mate Kole Committee Report was in conformity with Dagomba custom, bearing in mind sub-paragraph (a);
(e) to inquire into and examine the competing claims to the Yendi skin and make recommendations thereon between the Andani and Abudulai families; and (f) any other matter that appears to the committee to be reasonably connected with the foregoing matters . . .”
At the end of an exhaustive inquiry manifested by the number of witnesses called, the proceedings and research into the Dagomba Constitution and the law governing the matter, it made the following findings: (1) Selection of a Ya-Na is made by four elders of Dagomba, who are the traditional kingmakers; these are, (i) Kuga-Na, (ii) Tugurinam, (iii) Kpati-Na, and (iv) Gomli.
(2) The customary procedure for selection of a Ya-Na is soothsaying; and (3) The correct list of candidates consists of occupants of three skins, known as gate skins, namely (i)
Karaga, (ii) Mion, and (iii) Savelugu.
The white paper accepted some of the findings including the following:
(a) That the traditional selectors of a candidate are the Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Kpati-Na and the Gomli:
(i) that the customary procedure of selection of a Ya-Na is by soothsaying;
(ii) that no Ya-Na can be enskinned before the late Ya-Na’s funeral takes place,
(iii) that with regard to the Dagomba State Council in 1948 creating a selection committee to supersede the customary body, it is void by reason that it contravened the provisions of the
Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No 2 of 1932);
[p.245] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 (iv) government accepted the committee’s findings and endorsed its views that the purported deskinment of Ya-Na Andani III was not justifiable;
(v) the committee found that the purported nomination, selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai were null and void;
(vi) it came to this conclusion because first, Mahamadu Abudulal had not occupied any of the three skins, the occupation of which is a condition precedent to selection to the Namship; secondly, Mahamadu Abudulai was not selected by the constitutional body of kingmakers, rather his purported election was made by the illegal selection committee; and thirdly, his purported installation was procured by the force of arms;
(vii) government accepted the findings that the so-called enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai is null and void as the correct customary procedures for the nomination, selection and enskinment of a Ya-Na were not followed;
(viii) on the question of competing claims to the Yendi skin, the committee found that by custom there are two ruling families or houses in the Dagomba dynasty, namely the Abudulai house or family and the Andani house or family and that these two families succeed to the skin by rotation; and
(ix) government accepted the committee’s recommendation that the rotation system should be restored and strictly enforced henceforth.
Government also accepted the committee’s findings that Yakubu Andani, the eldest son of Na Andani III who was appointed Gbong-Lana after his father’s death, continued to be Gbong-Lana.
The committee found that the appointment to certain important skins in Dagomba was the exclusive prerogative of a Ya-Na. These skins included the three gate skins of Karaga, Mion and Savelugu. In filling skins, the custom is that the Ya-Na, by convention, should appoint from both members of the Abudulal family and the Andani family to ensure that the gate skins are occupied by members of both families to maintain the custom of succession to the Nam by rotation. It has already been noted that the Court of Appeal set aside the findings of fact and the acceptance of the recommendations in the white paper.
All the evidence, submissions of counsel and further submissions before the Supreme Court are supplemented by further submissions made on the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the Court
[p.246] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 of Appeal has no advantage over the Supreme Court; it is not, however, the function of the Supreme Court to substitute its opinion for the Court of Appeal except in so far as it is expedient to correct errors of law if any, and errors in the wholesale findings of fact by the Court of Appeal itself to which this court shall in due course address itself.
The customary constitutional law on or before 1948 is not much in dispute. Fortunately it has been historically recorded by writers who are authorities on the Dagomba constitution and people. These books and articles were written in tranquil times, when the present long drawn-out litigation was not envisaged. They were in this court’s view objective statements of the customary law at the time. The first of such authors’ work was Foster Tamakloe’s monograph: A Brief History of the Dagbamba People; the second, Rattray’s Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, Vol 2. The most important of the papers is the conference held at Yendi from 21 to 29 November 1930, to inquire into and record the Constitution of the State of Dagbon.
That history as recorded was the custom prevailing as at the year 1930. The acting chief commissioner in opening the 1930 conference addressed the chiefs on the agenda and gave this admonition to the Dagomba chiefs, “the information conveyed under these heads would be recorded in writing and signed by the Ya-Na, his divisional chiefs and counsellors.” He went on, “once the information concerning the custom was recorded and confirmed by the chiefs nothing could be changed unless they met in council to do so.” He therefore solemnly charged them to be true for the good of the state but not for their own ends. The acting chief commissioner informed the assembly that the findings of the conference would be given statutory recognition.
The conference of 1930 discussed the Constitution of the State of Dagomba and this information was recorded:
“WE THE UNDERSIGNED CHIEFS AND COUNSELLORS OF THE DAGBAMBA STATE COUNCIL, DO HEREBY STATE THAT ONLY FROM THE FOLLOWING THREE CHIEFTAINSHIPS MAY SELECTION BE MADE FOR THE NAM OF YENDI, VIZ: KARAGA-NAM, MION-NAM AND SAVELUGU-NAM.”
This resolution was signed by the Ya-Na and his chiefs and counsellors on 25 November 1930 as appendix C. There was another resolution on the administration of Dagomba. It stated that the State of Dagomba was administered by the Ya-Na assisted by a judicial committee of elders and a state council comprised of the divisional chiefs and elders. The divisional chiefs and elders in the past were only summoned in matters of importance such as a declaration of war or the changing of a custom. The Ya-Na, however, declared that if he had the
[p.247] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 occasion to make a new law, it would not be customary to summon the full council, he would merely promulgate the law and make it known to the divisional chiefs. There was a further agreement that on the death of a Ya-Na and other chiefs, the affairs of town and court would be temporarily in the hands of Gbong-Lana the eldest son except in a case of mental incapacity.
Pursuant to the 1930 conference, the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No 2 of 1932) was passed. The Ollennu Committee in comparative study and analysis of the various legislations affecting the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories, arrived at the conclusion that upon the appointment by the Chief Commissioner of the Dagomba State Council as a native authority under Ordinance No 2 of 1932, that body became a creature of statute. “It is not an indigenous body.” This definition and conclusion are some of the bones of contention. We think that there can be little doubt that the entity created by section 3 of Ordinance, No 2 of 1932, was a creature of statute.
Mr Appiah submitted that after the promulgation of Ordinance No 2 of 1932, a statutory body was created with powers and functions defined in the statute. Equally existing side by side with the statutory body was the traditional council of elders and chiefs which performed those customary functions which it did before the Ordinance was passed. The latter concerned itself with traditional matters such as advising the Ya-Na on important matters and when the Ya-Na was contemplating a change or amendment of customary law.
Edward Wiredu JA in his judgment in support of the Court of Appeal decision, approached the matter at 204-205 as follows:
“… Ya-Na in council with his elders and divisional chiefs is an indigenous institution” … Its indigenous duties are described as: (a) declaration of war; and (b) changing of a custom or the making of a new one.
It is the customary legislative body; see Blair at 27. It was therefore wrong for the committee to have held that the Dagomba State Council was created under the Native Authority Ordinance (Northern Territories), 1932 (No 2 of 1932). Even if it is accepted that the native authority created under Ordinance No 2 of 1932 can be equated to the state council as it existed, then all that the statute did was, in my respectful view, to adopt that indigenous institution as it existed and to confer on it certain statutory duties and powers. Its indigenous legislative functions were not taken away by any statute and they were also not conferred on any other institution established. The law as I
[p.248] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 understand it is that where a body exists as an indigenous institution and a statute is passed conferring certain statutory powers or functions on such an indigenous institution, the institution is not debarred from exercising its indigenous powers and functions unless these powers were taken away expressly or are conferred by statute on another institution. Such powers as are conferred on the indigenous institution by the statute are in addition to those it already possessed.
In view of the above, I find that no legislation existed prior to 1948 that took away the indigenous legislative function of the Dagomba State Council and it was within the competence of the state council to change any custom.”
Edusei J A in his opinion, considered that the traditional council was not affected by its appointment as native authority and that it continued to perform its functions in the usual manner; further, if it was intended that the traditional council should not exercise its powers and functions in that respect the Ordinance would have said so expressly. There is merit in that argument. If we understand the argument well, it is contended that there always existed the traditional body, the state council, which concerned itself with traditional matters, and another entity described as Dagomba Native Authority under Ordinance No 2 of 1932. It is true that the personnel of the two entities may be the same but the two have different functions. The first is not affected by Ordinance No 2 of 1932. We agree with the Court of Appeal that the traditional state council when performing its customary duties is not a creature of statute.
The next question is, what were the functions of the traditional body? Can it change the customary law? For an answer we advert to the Conference of Dagbamba (Dagomba) Chiefs the Constitution of the State of Dagbon, vide pages 23 and 27. The conference agreed that the State of Dagomba was administered by the Ya-Na assisted by a judicial council of elders and a state council composed of divisional chiefs and elders. This latter was in the past only summoned in matters affecting the kingdom such as declaration of war or the changing of custom. The Ya-Na said, “formerly, if the Ya-Na made a new law, he did it in council with his elders, but did not consult the divisional chiefs.” It must always be borne in mind that the Dagomba State was feudal in character and that all power emanated from the Ya-Na. He created chiefdoms and filled them. All land is owned by him. Until recently, no land in Dagomba could be transferred without his consent.
The Gbong-Lana had no such powers even if he is regarded as the regent. It is necessary at this stage to find out the powers of the
[p.249] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
Gbong-Lana when acting as Ya-Na in the event of the latter’s death: see appendix H to the conference papers which do define his functions as, “At the death of any chief of Yendi, affairs of town and court are temporarily in the hands of Gbong-Lana, i.e. the eldest son, except in cases of mental incapacity.” And Tamakloe in his Brief History of the Dagomba People at p 59 described the Gbong-Lana as “the presider over funeral customs and not regent as has been erroneously used in most cases in the Courts of the Northern Territories.” We do not think that Gbong-Lana has the power in association with a group of chiefs to alter the custom in the manner he did. As at 1930, the sole repository of power to make law reposed in the Ya-Na. The Gbong-Lana is not a Ya-Na.
At p 348 of the West African Chiefs, it is stated that after the death of Ya-Na Abudulai on 2 February 1938:
“a dispute arose as to the succession. The senior son of the dead Na, Alhassan chief of Adibo became regent.
Three candidates put forward their claim. The first, Muhammed, was a son of the former Na Andani and had become Mion-Lana in 1931. . . The second, Yaqub also a son of Na Andani, had been Kpatinga-Na and had been promoted to Savelugu in 1935. The third Karaga-Na Jibril was only a token candidate, a great grandson of Yana Yaqub, neither his father nor grandfather had held the paramountcy. . . The administration stepped in and on 23 September 1938, made Mion-Lana Mohammed Yana. . . The principal interest in this contest is that Gbong-Lana Alhassan also advanced his candidacy for the Namship arguing that the regency should constitute a fourth gate of Yendi. His attempt to prevent by force the new Yana from entering the palace was thwarted by the British. His loyalty was, however, secured by giving him the vacant skin of Mion from which in time he might make a bid for the paramountcy.”
After the conference of Dagomba chiefs had on 25 November 1930 categorically indicated that “only from the following three chieftainships may selection be made for the Nam of Yendi, viz Karaga-Nam, Mion-Nam and Savelugu Nam”, this is the first time when this customary legal position was apparently questioned and the settlement was a rejection that the regency was a fourth gate.
On 1 October 1941, the District Commissioner of Dagomba convened a meeting of many Dagomba chiefs including the Ya-Na and his elders. This followed apparently a complaint made by the Abudulai family against the appointment of Mohamadu the Nyologu-Na to the vacant skin of Savelugu by the Ya-Na Mahama II of the Andani house.
[p.250] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
The crux of the complaint touching future succession to the Nam of Yendi was two-fold:
(1) That the Nyologu-Na belonged to the Andani side of the family and the late Savelugu Na having also belonged to the Andani side, the present appointment should be made from that Abudulai side in order that that side of the family should have a candidate for the next Ya-Naship . . .
(2) That a Na-Yanga was eligible for election to the Savelugu Stool [sic] but that all the Na-Yanga had been told not to apply.”
The district commissioner in settling the dispute dealt with these two complaints. With regard to the first issue, he pointed out that: “the Mion-Lana was of the Abudulai side of the family and therefore that side of the family already had a candidate to the Ya-Naship.” This was admitted by the chiefs to be correct. With regard to the second question, he pointed out that if a Na-Yanga succeeded to Savelugu he could not be considered as a candidate to the Ya-Naship and as there was already a Na-Yanga at Karaga it would mean that the Mion-Lana was left with a clear field and no competitors. This was also admitted as correct by the chiefs. In the light of these facts the settlement virtually approved the appointment and confirmed the equal right of the Abudulai and Andani families in being given a fair chance to bid for the paramountcy in future contests.
The scene now moves on to 1953 which is the genesis of the tragedy which has engulfed the State of Dagomba. If the so-called committee had been faithful to its obligation and duties the sad series of events would not have occurred and the committee might in course of time have legitimised their function of selection of a candidate for the Nam.
In 1952 an Ordinance, the State Councils (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1952 (No 5 of 1952) was passed. Sections 12 and 13 thereof provided:
“12. (1) A State Council at any time may, and where the Governor so requires shall, submit to the Governor a written declaration of what in its opinion is the customary law relating to any subject in force in the area of its authority.
(2) A State Council may, at any time, submit to the Governor a written recommendation for the modification of the customary law relating to any subject in force in the area of its authority.
13. If the Governor is satisfied that a declaration or modification, made or recommended under the provisions of section 12
[p.251] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 of this Ordinance, is not repugnant to natural justice, equity or good conscience, nor incompatible either expressly or by necessary implication with any Ordinance, he may by Order direct that the customary law so declared or the modification so recommended shall be in force in any area specified in the Order.”
We will refer to the ratio decidendi in the cases of Kosia v Nimo (1950) DC (Land) ‘48-’51, 239 and Bima v Barfi (1951) DC (Land) ‘48-’51, 371 which we consider relevant and endorse the interpretation of the Divisional Courts in these cases.
The main judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by Edward Wiredu JA sought to rely on the case of Adjomoa v Amargyei [1961] GLR 170, SC to emphasise that the Andani family was guilty of condonation and were estopped by conduct from raising the legality of the selection committee. We think that that case has no relevance to the issues at stake. The Andani family has obtained no benefit from the appointment of that selection committee; in fact, that house questioned the new procedure when it realised that it was a machinery set up to defraud the Andani family of its birthright. For over 20 years it kept knocking at the gates of justice, protesting against the injury to its house. Whatever be the state of affairs before 1930, the custom had crystallised into customary rule of law in Dagomba that the candidate for the Nam of Yendi must come from one of the three gates. The state council had no aboriginal power to amend the customary law of the state at will. The statute, ie Ordinance No 5 of 1952, ss 12 and 13, regulates the manner in which the customary law can be amended.
In 1953 when the selection committee purported to appoint Abudulai II as Ya-Na, the council flouted the constitution in certain three material particulars, eg Abudulai the Gbong-Lana cannot be a candidate to the Nam, yet in flagrant violation of custom he was imposed upon the Dagomba people by the selectors of the state council, a body of doubtful authority. Thus in a letter addressed to the Government Agent dated 10 February 1954 (exhibit 8 of the Mate Kole Report) the Chief Regional Officer, A J Loveridge stated, inter alia, that the committee:
“asserts that it is for this committee to discuss any matter relating to the skin affairs. This assertion is completely wrong. The task of the committee is to choose from among the candidates from the three “Gates” already mentioned the person to succeed to the Yendi Skin. The committee does not have any authority to go outside its task and no recognisance can be taken of anything it does outside its proper scope.”
[p.252] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
(The emphasis is ours.)
Notwithstanding this admonition the selection committee purported to choose the Gbong-Lana. His candidature offended the Dagomba custom as recorded in 1930. In the past although a Gbong-Lana could apply to be Nam, the custom was that an aspirant must hail from one of these three gates. In choosing the Gbong-Lana, the committee violated the custom.
Tamakloe in his commentary about applications for the Nam says that a great many who have little hope of getting the skin do also apply alongside with the main candidates: the chiefs of Karaga, Savelugu and Mion.
The next issue is rotation of succession to the skin between the houses of Abudulai and Andani. There was abundant evidence before the Ollennu Committee that notwithstanding soothsaying the elders managed to rotate the succession from one house to the other. How it was done never came out in the evidence, may be it is one of the several secrets which were never disclosed. The stark evidence, however, is that from the period 1845 to 1945 the skin rotated from one house to the other. This list of Ya-Nas was produced in evidence and accepted by all the parties as follows:
(1) Na Abudulai I of Abudulai house.
(2) Na Andani II of Andani house.
(3) Na Alhassan I of Abudulai house.
(4) Na Bukari of Andani house.
(5) Na Abudulai II of Abdulai house.
(6) Na Mahama II of Andani house.
(7) Na Mahama III of Abudulai house.
Edward Wiredu JA in his opinion in support of the Court of Appeal decision thought that the rotation for a period of 100 years was a coincidence. If it was, it was a coincidence abundantly to be desired. Be that as it may, the list did support the evidence that there was consistent rotation between the two houses.
Tamakloe in his Brief History of the Dagomba People gives a rational explanation which might well result in rotation. He says that very often when the soothsayers are invited they often mentioned the names of minor chiefs whereupon the soothsayers were dismissed. Then nocturnal meetings were held by the elders to choose one as the paramount chief whom they probably knew had a blameless character, a thing which they had kept secret until the day is fixed. This may well be the answer of the mystery of succession during the 100 years. It gives more credit to the native intelligence of the Dagomba elders than Edward Wiredu JA was prepared to give. There is overwhelming evidence in support of the finding that the Nam is succeeded to in rotation.
[p.253] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
In 1960, the Opoku Afari Appeal Commission assisted by two assessors also arrived at the conclusion that succession to the Nam was limited to chiefs from the three gates; that the two houses succeeded to the Nam in rotation and that the incumbent, then Abudulai, was not enskinned through customary method. He, in fact, recommended that he should be deskinned. The government was unable to accept his findings not by reason of any errors in law or of fact but because at the time it was politically inexpedient to accept those findings: vide exhibits 14, 15, 16 of the report. Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah personally conducted an inquiry amongst chiefs of the Northern Regional House of Chiefs, his findings already referred to in the Ollennu Committee Report was that succession to the Nam was by rotation. It was as a result of this inquiry that EI 59 of 1960 was enacted. That instrument has been repealed. But the President must have been so impressed that he would have allowed the Andani family to occupy the Nam in two successive reigns to make up for the loss that family had suffered in being deprived of the Nam by the selectors. In Nyamekye v Tawiah [1979] GLR 265, CA (full bench) in delivering the judgment of the full bench of the Court Of Appeal (as stated in the original certified copy of the judgment dated 22 June 1978) Apaloo CJ said:
“It is often said justice consists in giving to every one his due. Where three different families are entitled to exercise one indivisible right, a scheme by which they do so in turns seems equitable and conforms with one’s notions of justice. A system of rotation is not unknown in many ‘royal houses’ in this country and as far as we are aware, no judicial tribunal has ever pronounced it to be, to use familiar phraseology’ ‘contrary to natural justice, equity or good conscience.’ On the contrary, we think it conforms with it.”
Before we are done we think we should comment on the approach to this appeal by the Court of Appeal. It conducted the appeal in the manner of a court sitting as at first instance. The court found the evidence led by witnesses conflicting and confusing and rejected them. It proceeded to make its own findings of fact. This court has had the opportunity of reading the proceedings and find that there were few lapses here and there in the evidence given by witnesses from both houses on matters they were intimately familiar with. In any event their evidence can be checked upon from other sources, such as the minutes of the 1930 Conference, Tamakloe’s Brief History; and Rattray on Tribes of Ashanti Hinterland, Vol II.
The witnesses were very old men. The Tugurinam was 86 at the time he gave evidence, the Karaga-Na was over 70 and so also were the witnesses of the Abudulai side. We think in such circumstances there
[p.254] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 were bound to be lapses of memory. They spoke in their native Dagbani which had to be interpreted. Interpretation is itself very difficult. The nuances of Dagbani language may be difficult to interpret and these and others might account for the lapses. The Ollennu Committee had an advantage over the Court of Appeal in seeing these witnesses and observing their demeanours. The committee is a fact finding committee of inquiry. There was no burden on any witness to prove anything. The witnesses gave evidence of facts they knew of and it was from the evidence that the committee would make its own findings of fact. Of course an appellate court can set aside a finding of fact if there is no evidence in support or that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily against the finding or that the inferences from the finding are wrong.
In Praka v Ketewa [1964] GLR 423 at 423-424, SC the court stated the principles which should guide an appellate court. The headnote reads:
“an appeal is by way of rehearing and so an appellate court is entitled to make up its own mind on the facts and to draw inferences from them to the extent that the trial court could. Where however the decision depends on the credibility of witnesses the appeal court ought not to interfere with findings of fact except where they were shown to be wrong or where those facts were wrong inferences drawn from admitted facts or facts found by the trial court. Where an appellate court sets aside the findings of a trial court without good ground, or upon grounds which do not warrant such interference with the findings made by the trial court, a higher court will set that judgment aside.”
In Asibey III v Ayisi [1973] 1 GLR 102 at 104, CA the headnote states that:
“when a decision upon an issue depended upon the credibility of witnesses who had given evidence at the trial and the question as to which witness was to be believed, and that question turned upon manner and demeanour, an appellate court would not interfere with a finding on that issue by the trial judge. But if there were circumstances existing which in the opinion of the court would go to credibility of witnesses, it would differ from the trial judge.
We will finally refer to Logs and Lumber Ltd v Oppong [1977] 2 GLR 263 at 265, CA where the headnote states:
Where an appellate court was satisfied that the reasons given by the trial court in support of its findings were not satisfactory,
[p.255] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 or where it irresistibly appeared to the appellate court that the trial court had not taken proper advantage of its having seen and heard the witnesses, then in such a case, the matter would become at large for the appellate court, in which case the appellate court was under the duty to give such decision as the justice of the case required, and if need be, reverse the decision of the trial court and substitute its own judgment.”
Applying these principles, this court thinks that the Court of Appeal was wrong in substituting its own findings for those of the Ollennu Committee.
We would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and orders of the Court of Appeal including costs and subject to our observation that the Dagomba Traditional State Council when performing its customary duties is not a creature of statute, we would restore the findings of the Ollennu Committee as was accepted by the White Paper WP 2/74 on the report of the said committee into the Yendi Skin Affairs.
We would order that:
(1) that the rotation system must be scrupulously observed, that is to say that after the incumbent Na Yakubu II of the Andani family, the next occupant should be from the Abudulai family in keeping with the rotatory system.
(2) that in accordance with the Dagomba Constitution only sons of former Ya-Nas should be appointed to the gate skins of Savelugu, Karaga and Mion;
(3) that having regard to the Dagomba Constitution that deskinment is unknown in Dagomba, all persons who have ever occupied the Nam of Yendi shall without regard to how they ceased to be Ya-Na be regarded as former Ya-Nas. Consequently, their sons do qualify for appointment to the gate skins of Savelugu, Karaga and Mion.
(4) to give effect to the rotation system all the three gates should not be occupied by one family.
Costs of ¢70,000 in the Court of Appeal and in this court to the appellant Na Yakubu II.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE JSC.
I regret I am unable to agree with my brother judges in the view they have taken of this appeal. I do not find it necessary to restate the facts of this case in extenso, this having been admirably done by the Court of Appeal, particularly in the leading opinion read by Edward Wiredu JA. These facts, fortunately, are largely agreed between the parties and not in dispute. The only ones which require to be addressed would seem to be the identity of the kingmakers in Yendi :
[p.256] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
(a) prior to 1948, which is a disputed question of fact; and (b) after 1948, which is a question primarily of law, depending on the status of the resolution of 1948 and its sister decision of 1953. There are two other subsidiary matters which will need to be considered. These are: (a) whether a Gbong-Lana, regent, can properly contest the Namship; and (b) whether the skin of Yendi rotates between two ruling houses, Abudulai and Andani.
Before embarking on an examination of the above issues, I must first clear the ground by looking at the status of the Dagomba State Council itself, as this was central to the arguments of the Ollennu Committee and to its conclusions. In view therefore, of the reasons given by the Ollennu Committee for declaring the 1948 resolution void (para 222 of his report) and therefore the selection committee illegal, I find it necessary to examine the relevant statutes relied on by the Ollennu Committee in arriving at that conclusion. The reasoning of the Ollennu Committee went like this: that the Dagomba State Council is a creature of statute; that its powers are as spelt out in the statute creating it; that the enabling statute, the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No 2 of 1932), did not give the Dagomba State Council power to modify the custom of the Dagomba Traditional Area; therefore the “attempted” modification of 1948- setting up a new selection committee, was ultra vires the Dagomba State Council and therefore void.
I am afraid I do not agree with the Ollennu Committee’s interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute. Section 3 of Ordinance No 2 of 1932 on which much reliance was placed for this interpretation reads:
“3 The Chief Commissioner may by Order made with the approval of the Governor (a) constitute any area and define the limits thereof, (b) assign to that area any name and description he may think fit; appoint any chief or other native or any group of natives to be a native authority for any area for the purposes of this Ordinance; and may by the same or any subsequent Order similarly made declare that the native authority for any area may be subordinate to the native authority for any other area.
(4) It shall be the duty of every native authority to maintain order in the area for which he is appointed and every native authority shall have and exercise the powers by this Ordinance conferred over all natives residing or being within such area.”
[p.257] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
The Ordinance itself is titled: “Native Authorities (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No 2 of 1932)”, and purports to be, “An Ordinance to provide for the appointment of native authorities and to prescribe their powers and duties.”
It must be noted that under the said section 3 any area at all, no matter what its extent, nor how many traditional groupings it may encompass, may be constituted a native authority area, and given such name as the chief commissioner may think fit. I do not suppose that it is being contended that if an area so constituted should take in a number of traditional groupings, those groupings would be deemed to have lost their traditional identities, and therefore ceased to have the power to discharge their traditional roles, just because they happen to have been roped into a constituted area. Besides, as can be seen from section 3 (c), the term native authority was not necessarily intended to apply to chiefs only, nor to their councils at all. Any native or group of natives could be so appointed.
The whole arrangement must be seen and evaluated in context, ie as the creation by the colonial authorities of a machinery for the implementation of a policy of indirect rule. What the colonial administration was interested in was identifying natives (be they individual persons, or groups, or chiefs, or native councils) believed to have sufficient clout and influence over particular areas, who can conveniently be relied upon and used by the colonial administration at the native level. Thus an individual person appointed for this purpose would be a native authority.
This person need not be a chief. That the original intention was to rely on and appoint individual persons is seen from the Ordinance itself, which preferred to use he to refer to a native authority rather than it (see eg s 4 et seq of Ordinance No 2 of 1932). The native authorities are therefore better seen as no more than native indigenous area representatives of the central government appointed to assist the district commissioners to administer the districts.
Seen in this light it is easy to understand why the mere appointment of a native authority had nothing to do with the traditional functions of whoever was appointed, except in so far as those functions were expressly taken away. It happens that in most areas the “privilege” of getting appointed as the central authority stool at the native level fell on chiefs (especially paramount chiefs) and their already existing traditional councils, simply because the colonial administration were quick to discover that natives tended to give unquestioning obedience to their native chiefs, regarding them as the earthly representatives of souls of their clan or kinship groups, embodied in various stools and skins.
[p.258] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
It will be noticed that the areas constituted were not necessarily coterminous with the areas of authority of particular paramount chiefs. For instance, in the Dagomba case, “lands belonging the Kokomba and Chakosi tribes”, not traditionally subject to the Ya-Na, were incorporated in the area, which was given the administrative name Dagomba Area: see Schedule to Order-in-Council No 2 of 1933. It is wrong to conclude from this that with effect from the date of this Order, ie 1 February 1933, the Kokombas and the Chakosis became traditionally absorbed by, and subject to, the Ya-Na. They were pushed into his administrative grip by the colonialists, but as Blair states (see p 15, para 39): the “Kokomba care nothing for the Na and very little for the Administration.” Under the Schedule referred to, the “constituted area” comprised:
(a) “lands subject to the Ya-Na of Dagomba.” [These will be lands over which the Ya-Na traditionally exercised suzerainty]; and
(b) “all lands belonging to the Kokomba and Chakosi tribes.” [These lands were traditionally outside the Ya-Na’s lands, but were brought into the constituted area for political administration purposes only.]
Another example may be cited from Order-in-Council No 7 of 1933 (see page 239 of the 1933 Proclamations, etc) which constituted the Mamprusi Area. The Schedule describes the area as comprising:
“those of the lands subject to the Na of Mamprusi situated within the Northern Territories together with all those lands within the Mamprusi District of Northern section of Togoland under British mandate and occupied by the Kusasi, B’Mwaba and Kokomba tribes.
(The emphasis is mine.)
The Mamprusi District already existed as an administrative unit under the political care of a district commissioner. For ease of native administration therefore the constituted area under Order-in-Council No 7 of 1933 was made co-extensive with the limits of the Mamprusi District, bringing under the Mamprusi Native Authority lands which did not necessarily belong to the Na of Mamprusi.
Examples may be multiplied. I have gone to some lengths to explain this, merely to show that the native authority concept should not, as is often done, be confused with that of the traditional [state] councils. It is wholly unacceptable to suggest that because a particular traditional council was appointed a native authority, that Council ceased to exist as a council, and from the date of the appointment was competent to discharge only the duties and functions of a native authority. This was never so. Supposing in the Dagomba case, a single
[p.259] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 individual person, believed to be a fit and proper person for the purpose, had been appointed the native authority (as indeed the chief commissioner could have done), would it have been suggested that by that appointment the Ya-Na and his council ceased to operate as a traditional native government for the Dagomba Area? The “single-person” native authority would be discharging his functions under the Ordinance No 2 of 1932, side by side with the Ya-Na and his council, save and except that where a conflict arose, it is easy to see how the solution would go.
In other words, by appointing the Ya-Na and his council as the native authority, the order merely added to, rather than took away from, the functions of the Ya-Na and his council, conflicts excepted. The appointment did not dissolve the Ya-Na and his council. Nor can it be said that the appointment created, ie brought into being, the Ya-Na and his council. The appointment merely added to the status and functions of the Ya-Na and his council. The constitution of an area is declared expressly to be “for the purposes of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1932” only and nothing else.
The appointment of the Ya-Na and his council is therefore for the purposes only of the functions expected to be discharged by native authorities under the Ordinance, without prejudice to whatever functions the council performed hitherto, unless expressly chipped off.
The question that naturally arises therefore is, what are these functions under the ordinance for which native authorities were appointed and given powers? These will be found, inter alia, in sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Ordinance No 2 of 1932 as “the duty to maintain order in the area for which he is appointed”, and for greater clarity it was emphasised under section 4 that:”… every native authority shall have and exercise the powers by this Ordinance conferred over all natives residing or being within such area” (the emphasis is mine); the implication being whether traditionally a native is a subject to the appointed native authority or not, making it an offence for such native to refuse to obey the native authority. Other functions include the power to prevent crime and arrest offenders (section 6); to employ supporting staff (section 5); and, under section 8, a whole array of general functions: to retrieve stolen goods, take remedial measures to alleviate famine, etc etc. A careful study of the legislation shows that it was never the intention to create new organs, but merely to put existing organs to use to serve the ends of empire building. More light is shed on this by the recommendations appearing at pages 16 and 17 of Blair.
Indeed, Mr Adjetey, counsel for the appellant, admits, correctly in my view, that the Dagomba State Council is not a creature of statute, contrary to what the Ollennu Committee maintains in its paragraph.
[p.260] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
148. But Mr Adjetey contends that with effect from 1933 the state council could exercise the statutory functions only and no more. I respectfully differ. Mr Adjetey’s argument runs:
“Issue is taken on the statement by the Ollennu committee at paragraph 148 of the report that the Dagomba State Council is a creature of statute, not an indigenous institution. It is queried what the Dagomba State Council was when it existed to be capable of being appointed a native authority under section 3 of Ordinance No 2 of 1932. The answer simply is that until it was constituted a native authority, the Dagomba State Council was an indigenous native institution exercising indigenous powers but that the moment it was appointed as a native authority under the Ordinance, it was clothed with statutory powers which could be exercised in accordance only with the statute. It also meant that apart from matters of a purely administrative, procedural or ceremonial nature it could exercise no jurisdiction save that which had been expressly conferred on it by the enabling statute. There is no contention here that from the date of the appointment of the Dagomba State Council as a native authority it disappeared or ceased to exist. In fact it still existed but no longer as the indigenous Dagomba State Council which it was at the time of the 1930 inquiry but as a native authority exercising powers within the framework of the Native Authority (Northern Territories)
Ordinance. If an analogy may be drawn, it may be said that the clothes of the indigenous native institution were removed and new ones were put on the institution so that thereafter it could only appear in those new clothes and do only such things as the new clothes permitted it to do.”
What Mr Adjetey fails to tell us is which section of which statute removed the old clothes. And if indeed the old clothes were removed, then from where did the state council get the powers to exercise what Mr Adjetey calls the “purely administrative” jurisdiction, inter alia? In the light of the provisions of the relevant statutes, I have no hesitation in concluding that Mr Adjetey’s reasoning is fallacious.
The colonial administration knew of the existence of the Dagomba State Council; it knew that the Dagomba Traditional Area was a unit of indigenous administration with a recognised head.
Paragraph 3 of Order-in-Council No 7 of 1933 stated simply, “3 The Ya-Na of Dagomba and his Council shall be the Native Authority for the [Dagomba] Area”: see 233 of the 1933 Proclamations, etc. In appointing it a “Native Authority” it was merely “creating” another central government body at the local level over an area bigger than the
[p.261] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
Dagomba Traditional Area, to assist in implementing the policy of indirect rule. It must be observed that the phrase “native authority” is a term of art used in contra-distinction to “central authority” which is the colonial government. Indeed, rather than appoint the Dagomba State Council a “native authority”, it could equally appropriately have been appointed “a government agent”, ie the agent of the central government at the local (ie native) level. The idea therefore was not to deprive it of its traditional powers, but to give it authority to represent the government in addition. Hence Ordinance No 2 of 1932 is silent on the customary functions of the state council. These were not intended to be affected by the Ordinance.
On the vital issue of the status of the Dagomba State Council I hold that the Dagomba State Council was not created by statute; it is not a creature of statute. The whole administrative strategy is summed up by Blair in para 39 at p 15 as follows:
“The Divisional Chiefs are to be taught to govern the primitive pagans as they themselves are governed, and that is through their headmen instead of dealing with them directly.”
This is the philosophy of indirect rule- government was to be through native headmen and native institutions already in place, instead of directly from the central government to the so-called “pagaus” In the process, destroying the native institutions, as is implied in the Ollennu Committee interpretation, runs counter to the success of that policy, and is tantamount to cutting the ground from under the central government.
Consistent with the policy of indirect rule, the native authority idea was made to percolate from the larger units (the states) to the towns. Attention may be drawn to Order-in-Council No 1 of 1933 titled Native Authority (Dagomba Subordinate Area) Order, 1933, effective from 1 February 1933. That Order appointed a number of subordinate native authorities, thirteen in all, to be responsible for native administration within major towns in the Dagomba State. All the sub-chiefs of the Ya-Na and their councils become native authorities. Thus the Gushie-Na and his council became the native authority for Gushigo; Gulkpe-Na and his council for Gulkpe; Karaga-Na and his council for Karaga; Mion-Na and his council for Sambu; Savelugu-Na and his council for Savelugu; and so on. These sub-chiefs and others together with the Ya-Na, constituted the council for the State of Dagomba; they formed the Dagomba State Council.
I do not suppose that it is being contended that because, say, the Karaga-Na and his council were appointed a native authority for Karaga:
[p.262] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
(a) the Karaga-Na and his council became creatures of statute; and
(b) they ceased to perform any duties outside those specified in the Ordinance.
If this were so, the Karaga-Na and his council could not discharge any customary functions within the town or in relation to the Yendi skin, since none of these is specified in the Ordinance No 2 of 1932 or in Order-in-Council No 1 of 1933.
I find the Ollennu Committee’s reasoning in this regard, respectfully, unimpressive. The committee failed to distinguish between the state council as an indigenous body, existing long before the Ordinance No 2 of 1932 was enacted, and the state council as a native authority appointed under that Ordinance. This double-hat concept must be clearly understood otherwise there is every danger of plunging into interpretational errors.
The Ollennu Committee Report exhibited some confusion of thought in this area. Reacting to counsel’s submission, summed up in paragraph 210, that:
“. . . there was no legislation up to 1948, indeed, he said prior to 1952, which could affect the indigenous powers possessed by the Chief’s Council prior to the advent of British rule. Therefore he contended that the state council possessed supreme indigenous powers and was entitled to change the Constitution and the custom at will,”
The Ollennu Committee said in paragraph 211:
“211. It is obvious that in making the above submission learned counsel overlooked the existence of the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance No. 2 of 1932, which created the State Council as a Native Authority and granted the powers and jurisdiction which it could exercise.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It is clear from paragraph 211 that the Ollennu Committee misconstrued, and therefore failed to react adequately to the point at issue. It was never controverted that the 1932 Ordinance “created” (or to use the Ordinance term, appointed) the Dagomba State Council as a native authority and granted the powers it could exercise as a “native authority.” But the question is, did that Ordinance create, ie bring into being, the state council itself? The answer obviously is No!
The confusion was not helped by the indiscriminate use of the term appointed and created. For instance in paragraph 213 the Ollennu Committee said, inter alia, “The State Council is a creature of statute
[p.263] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
. . . “ which cannot be correct. However, in paragraph 222, the committee rightly said that, “The Dagomba State Council, that is, the Ya-Na and his Council, was appointed a Native Authority by Order of the Chief Commissioner No 2 of 1933 . . .”
If the state council, ie the Ya-Na and his council, existed before being appointed a native authority, then it is necessary to find out and distinguish between what it could do before 1933 and continued to do as a state council after 1933; and what it could or could not do as a native authority. The two statutes should be kept separate and distinct, and not be confused.
As part of its normal administrative functions, being the native government of a native area, we are told that the Dagomba State Council had responsibility for; (a) declaring war; and (b) changing customs. Tearing ourselves from our traditional roots, we are apt to get astounded by the notion that a traditional state council could “declare war.” We forget that a “traditional” war normally has none of the trappings of a moon-age war: there are no bombs or mortars, no fighter planes or destroyers. There certainly are missiles, but missiles of a different kind. When one group of natives decide to attack another group, it is “declaring war”, and this is done by the head chief sitting in council with his elders, ie by the state council. This, in the instant case, will be the Ya-Na and his state council. As for changing customs, there should be nothing to jolt us about it. All native governments do meet from time to time to look at their customary practices in the light of prevailing circumstances, and where appropriate make modifications. Once it is conceded that the Dagomba State Council was not a creature of statute, it is no longer open to anyone to question its competence to modify the custom within its traditional area, subject only to limitations, if any, imposed by a statute.
The kingmakers.
One of the most hotly contested issues in this appeal turns on the question: who are the kingmakers of the Yendi skin? To say that the appeal is allowed is to imply that the appellant, Na Yakubu II, is the duly elected and installed chief of Yendi. He can only be “duly elected and installed” if the election and installation had been done by the competent kingmakers of the Yendi skin. So the question of who the kingmakers are becomes relevant from the very onset.
The Ollennu Committee found at p 42, para 254 of its report that the traditional kingmakers are the Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Kpati-Na and Gomli, whom I shall describe as “the committee of four.” The respondent challenges this vehemently, asserting that this alleged body cannot be proved to have selected a single Ya-Na throughout the whole
[p.264] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 history of Dagbon. He relies squarely on the selection committee set up at the meeting of the state council in 1948, as the only competent body, after 1948, to select a Ya-Na elect. As to who were the selectors prior to 1948, the respondent is hazy. The appellant was equally hazy in his pleadings, but quite naturally jumped at the Ollennu Committee’s finding to fight his appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the evidence concerning the kingmakers prior to 1948 was “conflicting and inconsistent.”
The problem does not lend itself to easy solution. In evidence, pendente lite, there are statements from which an inference may be drawn that the body of four were the selectors. But, as the respondent contends, none of the witnesses, not even the appellant, was able to name one Ya-Na who was selected for the skin by the committee of four. It would seem that the selection had in the past been done by cliques of elders; by force of arms; by fraud and trickery; and even by sheer luck. Tamakloe has several examples of these. For instance:
Na Zangina (1648-1677) was made king by the king of Mamprusi, after he had tricked three other contestants into squandering their chances;
Na Jimli (1687-1700) was selected by some old women who were at the time performing funeral rites of a deceased Ya-Na in the palace; Zibirim Kulunku (1806-1824), got it by force of arms after defeating his rival Sumani Zoli;
Na Yakubu (I 824-1849), by war; Abudulai I (1849-1876)-he became Ya-Na because he was the “leader of an insurgent party” which had rebelled against King Yakubu; and King Alasan (1899-1917): the Germans sent for him from Karaga, and made him Ya-Na; and so on, and so forth.
The appellant whose duty it was to justify the Ollennu Committee’s conclusion by reference to an actual event was not able to point to one.
The Ollennu Committee arrived at its finding without a single “practical” case to support it. The committee relied solely on oral evidence which had no firm foundation in history, and which in any case was not straightforward. Tamakloe gives a detailed description of the “Enstoolment Ceremony” in his book, at pp 53-57. So also does Kwame Arhin in Traditional Rule in Ghana at pp 51-56. From these it is manifest that the four committee members play a role in the enskinment ceremonies, but they are not, alone, the selectors. There were other elders. The statement by the Ollennu Committee is a reproduction from page 28 of Blair. Having regard to the view I take of the resolution of May 1948, I do not find it necessary to investigate this
[p.265] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 aspect in detail. It would seem to me, however, that some further research is called for, at least to set the records straight.
If either the Ollennu Committee or the appellant had been able to point to one chief in all history who owed his position as a result of the exertions of the committee of four, I would have readily accepted the Ollennu Committee’s finding as proven. But there is none. However, accepting the finding on this for purposes of argument, I would say that the committee of four “operated” prior to 1948.
In 1948, something happened. An event took place which is described in some quarters as an attempt. We do know that in that year, on 12 May 1948, the Dagomba State Council, as a state council, and not as a native authority, established a new selection committee to take over from the earlier committee of four.
A lot in this case has turned on the standing of this new committee. If the committee is accepted as a valid replacement, since 1948, of the Kuga-Na’s committee of four, then obviously the appellant fails, and the respondent wins. If on the other hand the committee is invalid, then the Kuga-Na’s committee of four was never superseded; it carried over from 1948, and the appellant wins. The Mate Kole Committee and the Court of Appeal found that the selection committee is valid. The Ollennu Committee said it was invalid. The status of this committee is the most controversial issue in this appeal. It is necessary therefore to look at the matter in some detail.
As to its origins, there is not much one can say, since there is no dispute about that. At a meeting held on 12 May 1948 the “Chiefs and Counsellors of the Dagomba State Council stated and agreed that the following chiefs are responsible for the election and appointment of the chief to the Nam of Yendi . . .” This statement was followed by the names of seven chiefs and four elders.
It was observed by the District Commissioner Bennett that the four elders were the traditional committee of four, save that Gagbin-Dana had been substituted for Gomli. So that in effect what happened at the meeting of 12 May 1948 was enlarging the committee of four to eleven, by the addition of seven divisional chiefs. None of the seven belonged to the “candidate-gates” of Karaga, Mion and Savelugu. Members of the state council who signed this agreement, by making their marks, numbered nineteen, and include: Andani Gbong-Lana as acting president, and Mahama Mion-Lana. Andani Gbong-Lana was the father of the appellant in this appeal. Whether the document is called an agreement, or a resolution or a mere statement, the important thing is that it contained and expressed the desire of the chiefs of the Dagbon State Council to regulate the selection of successors to the Yendi skin in a certain way. It was interpreted to the signatories by A Muse, Sang-Lana who witnessed the marks but was otherwise not a party to
[p.266] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 the document, and signed by the “DNA Secretary” [Dagomba Native Authority Secretary?] Imoru Kashegu. This document was not kept a secret. There is evidence to show that it was known to all the district commissioners, the chief commissioners, the Governor and all the political administrators who had anything to do with the Dagomba Area. Indeed, the document was executed before the then Acting District Commissioner, a Mr I W Bennett.
Although the decision was taken by the state council as a state council, and not as a native authority, the Ollennu Committee says that the decision called a resolution, was ineffective, because, it says, some statutory requirements for its validity were not complied with. Here again, the reasoning in the report is somewhat confused. The resolution was made in 1948. No statute is cited which it is alleged the resolution offended. The resolution therefore became effective from 1948, and until set aside, continued to be effective.
In 1952, the State Councils (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1952(No 5 of 1952) was passed. Some attempt has been made to use this enactment for purposes not at all justified by its contents. It must first be observed that this statute did not create state councils in the Northern Territories: it took them as it met them Hence in its interpretation section (ie section 2) a state council is defined as, “the highest traditional council within a territorial area for which a Head Chief has been appointed and installed as such in accordance with customary law.”
These “highest traditional councils” already existed; they were not being created by the statute. This position is further emphasised by section 3 which required the state councils to “declare their membership” and to “furnish the Government with a copy of the declaration.” Creatures of statute will have their membership declared by the statute, or else by a subsequent subsidiary legislation or by some executive act taken under powers given by the statute. Here the state councils were to tell the government who their members were. There was no limitation as to qualifications for membership, number, tenure of office, etc etc in the statute. Accordingly, not being creatures of statute, the state councils continued, even after 1952, to discharge their traditional functions, except in so far as any of these conflicted with anything in any statute.
The decision of 1948 setting up a new selection committee came up for discussion at the state council meeting in 1953. It was reaffirmed, and ordered to stand as part of the Dagomba “customary” constitution. This little act has been castigated by the Ollennu Committee and declared invalid, on the ground that it was a “modification” of custom, and failed to comply with Ordinance No 5 of 1952. To appreciate my
[p.267] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 reaction to this, I quote the relevant sections of Ordinance No 5 of 1952:
“Part IV-CUSTOMARY LAW 12. (1) A State Council at any time may, and where the Governor so requires shall, submits to the Governor a written declaration of what in its opinion is the customary law relating to any subject in force in the area of its authority.
(2) A State Council may, at any time, submit to the Governor a written recommendation for the modification of the customary law relating to any subject inforce in the area of its authority.
(3) If the Governor is satisfied that a declaration or modification, made or recommended under the provisions of section 12 of this Ordinance, is not repugnant to natural justice, equity or good conscience, nor incompatible either expressly or by necessary implication with any Ordinance, he may by order direct that the customary law so declared or the modification so recommended shall be in force in any area specified in the Order.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
First, as a matter of interpretation, attention may be drawn to the use of may and shall in section 12 (1). It is conceded that in legal documents, may can at times mean shall, but where the two come together, such as here, to control different circumstances, either word will have to bear its usual meaning. Accordingly I hold that may in section 12 (1) is permissive, and not obligatory.
Secondly, it is a canon of interpretation that where the same word appears in the same statute (and a fortiori in the same section) it is deemed to be used in the same sense. Accordingly may in section 12 (2) is also permissive, and never obligatory. It is wrong to interpret section 12 (2) as though state councils under Ordinance No 5 of 1952 were obliged to send to the Governor “a written recommendation for the modification of [their] customary law.” They could do it, if they so chose; they were not obliged to do it.
There is good reason why section 12 was drafted the way it was. After all, these state councils were regularly interacting with the district commissioners. If a state council modifies and implements a custom which the district commissioner has reason to think to be repugnant to natural justice, etc etc all he does is to alert the Governor who, using section 12 (1), will request a report from the state council which then shall send the particulars to him. Similarly, a state council may consider, for good cause, that it may require the backing of the central government in order to be able to enforce a certain desired modification
[p.268] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 of existing custom. It will then, on its own motion, in accordance with section 12 (2), send a recommendation for the modification to the Governor, to have it “ordered” from above, to make enforcement easier. Section 13 comes into play only when the particulars are with the Governor, in writing, either on the Governor’s request (section 12 (1)), or through the voluntary act of the state council (section 12 (1) or (2)). Thus if a state, council does not send a recommendation to the Governor, the question of an “Order” does not arise.
In the instant case:
(a) the modification of custom. effected by the resolution of 1948 had, as at 1953, solidified into a custom; it was no longer a recommendation. The fact that it was decided to be written into the constitution does not change its character;
(b) even if, as at 1953, it is deemed to be a recommendation for a modification, it was not, under section 12 (2), obligatory on the council to send it in writing to the Governor, to be ordered, as contended by the Ollennu Committee.
To suggest, as late as 1974, as the Ollennu Committee did, or in 1986 as Mr Adjetey argues, that the decision of 1953 is invalid as offending sections 12 and 13 of Ordinance No 5 of 1952, is, to my mind, to insult the intelligence of all who were concerned with the administration of the Dagomba Area at the time, namely the district commissioners, the chief commissioners, the Governor and all, as if, even though they were fully au fait with the proceedings of the state council, none of them knew that something had to be done by the Governor to validate the decision, given the significance of the Yendi skin matters, and the amount of time and energy the colonial administrators expended on them. No wonder Mr Appiah argues that even if the approval and order of the Governor were requisite, which he denied, the presence of the Governor’s representative at the meeting, in the person of the district commissioner, must be taken to satisfy these conditions. If there had to be a report it would have had to be sent through this very district commissioner, and whether a report was demanded by statute or not, the district commissioner would in any case send a report in the normal course of his administrative duties. The argument that, in all the circumstances, the Governor was informed of the decision of the state council, and he approved of them is not without some force, given the practices of the time. For instance, by section 3 of Ordinance No 2 of 1932, earlier quoted, “3. The Chief Commissioner may, by order made with the approval of the Governor”, etc etc. (The emphasis is mine.) Under this Ordinance, the chief commissioner made an Order- in-Council No 2 of 1933 constituting the Dagomba Native Authority Area, and appointing the Ya-Na and his council a native authority. That Order does not show on
[p.269] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 the face of it that it was made “with the approval of the Governor”, but no one ever contends, even remotely, that that Order is invalid. Given the circumstances, it is safe to apply the maxim omnia praesumuntur to both this Order and to the resolution, and make the judicial assumption of regularity to the effect that the Governor’s role in either case, if requisite, was played. This will apply to all the other Orders made at the time to appoint native authorities. The volume of 1933 Proclamations, Orders etc is replete with these Orders.
As regards the resolution of 1948 and 1953, the Ollennu Committee ruled them void mainly on the ground that the Dagomba State Council which passed them was a creature of statute, and that the statute did not give it power to modify custom. Reference may here be made to paragraphs 212 and 213 of the report:
“212. Mr Alhassan, learned Counsel for the 3rd Parties, had earlier made a similar submission. Mr Appiah in support of the contention cited to us the case of Kwesi Eku alias Condua v. Kojo Acquaah, Civ.
Ap. No. 21/66 of 4 March 1968 [see Eku alias Condua III v Acquaah [1968] GLR 412, CA] and commended to us, as of persuasive force, an obiter expressed by a minority of the learned Judges that quite apart from any statutes, the Chief with his Counsellors of an area constitute the highest judicial, executive and legislative body in that area, and that unless any subsequent express terms affect any part of this power, that power which is inherent by custom still exists.
213. This minority obiter need not take our time in view of the fact that the State Council is a creature of statute and the only powers it could exercise are those prescribed in the Ordinance, the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance No 2 of 1932. In fact the unanimous decision of the Appeal Court in the case cited above by Mr Appiah, is that the State Council is a creature of statute, and cannot exercise any powers and jurisdiction save those expressly given it by the statute which creates it.”
As the main plank in this argument has been demonstrated to be false, namely that the Dagomba State Council was not a creature of statute, the Ollennu Committee’s contention falls completely flat. Its earlier dismissal of the passages commended to him from Eku alias Condua III v Acquaah [1968] GLR 412, CA would therefore seem to be wholly unjustified.
The Ollennu Committee’s second reason was based on its interpretation of section 13 of Ordinance No 5 of 1952. This Ordinance at best could have effect only on the resolution of 1953, not on that of 1948. As the Ollennu Committee itself observed, “214. The resolution
[p.270] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 of 1953 was passed when the State Councils (Northern Territories) Ordinance No 2 of 1952 [sic] was in force . . .” The committee did not say the same of the resolution of 1948. That resolution, passed by the state council cannot be struck down as invalid, since the Ordinance of 1952 had no retrospective effect. Therefore by 1952, the selection committee of 1948 had validly and competently taken over from the traditional committee of four.
Besides, as has been demonstrated, under the said section 13 of Ordinance No 5 of 1952, the resolution of 1953 did not have to be gazetted. The Ollennu Committee relied on two Ashanti cases for the proposition that the resolution required gazetting. In this, with respect, the committee misled itself, and in the process misled the government too: see paragraph 8 of the white paper. The Ashanti cases viz: Kosia v Nimo (1950) DC (Land) ‘48-’51, 239 and Bima v Barfi (1951) DC (Land) ‘48-’51, 371 were decided on the basis of the Ashanti legislation, viz: Native Law and Custom (Ashanti Confederacy Council) Ordinance, Cap 102 (1951 Rev.) This Ordinance is not in pari materia with Ordinance No 5 of 1952. Section 3 (1) and (2) of Cap 102 are almost the same as sections 12 (1) and 13 of Ordinance No 5 of 1952. But section 3 (3) of Cap 102 says:
“(3) Upon such Order being made and published in the Gazette, the native law and custom set forth in the said declaration shall be deemed by every Court to be a true and accurate statement of the native law and custom with respect to the subject to which such declaration relates within the divisions specified in the Order.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
As to modification of custom, section 4 (1) of Cap 102 is the same as section 12 (2) of Ordinance No 5 of 1952. But under section 4 (2) of Cap 102, the modification recommended to the Governor “shall take effect in such division upon the Order being published in the Gazette.” (The emphasis is mine.) This requirement of publication in the Gazette is missing from the 1952 Ordinance. The Ollennu Committee alluded to this fact, but it drew no conclusions from it, save sub silentio. Seeing that the Ordinance No 5 of 1952 was passed as long ago as twelve years after Cap 102, it is safe to presume that the omission in the 1952 Ordinance was deliberate and that the requirement of gazetting was not intended to apply to the Northern Territories. After all, the Northern Territories were a protected area, and were not expected to be governed by the same stringent laws applicable to Ashanti, always regarded by the colonialists as a conquered territory.
[p.271] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
In the two Ashanti cases referred to above, the purported modification of custom was held invalid for the simple reason that “216 [the] resolution never received the sanction of the Governor-in-council and was therefore never gazetted” (see p 29 of the Ollennu Committee Report) in accordance with the provisions of Cap 102. These Ashanti cases are not applicable to the Dagomba situation, since the Ashanti law on which they were based had no application to the Northern Territories.
The Ollennu Committee was so obsessed with the idea of gazetting that it deprived itself of the opportunity to closely study Ordinance No 5 of 1952. Reference may here be made to three paragraphs only of its report to prove this:
“205. As regards the second reason, namely, that Government had previously approved the modification, all that need be done is to look at section 13 of the State Councils (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1952 No. 5 of 1952 and it will be seen that the only constitutional mode whereby such approval can be given is by an Order published in the Gazette (see also section 34 (2)) of the Houses of Chiefs Act, 1958 (No. 20 of 1958).
206. It would have been the easiest thing in the world for the law officers of the state to produce the Gazette publication containing the order or orders if any such order exists.
207. Indeed no order has been made to give legal validity to the resolution of 1948 and 1953 or any of them. As we have already pointed out, it is because no resolution of a State Council of the Northern Territories had been validated, that no provision was made in the State Councils (Northern Territories) Ordinance 1952 saving any resolution in force.”
The Ollennu Committee therefore mislead the government into rejecting the resolution of 1953 as per paragraph 8 of the white paper:
“8 Government also agrees with the Committee that the resolution of the State Council passed in 1953 abolishing the traditional kingmakers and substituting a Selection Committee for it, and adding the Gbong-Lana (Regent) to the list of candidates eligible for the Yendi Skin was ineffective as the resolutions were not approved and made into an order published in the Gazette as required by s. 13 of [Ordinance No 5/1952] then in force.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
In this the government relied solely on the Ollennu Committee’s interpretation of the relevant law which, as has been shown above, is respectfully, inaccurate: section 13 of Ordinance No 5 of 1952 did not
[p.272] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 require any gazetting. Given the Ollennu Committee’s interpretation of sections 12 and 13 of Ordinance No 5 of 1952 and its reasons for rejecting the resolution of 1948 and 1953 and declaring them void ab initio, its arguments concerning EI 59 make interesting reading, but require no further comment: see paragraphs 450 and 466 at pp 77-79 of the report.
Aware no doubt that the fate of his client depended almost entirely on the resolution of 1948, Mr Adjetey sought to prove its invalidity on two other grounds, none of which was dealt with by the Ollennu Committee. This is not to say that counsel was precluded from raising them: on the contrary, he was perfectly entitled to raise and argue any matter which, on the face of the record, he could legitimately draw attention to in favour of his client. These two new grounds are: that there was no proof that any such resolution was ever made; and that the body which purported to have made the resolution was not the Dagomba State Council; its proceedings could not therefore pass for the proceedings of the Dagomba State Council.
On (a) above, Mr Adjetey argues:
“In all cases when a resolution or decision of the Dagomba State Council had been proved this has been done by the production of the minutes of the council duly signed by the secretary. . . . It is only in the case of the 1948 resolution that the proof proffered was of a declaration alleged to have been made before the Ag District Commissioner of Dagomba . . .”
In making the above submission, Mr Adjetey was clearly clutching at a straw. Throughout the proceedings and the many documents, letters and petitions put in evidence by the two sides, there has never been any question raised, nor could any have been legitimately raised, is to the making of the decision by the body which met on 12 May 1948. To suggest that this decision/resolution was never made is to imply that the several signatures (including those of the secretaries and the Ag District Commissioner for Dagomba) were either forged, or that all those persons were party to a gigantic conspiracy to defraud – but to defraud whom? Interestingly enough, all the important supporters of the appellant including Kuga-Na and Sunson-Na were also “signatories”, and they have never challenged their signatures. I would reject this ground.
The second ground impliedly concedes that if the body which met on 12 May 1948 was the Dagomba State Council, then there could be no question as to the validity of the resolution, and the appeal
[p.273] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 collapses. On that ground, Mr Adjetey contends that, “not every meeting of Dagbon chiefs can be called a meeting of the Dagomba State Council.”
In open court counsel created the impression that the gathering must have been a private meeting of some chiefs huddling together at a secret hideout to plot against his client. The result of their deliberations was, inter alia, the resolution. If this were so, it would be extremely strange that the acting district commissioner took part in this conspiracy, and proceeded to have the result recorded in official documents, and even to report it to the Governor.
The meeting of 1948 was, on the record, attended by no less than eleven divisional chiefs all of whom appear as members of the state council in the list APP. B of Blair (pages 52-53). This list has fourteen divisional chiefs and nine judicial councillors. Among them were the Kuga-Na, Karaga-Na and the Mion-Lana, all of whom were at the meeting in 1948, The list may be compared with the list of chiefs who attended the 1961 state council meeting (see the Ollennu Committee Report at p 204). Again Karaga, Kuga and Mion were present.
The meeting of 1948 was presided over by the regent, the Gbong-Lana, who, in the absence of a substantive Ya-Na, was in charge of Dagbon affairs as a Ya-Na. It is admitted on all sides that the Gbong-Lana, by custom, acts until a Ya-Na is installed. As an acting Ya-Na he is entitled to carry on the affairs of state, including arrangements for the funeral of the deceased Ya-Na, and convening and presiding over meetings of the state council. After all, the state cannot be left ungoverned simply because there is no Ya-Na, and no one has suggested that in the absence of a Ya-Na, the government of the state falls into the hands of any person other than the Gbong-Lana.
Indeed, this matter is put beyond doubt in appendix H (p 60 of Blair), where in a document entitled “Devolution of Powers of Chiefs”, and signed by all the members of the Dagbon State Council, it was declared that:
“(1) At the death of any chief from Yendi downwards affairs of Town and Court are temporarily in the hands of the Gbong-Lana, i.e. the eldest son, except in cases of mental incapacity”.
Remembering that this document was drafted by an Englishman, Blair, “affairs of Town and Court” will take in all the powers and official duties of the deceased chief. Ya-Na was not specifically mentioned, because the document was drafted to cater for all chiefs in the Dagbon Area, “from Yendi downwards.” The Yendi chief is, of course, the Ya-Na. By paragraph 2 of that declaration, if a chief is not dead, but merely ill, or temporarily absent or for any good cause, his
[p.274] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 powers and duties do not devolve on the Gbong-Lana: they devolve on “any elder” whom the chief may think fit to appoint. Exhibit H was signed on 25 November 1930. Therefore, when in 1931 Tamakloe in his booklet at page 59 wrote that the Gbong-Lana is only a “presider over funeral customs and not “regent” as has been erroneously used in most cases in the courts in the Northern Territories” he could not possibly be right. In a footnote on the same page Tamakloe says, “Gbong-Lana is used not only in cases of kings, but for everyone having certain distinction.” This concept of a Gbong-Lana does not find support anywhere else. In the exhibit H of Blair above quoted, Gbong-Lana is specifically defined by the Dagbon State Council as “the eldest son” [of any chief, “from Yendi downwards.”]
In any case, as between Tamakloe on the one hand, and the 23 divisional chiefs and elders of the Dagbon State Council who signed (exhibit H) on the other, it is clear to me that the views of the state council unanimously expressed on a matter of their own tradition and custom, are to be preferred. It follows that the meeting of the state council, presided over by the Gbong-Lana which met and deliberated on, inter alia, the custom of the succession, was in every respect a properly converned, and competent meeting. That meeting could, as it did, change custom or declare war. In fact there is precedent for this: the state council meeting which affirmed Karaga, Savelugu and Mion as gates was presided over by a Gbong-Lana. This was after the death of Na-Gungobli, and before a substantive Ya-Na had been installed. Interestingly enough, the Gbong-Lana Andani who presided over the 1948 meeting was the father of the present appellant. And at page 26 of Blair, in a subsection of the report entitled, “(d) Constitution of the State of Dagbon, how administered and position of Ya-Na” appears the following statement:
“6. It was agreed that the State of Dagbon was administered by the Ya-Na assisted by a Judicial Council of Elders and a State Council composed of the Divisional Chiefs and Elders.
This last was, in the past, only summoned in matters of importance affecting the Kingdom such as declaration of war or the changing of custom. The Na said that if he had occasion to make a new law [Note: not a new custom] it would not be customary to summon the full council, he would merely promulgate the law and make it known to his Divisional Chiefs”.
(The emphasis is mine.)
And at page 27, para 8, we have the above sentiment repeated, but emphasising that the state council was summoned only, in matters of supreme importance such as:
[p.275] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
“(a) declaration of war; and (b) changing of a custom or the making of a new [custom] [The Na ] said that formerly if he made a new law he did it in Council with his Elders but did not consult the Divisional Chiefs.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
From the above, it should be the easiest of interpretational exercises to reconcile the role of the Ya-Na in the making of a new law, and that of the state council in changing custom or making a new custom. Because we are used to talking of custom as law, we tend to miss the essential conceptual difference between the two, particularly in the eyes of ordinary peoples. To them custom is not law; it is custom. In Akan it is amanie, literally “state matters”, and connotes the way things have been done within the state, traditions and festivals observed, and people have behaved generally towards one another from time immemorial. This is custom. What they regard as law, in Akan mmera, has less ancient origins, is geared towards specific events, and has relatively a temporary character, eg levying of tolls, commandeering labour for communal projects, requisitioning items of food for the use of strangers temporarily within their gates, etc. These demands, orders, laws are promulgated usually by the beating of gong-gong, and ends something like this, “And the chief says that anyone who does not do such-and-such violates the law”, ie to mmera, not violates custom.
The Ya-Na and any chief in promulgating laws will not need the state council; he only needs, at best, to consult his immediate elders in Yendi. But if he is touching traditions, festivals, custom then he requires that the divisional chiefs should assemble to deliberate. At this meeting he presides, or his substitute, the regent, does. This is exactly what happened in 1948 and 1953. There was nothing to which exception can legitimately be taken.
The resolution of 1948 was made by all persons who should be interested directly in matters affecting the succession to the Yendi skin. It was known to all and sundry, and accepted by all. The relevant declaration appears in the Mate Kole Report as exhibit 4A. The opening paragraph reads:
“We, the undersigned chiefs and Counsellors of the Dagbamba State Council, do hereby state and agree that the following chiefs and Elders are responsible for the election and appointment of the chief to the Nam of Yendi, and if a unanimous decision cannot be reached, it shall be decided by means of a secret ballot and a majority vote..”
[p.276] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
This is followed by the names of the members of the committee (seven divisional chiefs and four elders) and the signatures of nineteen “Members of the Dagomba State Council” all of whom signed before I W Bennett, Ag District Commissioner, Dagomba. The selection committee was constituted as follows:
“Divisional Chiefs Elders 1. Gushie-Na 2. Yelzori-Na 3. Nanton-Na 4. Gulkpe-Na 5. Sunson-Na 6. Tolon-Na 7. Kumbum-Na 8. Kuga-Na 9. Zohe-Na 10. Tugurinam 11. Gagbin-dana”
The new committee did, to the knowledge of all the chiefs, including the appellant, take over from the traditional committee of four, and from 1948 discharged its functions of selecting a Ya-Na. It selected for enskinment Mahama III in 1948; Abudulai II in 1954 and Abudulai III in 1968.
In his report on the Mion Lana’s appeal, the Government Agent, Yendi, in a letter to his superior officer in Tamale dated 18 Febraury 1964 (exhibit xx4) stated:
“9. This amendment to the composition of the Selection Committee was made in 1948, in which year the late Mahama III was appointed Ya-Na. The Committee evidently performed its duties satisfactorily at that time and no complaints have been recorded against it until now. . .”
In 1954, after the death of Mahama III, the same selection committee met to select his successor. Five contestants came forward, headed by the appellant who had been nominated (allegedly regularly) by the Kuga-Na. The appellant’s candidacy was preceded by an application for nomination dated 23 September 1953, addressed by him to the Dagomba State Council. He sent personal copies of this application to virtually all the members of the selection committee (exhibit 3, page 20 of the Mate Kole Report). Neither the appellant nor his mentor the Kuga-Na challenged the competence of the selection committee. The said committee reduced the number of contestants to four after scrapping the Kpati-Na as unqualified having regard to the state council decision item 8/53 of December 1953. A ballot was held on the four remaining candidates, viz: 1. Mion-Lana (the appellant); 2. Karaga-Na; 3. Savelugu-Na; and 4. Gbong-Lana. The result of the voting was as follows, Karaga-Na – nil; 2 Savelugu-Na – nil, 3
[p.277] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239
Mion-Lana – two (Kuga-Na and Tugurinam); and 4 Abudulai Gbong-Lana – nine. If the Mion-Lana or the Kuga-Na had reason to believe that the selection committee was an illegal body, why did they not withdraw from its proceedings? And the question may pertinently be put : supposing on that occasion the decision of the committee had gone in favour of the Mion-Lana would he and his supporters have repudiated the selection on the ground that the committee was an illegal body?
Commenting on this resolution the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, A J Loveridge, wrote on 10 February 1954. “That declaration [of 12 May 1948]. . . was properly reached and attested and replaced the previously accepted committee which consisted of Kuga-Na, Zohe-Na. Tuguri-Na and Gomli.” (See para 6. exhibit 8 of the Mate Kole Report.)
This observation was prompted by an undated “resolution” better referred to as a protest, challenging the proceedings of the state council held on 11 and 12 December 1953. The protest (exhibit XX3, p 226 of Ollennu) was written by:
“ . . . the sub-Divisional Chiefs, Elders of Dagbon, war chiefs and the Dagomba Youth Organisation protesting against the incompetence of the recent State Council’s meeting to discuss the Yendi Skin Affairs.”
In paragraph 1(b) of the protest, the protestors conceded that, the committee for the selection of a Ya-Na were the following: “Gushie-Na, Yelizoli-Na, Nanton-Na, Gulkpe-Na, Sunson-Na, Tolon-Na, Kumbum-Na, Kuga-Na, Zohe-Na, Gagbin-Dana . . .”
This list is the same as the 1948 list, save and except that Tugurinam is missing, an omission that seems accidental, or else insignificant. The protest resolution was signed, among others, by Andani (the appellant herein), Gulkpe, Kumbugu, Nanton, the president and the secretary of the Dagomba Youth Organisation, and the clerk of the State Council.
In spite of this protest, the appellant himself confirmed the minutes of the meeting of 11 and 12 December 1953 as correct: see exhibit 5, p 22 of the Mate Kole Report. In the face of these clear admissions, how can the appellant be suffered to deny the existence of the selection committee as constituted in 1948? And yet, as late as 1968, the old committee of four suddenly resurrected and purported to select the Mion-Lana (Na Andani),the appellant herein, as Ya-Na-elect (see exhibit C, at 19 of the Mate Kole Report), adding that, “according to the traditions and customs Of Dagbong [their] nomination is undisputable, and irrevocable . . .” They could not have been sincere. I fully [p.278] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 endorse the observation of the Court of Appeal per Edward Wiredu JA at 209 ante that:
“ . . . to permit Andani who presided over the state council’s meeting of 12 March 1948 which passed the resolution setting up the selection committee, and the Kuga-Na who together with Andani in 1954 confirmed the appointment of the said committee and to permit Andani again having contested the Nam by applying to the said committee as Gbong-Lana and for Kuga-Na and Tugurinam who sponsored and voted for the Gbong-Lana Andani at one of the meetings of the selection committee for selecting a candidate for the skin, to be heard now to say that the selection of the appellant by the same selection committee was void because the resolution that set up the committee was done without complying with statutory provisions, to the advantage of Andani their candidate, will be a conduct little short of a plea tantamount to fraud. What the three are now saying is that even though we took part in appointing the selection committee in the past, we have participated in the previous meetings for appointing candidates for the skin, we even presented a candidate to the selection committee in the past, what we are saying is that the creation of the selection committee is now void because we created it without complying with statutory provisions. If what they are now saying is right then the appointment of Andani as Mion Lana by Na Mahama III who himself was selected by the selection committee for the Nam was also null and void and he Andani would have no locus to challenge or contest for the Nam at all.”
I accordingly find that after 1948, the selection committee was and is the only body competent to select a candidate for enskinment as Ya-Na. The appellant, not having been selected by this body, was improperly and uncustomarily selected, and could not have been enskinned. On this ground too I would dismiss the appeal, and endorse the conclusion of the Mate Kole Committee and of the Court of Appeal.
The next question to be investigated is whether a Gbong-Lana is a competent contestant to the skin of Yendi. The proceedings of the 1930 Conference do state as reported at p 54 of Blair that, “. . . ONLY FROM THE FOLLOWING THREE CHIEFTAINSHIPS MAY SELECTION BE MADE FOR THE NAM OF YENDI VIZ: Karaga-Nam, Mion-Nam and Savelugu-Nam.” This declaration is dated 25 November 1930. The Gbong-Lana is not mentioned, and it would seem from this that he is by custom precluded from contesting the Nam. If this was the custom, it would seem that it was changed by the state
[p.279] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 council meeting of 1953. Even before this date, it is on record that the appellant’s father, Andani, then a Gbong-Lana, had contested in 1948, and nobody had said then that he was not qualified Indeed, as has been mentioned earlier, he was sponsored by Kuga-Na and Tugurinam, the very persons who now try to assert in these proceedings that a Gbong-Lana cannot contest.
In 1961, the state council, sitting as a state council, confirmed the “Laws of Succession to Yendi Skin (Paramountcy)” (see appendix F at p 203 of the Ollennu Committee.) In that document, the selection committee of 1948, as confirmed in 1953, was again confirmed, and, in paragraph, 3 at p 204, the order of precedence of dukedoms to the Yendi skin was given as follows: “1. Karaga-Na, 2. Savelugu-Na, 3. Mion-Lana and 4. Gbong-Lana (reigning regent of a deceased Ya-Na).” By paragraph 4 of the said appendix F, if the Gbong-Lana should lose the contest to any of the first three contestants, he takes over the skin vacated by the successful party.
Upon a careful examination and analysis of the evidence the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in rejecting the Ollennu Committee’s conclusion in this regard, and found that the Gbong-Lana was a competent contestant. In the list of chiefs appearing at page 10 of Tamakloe’s monograph, it is recorded that King Abudulai II, a regent, was enskinned Ya-Na, and he reigned from August 1917 to 2 February 1938. The historical narrative of this entry appears at the bottom of p 35 of Tamakloe that: “[King Alasan] died on 16 January 1917, and his son Abdulai was made Regent in the same year, and he is the present Na of Dagbon.”
This fact confirms the statement in paragraph 2 of appendix F (p 204 of the Ollennu Committee Report) that:
“By custom the Gbong-Lana of the deceased Ya-Na (whose father’s vacant post is being contested) has the right to apply for his father’s post (this has happened many times before in the history of the Dagomba Kingdom) regardless of whether he is a chief or Regent (Prince at the time.)”
This statement was confirmed in evidence before the committee of inquiry by all the important witnesses who spoke viz: Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Kumbun-Na, Karaga-Na, the Nayina (the drummer) and many others. All these witnesses admitted under examination that the Gbong-Lana is one of four eligible candidates to the skin. I accordingly endorse the opinion of the Court of Appeal on this issue.
Is the skin ascended in rotation? The appellant says Yes; the respondent says No. After examining the evidence the Court of Appeal, particularly Edward Wiredu JA, found for the respondent. I find it
[p.280] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 difficult to agree with the Court of Appeal in this regard. On the basis that before 1948, when the selection committee was established, the body responsible for selecting a Ya-Na was the traditional body of four, which went about its work by soothsaying, and assuming that the candidate was on each occasion given to the committee by the gods, is it not surprising that from 1845 to 1948 (seven chiefs), the gods had been selecting from the two houses, Abudulai and Andani, alternately? (see the Ollennu Committee Report at p 127). The Court of Appeal (per Edward Wiredu JA) said that the order of succession was a coincidence.” If it was a “coincidence, then it was a coincidence which clearly establishes that even the gods knew and sought to ordain that for the good of their earthly sons, the succession must swing from house to house. The gods were to give, as a candidate, a person with a “good head.” Somehow they realised that on each occasion, the person with a “good head” must come from the gate other than the outgoing gate. This leads to a strong presumption in favour of the appellant that the custom as known to the gods is that the succession must rotate. If on the other hand, the gods were guided by earthly humans, then the presumption matures into proof.
The respondent rejected the existence of the committee of four, contending that there was no proof that this committee selected a single Ya-Na throughout the whole history of the Namship. This argument does not advance the cause of the respondent one whit. For even if it is granted that the committee of four has never existed, it is a fact that from time immemorial Ya-Nas had been selected to ascend the skin and between 1845-1948 there had been seven Ya-Nas. Ignoring whoever selected them, the fact remains that these seven came from alternate houses, a fact which cannot be explained by a recourse to mere coincidence. On the evidence, I reject the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, and find that there had existed some system of rotation between the two houses, Andani and Abudulai. This conclusion is supported by appendix F of the Ollennu Committee Report at p 203 indicating that the state council, meeting in June 1961, affirmed that the “succession to the Yendi Skin should not be in rotation of any type but by majority decision of the Selection Committee …” (The emphasis is mine.) By this decision, the state council sought to change from what was accepted to be a rotation system; to another system, or at best, it implies that the state council knew that there had existed a “rotation of some type.”
For this reason, I would favour a recommendation that the parties be encouraged to observe this system of rotation as a means of avoiding conflicts in the future. But I shall leave this at the level of a recommendation, rather than as an order, in the belief that a self- [p.281] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 239 imposed obligation is likely to be more willingly and gladly discharged than one imposed from without. It may therefore be a good idea if the state council can be persuaded to reverse its decision of June 1961 (appendix F), and revert to a system of rotation.
In the result, I find that:
(a) the Dagomba State Council was not a creature of statute. As such its “aboriginal functions” were not in any way impaired by any statute;
(b) that the said state council validly resolved to substitute the traditional committee of four with a new selection committee, which after all was only an enlargement of the old one;
(c) that the resolution of 1948, as that of 1953, did not require to be gazetted to be valid; (d) that the appellant was not selected by the only competent selection body, and therefore could not have been validly enskinned; and (e) that the selection of the respondent by the selection committee was in order and according to the custom.
Accordingly, I find that the appellant has failed to persuade me that he deserved judgment. I would dismiss the appeal.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
Judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside.
Findings of the Ollennu Committee restored.
L.K.A
