ISAAC KWESI NUAMAH vs. GOLD FIELDS GHANA LIMITED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A.D. 2026

CORAM: LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)

PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC

ASIEDU JSC

DARKO ASARE JSC

ACKAAH-BOAFO JSC

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. J4/27/2025

24TH JUNE, 2026

ISAAC KWESI NUAMAH ………….. PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/

RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT

VS.

GOLD FIELDS GHANA LIMITED …………. DEFENDANT/APPLICANT/

APPELLANT/APPELLANT

JUDGMENT

ASIEDU, JSC:

[1]. INTRODUCTION:

My lords, this is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, dated the 30th October 2024, in which the Court of Appeal struck out an appeal filed by the Defendant/Applicant/Appellant/Appellant (herein referred to as the Appellant) on the basis that the said appeal was filed out of time.

[2.0]. FACTS

The Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent/Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the Respondent) issued out from the Registry of the High Court an amended writ and accompanying statement of claim against the Appellant for the following reliefs:

“a. A declaration that the chronic/degenerative disease suffered by the employer [sic] [Respondent herein] is occupational ill-health. b. A declaration that the Defendant being employer of the Plaintiff is liable for the occupational ill-health suffered by the employee plaintiff. c. An order for Special Damages directed at the Defendant as follows:

PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES i. Payment for remainder of contract period owing to termination of employee’s contract by BCM @ USD447/month for 6 months at Ghs 5.34 to 1 USD.

GHS

Loss of Income – 14, 321.88 ii. Rent @ 15% of basic for 6 mths – 2,148.28 iii. 13% SSNIT empl. Contribution for – 1,861.84 iv. 10% emp. Contribution for P/F – 1,432.19 v. Medical Expenses Incurred – – vi. Payment of 70 months salary for

Early retirement on grounds of

Occupational ill-health in line with Art.

11(b) of Collective Bargaining Agreement (2013) – 320,421.36 vii. Loss of future earnings from now up to age 60 (10yrs,

120 months) at a monthly pay of Ghs4,577.45 – 549, 293.76 viii. Payment of compensation in terms of Workmen’s

Compensation Law, 1987 (PNDCL 187) – –

Total – 889, 479.31 d. An order directed at the Defendant for general Damages in the sum of GHS 500,000 (five hundred thousand Ghana Cedis) for occupational injury suffered for: i. Continued pain and suffering ii. Continued medical expenses iii. Reduced quality of life iv. Emotional trauma suffered as a result of the termination. e. Costs including legal fees f. Any further orders that this Honourable Court may deem fit.”

[2.1]. The Respondent’s claim against the Appellant herein was founded on the Respondent’s averments that the Respondent was diagnosed of an ailment which, according to the Respondent, directly flowed from the nature of work done by the Respondent while the Respondent was in the employment of the Appellant. This, therefore, is a dispute between an employee and an employer who have parted ways.

[2.2]. After service of the writ and accompanying statement of claim on the Appellant, the Appellant’s lawyer entered conditional appearance and followed up with a motion on notice to dismiss the Respondent’s suit on the grounds that the Respondent’s action was statute barred, and was frivolous, vexatious and scandalous. The records do not seem to indicate what happened to the said application by the Appellant.

[2.3]. Subsequently, the Appellant, through their Counsel, filed another motion for an order to dismiss the Respondent’s action, this time, on the basis that the jurisdiction of the trial Court was not properly invoked. In a ruling dated the 14th day of July, 2023 (pages 192 to 200 volume 2 of the ROA), the learned trial Court Judge dismissed the Appellant’s application for an order to dismiss the Respondent’s suit.

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial High Court delivered on the 14th July, 2023, the Appellant, by a Notice of Appeal filed on the 7th August, 2023, lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal, praying the Court of Appeal to set aside the ruling of the trial High Court, and to make an order dismissing the Respondent’s suit for lack of jurisdiction.

[3.0]. RESPONDENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

In line with Rule 16(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19), the Respondent filed a notice of intention to rely on a preliminary objection and therein indicated that the notice of appeal filed by the Appellant was incompetent, having been filed out of time. According to the Respondent, given that the ruling of the trial High Court was delivered on 14th July 2023, the Appellant could not have filed a competent notice of appeal on the 7th August, 2023, 25 days after the ruling of the High Court. This, according to the Respondent, is so because the appeal before the Court of Appeal, being an interlocutory appeal, ought to have been filed within the mandatory and inextensible period of 21 days from the date of the impugned ruling on appeal. The Respondent argued, therefore, that having been filed out of the prescribed time limit of 21 days, the Appellant’s appeal was incompetent, with the effect that the said appeal was susceptible to being dismissed.

[4.0]. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL:

By a judgment delivered on the 30th October, 2024, the Court of Appeal sided with the Respondent’s argument and dismissed the Appellant’s appeal in limine. On the other hand, the Appellant’s submission that the Respondent’s objection was unfounded, in the circumstances of the case, was rejected by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal.

At page 54 Volume 3 of the Record of Appeal (ROA), the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal captured the Appellant’s argument as follows:

“The Defendant [Appellant herein], on his part, argued that it [the notice of appeal] was filed within time as the 21st day of the ruling was on Friday, 4th August, and the next available day that the appeal could have been filed was Monday, 7th August 2023, and the objection should be dismissed as unfounded.”

The Court continued (at pages 55 to 56 Volume 3 of the ROA) that:

“There is no doubt that an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within twenty-one days from the date of the decision of the Court below, and there is no provision for an extension of time.

The next legal step to address is when the twenty-one days are calculated. Rule 9 sub-rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) provides thus:

‘2. The prescribed period within which an appeal may be brought shall be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against.’

The twenty-one days shall be calculated from 14th July 2023, when the ruling was delivered by the trial High Court. From 14th July to 3rd August is 21 days, and for the avoidance of doubt, we shall calculate it. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1, 2, and 3. The 4th of August 2023 was the 22nd day, which was a public holiday and fell on a Friday. The appeal would have been void if it had been filed on Friday, 4th August 2023, as it was the 22nd day from the date of delivery of the ruling.

The defendant’s position would have been sound if the twenty-first day had fallen on Friday, 4th August 2023, and that would have permitted it to file it on the available working day, which is on 7th August 2023. Section 44, subsections 5 and 6 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792), is on the reckoning of time where an act to be done falls on a public holiday or weekend.”

The Court then concluded thus:

“We are satisfied that the Defendant [Appellant herein] failed to file its appeal against the ruling of the trial High Court within the twenty-one days prescribed by the Court of Appeal Rules, C.I. 19. We, therefore, dismiss the notice of appeal filed on 7th August 2023 as incompetent.” (see page 56 Volume 3 of the ROA).

[4.1]. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant, by a notice of appeal filed on the 13th November, 2024, lodged the instant appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds that:

“I. The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the reckoning of time for an interlocutory appeal in Rule 9(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) ought to include the day the decision appealed against was delivered.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR a. The Court of Appeal should have held that in reckoning time for the filing of interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeal, Rule 9(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) ought to be read together with Section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792). b. The Court of Appeal should have held that a proper construction of Rule 9(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19), read together with Section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) excludes the day the decision appealed against was delivered in the reckoning of time for an interlocutory appeal. c. The Court of Appeal should have held that by the Supreme Court’s decision in Torgbenu and 2 others v. Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VIII [2019-2020] 1 SCLRG 304, the date on which the decision appealed against was delivered ought to be excluded from reckoning the time limited for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19).

II. The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR a. The Court of Appeal should have held that 21 days from the date of the High Court’s ruling dated 14th July 2023 is 4th August 2023. b. The Court of Appeal should have held that the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was filed 21 days from the date of the High Court’s decision appealed against.”

[5.0]. ARGUMENT BY COUNSEL:

In the statement of case filed on the 4th March, 2025, Counsel for the Appellant prayed this Court to set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment and direct the Court of Appeal to hear the Appellant’s appeal dated 7th August 2023, on its merits. According to Counsel, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when their Lordships concluded that the 21 days for filing an interlocutory appeal, in the instant case, ended on the 3rd August 2023, and not on the 4th August 2023. That if the Court of Appeal had correctly computed the timelines, the 21st day would have fallen on the 4th August 2023, with the effect that the Appellant would be entitled, under the applicable rules, to file their notice of appeal on the 7th August 2023, the next available working day from the 4th August 2023 which was a public holiday.

Counsel, therefore, submitted that “the Court of Appeal should have held that by the Supreme Court’s decision in Torgbenu & 2 Others v. Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VIII [2019-2020] 1 SCLRG 304, the date on which the decision appealed against was delivered ought to be excluded from reckoning the time limit for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19).” And that given that “twenty-one days from the High Court’s Ruling fell on a public holiday which was on a Friday, the next available official working day (the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday) was Monday, 7th August 2023 on which the Appellant duly filed its notice of appeal.”

[5.1]. On the other hand, Counsel for the Respondent, in his statement of case filed on the 13th January, 2026, argued that the Court of Appeal was right in arriving at the conclusion that the Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed out of time. Counsel submitted (at page 8 paragraph 29 of his statement of case) as follows:

“Indeed in reaching its decision on the instant case, the Court of Appeal adverted its mind to the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Unreported case of Torgbenu & 2 Others v Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VII which analysed Rules 9(1) and 9(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997, C.I 19 and section 44 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) and held that the time for filing an appeal shall be computed from the day the decision was rendered and if the 21st [day] fell on a public holiday or weekend, it shall be filed on the next available working day. The Court of Appeal position was upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal in the case of Torgbenu & 2 Others v Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VIII [2019-2020] 1 SCGLR 304.”

Accordingly, Counsel for the Respondent prayed the Court to dismiss the instant appeal.

[6.0]. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL

My lords, the main issue for determination in this appeal, in my humble view, is whether or not the Court of Appeal was right in arriving at the conclusion that the Appellant’s appeal was filed out of time.

It is noteworthy that the nature of the appeal which went before the Court of Appeal, is not in dispute, having been filed against an interlocutory decision of the trial High Court. It is also not in dispute between the parties that the 4th of August 2023 was a public holiday.

[6.1]. My lords, Rule 9 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) provides:

“Time limits for appealing

(1) Subject to any other enactment for the time being in force, no appeal shall be brought after the expiration of-

(a) twenty-one days in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision; or

(b) three months in the case of an appeal against a final decision unless the court below or the Court extends the time.

(2) The prescribed period within which an appeal may be brought shall be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against….”

It has been held that the twenty-one days for filing an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9(1)(a) of C.I. 19, cannot be extended. XL Insurance Switzerland Co & Others v Gemini Maritime Services & Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority [2012] 1 SCGLR 658.

Section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) states that:

“44. (3) Where in an enactment a period of time is expressed to be reckoned from or after a particular day, that day shall not be included in the period.”

In Torgbenu & 2 Others v Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VIII [2019-2020] 1 SCLRG 304, the Court stated the position at page 309 of the Report as follows:

“It is therefore clear, that by section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792), the date on which the decision was made ought to be excluded from the reckoning of the time limited for the filing of the appeal, because rule 9(2) stipulates that the twenty-one days limited by rule 9(1)(a) shall be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against. In these proceedings, the ruling of the High Court, Sogakope, was delivered on 18 May 2016 and the notice of appeal was filed on 9 June 2016. In calculating the twenty-one days’ period prescribed under the rule in accordance with the formula provided under section 44 (3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792), the date of the ruling ought to be excluded, and if it is so excluded, then the twenty-one days’ period ends on 9 June 2016, that is, the very day that the respondent filed the notice of appeal in the Court of Appeal. Thus, the appeal was properly filed and the Court of Appeal committed no error in so holding.” (Emphasis)

[6.2]. My lords, their lordships in the Court of Appeal fell into grave error in their judgment with respect to the reckoning of the date and period that the notice of appeal in this matter should have been filed. My lords, this error came about as a result of the fact that their lordships failed to consider the specific provision in section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009, Act 792 [which has been quoted above] and, which directs that the day of the delivery of the judgment shall be excluded from the reckoning of the 21 days within which the notice of appeal ought to be filed in line with the provision in rule 9(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules to the effect that: “the prescribed period within which an appeal may be brought shall be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against”.

My lords, the word “from” as used in rule 9(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, takes its meaning from section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, 2009. The word “from” as it appears in rule 9(2) of CI.19, cannot be given a literal meaning but the meaning assigned thereto by section 44(3) of Act 792. After all, the time limit within which an appeal may be filed as stipulated in rule 9 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1996, CI.19 is “subject to any other enactment for the time being in force …” as clearly stated in rule 9(1) of CI.19. One such enactment is section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, Act 792. Thus, for failing to consider the effect of section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, Act 792 in the reckoning of the time within which the notice of appeal ought to be filed and also for failing to consider the judgment of this court in Torgbenu & 2 Others v Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VIII (supra) in which this Court gave meaning to the provisions in rule 9 of CI.19 and section 44(3) of Act 792, which was binding on the Court of Appeal, as stated in article 129(3) of the Constitution, 1992, their lordships’ judgment was given per incuriam and cannot be allowed to stand. If their lordships at the Court of Appeal had considered section 44(3) of the Interpretation Act, Act 792 and had also considered the decision of this Court in Torgbenu & 2 Others v Togbe Nakakpo Dugbaza VIII (supra), they would not have come to the decision they arrived at which has culminated in this appeal.

[6.3]. CONCLUSION:

From the foregoing, it is settled that in computing the timelines for filing an appeal, the date on which the decision appealed against was made or given, shall be excluded from the reckoning of time. Considering that the decision of the High Court was delivered on the 14th July 2023, the reckoning of time ought to commence from the 15th July, 2023 with the effect that the twenty-first (21st) day would fall on the 4th August 2023. But given that 4th August 2023 was a public holiday, the 21st day deadline shall extend to the following day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday in terms visualized by section 44(5) of Act 792 which states that:

“(5) Where the time limited by an enactment for the doing of a thing expires or falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday, the time shall extend to and the thing may be done on, the first following day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday.”

[7.0]. In the circumstances, it is my humble view that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when their Lordships included the day of the impugned decision of the High Court in computing the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. Let the appeal be restored to the cause list of the Court of Appeal for same to be heard on the merit.

(SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) PROF. H.J.A.N. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) K. T. ACKAAH-BOAFO

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

DANSO AMOAH ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPLICANT/APPELLANT/

APPELLANT LED BY KIMATHI KUENYEHIA ESQ. WITH EZEKIEL CODJOE ESQ. AND MAKAFUI AKYEA-ANSAH ESQ.

ELIAS ELIAS ASHKAR ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/

RESPONDENT LED BY HARUNA MAAMAH ESQ.