[2026] SLR (SC) 67Supreme Court - Ghana2026 SC - GHANA

ISSAH AHENE (SUBST. BY SACKEY AHENE ABDUL FATTAL) vs. VIVIAN AKU BROWN-DANQUAH(SUBST. BY MARGARET ADORKOR AKUFFO)

10 June 2026 · KULENDI JSC · ≈ 46 min read

Cite as[2026] SLR (SC) 67

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OSCOLAISSAH AHENE (SUBST. BY SACKEY AHENE ABDUL FATTAL) v VIVIAN AKU BROWN-DANQUAH(SUBST. BY MARGARET ADORKOR AKUFFO) [2026] SLR (SC) 67

APAISSAH AHENE (SUBST. BY SACKEY AHENE ABDUL FATTAL) v VIVIAN AKU BROWN-DANQUAH(SUBST. BY MARGARET ADORKOR AKUFFO), [2026] SLR (SC) 67 (Ghana).

BluebookISSAH AHENE (SUBST. BY SACKEY AHENE ABDUL FATTAL) v VIVIAN AKU BROWN-DANQUAH(SUBST. BY MARGARET ADORKOR AKUFFO), [2026] SLR (SC) 67 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 2026).

Linkhttps://superlawgh.com/slr/2026/sc/67/

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A.D. 2026

CORAM: LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)

PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC

KULENDI JSC

KWOFIE JSC

DZAMEFE JSC

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. J4/54/2024

10TH JUNE, 2026

ISSAH AHENE ………… PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/APPELLANT

(A.K.A. ALHAJI ISSAH ALAHU)

(SUBSTITUTED BY SACKEY

AHENE ABDUL FATTAL)

VRS

VIVIAN AKU BROWN-DANQUAH ………….. DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/

(SUBSTITUTED BY MARGARET RESPONDENT

ADORKOR AKUFFO)

JUDGMENT

KULENDI JSC:

INTRODUCTION:

This appeal presents yet another chapter in a protracted dispute over title to this particular area of land, which has traversed the hierarchy of the superior courts on repeated occasions but has returned to us yet again for, hopefully, a final determination.

The appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16th June, 2022 which varied the High Court Judgment of 14th May, 2021 and held that the Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant (hereinafter called “the Appellant”) was entitled to twelve (12) acres of land only but dismissed the remainder of Appellant’s original claim for 396.96 acres of land situate at Abokobi together with all the reliefs sought in the Appellant’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant has further appealed to this Court by the filing of a Notice of Appeal on 22nd July, 2022.

BACKGROUND:

The dispute in the present appeal concerns a parcel of land situate at Abokobi over which both parties lay competing claims of ownership.

It was the Appellant who caused to be issued, a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim against the Defendant/Respondent/Respondent (hereinafter called “the Respondent”) for the following reliefs;

Declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Alahu village measuring 310.90 acre (159.04 Hectare) bounded on the North with Abokobi Presby Mission Land and Awula Korso’s land measuring 2459.0 feet more or less, on the North East measuring 1260.0 feet more or less, on East with Agula Tesa, Sepene Cottage, Mensa Bu Bamboi, Sasraku’s land measuring 4416.9 feet more or less, on the South East with Abloh Adjei’s land measuring 223.4 feet more or less, on the southWest measuring 1804.8 feet more or less, on the North West by Abloh Adjei-Abokobi road with Hesse Village and Adanse and more particularly contained in the site plan

Recovery of possession of any portion of Alahu land trespassed on by the Defendant, her assigns, grantees, servants or any person claiming through her

Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant herein, her assigns, workers, servants, independent contractor, or any person(s) claiming through her from entering, developing, alienating or interfering in any manner with Alahu lands.

General Damages

Costs

The claim was founded on the Appellant’s assertion of long possession and customary ownership of the land. The Respondent resisted the action contending that the land in dispute forms part of the larger Krobiwohor lands belonging to the Adutso family of Osu, over which the family has previously obtained judicial recognition in earlier proceedings culminating in Appellate and Supreme Court decisions.

At the trial High Court, both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence, including site plans, statutory declarations, prior judgments, affidavits, and witness statements, each seeking to establish superior title to the land.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim, holding that he had failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish ownership of the land in dispute. An Appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed in part. The present appeal is lodged against the judgment of the Court of Appeal seeking its reversal and a grant of all the reliefs sought in the Appellant’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim.

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS CASE

By his Amended Statement of Claim filed pursuant to the Order of Court dated 11th June, 2019, the Appellant averred that he is the founder, first settler and customary owner of a parcel of land known as Allahu Village or Masha Allahu, situate near Abokobi, covering an approximate area of 396.96 acres.

According to the Appellant, he entered the land about seventy-five (75) years ago when same was virgin land, and through acts of hunting, farming, settlement, construction of buildings and allocation of portions to other persons, he reduced the land into his possession and established the Allahu village (also known as Masha Allahu ) community thereon. He contended that he has remained in continuous and undisturbed possession of the land since its founding and that all his eleven (11) children were born on the said land, evidencing long and settled occupation.

The Appellant maintained that the land known as Masha Allahu or Allahu Village is separate and distinct from the lands claimed by the Respondent’s Adutso family known as Krobiwohor lands. He asserted that the Respondent and her agents have unlawfully trespassed onto his land and have even made inscriptions on buildings and portions of the land demanding that occupants produce documents of title. The Respondent’s unlawful acts are anchored on a judgment of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. H1/123/2013 entitled Vivian Aku Brown-Danquah v. Samuel Lanquaye Odartey.

The Appellant further averred that he was neither a party nor privy to the said judgment and that same cannot validly be used to justify entry onto his land.

The Appellant referred to an earlier court proceedings in Suit No. FAL/378/2011 entitled Ivy Vanderpuye & Another v. Ahene Sackey in respect of the land in dispute but said that he was not a party to the said suit but rather his son, Ahene Sackey who incidentally is his lawful attorney in this suit, was the named party.

The Appellant further referred to a statutory declaration and site plan dating back to 1974 produced by the Odartey Sro Family in the Ivy Vanderpuye case which he contends acknowledged the existence of Allahu Village and captured it within a larger land area. He argues that this document acknowledged the existence, ownership and possession of Alahu Village by the Appellant.

He further stated that in Suit No. BMISC 16/2011 entitled Philip Odartey Cruickshank v. Samuel Lanquaye Odartey & Anor., the Respondent herein allegedly swore an affidavit admitting that her family land is located at Krobiwohor, which he contends is distinct and far from Alahu Village. He therefore argued that the Respondent’s prior representations contradicts her present claim to ownership of the disputed land.

The Appellant also contended that any claim by the Respondent or her family over portions of his land is statute-barred by limitation, given the long period of his occupation and possession.

The Appellant stated that the Respondent’s recent acts of entry and interference with his land have caused him hardship, injury, and loss. He therefore sought a declaration of title to the land, recovery of possession and damages for trespass.

RESPONDENTS CASE

The Respondent in an Amended Statement of Defence delivered on 29th July, 2019 disputed the claims of the Appellant and contended that the land in dispute, referred to by the Appellant as Alahu or Masha Alahu Village, forms part of the larger Adutso Family land, and known as Krobiwohor lands.

The Respondent averred that her family is the lawful customary owner in possession of the entire tract of land, including the area in dispute. She asserted that the Adutso Family acquired the land as far back as 1850 through settlement by their ancestor Ayi Baflasi, who entered into possession of a large tract of land comprising over 500 acres and reduced same into use through farming, hunting, and occupation.

She further averred that in a prior dispute over portions of the land, Amoa Kwadwo, the Mankrado of Berekusu claimed that the Royal Asona Family owned a section of the large tract of land upon which Ayi Baflasi settled on, Ayi Baflasi presented customary drinks to Amoa Kwadwo in exchange for the grant of approximately 238 acres of land , which was subsequently reduced into writing by his successor, Nana Ado Dwobi II, by a deed of gift dated 13th May, 1955. That a portion of this land was also leased by the Respondent to Nitaku Holdings Ltd.

The Respondent stated that the land has since remained in the continuous possession of the Adutso Family and its tenants, successors, and licensees. She contended that any settlement known as Masha Alahu or Alahu Village was founded not by the Plaintiff, but by one Ataa Laryea (also referred to as Masha Alahu), a tenant farmer of the Adutso Family, who was permitted by the family to farm and settle on portions of the land. Atta Laryea, she claims, died 2 years ago. She adds that other persons, including Numo Adanse also known as Colonial Soldier, were similarly permitted to farm and establish temporary settlements on portions of the land.

The Respondent relied heavily on prior judicial determinations concerning the land and contended that the Adutso Family had obtained judgments of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. H1/123/2013 and other related proceedings affirming their ownership and possession of the land in dispute. She further asserted that there exists a Supreme Court judgment covering the larger tract of Adutso Family land, which includes the disputed area, and that the judgment plans confirm the boundaries and ownership.

The Respondent also referred to Suit No. BL 433/2006 and other earlier proceedings in which testimony was allegedly given confirming that the land forms part of Adutso Family property and that settlements on same were made by tenant farmers under the authority of the family.

She contended that the Appellant and his privies, including his son Ahene Sackey, were aware of prior litigation involving the land but deliberately failed to join same, despite knowledge that they had no legitimate interest therein.

With respect to Suit No. FAL/378/2011 entitled Ivy Vanderpuye & Another v. Ahene Sackey, the Respondent averred that the Appellant’s son defended that action with the knowledge and support of the Appellant, and that the settlement documents arising therefrom expose inconsistencies in the Áppellant’s claim to ownership of the land.

The Respondent further asserted that the entire land in dispute falls within Krobiwoho lands, which are under the ownership of the Adutso Family, and that any alleged distinction between Krobiwoho and Alahu is unsupported by credible evidence. She denied that she ever admitted that her family land is separate from the disputed area in any prior affidavit, contending instead that any such interpretation is misleading and taken out of context.

The Respondent therefore maintained that the Appellant was not entitled to his claim.

PROCEEDINGS AT THE HIGH COURT

After Close of Pleadings, on 6th November, 2015 and 3rd February, 2016, both parties applied for directions by filing issues and additional issues. The Court set down the issues set out in the application for directions and additional issues for trial

Trial commenced on 15th January, 2019 with Appellant testifying through his son, Abdul Fattal Ahene Sackey, his lawful attorney who testified pursuant to a power of Attorney. The Appellant called other witnesses; Kassim Affortum (PW1), Jonas Nii Noi Dowuona (PW2) Mohammed Odamitey (PW4) and Nana Odei Leebi (PW5). One Agnes Mensah who filed a Witness Statement on behalf of the Appellant, and was to testify that the Appellant’s village shared boundaries with the Presby Mission School was never called upon to testify during the trial.

The Respondent also testified through her lawful attorney Edmund Brown and also called one other witness, Nana Addo Banfo IV.

In the course of the trial, the Appellant subpoened two additional witnesses, the Regional Surveyor and the Registrar of the Court of Appeal.

After close of trial, Judgement was delivered in favour of the Respondent on 14th May, 2021 and the Appellant’s claims were dismissed in their entirety. In arriving at its decision, the learned trial Judge held that although both parties relied on traditional evidence in support of their respective claims to ownership of Alahu Village, the Appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence of recent acts of ownership and possession capable of supporting his traditional evidence.

At page 118 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 5, the learned trial Judge held as follows:

“I note that although the Plaintiff’s witnesses, to a large extent, corroborated his claim that he was the founder of Alahu Village and that he was the one who permitted Atta Laryea to cultivate a farm on a section of his land, the Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence of recent acts of ownership or possession exercised by his grantees on the land in dispute. For example, the Plaintiff attached photographs of buildings and farms on the land in dispute (Exhibit C series) as evidence of the activitiesof his grantees of the land ion dispute yet he did not call any of the owners of these buildings or farms to testify on his behalf.He thus failed, in the view of the Court, to prove that he was the grantor of the building owners. I thus find that the Plaintiff failed to adduce cogent evidence of recent facts to consolidate his traditional evidence on the issue of ownership of Alahu Village.”

Further, the learned trial Judge also placed considerable reliance on the pleadings filed by the Appellant’s Attorney, Ahene Sackey, in Suit No. FAL/378/2011, entitled Ivy Vanderpuye & Anor v. Ahene Sackey. The Court found that in the said action, Ahene Sackey had pleaded that the land in question belonged to the Odartey Sro Family and that his father had acquired approximately twelve (12) acres of land from the said family in 1956. According to the learned trial Judge, those pleadings were fundamentally inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s case in the instant suit where the Plaintiff filed a site plan, Exhibit B which showed that Alahu Village comprised 396.96 acres and this substantially undermined the credibility of Ahene Sackey.

At page 120 of the Record of Appeal,Volume 5, the learned trial Judge stated as follows:

“Thus in Suit No. FAL/378/2011, the Plaintiff’s attorney not only asserted that his father’s land fell within Exhibit ‘O’, the land covered by the site plan attached to the Statutory Declaration made by the Odartey Sro Family, but also, he asserted that his father, in 1956, acquired 12 acres of land from the Odartey Sro Family. It therefore followed logically from his pleading that his father was a grantee of the Odartey Sro Family.”

The learned trial Judge further found that when confronted with the contents of the said pleading during cross-examination, Ahene Sackey feigned ignorance of the contents of his own statement of defence and failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies between that pleading and the Plaintiff’s case in the present action.

At page 121 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 5, the Court held that:

“It was evident from the Plaintiff’s attorney’s evasive answers to questions relating to Suit No. FAL/378/2011 and his attempt to extricate himself from the said suit, while relying on the site plan tendered by the Odartey Sro Family in the said suit as proof of the existence of Alahu Village, that he was being selective and economical with the truth.”

The learned trial Judge nevertheless expressed serious reservations regarding the documentary evidence tendered by the Respondent and highlighted several defects in the site plans and survey documents relied upon by the Respondent. The Court noted allegations of forged survey signatures, inconsistencies in survey coordinates, deficiencies in the Respondent’s judgment plans and irregularities in the certification of court documents.

Despite these concerns, the learned trial Judge concluded that the burden of proof rested on the Appellant and that the weaknesses in the Respondent’s evidence could not compensate for the Appellant’s failure to establish his own title. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge held that the Appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof required by law.

APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEAL

Dissatisfied with the High Court Judgement, the Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal on the following grounds;

That the judgment of the trial court dated 14th day of May, 2021 is perverse and against the weight of evidence adduced at the trial

That the trial judge erred in law and in fact when she held that the Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence of recent acts of ownership or possession exercised by his grantees on the land in dispute

That the trial judge erred in law and in fact when she held that Defendant’s family has been adjudged owners of a vast stretch of land which includes Alahu village

That the trial judge failed to appreciate that the inconsistencies and deficiencies in the Defendant’s site plans whittled down the potency of her judgments delivered in her favor by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court

That the trial judge fell into grave error of law by relying on the content of statement of defence filed in Suit No FAL/378/2011 entitled Ivy Vanderpuye & Anor v Ahene Sackey which has not been tested in trial for a finding of fact to be made thereon

That the trial judge erred in fact when she held that from the outset the identity of the land in dispute was not contested and therefore did not emerge as an issue for determination.

That additional grounds of appeal may be filed upon receipt of the records of appeal.

39. After reviewing the entire records, the Court of Appeal, by a Judgement dated the 16th of June 2022, upheld the judgment of the trial court in part. The Court of Appeal held that the Appellant’s case that he founded Alahu village by hunting and farming on unoccupied land in 1945 was preposterous. At page 64 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 7, the Court noted as follows;

“Therefore, an individual in the person of the appellant by his pleadings and having asserted that he was the founder of Allahu village and first settler, he had ipso facto postulated that he discovered the 396.96 acres of land by hunting, settlement, farming and making grant. That makes a clear assertion of allodial ownership. The time frame would be about 1945, if one were to do the computation of the 75 years back that he stated. The res litiga is not located in any uttermost or remote part of Ghana scarcely inhabited but around Abokobi, which is barely 20 kilometers away from Accra Central. Such a claim of having founded 396.96 acres of land not by acquisition from any original owners but that this land was ownerless, as it is implicit in that claim, until 1945 is nothing but extremely preposterous, If that claim can be true then it is no more true than saying that one can still in today’s Ghana, discover vast swatches of unclaimed or undiscovered land in Ga rural. What a delightful news that would serve many a Ghanaian who have fallen victim to double sale of lands. The reason why appellant disingenuously filed to name his grantor would be made bare later in this judgment.”

40. The Court further relied on admissions in earlier proceedings, particularly Suit No. FAL/378/2011, where it was stated that the Appellant’s father acquired only about twelve (12) acres from identifiable grantors, rather than discovering unoccupied land. The Court observed that the Appellant was bound by such prior admissions.

41. On possession, the Court accepted that there was evidence of the existence of Alahu village and some degree of occupation, including testimony that the Appellant and his family had lived and farmed on the land. However, the Court held that such occupation did not translate into proof of title to the entire 396.96 acres claimed but only of those 12 acres of land.

42. Accordingly, at page 83 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 7, the Court of Appeal concluded as follows;

“The appeal succeeds only in part and to the extent of this court decreeing that by virtue of the Limitation Act, Appellant is only entitled to continue to occupy land to the extent of 12 acres. We would order the appointment of the Regional Surveyor of Land from the Survey and Mapping Division of the Lands Commission to measure 12 acres of land taking the center of the Allahu village as the starting point and making sure for the coordinates to cover 12 acreage of land that visible signs of possession by Appellant in terms of the presence of its village and farming activities. Save for this variation, the appeal is dismissed.”

APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT

43. Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant on 22nd July 2022 invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court by the filing of a Notice of Appeal on the following grounds;

That the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the ground of appeal relating to the identity of the land in dispute vis a vis the composite plan on record and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice against the Appellant.

That the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal fell into an error of law and fact when it held that the Learned Trial Judge was well within the exercise of her judicial function to rely on the statement of defence in Suit No. FAL/378/2011 to expose the inconsistency in the claim of acquisition of the title to the land and the general porous nature of the case of the Appellant.

That the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal fell into grave error of law and fact when it held that notwithstanding the serious claims of conflicting site plans and attendant problems with them, it is not enough to pronounce that the decision in Suit No. J4/4/2016 entitled Vivian Aku Brown-Danquah vs. Samuel Lanquaye Odartey had not properly been obtained.

That the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal fell into an error of law and fact when it held that Appellant has been in possession of only 12 acres of land and decreed success for him only to the extent of 12 acres that he is in actual possession.

That the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16th June, 2022 is against the weight of evidence and perverse.

That additional grounds of appeal may be filed upon receip of the records of appeal.

THE LAW:

44. Having carefully examined the Judgments of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, we note that the two Courts were largely ad idem on substantial portions of their conclusions arising from the evidence on record.

45. While the High Court reasoned that the Appellant had failed to prove his claim including failing to prove sufficient acts of possession and therefore dismissed Appellant’s case in its entirety, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court on the issue of possession and limitation and allowed for the appeal to succeed in part and that the appellant is only entitled to continue to occupy the land to the extent of 12 acres.

46. In this appeal, we shall examine the record of appeal and ascertain which of the findings of the lower courts is justified having regard to the evidence led as well as the applicable law. Where this court is unable to endorse either of the findings of the two lower courts, we may come out with our own findings.

47. This position of the law is supported by a plethora of decisions including the decision of Wood CJ in the case of CONTINENTAL PLASTICS ENGINEERING CO LTD V. IMC INDUSTRIES-TECHNIK GMBH [2009] SCGLR 298 at 307 wherein she stated as follows:

“An appeal being by way of rehearing, the second appellate court is bound to choose the finding which is consistent with the evidence on the [page 308] record. In effect, the court may affirm either of the two findings or make an altogether different finding based on the record.”

SEE PRAKA V KETEWA [1964] GLR 423 SC, FOFIE V ZANYO [1991] 2 GLR 472 SC; ZAKARI V BARCLAYS BANK; TUAKWA V BOSOM [2001-2002] SCGLR 61 AT 65; SARKODIE V FKA CO. LTD [2009] SCGLR 65; FOSUA V ADU-POKU [2009]SCGLR; AGO SAI & ORS V KPOBI TETTEH TSURU III [2010] SCGLR 762; AKUFFO- ADDO V. CATHLINE 1992]1GLR 377, SC ; DJIN V MUSAH BAAKO [2007-2008]SCGLR636;

48. It is also to be noted that the Respondent did not make a counterclaim. The burden of proof therefore laid exclusively on the Appellant to establish their claim by leading cogent evidence which, when weighed against the evidence of the Respondent, was more probable. The onus has always been on the Plaintiffs to satisfy the Court that they are entitled on the evidence brought by them to a declaration of title.

49. In civil matters such as the instant case, the burden of proof requires proof on the preponderance of probabilities and is governed by S.10(1), 11(1),11(4), 12(1) & (2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323).

50. It is important to re-iterate the fundamental principle of the law of evidence that a party who bears the burden of proof must lead sufficient and credible evidence on the material facts in issue. If such a party fails to discharge this burden, their claim must necessarily fail. The law recognises that proof may be established through various means, including the oral testimony of parties and witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary evidence and real or physical evidence. All these forms of evidence serve the purpose of persuading the court or tribunal of fact that a particular fact is more likely to be true than not. Accordingly, any matter that is capable of proof must be supported by evidence of such weight and quality that a reasonable mind, properly directed, would conclude that the existence of the fact in question is more probable than its non-existence.

52. The law has also been long settled that a Plaintiff seeking a declaration of title to land assumes a heavy evidential burden. He bears the obligation of establishing by clear, cogent and credible evidence, a valid root of title and a superior entitlement to the land in dispute. Unless he discharges this burden satisfactorily, no declaration can be granted in his favour irrespective of the deficiencies that may exist in the Defendant’s case.

SEE AWUKU V TETTEH [2011]1 SCGLR 366 , TARKORADI MILLS V. SAMIRA FARIS (2005-2006) SCGLR 882 @ PAGE 900]

53. The Appellant’s in this case must rely on the strength of their own case and not on the weakness of the Respondent’s case. If this burden is not discharged, the weakness of the Respondent’s case would not help them. The law is that where a plaintiff in a civil action fails to discharge the burden of proof placed on him and accordingly does not provide any sustainable basis for the reliefs he seeks from the Court, he cannot rely on the deficiencies or the weaknesses in the defendant’s case to make out his claim. However, where the plaintiff has led sufficient evidence such that if the defendant had called no evidence, judgement would have been entered in his favour, then the plaintiff may in addition, rely on any weaknesses, inconsistencies or gaps in the defendants evidence. Such weaknesses, where they tend to support the plaintiff’s case, may properly be taken into account in determining whether the plaintiff has discharged the overall burden of proof.

SEE ODAMETEY V CLOCUH & ANOTHER [1989-90] 1 GLR 14 SC, RICKETS & ANOR V ADDO & ORS; RICKETTS V BORBOR (CONS.) [1975] 2 GLR 158.

54. Therefore in assessing whether or not the Appellant’s case is more probable than not, we shall evaluate the evidence on record and consider whether on the basis of the available evidence, the Appellant’s case was the more probable of the rival testimonies and is deserving of the verdict adjudged in their favour by the Court of Appeal.

EVALUATION:

55. Upon a review of the grounds canvassed in this appeal, we note that the Appellant’s alleged errors of law and errors of fact committed by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal. The Appellant however failed to particularise those errors of law to aid this Court in ascertaining in what way and in what manner those errors are deemed to have occurred.

56. Rule 6(1)f of the Supreme Court Rules, C.I 16 requires that an Appellant who alleges an error of law must provide the particulars of the said errors so alleged. This is one of the rules which prescribes the manner in which an Appellant must formulate his or her grounds of appeal. The Appellant is not at liberty to state the grounds of their appeal in any manner. The grounds of appeal upon which a party challenges the judgment of the Court below must therefore not only be properly formulated but shall be set out in the manner prescribed by the rules of the court.

57. The rationale behind rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996, CI. 16 is also stated by this court in DAHABIEH vrs. TURQUOI & BROS [2001 – 2002] SCGLR 498 as follows: –

“The intention behind rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C. I. 16) is to narrow the issues on appeal and shorten the hearing by specifying the error made by the lower court or by disclosing whether or not a point at issue had been raised. By that way, both the court and counsel for the respondent would be enabled to concentrate on the relevant parts of the evidence in the record of proceedings and not waste time on irrelevant parts of the evidences with respect to questions of law, it is necessary that the respondent and his lawyers know well in advance what points of law are being raised so that they may prepare their case and marshall their authorities; whilst an indication that the point of law was or was not raised in the court below may help the court resolve the issue faster.”

58. The failure of the Appellant notwithstanding, this Court shall not strike out the said grounds because the grounds as framed, also encompass allegations of error of fact, which are sufficiently cognisable for the purposes of our appellate review. In the circumstances and in the interest of substantive justice, the grounds will be considered within the purview of our re-hearing jurisdiction notwithstanding the procedural deficiency in not particularising the alleged errors of law.

58. The Appellant also urges the omnibus ground of appeal, arguing that the Judgement is against the weight of evidence. Under this ground, we shall undertake an independent evaluation of the evidence on record to determine which of the conclusions reached by the two lower courts are justified, or whether we shall come to a different finding and conclusion altogether.

59. Where an Appellant contends that a Judgement is against the weight of evidence, he is in substance, making an assertion that the trial court either failed to give due effect to material evidence or improperly evaluated certain pieces of evidence to the detriment of the Appellant. Such a ground of appeal invites the Court to undertake a careful review of the entire record to determine whether the conclusions reached by the trial court is reasonably supported by the evidence. However, the burden in this regard rests on the Appellant and it is incumbent on him to identify the lapses and demonstrate how the High Court and Court of Appeal’s assessment of the evidence have occasioned certain findings that cannot be justified by the evidence on the record. Mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of the case is insufficient. The Appellant must establish that the conclusions reached are not reasonably supported by the evidence on record.

SEE ABBEY & OTHERS V ANTWI [2011] 26 GMJ 151 SC, DJIN V MUSAH BAAKO [2007-2008] SCGLR 686.

60. We shall consider the grounds of appeal together under the omnibus ground that the Judgement of the Court of Appeal is against the weight of evidence and determine whether upon the totality of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeal was justified in affirming the Appellant’s claim save for the limited relief granted in respect of the 12 acre portion found to be in Appellant’s possession.

RESOLUTION:

61. The first ground of appeal canvassed by the Appellant is that the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the ground of appeal relating to the identity of the land in dispute vis a vis the composite plan on record and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.

62. It is the case of the Appellant that Masha Allahu village lands are distinct and different from Respondent’s land known as Krobiwohor and argues that the land occupied and possessed by him, is Masha Allahu Village. The Respondent’s case throughout has always been that Masha Allahu village formed part of the larger tract of family land known as Krobiwohor.

63. It is not in dispute that both parties acknowledge the existence of the village known as Allahu or Masha Allahu village as was rightly stated by the trial High Court Judge.

64. The Appellant’s claim that Masha Allahu and Krobiwohor were distinct land is not borne by the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, we find no merit in this complaint.

65. In the instant appeal, the record reveals that the identity of the land was never genuinely in dispute. The parties may have disagreed as to ownership but they were substantially referring to the same land. The evidence on record depicts that Masha Alahu Village lies within the area covered by the proprietary site plan of the Odartey Sro family and is completely surrounded by lands forming part of that larger tract.

66. More importantly, the land the subject of Exhibit Q, namely the Statutory Declaration of the Odartey Sro family, was subsequently determined by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court to belong to the Respondent’s family, the Adutso family.

67. It is important to note that the Appellant in an earlier suit No.:.FAL/378/11 entitled Ivy Vanderpouye & Anor vrs. Ahene Sackey pleaded that they obtained 12 acres of land from the Odartey Sro Family.

68. In the litigation between the Odartey Sro family and the Adutso family, the Court of Appeal expressly found that both families were laying claim to one and the same parcel of land. In its judgment, which was tendered by the Appellant as Exhibit E and by the Respondent as Exhibit 9, the Court of Appeal unequivocally stated as follows at page 8 “I find that the identity of the disputed land was one of agreed fact. It was agreed upon by both parties in their evidence that they were contesting over the same parcel of land.” This finding is significant. It demonstrates that the issue of identity had already been settled by a competent court, which found that the parties were disputing ownership of the same land and not separate or distinct parcels. Consequently, any attempt to suggest that Masha Alahu and the larger tract of land adjudged to belong to the Adutso family are different lands is inconsistent with both the evidence on record and the previous judicial findings on the matter.

69. We must ordinarily come to the same conclusion for consistency in judicial decision making is indispensable to the orderly administration of justice. Guided by the well-founded common law maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, we cannot be heard to pronounce the opposite. We must stand by previous decisions and not disturb settled matters. It must require very good reasons to make a departure. It must appear to us right to do so and a failure of justice not to do so.

70. This salutary principle is given constitutional expression in article 129(3) of the 1992 Constitution which provides as follows:

“(3) The Supreme Court may, while treating its own previous decisions as normally binding, depart from a previous decision when it appears to it right to do so, and all other courts shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law.”

See FREDERICK NYEMEKYE VRS FKA COMPANY LTD, Suit No. J4/29/2024 judgment dated 23rd October, 2024.

71. During cross-examination at page 272 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 2, A significant admission was made by the Appellant’s Attorney, Abdul Fattal Ahene Sackey, when he was confronted with Exhibit Q, the statutory declaration and accompanying site plan of the Odartey Sro family. The following exchange appears on the record:

“Q: You annexed exhibit Q to your further witness statement which is a statutory declaration made by Odartey Sro family acting per Charles Borketey Bortey and others is that not correct?

A: Yes My Lord.

Q: Take a look at the site plan in exhibit Q, have you seen it?

A: Yes My Lord.

Q: It is true that Masha Alahu village falls within the property site plan of Odartey Sro family in exhibit Q?

A: That is true. That is even a map in which they themselves they have stated that there was a village there by name Masha Alahu before 1945 and they also said they have a village here called Adansi.”

72. The foregoing admission is important. The witness expressly accepted that Masha Allahu Village falls within the land depicted on Exhibit Q. His disagreement was not with the location of the village but with the claim of ownership being asserted over it.

73. The same witness maintained this position throughout his testimony. At no point did he suggest that Masha Allahu Village was incapable of identification or that it lay outside the area represented on Exhibit Q.

74. The evidence of PW1, Kassim Affortu, was to the same effect. When referred to Exhibit Q during cross-examination at page 286 of the Record of appeal, Volume 2, the following exchange occurred:

“Q: Look at Issah Alahu village also known as Masha Alahu village is right in the middle of the site plan contained in exhibit Q. Is that not correct?

A: That is what the document says.”

Again, this evidence confirms the identifiable location of Masha Allahu Village on the very plan around which the dispute revolved.

75. Equally revealing was the evidence of the Respondent’s lawful attorney who, when confronted with the same exhibit at page 265 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 3, testified as follows:

“Q: Kindly take a look at exhibit Q you referred to at the last sitting and as testified by you Masha Alahu village is in the middle of exhibit Q correct?

A: That is correct.”

76. Thus, all sides accepted that Masha Allahu Village was shown on Exhibit Q and was capable of precise identification on the plans before the court.

77. In our considered view, these admissions effectively dispose of the Appellant’s complaint that the identity of the land was not determined. The evidence demonstrates that the location of Masha Allahu Village was known, identifiable and indeed identified by both sides. The dispute before the courts below was therefore not one of identity but one of title.

78. It is no wonder the Court of Appeal did not even bother to deal with the identity of the land because the identity of the land is not even in dispute. Even though the High Court and the Court of Appeal did not undertake an elaborate discussion of every feature appearing on the composite plans, no miscarriage of justice was occasioned thereby. The identity of the disputed land was sufficiently established and was never a live issue requiring resolution. The real issue was ownership and not identity.

79. This ground of appeal therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.

80. Ground (ii) of the Appeal seeks to fault the Court of Appeal for holding that the Learned Trial Judge was well within the exercise of her judicial function to rely on the statement of defence in Suit No. FAL/378/2011 to expose the inconsistency in the claim of acquisition of the title to the land and the general porous nature of the case of the Appellant and that the said pleading ought not to have been accorded any evidential weight.

81. Ground (iv) impugns the Court of Appeal’s holding that the Appellant has been in possession of only 12 acres of land and decreed success for him only to the extent of 12 acres that he is in actual possession which said 12 acres, was borne from his own prior pleadings in Suit No. FAL/378/2011.

82. The case of the Appellant in this Suit sharply contradicts the case of the Appellant in an earlier suit; Ivy Vanderpouye & anor v Ahene Sackey Suit.: No. FAL/378/11 where the Appellant pleaded that they obtained the land from the Odartey Sro Family, whom the Respondent in this Suit have won a case against in respect of the land in dispute. In Suit No. FAL/378/11, the Appellant’s Statement of Defence asserted that they only acquired 12 acres of land from the Odartey Sro family.

83. The relevant part of the Defence, found at page 129 of Volume 5 of the record of appeal; stated the following:

“10. Defendant avers that the land does not belong to the Nuumo Nmashie family but Odartey Sro family paragraph 6 hereof is repeated.

11. Defendant says that his father acquired 12 acres of land from the Odartey Sro family in 1956.

…

23. Defendant says the investigator asked him to take him to the Odartey Sro family, defendant’s father’s grantors, to conduct an investigation from them. The investigator confirmed that the portion of land was allotted to the defendant’s father to set up a village and to take care of the entire family land…”

84. Strangely, the Appellant makes a u-turn to now assert in this present case that they discovered the land in dispute about 75 years ago as first settlers and that their land encompasses 396.96 acres of land. This, the Court finds to be dubious, more so as Appellant had only tendered in the statement of claim filed by Ivy Vanderpouye in Suit No: FAL 378/11 in evidence but failed to tender the Statement of Defence and fiercely resisted the tendering of that Statement of Defence during cross examination of the Appellant’s Attorney by counsel for the Respondent as though he had skeletons in his closet and were desperate to conceal same.

85. In Suit No.: FAL 378/11, the Appellant’s legal attorney pleaded that the Appellant’s family derived their interest from the Odartey Sro family and that the extent of land involved was approximately twelve (12) acres, acquired by grant in or around 1956.

86. Those pleadings in Suit No: FAL 378/11 are prior admissions of material facts that have been made in judicial proceedings and such admissions affect credibility and consistency.

87. It is accordingly very significant that the Appellant, in this present proceedings, advances a totally different case, that is, he is the finder of a vast tract of land measuring approximately 396.96 acres, which he allegedly acquired by discovery and settlement, independent of any grantor.

88. This represents a fundamental change in the Appellant’s root of title and the law does not and will not permit such wholesale reversals.

89. It is a cardinal principle of law that parties are bound by their prior inconsistent statements and cannot approbate and reprobate to suit themselves where they find it in their interest or advantageous to do so. Further, pleadings constitute the foundation upon which every civil action is built. It is through the pleadings that each party discloses the material facts upon which he relies and it is those pleaded facts that determines the evidence that a party could properly lead. Consequently, a trial Court is duty bound to evaluate the evidence before it against the backdrop of the pleaded case.

90. The inconsistency in the prior suit and this present suit goes to the core of the credibility of the asserted root of title.

91. The “U-turn” in the Appellant’s narrative can be deduced from the collapse of the Odartey Sro line of title in earlier suit, thereby making it strategically unattractive for the Appellant to maintain reliance on that source. In suit No.: HI/123/2013, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Odartey Sro family did not own any land near Abokobi and that the Adutso Family owns land in Abokobi. This was confirmed by the supreme court in Suit No.: J4/4/2016.

92. By section 26 of the Evidence Act 1975, Act 323, captioned as “Estoppel by own statement or conduct” which states as follows: “Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, when a party has, by that party’s own statement, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, the truth of the thing shall be conclusively presumed against that party or the successors in interest of that party in proceedings between (a) that party or the successors in interest of that party, and

(b)the relying person or successors in the interest of that person.”

93. See also Section 80 of the Evidence Act 1975, Act 323 which provides as follows

80(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Decree, the Court or Jury may, or in determining the credibility of a witness, consider any matter that is relevant to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the trial.

(2) Matters which may be relevant to the determination of the credibility of a witness include, but are not limited to the following: the demeanor of the witness the substance of the testimony the existence or non-existence of any fact testified to by the witness the capacity and opportunity of the witness to perceive, recollect or relate any matter about which he testifies the existence or non-existence of bias, interest or other motive the character of the witness as to traits of honesty or truthfulness or their opposites a statement or conduct which is inconsistent with the testimony of the witness at trial the statement of the witness admitting the untruthfulness or asserting truthfulness

94. The Court of Appeal was accordingly right in treating the Appellant’s present claim of expansive possession with considerable scepticism.

95. The Appellant’s case before the trial court was that he founded Alahu village by hunting and farming on previously unoccupied land and thereby became owner of approximately 396.96 acres. Given the Appellant’s own evidence regarding the period of settlement, this would place the alleged discovery sometime in the mid-twentieth century, and in his own words per his amended statement of claim, seventy-five(75) years ago.

96. We acknowledge that under customary law, acquisition of land by first settlement or discovery is a recognised mode of acquisition of allodial title. The authorities are replete with instances where families, stools, skins, clans and individuals established titles through first settlement on previously unoccupied lands. See OHIMEN V ADJEI [1957] 2 WALR 275, NGMATI V ADETSIA [1959] GLR 323

97. The issue before us, however, is not whether acquisition by discovery is possible. The issue is whether or not based on the facts and circumstances of this present case, the Appellant’s account of his root of title bears sufficient proof that indeed, he acquired those lands some 75 years ago through discovery and settlement. This, we are unable to agree with the Appellant

98. The land in dispute is not situated in a remote region, an inaccessible forest or a sparsely inhabited area which is detached from settled communities. The land as depicted by the parties and in evidence is within the Abokobi area of the Greater Accra Region.

99. It is therefore hard to believe that, as late as the middle of the twentieth century, a single individual could chance upon nearly four hundred acres of completely ownerless and unclaimed land within such a locality and thereafter acquire absolute ownership thereof merely by hunting and farming activities.

100. If indeed the Appellant was the original discoverer and founder of the land as he alleges, there would have been no reason for his attorney, in the Ivy Vanderpuye case, to assert that the land had been acquired from the Odartey Sro family. The Appellant’s previous attribution of his interest to a grant from the Odartey Sro family is of itself inconsistent with the claim that he was the original discoverer of the land. Between the two competing narratives, the story told in the Ivy Vanderpoye case is more probable.

101. We are therefore unable to accept the proposition that the Appellant acquired title to the disputed land as first settler or discoverer. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that his occupation, whatever its extent, was derived from a different source rather than from original acquisition of ownerless land.

102. The Respondent’s account of acquisition of land, however, is more probable. The Respondent demonstrates in paragraph 4 of their witness statement, found on Page 149 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 3, how their ancestor, Ayi Baflasi acquired over 500 acres of land through settlement in or about the year 1850. However, whilst on the land Amoa Kwadwo, the Mankrado of Brekusu, claimed ownership of some 238 acres of the land and to maintain peace and avoid any form of conflict, Ayi Baflasi was given a customary grant after giving customary drinks to Amoa Kwadwo.

103. This traditional history was corroborated by the testimony of DW1, Nana Addo Banafo IV, Mankrado of Brekusu during cross examination. PW2, Appellant’s witness (Nana Odei Leebi II) during cross examination had admitted the Defendants claim that the res litigosa fell on the larger tract of Adutso family land.

104. During cross examination, found at page 318 of the Record of Appeal Volume 2, the following ensued;

Q: Are you aware that Ayi Baflasi the great great grandfather of the Adutso family acquired a large tract of land within which the land in dispute falls by settlement in the year 1854 when Osu was bombarded by the whites living in Osu Castle

A: Yes my Lord. My forebearer Nana Addo Dwobi was literate so he showed the extent of land that he gave to the Adutso family. He indicated that he gave them 238 acres of lands that it was given out to them in trust. Any other piece of land beyond this piece of land does not belong to them.

105. It can be gleaned from the above that PW2 had clearly made admissions that the land the Appellant is claiming, which is the subject matter of the dispute, falls within the larger tract of land acquired by the Adutso family. Exhibit L is the indenture evidencing the ownership of 238 acres of land.

106. There is perhaps no better form of evidence than an admission made by a party against his own interest. Where a party clearly admits of facts advantageous to his adversary, the law will ordinarily not require the latter to embark upon the needless exercise of proving what has already been conceded.

SEE ACHORO & ANOR v. AKANFELA & ANOR [1996-97) SCGLR 209 at 214 , RE ASERE STOOL; NIKOI OLAI V. AMONTIA IV (SUBSTITUTED BY NII LIMON I) V. AKORTIA OWORSIKA III (SUBSTITUTED BY LARYEA AYRIKU 1II) [2005-A)SLR 637

107. The Respondents’ traditional evidence appears more probable and better supported by the surrounding circumstances.

108. The Appellant in his amended statement of claim also raises the issue of statute of limitation and contends that any claim of any portion of Allahu village is barred by the statute of limitation.

109. In Ghana, the Limitation Act 1972 (NRCD 54) sets out the limitation periods for most actions. Section10 of Limitation Act 1972 (NRCD 54) posits;

(1) A person shall not bring an action to recover a land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or if it first accrued to a person through whom the first mentioned claims to that person.

(2) A right of action to recover land does not accrue unless the land is in the possession of a person in whose favour the period of limitation can run.

(3) Where a right of action to recover land has accrued, and before the right of action is barred, the land ceased to be in adverse possession, the right of action does not accrue until the land is again taken into adverse possession.

(4) For the purpose of this Act, a person is in possession of a land by reason only of having made a formal entry into the land.

(5) For the purposes of this act, a continual or any other claim on or near a land does not preserve a right of action to recover the land.

(6) On the expiration of the period fixed by this Act for a person to bring an action to recover land, the title of that person to the land is extinguished

(7) For the purpose of this section “adverse possession” means possession of a person in whose favour the period of limitation can run.”

110. For a party to succeed in his plea of limitation, he must demonstrate that he is by law, in adverse possession of the land. From the above, the 12 years limitation period does not run unless the person against whom a suit is instituted for the recovery of land is in adverse possession of same.

111. Adverse possession must be open, visible and unchallenged so that it gives notice to the legal/paper owner that someone was asserting a claim adverse to his. SEE ALSO MRS. VIVIAN AKU-BROWN DANQUAH V. SAMUEL LANQUAYE ODARTEY ( SUPREME COURT CIVIL APPEAL. NO. J4/4/2016 DATED 29TH JULY 2016)

112. The doctrine of adverse possession is anchored on well-recognised requirements of possession being nec vi , nec clam and nec precario , meaning without force, without secrecy, and without permission of the paper owner.

113. Thus, for limitation to assist the Appellant, he must demonstrate:

Continuous possession for at least twelve (12) years;

That such possession was adverse, open, and inconsistent with the true owner’s rights; and

That the land so possessed is sufficiently certain and identifiable.

114. Possession remains a relevant consideration in land litigation. Under Section 48(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323), a person in possession of property is presumed to be the owner of it. A rebuttable presumption is therefore established in favour of the person in possession. The law is that possession is one of the means of establishing a good title, especially in the absence of documents. Possession is seen as a source of good or reliable title to land against the whole world, except someone having a better legal right to possession. A person in possession can maintain an action against the whole world, except the true owner

115. The evidence supports the long occupation of the settlement known as Alahu village.

116. The evidence on record, including testimony from witnesses and the photographic exhibits tendered as Exhibit “C” series, establishes the existence of Alahu village, with residential structures, cultivated areas, and continuous human settlement. It is further supported by oral testimony that members of the Appellant’s family and grantees have lived within the area over a prolonged period.

117. In reaching this conclusion, we find additional support in the Respondent’s own conduct following the judgments obtained in her favour. The evidence on record shows that in an attempt to enforce those judgments, notices and posters relating to the execution process were posted on structures situated within Alahu village and on portions of the disputed land occupied by the Appellant and persons claiming through him.

118. That conduct is legally significant. One does not execute a judgment for recovery of land against vacant property. The very act of posting execution notices on structures located on the land constitutes an acknowledgment that there existed persons in actual occupation whose possession would necessarily be affected by the execution process.

119. Accordingly, It lends considerable support to the Appellant’s contention that Alahu village was not a recent creation nor a transient settlement, but a community physically present on the land. For this reason, we respectfully agree with the Court of Appeal that the learned trial Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant failed to establish acts of possession cannot be sustained on the evidence. The totality of the record overwhelmingly demonstrates actual occupation and possession of a defined portion of the land by the Appellant and his predecessors over a substantial period of time.

120. Appellant, per the evidence, has been in occupation of the Allahu village for sometime now. Even though the Appellant could not prove title to the over 300 acres in this suit, the Appellant is undoubtedly the founder of the Allahu village. Appellant therefore ought to be permitted to continue to enjoy the possessory rights in the Allahu village. The Appellant is therefore entitled to the 12 acres that was asserted as having been granted him for decades and on which the Appellant has lived and possessed for all these years without objection from the Respondent’s family.

121. The Court of Appeal was therefore right to hold that the Appellant’s long possession entitled him to protection under the limitation act. The Court of Appeal was similarly right to limit the Appellant’s relief to a defined and measurable extent of twelve (12) acres. Significantly, this acreage was not arbitrarily selected. It was consistent with the Appellants own previous admissions in Suit No. FAL/378/2011.

122. Having resolved the preceding grounds of appeal, we now turn to Ground IV, being the final ground requiring our determination.

123. The Appellant’s complaint under this ground is that the Court of Appeal erred when it held that notwithstanding the serious allegations concerning conflicting site plans and attendant problems with them, it was insufficient to conclude that the judgments in Vivian Aku Brown-Danquah v Samuel Languaye Odartey Suit No: J4/4/2016 had been improperly procured.

124. We find no merit in this complaint.

125. A summary of the Appellant’s argument is that certain site plans and judgement plans associated with the Respondent’s family had certain discrepancies, and, in some instances, signatures alleged to have been forged. Based on this, the Appellant invites this Court to impeach the judgments of both the Court of Appeal and this Court in earlier proceedings involving the Respondent’s grantors and the Odartey Sro Family.

126. A substantial portion of the trial was dedicated to the interrogation of three site plans that was tendered by the Respondent’s witness, DW2 Edmund Brown. These were Exhibit 10, Exhibit S and Exhibit T.

127. The Appellant subjected DW2 to a vigorous cross-examination. The record reveals that DW2 ultimately admitted that Exhibit 10 was not the correct plan of the Adutso Family land and that it had been wrongly attached to his witness statement. When confronted with the differing coordinates, he repeatedly maintained that Exhibit 10 was an erroneous exhibit.

128. Counsel for the Appellant places considerable reliance on DW2’s admissions of wrong and defective site plans and states that this Court should tilt the scale of justice heavily in favour of the Appellant. These admissions undoubtedly weakened the Respondent’s evidential position.

129. It is settled law that a Judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction remains valid, binding and enforceable until set aside by a Court clothed with the requisite jurisdiction.

130. It is untenable for the Appellant to allege fraud and forgery on the part of the Respondent in obtaining the judgment in No.: HI/123/2013 and Suit No.: J4/4/2016. This is because, to impeach a judgment against the grantors of the Appellant, a suit ought to be instituted to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud where the fraud would be particularized and proven.

131. The law has long recognised that allegations of fraud occupy a special place in civil litigation. Fraud is never presumed. It must be specifically pleaded and established by cogent and compelling evidence. More importantly, where the allegation is that a judgment was procured by fraud, the issue of fraud becomes the very foundation of the action and cannot be treated as an incidental matter within unrelated proceedings.

132. In Odger’s Principles of Pleading and Practice, 18th Edition at page 202, the learned authors stated the positions as follows:

“Where fraud is intended to be charged, it must be distinctly charged, and its details specified. General allegations, however strong, are insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice. See the English case of LAWRENCE v NORREYS (1890), 15 App Cas.210; [1886-1890] All E.R. Rep.858, where the Court said that in the absence of such averments, the court may dismiss the action.”

133. In the present case, no action was commenced by the Appellant to set aside either the judgment in Suit No. J4/4/2016 and/or No.: HI/123/2013 . No relief was sought for the nullification of those judgments. No particulars of fraud were pleaded against the parties who obtained those judgments. No opportunity was afforded to the persons alleged to have perpetrated the fraud to answer the accusations in proceedings specifically directed at that issue.

134. Yet, the Appellant urges this Court to arrive at the same practical result indirectly by holding that the judgments were improperly obtained. Such an approach would offend settled principles governing the finality of judgments .

135. The judgments in Suit No. J4/4/2016 and/or No.: HI/123/2013 were not founded solely upon site plans. The Courts considered the entirety of the evidence, including traditional evidence, recent acts of ownership, acts of possession and the competing claims of the parties. Ultimately, those courts pronounced upon the rights of the parties before them and entered judgment.

136. Unless and until those judgments are set aside through the legally prescribed process, they continue to enjoy the presumption of regularity and validity.

137. I therefore agree entirely with the Court of Appeal that, notwithstanding the allegations concerning conflicting site plans and alleged irregularities, such allegations, standing alone, were insufficient to justify a finding that the judgments in Suit No. No. J4/4/2016 and/or No.: HI/123/2013 had not been properly obtained. The Court of Appeal committed no error of law or fact in so holding.

138. It ought to be borne in mind that the Respondent did not have any Counterclaim and therefore they did not have to prove any claim in this suit. Neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal made any declaration to title to land in respect of this Suit in favour of the Respondent.

139. It is the Appellant who made a claim for a declaration of title to land and therefore bore the burden to prove his claim. It is preposterous, to say the least, to suggest that because of an alleged conflicting site plans of the Respondents, this Court ought to necessarily declare title in favour of the Appellant. This is impossible in the face of the earlier Judgements which binds the Appellant and the operation of estoppel against the Appellant who in the previous suit alleged he owned 12 acres of land by means of a grant but now makes a U-turn to assert a discovery and ownership of over 300 acres of land through discovery and first settlement some 75 years ago.

140. A party who bears a burden of proof in a suit cannot rely on the weaknesses of his or her adversary’s case in discharging such a burden. It was the duty of the Appellant to lead cogent and credible evidence to substantiate his case. Unfortunately, this was not done.

140. This ground of appeal also fails and is accordingly dismissed.

CONCLUSION:

139. It is for the above reasons that on 3rd June, 2026 this Court unanimously dismissed the Appeal as without merit and affirmed the Judgement of the Court of Appeal dated 16th June, 2022. Cost was awarded at GHS 80,000.00 against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

(SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI