KAI vs. AMARKYE [1982-83] GLR 817
25 January 1982 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 10 min read
[1982] SLR (CA) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Derrick v. Williams [1939] 2 All E.R. 559; 160 L.T. 589; 55 T.L.R. 676; 83 S.J. 397, C.A.
(2) Busch v. Stevens [1962] 1 Q.B. 1; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 511; [1962] 1 All E.R. 412; 106 S.J. 153.
(3) Hyams v. Stuart King [1908] 2 K.B. 696; 77 L.J.K.B. 794; 99 L.T. 424; 24 T.L.R. 675; 52 S.J. 551, C.A.
(4) Armah v. Addoquaye [1972] 1 G.L.R. 109, C.A.
(5) Warner v. Sampson [1959] 1 Q.B. 297; [1959] 1 All E.R. 120; 103 S.J. 91; 173 Estates Gazette 43, C.A.
(6) Hesse v. Accra Municipal Council [1964] G.L.R. 399, S.C.
(7) Narwu v. Armah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.
(8) Litchfield v. Dreyfus [1906] 1 K.B. 584; 75 L.J.K.B. 447; 22 T.L.R. 385; 50 S.J. 391.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant-appellant from the decision of the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, in an action for, inter alia, declaration of title to land and damages for trespass. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Sarkodee J.
COUNSEL
Ennin for the defendant-appellant.
Ato Dadzie for the plaintiff-respondent.
JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.
This is an appeal from the judgment of his Honour. K. K. Okyere, Circuit Judge, sitting at Cape Coast. The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) in his capacity as head of the Abokyi family sued the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) for a declaration of title to a piece or parcel of land (called “Odumase land” which was formerly known as Osamkrom), damages for trespass and perpetual injunction.
The plaintiff succeeded on his claim, the court awarding him ¢2,000 damages for trespass and an order for perpetual injunction. The court also gave judgment to the defendant on his counterclaim and awarded him ¢500 damages and ¢150 costs.
The defendant dissatisfied with the decision of the circuit court appealed to this court. Two main grounds of appeal were argued, i.e. additional ground (1) and ground (a) of the original grounds, namely:
“(1) Whether the omission to deny specifically paragraphs (8), (9) and (10) of the plaintiff’s statement of claim operates as admission of those averments which were denied in the original statement of defence.
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(2) The judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence before the court.”
After pleadings had closed, but before trial, the defendant applied for and was granted leave by the lower court to amend paragraph (6) of his statement of defence. In his amended statement of defence filed subsequently, he failed to repeat the paragraphs in the original defence by which he had specifically denied paragraphs (8), (9) and (10) of the statement of claim. The three paragraphs contain important averments touching on the plaintiff’s title.
By those paragraphs the plaintiff claimed that some time in 1978, he redeemed the land in dispute from one Opanyin Takufa to whom the land had been pledged in 1928. That he successfully instituted an action in the District Court, Saltpond, against one Kojo Awer, head of family of Opanyin Takufa and Takufa’s successor the judgment of which vested the land in dispute in the plaintiff. At that trial, the defendant’s brother, hereafter referred to as Kwesi Dofo, gave evidence against the plaintiff and claimed that the land in dispute was first acquired by his ancestors. That claim was rejected by the district court.
The plaintiff therefore, by paragraph (10) of the statement of claim stated that the defendant was estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff and averred that the defendant had trespassed on the said land and felled palm trees thereon. By reason of the defendant’s failure to repeat those paragraphs in the amended statement of defence, the trial judge held that the defendant was deemed to have admitted paragraphs (8), (9) and (10) of the statement of claim and therefore there was no need for the plaintiff to have led evidence in support of those allegations of facts.
It is not surprising, from a closer look at the amended statement of defence, that the learned trial judge was led into that conclusion. For not only did the defendant omit those paragraphs but he chose to file a defence substantially different from the original one and appeared to have ignored paragraph (6) for which he had been granted leave. Indeed, the amended statement of defence pursuant to leave granted was a complete departure from the proposed amendment as formulated in the defendant’s notice of amendment upon which the court relied to grant leave. The new statement of defence also had attached to it a counterclaim for which no leave had been sought.
Where one party applies for leave to amend his pleadings it is very important that the precise terms of the amendment should be formulated not only for the information of the court but also to enable the other party to know exactly what it is that is being asked for and to raise objection if any; for leave to amend ought to be given only when and to the extent that the proposed amendment had been properly formulated: see Derrick v. Williams (1939) 55 T.L.R. 676, C.A. Order
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28 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) does not mean that an order may be made in general terms, but it gives a general power to make proper orders in all cases for determining the real questions in issue. In other words, a party cannot amend generally and the order giving leave to amend binds the party making the application. He is not entitled to introduce in his pleadings amendments which would not have been allowed if he had stated in writing the exact amendment he was seeking. As was stated by Lawton J. in Busch v. Stevens [1963] 1 Q.B. 1 at p. 5:
“It would be an abuse of process for a plaintiff, who had obtained an order under R.S.C., Ord. 28, r. 12, in a form to which he was not entitled, to use that order as a shielding rampart behind which to make amendments which would clearly not have been allowed if he had told the court in writing what he wanted when he applied for leave to amend.”
It is therefore the duty of every counsel who applies for leave to amend his pleadings to formulate and state in writing the exact amendment being sought: see Farwell L.J. in Hyams v. Stuart King [1908] 2 K.B. 696 at p. 724, C.A.
Counsel for the defendant conceded and it is clear from the notice of amendment that the defendant intended to amend only paragraph (6) of the statement of defence but yet he failed to confine himself to that paragraph only and introduced allegations of facts for which he had not obtained leave. In effect, the defendant failed to comply with the court’s order. I am therefore of the view that his conduct amounted to an abuse of the process of the court.
What is more important is, did the failure by the defendant to deny the three paragraphs amount to an admission of them? The whole object of pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue. As was decided by the Court of Appeal in Armah v. Addoquaye [1972] 1 G.L.R. 109 (as stated in the headnote at p. 110): “Order 19, rr. 14, 18 and 20 have one common object, namely, to compel each party in his turn to admit fully or deny fully each allegation of fact in the pleading of his opponent.”
In the amended statement of defence the defendant admitted only paragraph 2 of the statement of claim. He, however, denied specifically paragraphs (1)-(7). He then went on in the remaining paragraphs to set out facts which would support his family’s claim of ownership to the land in dispute. The comprehensive statement of defence completely ignored the averments contained in paragraphs (8)-(10) of the statement of claim. These related to the Saltpond case, judgment of which was admitted in evidence in the circuit court in support of the plea of estoppel. These paragraphs were not specifically denied even though they were repeated in the reply to the statement of defence. The issue of estoppel was again raised in the summons for
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directions. The learned circuit judge found that the identity of the land in the earlier suit was the same as the one in the present dispute between the same parties or their privies.
In my view, the defendant ought to have repeated those denials in his amended statement of defence if he was relying on them. What he did amounted to setting down a new line of defence to which he added a counterclaim. As was stated by Hodson L.J. in Warner v. Sampson [1959] 1 Q.B. 297 at p. 321, C.A: `Once pleadings are amended, what stood before amendment is no longer material before the court and no longer defines the issues to be tried.”
There was neither a specific denial of paragraphs (8)-(10) of the statement of claim nor was there even a general traverse of either the whole or any part of those allegations of fact. The trial judge was therefore right in holding that the issues as to the pledge and plea of estoppel per rem judicatam had been admitted by the defendant and that the plaintiff need not to have led evidence in proof of them. Failure to deny either specifically or by implication allegations of fact amounts to an admission of them and no further proof of them is required: see Hesse v. Accra Municipal Council [1964] G.L.R. 399, S.C.
Pleading apart, the plaintiff led evidence in support of this case. Whereas the plaintiff called as boundary owners heads of the various families who own lands along his boundaries, the defendant called junior members of the same family to contradict the evidence of the heads of family. For example, where the plaintiff called Kobina Tawiah, head of his family who gave evidence in support of the plaintiff, the defendant called Kow Arkorful another member of the same family but a subordinate member. The trial judge carefully considered the rival testimonies and preferred the evidence of the various heads of family. I see no reason why I should disturb his findings.
The most recent act of ownership exercised by the plaintiff was that a month before the trespass complained of, he had redeemed the land in dispute from a pledge to which it was subjected. The defendant cannot claim that he was not aware of the case before the District Court, Saltpond.
The evidence of Kwesi Odofo, the defendant’s brother, was substantially the same as that of Yaya, the defendant’s representative and who also gave evidence on behalf of the defendant in the circuit court. The land in dispute was inspected during the hearing of the Saltpond case when all the boundary owners were present. Kwesi Odofo, the defendant’s brother was also present. If it was true that the defendant was in possession he or his representatives would have seen the magistrate and the parties to the dispute on the land. I am satisfied with the judge’s finding that the defendant by his conduct is estopped per rem judicatam from re-litigating title to the same land. The defendant having stood by during the pendency of the motion in Saltpond is estopped by conduct from asserting his title afterwards.
The plaintiff did not stop there but went further to call traditional evidence to show his root of title. He showed that the land in dispute was for his ancestor Kwame Ewusi and that Awer held that land at Ewusi’s pleasure. I accept the findings of the learned trial judge and hold that the plaintiff established a clear case for title to the land in dispute. The activities of the defendant on the land amounted to trespass.
Having found that the plaintiff had proved his title and that the defendant had committed acts of trespass on the plaintiff’s land, the trial judge erred in upholding the defendant’s counterclaim. What the judgment amounted to was that the court accepted that the plaintiff was in possession and rejected the defendant’s rival claim to possession. The plaintiff was therefore, justifiably exercising his rights as a person in possession of the land in dispute. The complaint by the plaintiff to the police upon which the police decided to arrest and detain the defendant was justified.
The defendant as found by the trial judge committed trespass and caused damage to property. That apart, the plaintiff made a complaint to the police who in exercise of their own judgment arrested and detained the defendant. The plaintiff cannot be made responsible for the conduct of the police. There is no justification for the award of damages: see Narwu v. Armah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A. The defendant should have been prosecuted for trespass and stealing. In the light of the conclusion arrived at by the court the counterclaim was a useless amendment which the trial judge ought not to have considered. If at the trial, an amendment turns out to be useless and such as ought never to have been asked for, the party who applied for it must be mulcted in costs: see Litchfield v. Dreyfus [1960] 1 K.B. 590. Moreover the defendant admitted entering the land in dispute and making heavy investments on it.
Accordingly, the defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed and the award of ¢500 damages and costs of ¢150 are hereby set aside. The appeal is dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
Damages and costs awarded appellant on counterclaim by trial court set aside. D. R. K. S.
