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[1985] SLR (CA) 24Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

KOBINA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 337

28 May 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 24
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OSCOLAKOBINA v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 337 [1985] SLR (CA) 24
APAKOBINA v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 337, [1985] SLR (CA) 24 (Ghana).
BluebookKOBINA v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 337, [1985] SLR (CA) 24 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant against his conviction and sentence for rape by the High Court, Tamale. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.

COUNSEL

Amui for the appellant.

Sam Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. On 12 March 1985 the appellant was convicted by the High Court, Tamale of the offence of rape and was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour.

The main facts of the case were narrated by the victim, a ten-year old girl called Cecilia Akude. This little school girl lived with her mother in a village called Limpusi near Yendi. The appellant who is a blacksmith, also lives there and the evidence shows that he was well known to the complainant and her mother.

Sometime in July 1982, when the complainant was returning home after attending nature’s call, the appellant called her. He said he was going to send her to buy him drink from her mother. The latter sells a potent local gin called “akpeteshie.” According to the complainant, when she went to the appellant, he asked her to enter his room and fetch a bottle. The unsuspecting girl went there. The appellant followed, put her in his bed and had sexual intercourse with her, To prevent her attracting the attention of neighbours, he covered her mouth with a piece of cloth. When he finished the act, he then gave her a bottle to buy the drink. According to the evidence, the girl threatened to report the affair to her mother but the appellant in turn threatened to shoot her if she did. For that reason, the victim kept quiet until her mother

[p.339] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 337

discovered that her private part was interfered with. When she inquired who was responsible for this, she said it was the appellant.

The evidence is unclear when exactly the complainant’s mother discovered her daughter’s condition. It seems this was a week or so after the event. The complainant was taken to the hospital. This was on 26 July 1982. Dr Tapang discovered a tear in the posterior part of the orifice. He found that her hymen was not intact. When questioned in court, the complainant said she had never been carnally known before this incident.

A report was thereafter made to the police. Deputy Superintendent Amarteifio gave instructions for the appellant to be sent for. He knew him as well as he knew the complainant and her mother. According to Superintendent Amarteifio, when he inquired from the appellant why he did such a thing, his reply was that it was the work of the devil.

In due course, the appellant was charged with rape. He made a statement to the police in which he denied that he had had any sexual relations with the complainant. Indeed, he said he was away from the village at the time, and stayed away a fortnight. He implied that as he was not in the village, he could not have been responsible for the offence alleged. At his trial, he gave evidence and reiterated this position.

After the conclusion of evidence, the judge summed up the case for the prosecution and the appellant. The case did not appear to have presented any problem to the jury. They took only five minutes to return a verdict of guilty. The judge proceeded to convict the appellant and, as we said, sent him to prison for the comparatively short period of eighteen months. It is this conviction that the appellant contests by this appeal.

The main complaint directed against the conviction was the summing up. It was argued that the judge misdirected himself by non-direction inasmuch as he failed to direct the jury on the need for corroboration in a case such as the present. This being an offence against females, this is one of the cases in which, as a matter of practice, it is necessary for a court to warn the jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The learned judge appears to have been oblivious of his duty on this score. In no part of his summing up did he direct the jury on the need for corroboration of the complainant’s evidence. To this extent, the appellant’s contention is well-merited. But the principle is that if there is indeed, independent confirmation of the complainant’s evidence which implicates the accused, then the failure to direct the jury cannot, per se, vitiate a conviction. That principle of case law has now been put on a firm statutory basis by section 7 (4) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323).

[p.340] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 337

The question therefore is, was there any independent confirmation of the girl’s story? That she was sexually assaulted was also testified to by her mother Paulina Dua. She was the first to notice the interference with the girl’s female part. That was also confirmed by the independent evidence of the doctor who noticed a recent tear in that part of her private organ technically called orifice. The issue was really clinched by the testimony of Superintendent Amarteifio. He said he was friendly to both parties and knew them well. According to him, when the appellant was brought to the station and he queried him why he behaved in that way, he said, “It is the work of the devil.” In the context of this case, this can only mean that he did the wrong on the urging of the devil. And the only wrong then under inquiry was the forcible violation of this little girl.

We think that evidence provides the clearest possible corroboration of the complainant’s evidence. Before us, that officer’s testimony was attacked. But the jury clearly believed him. He told a natural and inherently probable story and we see no reason why the jury should not have believed him. Accordingly, while we think this point of law was well taken, it can have no impact on the result of this case.

Counsel for the appellant next combined his grounds two and three of the appeal. The pith of the argument presented on these grounds was that the judge failed to direct the jury on the burden of proof and that had he so directed them, the jury may well have come to a different conclusion. True, the judge did not use the conventional expressions used by judges when addressing juries. He did not, for instance say, the onus probandi was on the prosecution and that they must prove beyond reasonable doubt every ingredient of the offence.

But the judge made it clear to the jury that the prosecution must prove its case to their satisfaction. As he put it: “You therefore have to find from the evidence put before you whether the prosecution have proved to your satisfaction the charge of rape . . . bearing in mind that rape is having sex with another against the consent of that other.”

That direction was, in our opinion, adequate. True, the judge used expressions which can be improved upon, but that is no ground for setting the verdict aside. On the whole, we think this ground contains no issue of substance but is merely a verbal controversy. We see no good ground for disturbing the verdict of the jury. It follows that this appeal fails and is dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

M.C.N. -N.

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