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[1980] SLR (HC) 30High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

KUAH vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 481

19 May 1980 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 30
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OSCOLAKUAH v ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 481 [1980] SLR (HC) 30
APAKUAH v ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 481, [1980] SLR (HC) 30 (Ghana).
BluebookKUAH v ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 481, [1980] SLR (HC) 30 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Lands Commission; Ex parte Akainyah [1975] 2 G.L.R. 487.

(2) Kodi v. Accra-Tema City Council [1976] 2 G.L.R. 348.

(3) Ghassoub v. Dizengoff’ (W.A.) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 133, S.C.

(4) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

(5) Aquatic Biology Institute v. Abokuma [1978] G.L.R. 72.

(6) Barclays Bank of Ghana Ltd. v. Lartey [1978] G.L.R. 282.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION raised by the Attorney-General that the plaintiff’s action was not properly before the court on the ground that the statutory notice required to be served on the Attorney-General under Act 51, s. 1 (2) as substituted by N.L.C.D. 352 had not been complied with. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the plaintiff.

John Boateng, State Attorney for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.

On or about 26 February 1980 the plaintiff issued out of this court a writ against the defendants for (a) an injunction restraining the defendants herein from unlawfully interfering with

[p.484] of [1981] 1 GLR 481 the plaintiff’s trade or business, and (b) damages against the defendants herein for unlawful interference with the plaintiff’s trade as a seaman. The writ filed was accompanied with a twenty-paragraph statement of claim setting out the facts on which the plaintiff intends to rely to prove his claim.

On 29 February 1980 an appearance was entered on behalf of the defendants by the Solicitor-General and on 5 March a thirteen paragraph statement of defence was filed on their behalf in answer to the claim by the plaintiff. On 19 March an amended statement of defence was filed which reads:

“The defendants will at the hearing date contend by way of preliminary objection that the plaintiff ‘s action is not properly before the court, in that no statutory notice was served on the first defendant as enjoined by paragraph 1 (2) of the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352).”

This amendment was moved and was granted without objection on 14 April 1980. On that same day counsel agreed to argue the terms of the amendment as a preliminary issue.

Arguing in support of the objection, Mr. John Boateng, State Attorney, representing the Solicitor-General for the defendants, submitted that paragraph 1 (2) of the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352), enjoined the plaintiff to have given a statutory one month’s notice to the Attorney-General. Learned state attorney argued that the facts before the court show that the plaintiff failed to comply with this statutory request. He therefore submitted that since this statutory requirement, if I understood him well, was a sine qua non to maintaining the plaintiff’s action, his failure to comply with it rendered his claim incompetent before the court.

Replying on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata argued that under article 211 of the Constitution, 1979, all claims against the State (the government) has been put on equal footing with claims between individual citizens. Learned counsel argued that under article 211 proceedings against the State did not require the grant of a fiat or the use of the process known as petitions of right. Learned counsel referred to clause 2 of article 211 and submitted that it was made abundantly clear under the sub-clause that an action against the State lay as of right and that the Constitution has by implication taken away the provisions of N.L.C.D. 352. He submitted that the provisions of paragraph 1 (1) of N.L.C.D. 352 conflict with the plain language of article 211 (1) and (2) and the latter being the fundamental law of the land, the provisions of [p.485] of [1981] 1 GLR 481

N.L.C.D. 352 to that extent ought to give way to it. He cited Republic v. Lands Commission; Ex parte Akainyah [1975] 2 G.L.R. 487 and Kodi v. Accra-Tema City Council [1976] 2 G.L.R. 348 to support his contention.

Learned counsel argued in the alternative that if the preliminary objection was upheld then the action ought to be struck out only in respect of the first defendant, the Attorney-General. He argued that the action was against the two defendants and the second defendant being a statutory body could be sued. Learned counsel argued that since the notice required was to be given to the Attorney-General alone the success of the objection raised could only be referable to him.

In order to appreciate the full significance of the requirement to serve notice on the Attorney-General, it will be necessary to go briefly into the history of the State Proceedings Act, as amended up to date.

On 11 May 1961 the Government of Ghana passed the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51), to govern proceedings against the State. Section 1 (1) and (2) which deals with civil liability of the Republic provides:

“1. (1) No action shall be brought against the Republic without the fiat of the Attorney-General.

(2) No writ of summons shall be issued against the Republic, but in lieu thereof a claimant may file a statement of claim in the appropriate Court, a copy whereof shall be served on the Attorney-General.”

On 2 May 1969 the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352), was enacted. It reads:

“The State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51),is hereby amended by the substitution for section 1 thereof of the following new section: ⎯ 1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an action may be brought against the Republic without the fiat of the Attorney-General if the cause of such action arises on or after the 1st day of May, 1969.

(2) No action shall be commenced against the Republic until the expiration of one month after written notice of intention to commence the action has been served by the claimant or by his attorney or agent:

(i) on the Attorney-General or an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department not below the rank of Senior State Attorney, or

[p.486] of [1981] 1 GLR 481

(ii) in cases where action is to be commenced in a court in any Region, on the officer in charge of the Attorney-General’s Office in that Region.

(3) The notice shall state the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intended claimant and the relief which he claims.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, where a cause of action is founded on a continuing act it shall be deemed to have arisen at the commencement of the continuing act.”

N.L.C.D. 352 abolished the “fiat” requirement as an authority to bring an action against the Republic in respect of actions arising on or after 1 May 1969, and replaced same with the requirement of the service of a notice on the Attorney-General. This notice when served must expire before an action can be maintained and the statutory period given for its expiration is one month after service.

The crux of the matter raised by the submissions of learned counsel must depend on the respective relationship of the need for a “fiat” as a condition precedent and the requirement to serve notice as enshrined in N.L.C.D. 352 also as a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the State and to what extent the two or either of them has been affected by article 211 of the Constitution, 1979.

In resolving the issue posed by submissions of learned counsel, I have found the authorities cited to me by learned counsel for the plaintiff inapplicable to the facts of this case.

The purpose of the “fiat” as required under Act 51, which (in any way does not exist now by virtue of the provisions of N.L.C.D. 352 as I see it) was to give an authority to sue. In fact it operated as a licence or a passport to commence an action against the State. This cannot be said to be so of the “notice” required under N.L.C.D. 352 which by paragraph 1 (1) merely enjoined the would-be plaintiff to notify the Attorney-General as the Chief Legal Adviser of the Government of his intention to bring an action against the State. Once the notice is served all that the plaintiff has to do is to wait for one month after which he is at liberty to commence his action. The pre-condition to maintain an action under the “fiat” placed the State in a privileged position whereas the pre-condition to give notice does not necessarily do so. It seeks to liberalise, to maintain fairness and to bring sanity into the provisions of the State Proceedings Act which enjoins actions against the Republic to be brought in the name of the Attorney-General. In fact the requirement of serving notice is not only enjoined in respect of proceedings against the State. An example which comes to mind, off

[p.487] of [1981] 1 GLR 481 hand, is the requirement under the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, 1958 (No. 42 of 1958). In order to maintain an action under section 10 (1) of the Act a plaintiff is required to give a month’s notice to the insurance company as a condition precedent to be able to enforce a judgment obtained against their insured against the insurance company.

Under section 10 (2) of Act 51, civil proceedings against the Republic may be instituted directly against the Attorney-General or any other officer authorised in that behalf by him or any officer specified in that behalf under any law for the time being in force. In other words, actions against any government department or other agencies of the government which do not have legal personality can he brought against the Attorney-General and served on him directly without the knowledge of the particular department or agency involved. The notice envisaged under N.L.C.D. 352 which dispensed with the “fiat” and served both as an authority and notice to the Attorney-General, is intended to offer the Office of the Attorney-General an opportunity within the one month period to contact the particular state department involved in the action being contemplated for the necessary information to enable the office to study the nature of the claim and to decide what advice to give.

I therefore hold that from the above critical analysis, the provisions of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, as amended by N.L.C.D. 352, do not in any way conflict with the provisions of article 211 of the Constitution, 1979, and that the notice required thereunder is still in force.

The facts before the court show that no such notice was given before the writ in this action was issued. I therefore uphold the contention by learned State Attorney that the statutory requirement not having been complied with the plaintiff’s action against the State cannot be maintained.

I will now turn to the other leg of the submissions by learned counsel for the plaintiff that if the objection raised was upheld then the action should be dismissed only as against the Attorney-General. I think this submission is misconceived. Firstly, because the defendant has no cause of action against the first defendant and therefore there was no need to have sued him in the first place. But one cannot doubt that the reason for bringing the present action jointly against the two defendants was dictated by the provisions of section 10 (2) of Act 51. Section 10 (2) uses the phrase “may be instituted.” I do not intend to go into the question of construction here but it seems to me that the liberal construction of section 10 (2) gives the plaintiff an option to go either against the Attorney-General or the particular State organisation or department concerned, provided of

[p.488] of [1981] 1 GLR 481 course, that the latter has the legal capacity to sue and be sued. If “may” as used is one of option then the plaintiff can opt for one and is not entitled to sue the two institutions as has been done in this case.

Be that as it may, the point of relevance here is that one must look at the institution that will have to bear the result of the judgment. If the institution is a State Department, in other words, if the department even though given a statutory recognition does not exist independently as a legal entity with capacity to sue and be sued, then no action should be maintained against it solely because it has a statutory recognition. Assuming therefore that if the request by learned counsel for the plaintiff can be met, the question which then arises is whether the second defendant can be sued in its own right.

To answer this question we shall examine the legal status of the second defendant. The second defendant was established under the Ghana Seamen’s Employment and Welfare Board Instrument, 1968 (E.I. 28), with the following functions:

“6. Subject to the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1963 (Act 183), the functions of the Board shall be ⎯ (a) to exercise control over the recruitment, training, employment, welfare and discipline of Ghanaian sea-going labour;

(b) to establish and maintain generally an efficient administrative machinery to ensure high standards of work amongst such labour; and (c) to establish cordial relations between employers and employees of the Ghana Mercantile Marine.”

The Ghana Seamen’s Employment and Welfare Board is actually the employment and welfare board for Ghanaian seamen under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. On its face, nowhere in the provisions of E.I. 28 has legal personality been accorded to the board. It would appear therefore that no writ can be issued against it and any such action brought will not be warranted by any law or rule of procedure. Any writ issued against such a body will be void and the action treated as a nullity: see Ghassoub v. Dizengoff (W.A.) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 133, S.C.; Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.; Aquatic Biology Institute v. Abokuma [1978] G.L.R. 72 and Barclays Bank of Ghana Ltd. v. Lartey [1978] G.L.R. 282. But it appears from the functions and duties accorded to the second defendant that an action may be maintained against it singularly. But it is of significance to note that the plaintiff’s writ was issued

[p.489] of [1981] 1 GLR 481 jointly against the two defendants not severally and one wonders how the two can in law be severed as far as the present action is concerned as demanded by learned counsel for the plaintiff.

The preliminary objection therefore succeeds and the plaintiff’s action is hereby struck out.

DECISION

Preliminary objection upheld.

Plaintiff’s action struck out.

D. F.L.

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