KUO-DEN ALIAS SOBTI AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 41
25 July 1985 · TAYLOR JSC · ≈ 24 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Baffoe [1978] G.L.R. 358.
(2) State v. Anani Fiadzo [1961] G.L.R. 416, S.C.
[p.43] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41
(3) R v. Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 Q.B. 388; [1955] 1 All E.R. 274; 39 Cr. App. R. 1, C.C.A. ,
(4) R v. Horry [1952] N.Z.L.R. 111.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellants from the judgment of the High Court, Bolgatanga convicting them of murder. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
T. E. K. Amesimeku (with him Owusu Yeboa) for the appellants.
Sam Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
The three appellants in this case were convicted for murder by Dove J. sitting with a jury on 24 February 1982 at the criminal session of the High Court held at Bolgatanga.
The facts of the case for the prosecution are that on 15 February 1977, the deceased, Aleo Nubu, a Fulani shepherd, left his village in the morning to graze his cattle. In the evening the cows came back in batches without the deceased. The first prosecution witness, the brother of the deceased, reported the incident to his chief who told him that he had heard that some Dagartis had chased a Fulani man in the bush. The first prosecution witness went to the Dagarti chief’s house at Sugo and the chief confirmed the story of the chase. According to the chief, who gave evidence as the fifth prosecution witness, when he first heard of the chase he went to the appellants’ house. They told him that three of their cows were stolen by the said Fulani man, but that they had recovered their cows and that the Fulani man had gone away. So when the first prosecution witness came to him, he invited the appellants to his house to meet the first prosecution witness. In response to his invitation the appellants came to the chief’s house. They were four, the three appellants and a fourth man who died before the trial commenced.
When the four persons, all Dagartis, appeared before the chief and were asked about the whereabouts of the Fulani man in the presence of the first prosecution witness, they admitted chasing the Fulani man but said the man had ran away from them with his cattle. In evidence, the first prosecution witness said that at the chief’s house: “I asked them to let me know whether or not they had killed him. They said they did not kill him. They drove him away with his cattle.”
The first prosecution witness was not satisfied and so on the same day he reported the matter to the police at Nandom. The police arrested the first and second appellants as well as the other person who died before the trial. The third appellant was then at large and was only arrested eight months later. The second prosecution witness, the police detective who investigated the case, interrogated the appellants one
[p.44] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 after another separately. According to him the first appellant on interrogation stated that while they were drinking pito at his house they were informed by the fourth prosecution witness, a relative of the third appellant, that when he was out grazing the third appellant’s cattle he met the deceased in the bush and as he was afraid the deceased would steal his cattle he had come to report to the third appellant. This was apparently in the afternoon. On receipt of the report the three appellants together with their deceased colleague and a fifth Sissala man called Kojo went to the bush and met the deceased. The first appellant then told the police that they tried to invite the deceased to Sugo their village but he rather drew a knife and they all started to throw stones at him. He stated further that the third appellant hit the deceased with a club and he fell and died. On interrogation the second appellant confirmed that when they chased the deceased he drew a knife and that they all started throwing stones at him. He said however that the third appellant used the knife to kill the deceased. He also told the police that an amount of ¢32 was found on the deceased and that they all shared the amount, but later the first appellant gave his share to him. He surrendered the amount to the police and one of the cedis notes was found to have stains suspected to be blood.
The third appellant when arrested eight months after the incident confirmed the chase and stated on interrogation that he and the other persons chasing the deceased threw stones at the said deceased and that the deceased was hit on the forehead by a stone thrown by the first appellant. The first and second appellants told the police that the man died and that they left him in the bush but that later in the evening, they went together with their dead colleague to the bush and three of them dug a grave and buried the deceased. The first appellant took the police to the bush and showed the police the grave. The body of the deceased, identified by the first prosecution witness, was recovered from the grave. Before the body was exhumed, however, the first appellant showed a pair of sandals and a cap which was identified by the first prosecution witness as what his deceased brother was wearing before he left the house with the cattle. The body thus recovered was examined at the scene and a cut was found on the forehead and another big cut on the chest. The body was conveyed to the Jirapa Hospital and a post-mortem was performed. The cause of death according to the second prosecution witness was given by the doctor, who was not called, as due to stab wounds.
The police took statements from the appellants. Copies of the statements, were attached to the bills of indictment and summary of evidence of the proposed witnesses, which were served on each of the appellants before the preliminary hearing at the District Court, Wa on 19 July 1978, almost seventeen months after the arrest of the first and
[p.45] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 second appellants and nine months after the arrest of the third appellant.
At the preliminary hearing in accordance with the provisions of section 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the district magistrate addressed the following words to each of the appellants:
“Before deciding whether to commit you for trial, I wish to know whether you have anything to say in answer to the charge. You are not obliged to say anything but if you have any explanation, it may be in your interest to give it now. Whatever you wish to say will be taken down in writing and if you are committed for trial it may be given in evidence. If you do not give an explanation, your failure to do so may be the subject of comment by the prosecution and may be taken into account at the trial.”
In reply the first appellant stated as follows: “I do not know anything about this case.” The second appellant reacted as follows: “I do not know anything of this crime.” And the third appellant told the magistrate: “I do not know anything of the crime attributed to me in the bill of indictment and the summary of evidence.”
The district magistrate, realising that these statements were inconsistent with the copies of the statements of the appellants attached to the bill of indictment and summary of evidence, and acting in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule to Act 30, drew each of the appellants’ attention to the inconsistency and invited any correction they might wish to make and each appellant replied as follows:
The first appellant:
“The statement given in the bill of indictment and summary of evidence was not my statement. The police forced me to thumb-print.”
The second appellant:
“I did not volunteer the statement attributed to me in the bill of indictment and the summary of evidence. The police forced me to thumbprint the statement.”
The third appellant:
“I did not give any such statement to the police. The police wrote the statement and forced me to thumbprint.”
It is noteworthy that at the preliminary hearing they specifically disclaimed any knowledge whatsoever about the death of the deceased, and repudiated their statements attached to the bill of indictment on
[p.46] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 grounds that they were statements conjured up by the police to which their thumbprints had been obtained by duress. At the trial, however, when the police witness for the prosecution attempted to tender the statements which were then in police custody, objection was taken on the sole ground that section 182 of Act 30 had been infringed. The gravamen of the objection being that the statements should have been lodged with the registrar of the court before the trial and the registrar and not the police should have tendered them having regard to section 192 (4) of Act 30 and the case of the Republic v. Baffoe [1978] G.L.R. 358 at 360. The trial judge upheld the objection and the statements were accordingly rejected.
At the trial when he was called upon for his defence, the first appellant accepted the case of the prosecution up to the point when the chase of the Fulani shepherd began. His evidence in-chief after this point is as follows:
“When we were going Kojo Sissala took the lead and started running to where the Fulani man was. He crossed the Fulani man with the cattle. Before we reached we saw the Fulani man had drawn a cutlass. Kojo Sissala broke a stick and hit the Fulani man on the forehead. He fell down. When I reached him I saw that there was blood sprinkled on the floor and he was not breathing. I asked Kojo Sissala what happened and he asked me if I had not seen the Fulani man drawing a knife. When he told me this I left the scene.”
With regard to what happened in the chief’s house when the Sugo chief, the fifth prosecution witness, sent for him, he had this to say in his evidence-in-chief:
“When I went, the Sugo chief told me that a Fulani man who was sitting with him had come to ask about his relative. He had heard that some Dagarti men were chasing a Fulani man and that was why he sent for me. I did not give any answer to the chief for I was so frightened when I saw that Kojo Sissala had killed the Fulani man. The Fulani man with the chief said since I gave no answer, he would go home and see if his brother had returned and would report back to the Sugo chief .’’
In spite of the contention of the first appellant which contradicted the evidence of both the first prosecution witness and the Sugo chief, counsel for the first appellant cross-examined the fifth prosecution witness, the said chief, to suggest that far from being mute at his house, the first appellant gave information about the deceased as follows:
[p.47] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41
“Q I am suggesting to you that on that day, the accused (the first appellant) told you that Kojo Sissala ran and crossed the Fulani man and hit him with a stick.
A They did not inform me in the house. It was only in court that they told me that one of our Sissala boys was among.
Q You are not speaking the truth because Kojo Sissala belongs to the same tribe as you do.
A It is not so.”
In his evidence-in-chief he said that when the police contacted him he denied knowing anything about the death of the deceased. In short he told them nothing at the time when he was taken into custody. In spite of this stand when the policeman, the second prosecution witness, gave evidence before him it was suggested to the second prosecution witness by counsel for the first appellant during cross-examination that the first appellant did give him information about the death consistent with the defence at the trial:
“Q What he told you in the course of the investigation was that one Sissala man who went with them to retrieve a cow killed the Fulani man.
A He said it was (the third appellant) who killed the Fulani man.
Under cross-examination by counsel for the Republic, the first appellant admitted that he did not inform both the chief and the police about Kojo Sissala’s involvement thus contradicting the line of cross-examination adopted by his counsel:
“Q In your evidence you said it was Kojo Sissala who killed the man.
A I had seen Kojo Sissala use a club on the man and if he was dead he killed him.
Q Why did you not tell the chief that Kojo Sissala had killed the Fulani man?
A Kojo Sissala did not give me any orders to tell people about it.
Q Did he order you not to tell anyone?
A No.
Q The police suspected you of killing the Fulani man, why did you not say it was Kojo Sissala who killed the man and not you?
A I cannot inform the police about it.
Q You were happy that the blame was put on you?
A I was not happy. I used to tell them that I was not the one who committed the offence.”
[p.48] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41
Although the evidence led by the prosecution was that the first appellant led the police to the grave of the deceased, the police witness account was not challenged in cross-examination. When however the first appellant was cross-examined he denied showing the police the grave, although in examination-in-chief he had said he told the police nothing:
“Q Because you joined in burying in the night you were able to show the police where he was buried?
A I did not show them any grave. I only showed them the spot where Kojo Sissala crossed the Fulani man.
Q And did you show them the blood stains?
A No.
Q Did you show them where you saw the body lying?
A No.
Q Why not?
A I did not show them because I did not take part in the killing and I was not in a position to show.” The evidence-in-chief of the second appellant was practically the same as that of the first appellant except that the second appellant apart from confirming what Kojo Sissala allegedly did, also indicated that the Fulani man stole their cattle when he said: “When the Fulani man saw that Kojo Sissala was coming after him he started driving the cattle before him. Our cattle were among the Fulani man’s cattle.” (The emphasis is mine.) He also said that at the Sugo chief’s house he maintained total silence although when the police contacted and arrested him he said: “I told them I was not concerned.” His evidence under cross-examination followed the pattern of the first appellant. Asked about the incident in the chief’s house he reacted:
“Q He also said that he asked you about the Fulani man in the presence of the first prosecution witness to his house and you said the Fulani man had gone.
A He questioned me about the Fulani man.
Q And what did you tell him?
A I told him nothing.
Q Apart from exchanging greetings with the fifth prosecution witness you mean to tell us that you never said anything?
A Yes, I did not say anything.
Q Why did you refuse to answer the question when the chief spoke to you?
A I did not say anything because I was not concerned in the killing of the Fulani man.
Q But you knew the Fulani man was dead?
[p.49] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 A Yes.
Q You told the chief that you had not seen the man because you had joined in killing and burying him.
A I was not concerned with killing him.
Q You confessed to the police that you threw a stone at the Fulani man.
A I did not say anything to the police.
Q So like before the Sugo chief, you were mute before the police?
A Yes.
Q Did you join in the search?
A Yes.
Q What exactly did you do during the search?
A I did not do anything.
Q Did you tell the police that you saw the Fulani man at such a distance with Kojo Sissala?
A No.
Q Did you tell the police that you saw Sissala hit the deceased with a stick and he fell down?
A No.
Q So in short you never told the police that it was Kojo Sissala who killed the Fulani man?
A No. I did not tell him.”
The evidence-in-chief of the third appellant confirmed the evidence-in-chief of the first and second appellants’ allegation that it was Kojo Sissala who hit the deceased. His version, however, is that when Kojo Sissala crossed the deceased the cattle got scattered and he undertook to gather the cattle which apparently belonged to his kraal but which were being driven with the herd of the Fulani man. He did not actually see what happened. As he put it:
“When I brought the cattle together I saw the Fulani man on the floor. I saw Kojo Sissala was holding a stick in his hand . . . When I reached the spot where the Fulani man was lying the first appellant asked me to go back to the house. I asked why the Fulani man was lying down and Kojo Sissala said the Fulani man had drawn a knife and he had hit him and he fell.”
He also said that he saw the Fulani man bleeding from the forehead but he did to know whether he was dead or not. He said that at the chief ‘s house he told the chief that the Fulani man had gone away and that they had not seen him.
[p.50] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41
The next day he left very early in the morning for Kumasi and was arrested there eight months later. His evidence under cross-examination is illuminating:
Q You knew the first prosecution witness?
A Yes.
Q You remember that night after the incident the chief called you to his house?
A Yes.
Q And you saw the first prosecution witness there?
A Yes.
Q And the chief told you that the first prosecution witness had come to enquire about the Fulani man?
A He asked about the Fulani man and I said I did not see anything.
Q Your answer to the chief was a lie.
A I was not lying.
Q Why did you not tell the chief that you saw the Fulani man bleeding on the ground?
A I could not tell him because it was a Sissala man who had knocked him down.
Q Was Kojo Sissala before the chief?
A I did not see him.
Q Did you not know that you were under suspicion that night?
A I did not think that I would be suspected because I did not do anything.
Q When you were arrested and brought to Wa and you were told that you had killed the Fulani man you made a confession that you did.
A I did not confess that I had killed that Fulani man.
Q You told the inspector that the four of you threw stones at him.
A I did not say so. The inspector is lying.
Q And you said it was the first accused’s stone which hit the Fulani man on the head.
A The first accused did not stone the Fulani man. It is only a lie.
Q And that the Fulani man fell down?
A He did not stone him.
Q The Fulani man fell down?
A Kojo Sissala hit him and he fell.
Q You said you could not tell whether the Fulani man died or not.
A Yes. I said so.
Q But you never told the inspector that it was Kojo Sissala who hit him?
[p.51] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 A No.I did not tell him.
Q Why did you not tell him?
A I did not tell him because I did not know whether the man was dead or not.
Q When you were taken to Wa did you hear that your other three friends were arrested?
A Yes. I heard.
Q And they had also been charged with killing the Fulani man?
A Yes. That is what they told me.
Q And Kojo Sissala was on the run all the eight months that you were away?
A Yes.
Q Then why did you not tell the police to clear your friends that it was Kojo Sissala?
A It was because I did not know anything about that case.”
When the evidence of both the prosecution and the defence is critically examined, what emerges is quite clearly circumstantial evidence of murder. For the prosecution it was given in evidence and was not challenged, that according to the doctor the deceased died from stab wounds. The appellants suspected the deceased of stealing their cattle. The deceased was admittedly chased by the three appellants and the appellants were on their own admission present when the deceased died. The first and the second appellants when arrested, and before the arrest of the third appellant, admitted throwing stones at the deceased but the first appellant said that the third appellant hit the deceased with a club and he fell and died; the second appellant however rather said it was the knife of the deceased which the third appellant used to kill the deceased. On the arrest of the third appellant eight months later he also admitted the stone throwing but said that it was rather a stone thrown by the first appellant that hit the deceased on the forehead and he fell down. The first and second appellants also admitted burying the deceased and indeed it was the first appellant who led the police to the grave to recover the body. At the summary hearing the appellants denied all knowledge of the death and would seem to repudiate all admissions they had made. It was at the actual trial at the High Court that for the first time they gave evidence that they had knowledge of the death of the deceased and that it was caused by one Kojo Sissala. They admitted that they did not reveal this to the police and all other persons who interrogated them about the death of the deceased and the evidence also does show that although the committing magistrate explained to them the consequence of silence if they had any explanations, they nonetheless chose to insist on knowing nothing about the death.
[p.52] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41
Much of the arguments advanced in favour of the appellants in this appeal was directed at showing that there was no admissible evidence as to the cause of death since the doctor’s evidence that the death was due to stab wounds was clearly hearsay. It seems clear that this argument ignores the effect of sections 117 and 118 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323) under which hearsay evidence becomes admissible in the case if no objection is raised to it at the trial at the time the said hearsay evidence is given, for such cases connote clearly an implied agreement to the admission of the said hearsay evidence. The hearsay evidence so admitted without objection corroborates the evidence of the police officer’s actual physical examination which revealed a cut “on the forehead and another big cut on the chest” quite consistent with stab wounds.
The next point made in favour of the appellant was that the evidence in the case is so circumstantial and of such a nature as to be inadequate to sustain the verdict of the jury. In this connection it is noteworthy that in his summing up to the jury, the learned judge explicitly told the jury that the case of the prosecution rested on circumstantial evidence. He then referred to the case of State v. Anani Fiadzo [1961] G.L.R. 416 at 418, S.C. and drew their attention to what constitutes adequate circumstantial evidence to support guilt as was explained by Sarkodee-Adoo J.S.C. (as he then was) as follows:
“Presumptive or circumstantial evidence is quite usual, as it is rare to prove an offence by evidence of eye-witnesses, and inferences from the facts proved may prove the guilt of the appellant. A presumption from circumstantial evidence should be drawn against the appellant only when that presumption follows irresistibly from the circumstances proved in evidence; and in order to justify the inference of guilt the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the appellant, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. A conviction must not based on probabilities or mere suspicion.”
The judge then discussed the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution and the defence of the appellants. I think this aspect of his summing up is sound in law.
The headnote in R v. Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 Q.B. 388 which drew inspiration from the headnote of the New Zealand case of R v. Horry [1952] N.Z.L.R. 111 as was quoted by Lord Goddard in the Onufrejczyk case, lends support to the learned judge’s approach. It is there stated:
“In a trial for murder the fact of death can be proved by circumstantial evidence provided that the jury are warned that the evidence must lead to one conclusion only, and, therefore,
[p.53] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 notwithstanding that there is no body, or trace of a body, or any direct evidence as to the manner of death of a victim, the corpus delicti may be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain and leave the jury with no degree of doubt.”
(The emphasis is mine.) In this case the alleged confession statements of the appellants were all rejected on grounds which can hardly be justifiable in view of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261). That, however, is not very relevant here as the headnote of the Onufrejczyk case as reported in the (1955) 39 Cr. App. R. 1 shows:
“On a charge of murder, the fact of death is provable by circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding that neither the body nor any trace of the body has been found and that the prisoner has made no confession of any participation in the crime. Before the prisoner can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that on no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It seems that on the circumstantial evidence led by the prosecution and the admitted facts that the appellants knew and participated in the killing and considering the incredible defences of the appellants by incorrect and vacillating accounts they persistently told to the Sugo chief, the police and the committing magistrate, the jury were justified in returning the verdict of guilty which they did return considering the behaviour of the appellants as was given in evidence by the prosecution. Although charged with the capital offence of murder and by their subsequent evidence at the trial they professedly knew the facts surrounding the death of the deceased and the circumstances and that knowledge, if they are believed, showed them to be innocent, nevertheless they did not pass the information to the police. The first and second appellants chose rather to implicate the third appellant while that appellant was at large. When the said third appellant was subsequently arrested, he on his part rather chose to implicate the first appellant. Until they were all brought to the High Court and they actually gave evidence at the trial they would seem to be accusing one another of the act of killing the deceased. Before the police came on the scene they told the Sugo chief and later the brother of the deceased that
[p.54] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 after they had chased the deceased and left for their village the deceased was still alive and yet they knew he was dead and buried. The third appellant left the village the next day and was not seen for eight months thereafter. Even before the committing magistrate they disavowed any knowledge of the death of the deceased. This therefore is the overall picture they gave; while the third appellant was at large and before his arrest the first and second appellants put the blame for the killing on the third appellant. After his arrest the third appellant put the blame for the death on the first appellant, but at the actual trial the blame was for the first time unanimously shifted by all the appellants onto Kojo Sissala who was then not available to give evidence.
The Onufrejczyk case (supra) illustrates how the vacillating behaviour of an accused can create circumstances from which the mens rea of the offence of murder can be imputed to him. In that case Michael Onufrejczyk, the appellant who was from Poland, carried on a farm in Britain in partnership with a countryman of his, the deceased, named Sykut. By November 1953 the appellant in dire financial difficulties was endeavouring to borrow money from various sources. His partner the deceased was anxious to terminate the partnership and sell his share to the appellant for £700 if the appellant could pay that sum, failing which he would want the farm put up for sale so that he could obtain his share from the proceeds of sale. The appellant was anxious to avoid a sale but the partner would not budge. The appellant and his said partner went to see a solicitor to discuss the difficulties but they were unable to effect a settlement and there was evidence of quarrelling between them. By 14 December 1953 the parties had not succeeded in settling their difficulties and on that day Sykut disappeared completely and no trace of his body or clothing was found although the appellant was the last person to see him alive. The appellant gave a number of conflicting and false accounts concerning what he alleged were the movements of his partner on and after 14 December 1953. He also tried after 14 December 1953 to get a witness to impersonate Sykut and he endeavoured to concoct evidence to show that Sykut was still alive after that date. Upon those facts Oliver J. at the Glamorganshire assizes holden at Swansea on 1 December 1954 convicted him of the murder of Sykut upon the verdict of the jury after he had, inter alia, given them this direction with regard to the death of Sykut:
“If he did not die by natural causes, he was killed. Members of the jury, if he was killed his body was concealed or destroyed and has not been found. If he is dead and was killed and the body was destroyed or concealed, he was murdered, was he not? That
[p.55] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 41 is the point. I want you to apply your minds to that set of circumstances, and decide for yourselves whether, in the matter of the facts, you can say that you are satisfied that no rational hypothesis except that he is dead, dead by violence, is open. If you are driven to that conclusion, that would be a verdict of murder; but if you think that that would be going too far, and that you could not safely say that no rational explanation of his death except murder could be conceived, why then it will mean that you have a doubt about it, and you will acquit him.”
This direction was approved of by Goddard L.C.J. reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the appeal (see R v. Onufrejczyk (supra) at 395). The direction is consistent with the line canvassed by Sarkodee Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) in the State v. Anani Fiadzo (supra) and this was the line of approach adopted by the trial judge in this case.
Quite clearly the circumstantial evidence led in this case, when considered alongside the vacillating explanations which the appellants gave as they faced a capital charge as serious as murder, must have led the jury to conclude rightly in the circumstances that the offence of murder has been proved by the prosecution. In the circumstances the appeal of all the appellants are dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed
L.K.A.
