MENSAH AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 523
7 July 1978 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 60 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 28Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Hollington v. Hewthorn & Co., Ltd. [1943] K.B. 587; [1943] 2 All E.R. 35; 112 L.J.K.B. 463; 169 T.L.21; 59 T.L.R. 321; 87 S.J. 247, C.A.
(2) Noor Mohammed v. R. [1949] A.C. 182; [1949] 1 All E.R.365; 65 T.L.R. 134; 93 S.J. 180, P.C. (3) R. v. List [1966] 1 W.L.R. 9; [1965] 3 All E.R. 710; 130 J.P. 30; 110 S.J. 12; 50 Cr. App. R. 81. (4) R. v. Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B.256; 93 L.J.K.B.
(5) Badu II v. Caesar [1961] 1 G.L.R. 176, S.C.
(6) Quarshie v. Tackie [1962] 1 G.L.R. 65.
(7) Tano v. Dapomah [1960] G.L.R. 241.
(8) R. v. East Kerrier Justices; Ex parte Mundy [1952] 2 Q.E. 719;[1952] 2 All E.R. 144; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1618; 116 J.P. 339; 96 S.J. 428.
(9) Sallah v. Attorney-General, Supreme Court. 17 April 1970. unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 54;
(1970) 2 G. & G.487.
(10) Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service [1923] A.C.
191; 92 L.J.K.B. 142; 128 I.T. 546; 39 T.L.R. 133, 67 S.J. 182; 16 Asp. M.I.C. 33; 28 Com.Cas.
296, H.L.
(11) R. v. Aldred (1909) 22 Cox C.C. 1; 74 J.P. 55.
(12) R. v. Burns (1886) 16 Cox C.C. 355; 2 T.L.R. 510.
(13) R. v. Sullivan (1868) 11 Cox C. C. 44.
(14) Wallace-Johnson v. R. (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 56; [1940] A.C. 231; [1940] 1 All E.R. 241; 109 L.J.P.C. 33; 56 T.L.R. 215; 84 S.J. 149, P.C.
(15) Mensah Gyimah v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 147, 1 C.A.
(16) R. v. Agwuna (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 456.
(17) Commissioner of Police v. Apaloo, District Court, Accra, 7 April, 1951, unreported. [p.527] of [1979] GLR 523
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS APPEAL against the conviction and sentences for sedition and aiding and abetting the commission of sedition entered against the appellants by the trial circuit court. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
B. J. da Rocha for the first appellant.
Nana Akufo-Addo for the second appellant.
E. A. Osew for the third appellant.
K. Gyeke-Dako, Director of Public Prosecutions, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW
At the Circuit Court, Accra, which has since its creation been generally designated as the “special court,” the first appellant was convicted of sedition contrary to section 183 (3) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The other two appellants were convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of the sedition, contrary to sections 20 (1) and 181 (3) of the Criminal Code, 1960. The first appellant was sentenced to a term of eight years’ imprisonment with hard labour, the second appellant to a term of six years’ imprisonment with hard labour, and the third appellant, five years’ imprisonment with hard labour. On these convictions the appellants have appealed to this court: the first appellant on nine additional grounds, in addition to the omnibus grounds contained in the petition; the second appellant on eight additional grounds and the third appellant on seven additional grounds.
The particulars of the offence against the first appellant as contained in the charge sheet are:
“Joseph Henry Mensah: during the month of August 1975, at Accra, in the Greater Accra Circuit, published seditious words or writing in the following terms: ‘Hello-fellow Ghanaians, when the National Redemption Council took up the reins of government, all of us jubilated and gave them our whole-hearted support. They promised of providing Ghanaians all the things that make life worth living including normalisation of prices to the bare minimum. We never doubted their ability of fulfilling these promises because of Col.
Acheampong’s declaration that he had put the economy on war footing.
But today all our hopes and expectations have been dished out in the bud. What do we see? Inflation of the highest order as a result of which prices on every commodity has gone up ten times than what was obtained before. Moreover, there is shortage of everything in the country, including foodstuffs. We cannot get sufficient [quantities] of corn for our meals, neither do we get fish and meat to eat. Col. Felli was proud to announce that he had exported ¢330,000 worth of corn to other countries. This is serious.
Since the National Redemption Council came to power over three and a half years ago, the performance of the economy reveals that there has been no growth. This stems out of the fact that Col. Acheampong who is responsible for finance has continued to raise prices often and often during the years. Prices since as from January to June this year were so fantastic that there was acute expectation of increases in the budget announced recently.
[p.528] of [1979] GLR 523
Ah! No! This year’s budget we cannot bear. It has gone harshly against every section of life in the country.
Col. Acheampong, Commissioner for Finance, has always read the budget, but this year’s budget passed through others to be released to the Press—because it is a very bad budget.
The National Redemption Council failed and failed miserably, and to find a scape-goat attributes high prices to oil crisis and inflationary trends in the world. If so why burden us with exorbitant increase in taxes and excise duties?
Increase in import duty amounts to devaluation. The National Redemption Council gave workers 27% increases in salaries and raised prices more than 500%. This is real redemption. The market women are suffering imprisonment without the option of a fine. The lorry owners and drivers are no exception. The businessmen are facing the full measure of the hardship. The new rate of assessment for doctors, lawyers, dentists, accountants, engineers, architects, proprietors of schools and quantity surveyors in private practice would lead to more burden for themselves and the consumers of the services these factors render.
By and large, they attribute the cause of high prices to world-wide inflation. But inflation has been solved in most European and some African countries. Why not in Ghana?
If Acheampong will show all due respect for the traditional way of doing things in this country and get all talents involved in the administration inflation can be solved. Ghana has men of integrity among the civilians and better qualified men even in the Army to contain the situation.
Acheampong has failed this country, his blatant, despotism; his outrageous racist statements; his erratic self-glorification behaviour coupled with his failure to check and solve the economic ills as promised, have convinced most Ghanaians that he is unfit to rule and must give way to selfless men capable of solving the problems he has created.
Instead of thinking to solve the problems, Acheampong is grabbing money to build mansions here and there with some of his commissioners.
No licences are issued to import raw materials but there are licences to import cars because of commissions.
Contractors and manufacturers are having to lay off workers because of shortage of raw materials. Even postage stamps are in short supply. A political feeling is awakened in this moment of crisis and every hope of bringing down the cost of living has failed. The rank and file of the T.U.C. must come out and say something if their leaders are afraid to speak for the interest of the workers.
If soldiers must rule Ghana, Acheampong is not the right type of a soldier to rule. We want a new government prepared to unite the Army and the people and government which does not think of exerting power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives
[p.529] of [1979] GLR 523 to be the voice of the people. A government that will give us the opportunity to speak our minds freely and to have a government of our choice; a government that will give us food to eat; a government that will give us clothes to wear; a government that will give us shelter; a government that will flood the markets with essential goods; a government that will make spare parts available for us to repair the vehicles; a government that will bring raw materials to feed the factories.
The dawn is cast and the salvation bell begins to Appeal. Salvation depends largely on deploying the available forces and talents—soldiers and civilians alike. For the peace which is from above and for the salvation of our motherland, we submit ourselves to thee O God, praying for a change and to teach us how to act and what to do with our will.’ Which said words or writing were intended to excite disaffection against the Government of Ghana.”
The particulars of offence in respect of the charge against the second appellant are, “Kwame Karikari during the month of August 1975 at Accra in the Greater Accra Circuit, purposely aided one Joseph Henry Mensah in the commission of a crime, namely sedition,” and those as against the third appellant are, “Ibrahim Codjoe Quaye during the month of August 1975 at Accra in the Greater Accra Circuit, purposely aided one Joseph Henry Mensah in the commission of a crime, namely sedition.” The prosecution called ten witnesses to substantiate the charges.
The circumstances leading to the arraignment of the appellants before the special court as gathered from the evidence on record are these: The second appellant, Kwame Karikari, was employed by the first appellant, J. H. Mensah, as an administrative secretary on part-time basis. J. H. Mensah is a well-known figure in this country; he is a renowned economist; and a politician. He was Commissioner for Finance in the government of the National Liberation Council. He also held that portfolio in the Busia regime, until it was toppled by a coup d’etat in 1972. At the time of his arrest for this charge he was running an economic consultancy.
The duties of Karikari as an administrative secretary of J. H. Mensah included writing letters and typing for him. In early August 1975, J. H. Mensah gave Karikari a draft to put on stencil. Karikai put this on stencil. J. H. Mensah then gave him ¢40 to buy materials to print the stencil; he was told to do the duplicating himself, and the work was to be returned to J. H. Mensah personally after its completion. After typing the stencil, Karikari took the stencil and the manuscript to J. H. Mensah, but the latter kept the manuscript and returned the stencil to Karikari to cyclostyle. This would be about 7 August 1975, because the ink and duplicating papers were bought on that date.
Karikari is an old customer at Atlas Co., Ltd., a firm which makes photocopy of documents. On 23 August 1975, he went to the offices of this company to photostat some documents. While he was at the office he took the advantage and inquired from the fourth prosecution witness, Asare Darko, the man who does the photostating, whether the firm does
[p.530] of [1979] GLR 523 cyclostyling on commercial basis. The firm did not, but Asare Darko said they could help him because he, Karikari was an old customer. Asare Darko put him in contact with Agyakwa, the first prosecution witness, the man who worked on stencil at the office. Karikari asked Agyakwa for his help to duplicate something very confidential which he had on a stencils Agyakwa was reluctant to accede to the request but when Karikari said he had his own ink, paper and the stencils. Agyakwa agreed to help.
This meeting was at 10.20 a.m. on Saturday, 23 August 1975. Karikari did not have the materials readily available so he left the offices of Atlas Co., Ltd. and returned later and gave some stencils to Asare Darko to be given to Agyakwa who in the meantime had been called away at the bidding of his boss. Asare Darko did give the stencils to Agyakwa. About 12.15 p.m. Karikari returned to the offices of Atlas Co., Ltd. and Agyakwa went with him to the printing room of the offices. The office closed at 12 noon so there was nobody except Agyakwa in the building. Agyakwa set the printing machine in motion and started rolling the papers; as he rolled, Karikari picked up the papers, he was careful not to let Agyakwa see the contents of the documents. According to Agyakwa, Karikari tore up the documents in which the printing did not come out well, and tore them to small pieces.
This behaviour aroused the suspicion of the printer so he conceived the idea to steal a copy of the document. When a car pulled up outside the office, Agyakwa sent Karikari to check who it was, and karikari left the printing room. During his absence from the printing machine, Agyakwa took a cyclostyled copy of the first sheet and hid it under the table on which the duplicating machine rested. Then he took the carbon copy of the second page of the document and hid it under the same table. About 250 copies were printed, even though Karikari had brought two reams of duplicating papers. Each ream contained 500 sheets of paper.
After the printing, Karikari packed the cyclostyled documents in two large brown envelopes and left. Agyakwa saw him off in a yellow Nissan car with registration No. GO 5626 parked outside the building. When Agyakwa returned to the office, he took the papers he had stolen from Karikari and read them. He said he found them seditious so he became afraid and folded them and put them in his pocket and started to prepare to go home. Precisely at that time Inspector Kwame Asante came into the office. He questioned Agyakwa about his dealing with Karikari and threatened that he had seen all that had been going on. Agyakwa got frightened, brought out the documents and gave them to the inspector.
Inspector Asante tendered these documents as exhibits D and E. Exhibit D is the first cyclostyled page of the document and exhibit E is the carbon of the second page. The carbon is faint but readable. The content of these two documents is the seditious matter particularised and set out in count one and about which the prosecution complained. Exhibit D contains the first part and exhibit E the second part. Inspector Asante did not merely blunder into the office; he had been put around the premises of Atlas Co., Ltd. on surveillance duty to observe the activities of the [p.531] of [1979] GLR 523 second appellant. When he saw the second appellant leave the office and enter his car he detailed the two men with whom he was on guard to trail the second appellant while he went into the office. The two men lost Karikari in traffic.
On 26 August 1975, Karikari took the documents to J. H. Mensah in his office; the latter looked at one copy and asked Karikari to give them to his driver to lock up in the boot of his car. The two big envelopes were given to the driver and he put them in the boot of J. H. Mensah’s car. On the same day between 2 and 3 p.m. J. H. Mensah with his driver, the second prosecution witness, drove to the house of the third appellant, Quaye. On the instructions of his master, the second prosecution witness brought the two big envelopes and left them on a table in a room where Quaye, was sitting. J. H. Mensah left the house without these two envelopes.
The events recounted above, are in the main not disputed by the defence. There are some minor details which are denied; for example, the evidence regarding the contact between Agyakwa and Inspector Asante was strenuously challenged; Karikari maintained that at the completion of the work he gave Agyakwa a lift so Asante could not have found him at the office. But this is not a point on which much ink should be spilt. Whether Agyakwa himself went to report this matter, or Inspector Asante paid a surprise visit at his office is not very material to the charge nor the defence. The vital point in Agyakwa’s evidence is not controverted.
The development of the prosecution case after this point is curious. A sand contractor at Tema called Kant George Anguah giving evidence as the ninth prosecution witness, testified that between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 27 August 1975, he saw some people picking cyclostyled papers from the ground in the neighbourhood of the post office in community two. He picked up one of those papers and read it. On his perusal he said he tore it up but he became excited and afraid. He said he saw about twelve of the documents and each consisted of two sheets. Even though he destroyed it on reading it, when he gave evidence he remembered some excerpts of the contents. For instance, he remembered that the salutation part read, “Hello-fellow Ghanaians”, He remembered also the following excerpts:
“(1) That Colonel Acheampong and his government have raised prices up to 500%. (2) That while there is scarcity of corn in the country, the government has exported about ¢330,000 worth of corn to other countries. (3)That if the army were to rule Col. Acheampong was not the right soldier to rule or should not be the head.”
After destroying the paper, the witness turned the matter over in his mind and decided to report and from Tema he came all the way to Accra and he reported it at the Special Branch Head Office. After his report he was asked to go and that when he was needed, he would be contacted. A week later he was called to the Special Branch and shown some paper which he read. According to him he saw all the three points he had mentioned on that document. The document, he said, was also made up of two sheets. There is no other evidence as to what document
[p.532] of [1979] GLR 523 was shown to him at the Special Branch.
Two days later on 29 August 1975, at 7 a.m. the tenth prosecution witness, Kweku Arkorful Bondzie, who lives at Teshie and was on his way to Madina saw people reading some papers at the Accra-Tema Station. Some of the papers lay scattered on the ground so he picked up one and read it. He found the contents “to be discrediting the present government” so he destroyed it and decided to report what he had seen to the authorities. He abandoned his journey to Madina and went directly to the Special Branch and reported the matter to the director. He was also told to go and to be called if needed. A week later he was called to the Special Branch and was shown a document consisting of two sheets. He found the contents to be the same as those in the paper he read at the Tema lorry park; and he told the director so. He was again asked to go. On 29 September 1975 he was sent for by the director. This time his statement was taken. The witness in his evidence remembered parts of the contents which he quoted verbatim to the court.
On these facts, the prosecution contend that the words contained in exhibits D, E and H are seditious: that the first appellant published them in series to the second appellant, the first prosecution witness, the third appellant and the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses, with intent to excite disaffection against the Government of Ghana. The intention which the prosecution sought to prove is to be found under section 183(11)(b) of Act 29. The prosecution maintained that the second appellant aided and abetted the first appellant in the publication made to the first prosecution witness, the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses and the third appellant. According to them the third appellant also aided and abetted the publication to the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses respectively.
As I have said earlier, the outlines of the facts are not disputed. The defence of the first appellant is that he did not intend to disaffect the minds of the people against the government; his intention was to mobilise public opinion on a massive scale so as to forge a change of government policies. He said he compiled the documents from notes he had taken of interesting things he had heard. His counsel conceded that there was publication to the second appellant, the first prosecution witness and the third appellant but denied that the first appellant published the document to the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses.
The defence of the second appellant was that he did not find the document to be seditious, so he could not have had the intention attributed to him and that he typed the document in his normal course of work. The explanation given by the third appellant was that when the papers were given to him, the first appellant told him that they would be discussed later. These papers were brought with other documents pertaining to the third appellant’s business. After the first appellant left him, the third appellant said he read one of the documents, and he got so frightened that he burnt them to ashes in his back-yard. The reason for his conduct was that his family had had so much suffering on account of politics, so he did not
[p.533] of [1979] GLR 523 want to be drawn into the game again. He gave details of the sufferings his family had had as a result of their involvement in politics. He denied the charge of aiding and abetting the publication to the ninth and tenth prosecution witnesses.
The trial judge in his judgment accepted the prosecution’s case, rejected the explanation of all the accused persons and convicted them on their respective charges, and sentenced them accordingly. It is against this judgment that the appellants have appealed to this court. Mr. da Rocha, leading counsel for the first appellant began his submission with the first additional ground of appeal. It reads:
“(1) The learned judge was wrong in admitting the evidence of George Akuamoah Boateng, the third prosecution witness, and the documents, exhibits A , B and C tendered by the said witness in that the said evidence was entirely irrelevant to the charges before the court but likely to influence and did influence the learned judge prejudicially against the first accused.”
In recounting the facts of this case, it would be observed that I did not refer to the evidence of this witness—the third prosecution witness, George Akuamoah Boateng. It was not an oversight; it was deliberate; because I did not find any place for that evidence in the scheme of things. Akuamoah Boateng was the chief executive at the office of Business Promotions. His evidence was that in 1973 J. H. Mensah in his capacity as the managing director of the Economic Consultants (Ghana) Ltd., applied for a loan from the office of the Business Promotions and that his application was personally approved by General Acheampong— Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, but in his position as Commissioner for Finance, and that he was granted ¢80,000 loan repayable over a period of 48-50 months.
Exhibit A is the letter of application for a loan under the small business loan scheme by J. H. Mensah. Exhibit B is the letter of approval of the loan, and exhibit C is the memorandum to the Commissioner for Finance by the chief executive of the Business Promotions recommending the loan. The portfolio for Finance was at the time held by General Acheampong. When this witness was sworn in and his particulars were given, and counsel for the first appellant anticipated the nature of that evidence he was going to give, he raised an objection to that evidence as being irrelevant to the charges before the court. The objection was overruled. The rationale of the ruling was that the evidence might show that the accused was telling malicious lies about his benefactor to discredit him. It reads inter alia, “. . . then this is just not a case of beneficiary being over-critical about his benefactor, but as well it may be an instance of a beneficiary telling malicious lies about the performance of his benefactor for the sole purpose of discrediting the benefactor.”
To determine the relevancy of this evidence, the issues which the court had to resolve must be spelt out. In respect of the first appellant the facts were not disputed. What his defence put in issue was the seditious nature of the document and the relevant intent with which it was published. Was Akuamoah’s evidence relevant in deciding whether the document was
[p.534] of [1979] GLR 523 seditious or it was published with intent to excite disaffection against the government?
The general rule governing admissibility of evidence is that all evidence which is sufficiently relevant to an issue before the court is admissible and all that which is irrelevant or insufficiently relevant, should be excluded: see Hollington v. Hewthorn & Co., Ltd. [1943] 1 K.B. 587, C.A. As it is stated in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice (35th ed.), pp. 416-417 at para. 1015, “nothing may be given in evidence which does not directly tend to the proof or disproof of the matter in issue.”
The definition of “relevance” given by Stephen J. in his book Digest of the Law of Evidence (12 ed.), art. 1: (see Cross on Evidence (3rd ed.) at p. 13) is that:
“any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present, or future existence or non-existence of the other.”
For example, where A is charged with stealing, evidence that the goods were found in A’s possession shortly after they were missing and he gave no adequate explanation as to how he came by them, would be relevant in determining that A must have stolen the goods. The evidence of recent possession without adequate explanation is logically probative, and has direct relevance to the fact it purports to establish. Therefore evidence which has no probative value to the matter at issue must be regarded as irrelevant and must be rejected. Was evidence that the first appellant applied for and obtained a loan from the Business Promotions probative to resolving any of the issues? The learned Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Gyeke-Darko, in his reply to the objection raised by Mr. da Rocha against the reception of that evidence said, inter alia, that that evidence was relevant to other evidence which, he implied, would be called later in the trial.
He impressed upon the judge that Akuamoah’s evidence would be linked with other evidence which would be led to show that money was involved in the transaction forming the subject-matter of the charge, so it was not irrelevant to prove the first appellant’s financial circumstances at the time of the commission of the offence. The other reason he gave for the relevancy of that evidence was that it would tend to prove false some of the allegations made in the alleged seditious document. The rule of evidence is that where the good faith or intent of a party is a material fact, evidence apparently collateral may have a direct bearing on the point at issue, and if it has, it is admissible even if it relates to facts which happened before the principal transaction and although it may have no direct or apparent connection with it: see Taylor on Evidence.
But “in all such cases the judge ought to consider whether the evidence which it is proposed to adduce is sufficiently substantial, having regard to the purpose to which it is professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of justice that it should be admitted”: see Noor Mohammed v. R. [1949] 1 All E.R. 365 at p. 370, P.C. I have already referred to the trial judge’s reaction to this objection; he allowed
[p.535] of [1979] GLR 523 the evidence because he thought it might prove that the first appellant told malicious lies about his benefactor. Even the grounds of the objection raised and the reply to it were not reflected in the ruling.
However, as the learned Director of Public Prosecutions made it appear that the relevancy would be seen when taken together with some further evidence to be given later, the judge might have been right in allowing the evidence to go in, but this should have been conditional on its turning out to be relevant.
The fear, which counsel for the first appellant entertained, that the evidence would prejudice the case of the first appellant and yet it would not advance the case for the prosecution in any way, was not groundless. The prejudice which counsel feared had already reared its ugly head in the ruling, even before evidence on the matter was given. It would seem that even at that stage the judge had made up his mind that the first appellant had been telling malicious lies about his benefactor. He had already imputed malice to the first appellant before hearing the evidence and the first appellant’s explanation to the charge.
The prosecution led no other evidence to link Akuamoah’s evidence to any of the issues involved in this case. The allegation that money was necessary for the commission of the crime was not in any way substantiated. Therefore the condition of admissibility was not fulfilled and the judge should have disregarded that evidence in his judgment. Very rightly the Director of Public Prosecutions in his address did not make any submission on this evidence; he sedulously avoided any reference to it. That evidence was literally jettisoned by him; he made no reference of it even in his résumé of the evidence. The judge also did not refer to it when he recapitulated the facts, for obviously that evidence had no relevance to the facts of the charge. Curiously enough, however, in his reasoning, the learned judge did use this piece of evidence to rebut the defence of the first appellant. In dealing with the defence of the first appellant he said:
“The explanation by the first accused that he could not forward the views direct to the government because he is not an intimate friend of the present administration is not convincing. On the one hand he has no qualms in contacting the government for a loan of ¢80,000 (as shown by exhibits A, B and C), but when it comes to pointing out errors and faults of the government, he chooses to do it clandestinely, furtively and maliciously.”
Exhibits A, B and C referred to were the correspondence of the loan transaction. This passage is a clear indication that that evidence greatly affected the mind of the trial judge. The judge was surely not commenting on the criminal responsibility of the appellant but on his moral responsibility towards his benefactor. But ingratitude is never an ingredient in any criminal charge.
In his address in this court, the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the evidence of Akuamoah was relevant to prove that parts of the statements contained in the publication were false. In a trial for sedition, it is no defence for the appellant to prove the truth of
[p.536] of [1979] GLR 523 the seditious matter; therefore evidence to prove its truth is irrelevant and inadmissible.
The admission by the judge of evidence of other activities of the appellant very remote from the action, and which tendered to show that the appellant is a liar and therefore establish the falsity of the allegations in the seditious matter had from the word “go” loaded the scales against the first appellant. It had deprived him of the fairness which a criminal trial should always have as an unassailable basis. In R. v. List [1965] 3 All E. R. 710 at p. 712, Roskill J. stated, “A trial judge always has an overriding duty in every case to secure a fair trial.” In a criminal trial, a judge has a discretion to exclude even legally admissible evidence if justice so requires. The evidence of Akuamoah was definitely irrelevant. And even if it was not prejudicial in itself the judge used it prejudicially against the accused. The evidence drew the judge’s mind away from the points at issue and excited his prejudice.
Having fallen foul of that cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, namely that a criminal trial should be fair, and having infringed that other fundamental principle of the law which was ventilated in the memorable words of Lord Hewart C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy), [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at p. 259, namely “that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done,” it is obvious that such a judgment as this ought not to be allowed to stand. But I will proceed to deal with other points of importance raised in this appeal.
The next ground of appeal argued on behalf of the first appellant was additional ground 3, “That the judge was wrong in considering criticism per se of the economic policies of the government as seditious and that he displayed bias by embarking on an irrelevant apologia for the government.” The burdens of this ground of appeal are two-fold: The first being that the contents of exhibit H were not seditious, and the second being that the judge was biased against the accused. The criticism stemmed from the comment which the trial judge made on parts of the contents of the alleged seditious document, and the inference he drew from those words. This inference was that “the natural consequence [of the words used] was to rally the people against the government and to seek its immediate change.”
He also said, among other things, “Another point I wish to refer to is that there would be no justification if the first appellant attributed inflation and the state of the economy to mismanagement by Acheampong and his government.” After this he continued and said that the first appellant in his position as an ex-Minister of Finance and Economic Planning should have known that the government was not responsible for every mishap or economic woe happening to the country. After making these general comments, the judge made observation on specific topics in the following words:
“For example, can one blame the government for: (a) inflation in the country, creating exorbitant high prices to the tune of ten times former prices—when inflation is known to be world-wide; (b) attributing high prices to the oil crisis and inflationary trends in the world.
[p.537] of [1979] GLR 523
Is it not a fact that the oil crisis has worked adversely on the economies of many countries? (c) Can we always lay the blame for the short supply of certain commodities, on the government? Have we always had the foreign exchange to pay for all that we import? Is it not a fact that hoarding and smuggling and speculative offences are still with us? And is it not a fact that this government has gone all out against such economic offences which have some deleterious effect on our economy? The first appellant knew that he could not blame such matters on the government.”
Mr. da Rocha aptly described this part of the judgment as sounding like a radio commentary in defence of the government’s economic policy. He submitted further that this partisan attitude amounted to bias which prejudiced the case for the defence. He said the judge was biased at the trial and this is manifested in the judgment. He did not say what form the bias took at the trial. He argued that there was no evidence upon which such bold pronouncements could be based. On bias and prejudice counsel propped his submission with the cases, Budu II v. Caesar [1961] 1 G.L.R. 176, S.C., Quarshie v. Tackie [1962] 1 G.L.R. 65 and Tanor v. Dapomah [1960] G.L.R. 240. These cases were buttressed with an English case, R. v. East Kerrier Justices; Ex parte Mundy [1952] 2 All E.R. 144.
The Director of Public Prosecutions’ reply to this argument was that mere vituperative words per se in a judgment do not show a biased tendency in a judge nor render the judgment prejudicial to the accused. He sought support from the judgment in Sallah v. The Attorney-General (1970) 2 G. & G. 487, S.C. In that judgment Amissah J.A. at p. 487, S.C. described two of the witnesses as “rogues.” With due respect to the learned Director of Public Prosecutions I think he missed the issue on this point. Counsel for the first appellant did not complain about the fact that the judge used unrefined language or vituperative words. The exhibition of bias complained of, as I understood learned counsel, did not consist in the mere use of vituperative words. He complained about the biased and the partisan attitude of the trial judge and the way in which he dealt with the evidence and handled the whole trial.
The points made by learned counsel in this regard are to my mind very valid and must be upheld. On reading the judgment it strikes one in the eye that the trial judge was biased. He definitely “picked up his cudgel and entered the lists” himself. By doing so he deprived himself of the faculty to do justice in the matter. The defence role which the judge took of the government economic policy is not supported by the evidence. The only evidence on record bordering on the economy was that elicited during cross-examination from the first appellant. In fact the first appellant led no evidence on the score of the state of the economy of the nation to justify his acts. That approach would certainly not have enhanced his position in any way. It was rather the Director of Public Prosecutions who for some unknown reason dwelt so much on that point in his cross-examination. He would seem to have pursued that line of cross-examination to establish that the first appellant was aware of the falsity of
[p.538] of [1979] GLR 523 the ideas contained in the deleterious document in order to establish that he was actuated by ill-motives.
Even so, those answers cannot in my view support that part of the judgment. But the judge did not purport to act upon any evidence on record, he conceded that there was no such evidence because it appears he based his pronouncements on facts which, according to him, had attained notoriety. He prefixed his commentary with these words, “It is common knowledge that inflation is world-wide these days, and economies of most countries have been thrown out of gear by the oil crisis.” As Lord Sumner put it in Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service [1923] A.C. 191 at P. 212, H.L., “Judicial notice refers to facts, which a judge can be called upon to receive and to act upon, either from his general knowledge of them, or from inquiries to be made by himself for his own information from sources to which it is proper for him to refer.”
To take judicial notice of a fact, however, the judge has to be convinced that the matter is so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable men, or that the matter is capable of immediate accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy: see Cross on Evidence (3rd ed.), p. 129. The facts which the trial judge took judicial notice of in this case cannot be classified under this definition. World inflation is a matter of public notoriety but the extent to which each country is affected is not a matter of which judicial notice can be taken. Again one cannot also make a sweeping statement about world inflation being due to the oil crisis and the extent to which this country has been affected without basing such observation on any evidence. As to whether or not the government should be blamed for inflation, the rise in prices of goods, and the scarcity of goods, these matters were not matters of relevancy to the issues involved in this case.
What the judge was in effect saying was that even if the allegations made in the alleged seditious document were true, the government was blameless, because the inflation is due to the oil crisis, and scarcity of goods is due to hoarding and lack of hard currency for the purchase of essential commodities. These may be his personal views of the economic situation in the country but that may not be the true causes of the situation. In any case these are irrelevant to proving the ingredients of the charges before the court. On this aspect of the matter, I think the judge allowed his own personal views to override his judicial commitment. In R. v. Aldred [1909] 22 Cox C.C. 1 at p. 4 Coleridge J. (as he then was) in a trial for seditious libel gave these directions to the jury:
“Having said this much, I should like to say by way of comment upon a good deal that has fallen from the defendant in the speech that he has addressed to you—that the expression of abstract academic opinion in this country is free. A man may lawfully express his opinion on any public matter, however distasteful, however repugnant to others, if, of course, he avoids defamatory matter, or if he avoids anything that can be characterised either as a blasphemous or as an obscene libel. Matters of State, matters of policy,
[p.539] of [1979] GLR 523 matters even of morals – all these are open to him. He may state his opinion freely, he may buttress it by argument, he may try to persuade others to share his views. Courts and juries are not the judges in such matters.”
In this instant case the judge appeared to be a judge in these matters. In this he erred. He introduced irrelevant matters into the trial and used them as the basis of his verdict. Since the judgment was not based on admissible evidence it was wrong in law and ought not to be allowed to stand.
This brings me to the crux of the matter. I have now to decide the vital issue as to whether the judge was right in holding that the words complained of were published with intent to excite disaffection against the Government of Ghana. Counsel for the first appellant’s submission was that in determining this issue the trial judge paid little or no attention to the defence of the first appellant. That the decision was mainly based on the evidence of the prosecution. Without giving due consideration to the explanation of the first appellant, which was based on section 183(12) of Act 29. These submissions are based on ground (b) of the original grounds of appeal which was argued together with additional ground (7). Original ground (b) reads, “The learned circuit judge was wrong in holding that the words complained of were seditious and were published with the intention to excite disaffection against the Government of Ghana,” and the additional ground (7) reads:
“The learned judge was wrong in failing to consider the effect of the alleged seditious writing on the first prosecution witness, the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses the only persons apart from the accused who according to the prosecution read it.”
The Director of Public Prosecutions’ reply to these criticisms was that there is no laid down formula by which a judgment should be written and that the judge having recapitulated all the evidence, an indication that he had evaluated the evidence or adverted his mind to any particular piece of evidence is sufficient to justify his conclusion. The offence with which the first appellant was charged was based on section 183 (3) of Act 29 which reads:
“(3) Any person who conspires with any person to carry into execution any seditious enterprise, or prints or publishes any seditious words or writing; or utters any seditious words, or sells, offers for sale, distributes, reproduces or imports any newspaper, book or document or any part thereof or extract therefrom containing any seditious words or writing, shall be guilty of second degree felony.”
The first appellant was charged with publishing seditious words or writing, with the intent “to excite disaffection against the Government of Ghana.” For the publication to be seditious the prosecution had to show that it was with the one intent namely, the intent to excite disaffection.
The first appellant never at any time denied the authorship of the words or writing forming the subject-matter of this charge. He said he [p.540] of [1979] GLR 523 did not remember whether the contents of the papers he gave to the third appellant to disseminate were identical with the contents of exhibits D, E and H but he thought the gist was very similar. Later he affirmed his authorship when he said, “These are the views as recorded by me in exhibits D, E and H.” The questions to be answered are whether these words or writings were capable of being described as seditious and whether they were published, and if so with the intent to disaffect the minds of the people against the government. Our Criminal Code does not define sedition. Mr. da Rocha submitted that since sedition is a crime which was imported from English law into our law, a study of the development of English law of sedition should lead to a proper understanding of our own law as contained in the code, and should also serve as a guide to its definition.
The history of the English case law of sedition shows that the English courts have been progressive in their application of the law. They have been moving away from the strict interpretation adopted in the medieval period towards the enlightened path of the twentieth century. Mr. da Rocha invited this court to follow the “enlightened path” as was done in R. v. Burns (1886) 16 Cox C.C. 355. A panoramic view of the situation shows that what amounted to sedition in the middle ages would not necessarily amount to sedition in this modern age. If the liberal approach were to be adopted as has been done in the English courts it will be seen that the mere publication of words such as those complained of in this case would not be seditious. It is from the particular intention that the words would take their colour. In R. v. Sullivan (1868) 11 Cox C.C. 44 at p. 59, Fitzgerald J. directed the jury to deal with the case “in a free, fair and liberal spirit.” The prosecution for sedition is rare. As Coleridge J. said in R. v. Aldred (supra) at p. 4, “It is a weapon that is not often taken down from the armoury in which it hangs.” Such prosecutions have been so few in this country that one cannot see what approach has been adopted in our courts.
In the two Ghanaian cases which were cited before this court, our courts refused to follow the enlightened approach of R. v. Burns (supra). The two cases are Wallace-Johnson v. R. [1940] 1 All E.R. 241, P.C. and Mensah Gyimah v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 147, C.A.
Following the injunction imposed by the Privy Council in the Wallace-Johnson case, our Court of Appeal held in Mensah Gyimah v. The Republic (supra) that in interpreting the word “sedition” one has to confine oneself to the strict words of the Code and is precluded from venturing outside the four corners of the Code for help. What then is sedition under our Code? It is that set out under section 183 (3) of Act 29; but the intention may take any of the forms set out under section 183 (11).
In this judgment we are concerned with section 183(11) (b). Mr. da Rocha’s contention has been that in determining whether a document is seditious, the court must not only look at the document, but it must also consider matters outside the document to determine the intent with which it was published. He also contended that the definition of “sedition” in our law, (that is in the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast) was
[p.541] of [1979] GLR 523 taken almost word for word from the definition of the term by Stephen J., as applied in R. v. Burns (supra). The present law, was lifted from the early editions of the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast and refurbished in the present.
Mr. da Rocha in a forceful manner maintained that the courts of this country may espouse the exposition on the law of sedition contained in R. v. Burns (supra) and the application given to it in that case. He pressed this point with great persuasion in spite of the comments made in the decision in Wallace-Johnson v. R. (supra), and which was that in interpreting the section (i.e. Act 29, s. 183) the courts must confine themselves strictly within the four corners of the Code and not seek any outside aid from English authorities. Wallace-Johnson was a resident Sierra Leonean journalist who was charged with and convicted for sedition at the time when the Gold Coast was still a British Colony. At the appeal before the Privy Council, R. v. Burns (supra) was cited before the eminent judges but they refused to look at it, saying at p. 244, P.C.:
“The fact remains, however, that it is in the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast Colony, and not in English or Scottish cases, that the law of sedition for the colony is to be found. The code was no doubt designed to suit the circumstances of the people of the colony. The elaborate structure of sect. 330 suggests that it was intended to contain as far as possible a full and complete statement of the law of sedition in the colony. It must, therefore, be construed in its application to the facts of this case free from any glosses or interpolations derived from any expositions, however authoritative, of the law of England or of Scotland.”
Our own Court of Appeal has described these words as wise words. All I am prepared to say is that the argument which have been so ingeniously put before this court was never addressed to the Court of Appeal in that case. If that proposition of the law were right and (I am bound by precedent) I would submit that the view is rather narrow and the dictum of the Court of Appeal too restrictive. For were the position as expressed in the view of the court to be adhered to strictly and to the letter, then all references made to English authorities and authoritative works like Archbold in this country would be against the law and all decisions based on them would fall foul of the law. I would therefore rather adopt the way in which Wallace-Johnson (supra) was applied in R. v. Agwuna (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 456. (That according to the authorities I am permitted to do). In R. v. Agwuna (supra) at p. 458 the West African Court of Appeal said:
“We propose to consider this ground of appeal in the light of these authorities, bearing in mind, however, that the law of evidence in this Colony, like the law of sedition, has been codified. It is contained in the Evidence Ordinance. Any glosses or interpolations, however authoritative, of the law of England must therefore be considered subject to this qualification (R. v. Wallace-Johnson).”
[p.542] of [1979] GLR 523
My interpretation of this is that since the law which the court had to apply was codified, any “glosses or interpolations” of the law of England must be considered subject to the qualification that the wording of the Code may permit. The West African Court of Appeal could not have adopted these words in their strict sense. In R. v. Agwuna (supra) even though the law of Nigeria under which the appellant was charged was contained in a Code, the West African Court of Appeal in deciding whether the seditious words were published with the relevant intent, relied on the test applied by Coleridge J. in R. v. Aldred (supra).
Whatever meaning was given to those words by the eminent judges, in my view, the effect of the reasoning in the Wallace-Johnson case is no longer as potent as it used to be. With the passing of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), a court in this country may resort to any textbook or other work of reference from any Commonwealth country or even the United States of America where the law applied derives from the English common law, to help ascertain the meaning of any enactment: see section 19 of C.A. 4. R. v. Burns can fall within the definition of “work or reference” at which this court may look in determining the meaning of “sedition” as contained in section 183 (3) and (11) (b), if the court found it necessary. The intents with which Burns and others were charged were “intent to excite ill-will between classes of Her Majesty’s subjects and to incite riot.”
But in his direction to the jury, Cave J. did not limit his address to these particular intents, he dealt with all the intents contained in Stephen J.’s definition of sedition and he discussed what intent in his view did not amount to seditious intent. All the situation amounting to intent in Stephen J. definition of sedition and he discussed what intent in his view did not amount to seditious intent. All the situations amounting to intent in Stephen J.’s definition are contained in our own Code. This is not surprising when one considers that our Code was based upon the Indian Penal Code which was fashioned by Stephen J. himself. Having lifted the English common law and codified it as our laws, could it not be said that the interpretation given by the English courts on the subject would be relevant after due allowance had been made for the incidents of codification? If there is any persuasive authority which helps to set the confines within which section 183(3) and (11) (b) should be applied I, would not feel that Wallace-Johnson’s case imposes a fetter on me to use such material.
The ordinary meaning of “disaffection” according to Longmans English Larousse at p. 314 is “discontent, disloyalty.” In Hartrampf’s vocabularies “disaffect” is synonymous with “provoke” or “incite.” These are the natural and ordinary meaning of the word, and it is this meaning which should be given to the word. Words in a statute bear the usual meaning found in a dictionary, if a clear meaning can be extracted. To determine whether the words are seditious, it is my view that extrinsic evidence should be looked at; but the words in the document must be capable of provoking the people to react in a way which would disturb the public order; they must be capable of creating a feeling of ill-will against the government. This document deals with matters of public affairs, it criticises the economic policies of the government, it charges the government with maladministration and mismanagement, it maligns
[p.543] of [1979] GLR 523 the Head of State and some of his commissioners, it charged the Head of State with incompetence and corruption. It is couched in very strong and rude language.
It is very disrespectful to the Head of State. The document speaks for itself. The statement is lamenting upon the chaotic state into which the economy of the country has been plunged; it points out the errors and ills of the government, it calls upon the rank and file of the Trades Union Congress to be bold and say something about the state of affairs. It calls for a united government, a tolerant government which will allow freedom of speech, and a government which will give the people the necessaries of life. It concludes by saying that the time for saving the country has come, and that salvation depends on all available talents of the population. Then it prayed for a change. When the document is considered as a whole in a fair, free, and liberal spirit, it cannot be said that it is not seditious.
Counsel for the first appellant himself conceded to this point at this appeal. It is capable of exciting disaffection against the government and Head of State, because the document was drafted in such a way that the contents were likely to incense the people. The words are capable of being seditious, but were they published with seditious intent? Leading counsel for the first appellant argued that in resolving this issue, the court must not only look at the document, but other evidence, adduced in the case, whether it came from the prosecution, or the defence. He contended that the trial judge was obliged to consider any evidence which would bring the matter within the exceptions enumerated in section 183 (12) of Act 29.
The Director of Public Prosecutions’ view of the matter is that when the seditious words have been reduced into writing, the intention must be gathered from that document alone. Yet he submitted that the circumstances attendant to the publication showed that the accused was actuated by malice in publishing the document, and since the document speaks seditions the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his acts has not been displaced. His reply to the first appellant’s reliance on section 183 (12) was that if the first appellant acted bona fide, he would have been able to point to the particular limb of section 183 (12) on which he relied.
In his judgment, the learned trial judge held that the clandestine manner in which the document was disseminated imputed malice to the first appellant. He also held that the first appellant told malicious lies when he blamed inflation on the government, so he could not have acted with genuine intentions. The trial judge rightly considered the circumstances of the publication.
I do not find anything in the Code which limits the search for the seditious intent to the document. The Director of Public Prosecutions supported this proposition with section 183 (13) of the Code which provides:
“(13) In determining whether the intention with which any act was done, any words were spoken, or any document was published was or was not seditious, every person shall be deemed to intend
[p.544] of [1979] GLR 523 the consequences which would naturally follow from his conduct at the time and under the circumstances in which he so conducted himself.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
On the contrary, I think this subsection permits other matters outside the document to be considered in the determination of the question of intent. The words “at the time” enables the court to consider the timing of the publication, and the phrase “under the circumstances” suggests that the incident of the publication shall also be probed in the search for the seditious intent.
My own view of the matter is that, in deciding whether the written words were seditious or not, it is the written material only which must be looked at and nothing outside it. But to determine whether the seditious words were published with the particular intent, other circumstances must be considered. The audience addressed may be considered; the public feeling at the time of the publication will also help to determine the intent. The explanation of the appellant must also be considered.
If these words had been addressed to a conference of Ghana envoys, it could not be said that they were meant to provoke them to breach the public order. But if they were addressed to a crowd at the Accra lorry park or to the magazine boys at Kumasi at a time immediately before the referendum, then there could be no other intent but to incense the audience against the government. It is my judgment that the surrounding circumstances under which the seditious matter under inquiry was published should be examined before a decision one way or the other can be arrived at. In R. v. Aldred (supra) at p. 3 Coleridge J. in dealing with a matter in which he had to direct the jury as to whether a particular publication amounted to sedition, gave these directions:
“In arriving at a decision of this test you are entitled to look at all the circumstances surrounding the publication with the view of seeing whether the language used is calculated to produce the results imputed; that is to say, you are entitled to look at the audience addressed, because language which would be innocuous, practically speaking, if used to an assembly of professors or divines, might produce a different result if used before an excited audience of young and uneducated men. You are entitled also to take into account the state of public feeling. Of course there are times when a spark will explode a power magazine; the effect of language may be very different at one time from what it would be at another.”
In this case the time of the alleged publication must be considered, the audience must be considered, and the explanation of the appellant must also be probed into. This document was alleged to have been published in August 1975, in series to the second appellant, third appellant, and the first, ninth and tenth prosecution witnesses. For reasons stated hereunder in this judgment, it would be a mere academic exercise to determine whether publication to these people was with seditious intent. The document was given to the second appellant to reproduce copies; it was given
[p.545] of [1979] GLR 523 to the third appellant to disseminate. Surely, it could not be said that the first appellant intended to provoke or incite the second appellant to feel ill-will against the government. From the circumstances of the publication to the second and the third appellants, a seditious intent cannot be imputed to the first appellant. The alleged publication to the ninth and tenth prosecution witnesses, even if there were such publication must be considered with the explanation of the first appellant.
The first appellant said he merely wanted to mobilise a massive public opinion so as to forge a change. His explanation sounds genuine and honest; his only intention he said was an honest desire to bring a change, which will put the economy of the country on a sound footing. This sincerity may be discerned from his evidence. He was very articulate in this desire. He said in his defence:
“I compiled the documents from notes I had taken of interesting things I had heard. I put the notes together because they seemed to present a rather different view of public opinion, than might be guessed from the established organs of public opinion. The question was: How do people holding such views make themselves heard? There seems to arise a number of important public issues which it seems must be discussed for the benefit of everybody. The general principle that emerges is that for the last three and a half years we Ghanaians have lost the right to choose our own rulers and secondly, to tell these rulers without coercion and without fear, what we would like them to do or not to do, how to use our taxes, how to manage our lives.
These two fundamental rights are such that I thought we must begin to do something to restore them.
Experience shows that the best way to arrive at a solution on these matters is to let people speak for themselves. The way I saw it, it was not the case that the majority of the people that one talked to were happy to let the status quo continue. On the contrary, it seemed to me that the majority of the people I had heard wanted a change in the situation in various directions, each according to his own interest. I thought that these views should be ventilated and that the outcome would be of benefit. I might explain that I based myself on experience in this country in this regard. In 1947-48, there were a number of various complaints by various sections of the community.
Ex-servicemen were complaining about employment and pensions, people were complaining about high prices of goods charged by the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM). The politicians were not satisfied with the political situation. When all these various points of view were brought together and articulated, we had a massive expression of public opinion which was irresistible to the British. Inevitably, the demands were couched in political terms. We members of the United Gold Coast Convention asked them to allow us to choose our government to solve these problems. Because there were so many of us, the British had to parley: they could not imprison us or try us for sedition.
They had to meet us more than half-way. So also I am sure
[p.546] of [1979] GLR 523 that if the opinions of ordinary Ghanaians are allowed to be expressed, then the government of today would be forced to make changes. If one wants to talk, one has to have the feeling that others too have similar views. Therefore, what is required is to give people the courage that the feeling is widespread. This is the only way to mobilise public opinion on a massive scale. If this can be done, I am sure there will be changes.
I know I am charged with sedition. It is alleged that my intention in compiling the document shown to me was to excite disaffection against the government. This is not so. Naturally this is not a document of praise for the government but I hope that if one expresses views which are critical, it should not be taken or construed as an attempt to excite disaffection.”
This is the intent with which the alleged seditious document was compiled. It is an intent to highlight the errors of the government with a view to forcing it to correct them. But it is not this intent which is relevant to the charge but the intent with which the material was published. The material could have been compiled without being published. If these had been found in a drawer of the first appellant he could not have been charged under section 183.
Even though the words are capable of being seditious, when one looks at this explanation, one cannot say that the first appellant had the intent imputed to him. The publication would have given the words their definite colour but as it is my view in this judgment that there was no publication, there was no sufficient data to determine the gravamen of the charge.
Whatever view one takes of the matter, the question as to whether or not the first appellant had the intent charged would seem not to be very important in this present case. Because by the end of the day it would have lost its relevance unless it would then have been established also that the material, however innocent or however vicious, were published. For as I stated above, in order to succeed against the appellant it is necessary to prove certain things which are (a) that the words complained of were seditious and (b) that these words were published with the intent to cause disaffection. If the proof of one of these essential ingredients or elements was missing, the prosecution must fail. In my view it is on the rock of this element of “publication” that the prosecution in this case must founder. We must at this stage therefore consider the question of “publication.”
The matter of publication was not fully ventilated at the trial by either side. It would even seem that Mr. da Rocha leading counsel for the first appellant, in a measure conceded the point of publication. If I understood him properly he conceded that there was publication to the first prosecution witness. Learned counsel would seem to have taken the bait dropped by the Director of Public Prosecutions, namely, that publication in a charge of sedition was analogous to publication in libel. The trial judge must also have fallen into the same trap. For, accepting the
[p.547] of [1979] GLR 523 argument of the Director of Public Prosecutions on the point, he misdirected himself on the question of publication. Dangling before his eyes the two types of publication, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions convinced him to accept and apply the wrong concept in arriving at his verdict. He accepted the interpretation of publication which the Director of Public Prosecutions curiously described as “a series of publication,” by which he meant that the offensive material was published to the first, the ninth and then to the tenth prosecution witnesses and that therefore the ingredients of “publication” in the charge had been satisfied.
If in the view of the Director of Public Prosecutions that sort of publication was what was envisaged by the law one wonders why the prosecution bothered and went to such lengths to produce such witnesses as the ninth and tenth prosecution witnesses. For the material had already in its preparation been exposed to the two persons who helped the first appellant to prepare the document. I take a different view of the matter. I do not think the law in the matter was vindicated. Counsel in a case after all are officers of the court whose duty is to assist the judge seised of the matter to arrive at a just conclusion. Their views of the matter must not necessarily be accepted by the court.
In my view publication in the context of this charge should mean publication to the public at large. My view is that that kind of publication put forward by the Director of Public Prosecutions is good in a case of libel or defamation, but not in a case of sedition. In defamation or libel publication is satisfied even if the contents of a libellous material is brought to the notice of the person defamed or to the notice of any other third person. This is not so with regard to publication in the criminal law of sedition. Publication in the law of sedition can only mean disseminating the offensive material broadcast in order or with the intention of causing the public to be so incensed as to cause a breach of the public peace. Whether the breach of the peace is actually caused is immaterial, but the communication must be such that the likely result will be tumultuous disturbance of the peace. It would not mean bringing the deleterious material to the notice of one other person beside the writer or speaker.
Any dissemination short of that cannot in the context of the law of sedition amount to publication. The heading of the part of the Criminal Code under which section 183 falls is “Offences against Public Order, Health, and Morality.” And the relevant part of the heading to us is the “Public Order” aspect. The mischief aimed at is the maintenance of public order, nothing more and nothing less. One man does not constitute “the public.” The heading of the part clears every ambiguity that the publication under section 183 must be publication to the public at large, not merely publication to one person, or one person at a time. To satisfy the requirement of publication to one person, or one person at a time. To satisfy the requirement of publication under section 183 of Act 29 it is my view that the accused must have addressed himself to the public, either through the press or from a public platform. The publication under section 183 should be analogous to publication under section 208 (1) of the Code, and not publication under section 115.
[p.548] of [1979] GLR 523
Over the years there has been only one case in this country in which “publication” in this context has been defined by a court, and it is in the unreported case of Commissioner of Police v. Apaloo heard by Mr. H.B. Benson, district magistrate. In his judgment in that case delivered on 7 April 1951, Mr. Benson had this to say on the subject:
“. . . there is another aspect of the matter to which little importance seems to have been attached by counsel for the accused; I refer to the question of `publishing’ the report. The point is now purely of academic interest, by reason of my findings on the facts, and it is an extremely moot point whether in fact the accused `published’ the report in the sense envisaged by section 440 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 9 (1951 Rev.). My view of the law in this connection is that ‘publishing’ means something more than sending of a telegram to the Daily Graphic; I do not consider that the peculiarly technical meaning applied to ‘publication’ in matters of libel can automatically be applied to cases under section 440 relating to false news; in the absence of any special definition applicable to that section, I am of the opinion that the dictionary meaning of `publishing’ should be the one by which the court should be guided.
In the Oxford English Dictionary at p. 1561 the word `publish’ is defined as follows: `to make publicly or generally known; to declare or report openly or publicly . . . or noise abroad, . . . to proclaim etc.’ It was the Daily Graphic which made the report publicly or generally known and not the accused; the newspaper could have refrained from publishing the contents sent in the accused’s telegram; if they had so refrained, I doubt if any prosecution could ever have been commenced against the accused, except possibly for an attempt to publish; even this is doubtful, as the words ‘attempt to cause publication’ do not appear in section 440 as amended by Ordinance No. 1 of 1950; such words appeared however in the section as it read before being amended in 1950 and it must be presumed that the legislature had some reason for excluding them in [sic] the new section.”
In that case the accused was charged with publishing false news contrary to section 440 (1) of the Criminal Code, Cap.9 (1951 Rev.). That section which was amended by section 3 of the Criminal (Amendment) Ordinance, 1950, reads:
“Any person who publishes or reproduces any statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace, knowing or having reason to believe that such statement, rumour or report is false shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.”
The facts of the matter were that the accused in his capacity as a newspaper reporter telegraphed a report to the Daily Graphic for publication in connection with some disturbances which took place at a place called Suife in the Volta Region on 27 November 1950. The police fired on a crowd and some persons died. The government later published a report on the casualties which in the view of the defendant did not represent the
[p.549] of [1979] GLR 523 true facts. He therefore went to the area, and sent a report to his paper which in effect said that the casualties were by far higher than what the government report said. It was as a result of that that the accused was charged. The trial district magistrate found on the facts that the prosecution should fail. He however took the opportunity to define the term “publication” contained in the section.
The obvious implication of the case is that in the view of the learned magistrate, to bring the contents of the report to the editorial staff of the Daily Graphic did not amount to “publication” within the contemplation of the law it was when the report was produced in the paper for the reading of the general public that “publication” was made.
My view on the matter coincides with the view expressed by the trial magistrate, Mr. Benson, and it is my submission that it is only that interpretation of the law, that is right.
One last point I would like to comment upon is the evidence of the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses. The evidence of these witnesses was accepted by the judge; he said he saw them and he believed them to be telling the truth. And such findings of fact, according to our jurisprudence may not be overridden without any weighty considerations. To me, however, it is very unnatural to find two people unconnected in anyway to behave in such an identical manner.
The reaction of the judge to their evidence is contained in the following passage of his judgment, “The account given in court by the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses satisfies me that they indeed read the paper as they claim. I find that there was publication to the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses.” It would be relevant at this stage to look at the account which satisfied the learned judge. The ninth prosecution witness saw the alleged document on 27 August 1975 between 4 and 5 p.m. at Tema and reported it on the next day at Special Branch Head Office, Accra. He destroyed the papers so he had nothing to show the Special Branch. A week later he was called and shown a paper which according to him he identified by three points which he had seen in the paper he had read and destroyed. Then he gave his statement on 29 September 1975. The tenth prosecution witness found his document on 29 August 1975 and reported at the Special Branch, Accra, on the same day after he had also destroyed the paper. He was also called a week later to identify a document, and he found some of the contents similar to those contained in the one he had read and destroyed. On 29 September 1975 he was called to give a statement and he did.
One would ask, when each witness was called a week later to the Special Branch, what document were they shown? And where was that document obtained from? The evidence of the fifth prosecution witness reveals that as early as 23 August 1975 the investigating officials of this case had intercepted exhibits D and E from the first prosecution witness. Exhibit D contains the first part of the alleged seditious document, and exhibit E is the carbon sheet containing the second part. Therefore if the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses actually made reports of reading such documents the contents of which they described the
[p.550] of [1979] GLR 523
Director of the Special Branch would have been able to appreciate and comprehend the nature of their reports. He would also have been in a position on those dates, on 28 and 29 August, to show them a copy of the document made from that one confiscated from the first prosecution witness.
Exhibit H seems to be a copy made from exhibits D and E. Exhibits D, E and H were given to the seventh prosecution witness, the document examiner, on 1 September 1975, and he submitted his report on 12 September 1975. These pieces of evidence show that as on 28 August 1975 when the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses made their reports, the Special Branch had in their possession exhibits D, E and H. But a week after 28 August 1975 would be 4 September 1975 and after 29 August 1975 would be 5 September 1975 and on those dates the documents would be with the document examiner so what did they show to the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses? In fact nobody gave evidence of what was shown to them; nor was that document tendered in evidence; the ninth prosecution witness said the document he read at Tema was made of two sheets of cyclostyled material.
He was shown exhibit H which is a type-script incorporating exhibits D and E, but he did not in any way relate it to the document which he had been shown at the Special Branch. No reference was made by the witnesses from the investigating team of the document which was shown to the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses nor that they made such reports. It is rather curious that such spontaneous reports were made, and none of the investigating officers mentioned them at all in their evidence, especially when the evidence of the alleged reports was so seriously challenged.
Another point which the learned judge did not advert his mind to is the way each of the witnesses conveniently remembered certain portions of the document. This ought to have been considered in the light of the fact that they destroyed the papers after each of them had read them. The ninth prosecution witness is not by any means a scholar. He had primary education but no secondary education. He passed the standard seven in 1943. He is a man of 52, and a sand and stone contractor. This man read a document and destroyed it there and then. It was a document of one seven-eighth foolscap, type-written and cyclostyled. He merely read it, got excited, and destroyed it. Yet in the middle of October when he gave evidence he remembered certain portions almost word for word. Very ingeniously, he remembered the opening words of the document, a sentence in the second paragraph, another point about two-thirds down the page, and another sentence down the middle of the second page.
The tenth prosecution witness is a trader who also read the document and became afraid and tore it to pieces. On 17 October 1975 when he gave his evidence he remembered a sentence in the first paragraph, and the first sentence in the second paragraph – word for word. He remembered that the National Redemption Council gave workers 27 per cent increase in salaries but there was more than 500 per cent rise in prices on the first sheet; he also remembered a sentence in the middle of the second sheet and the first and last sentences in the last paragraph of the second sheet.
[p.551] of [1979] GLR 523
The manipulation of the witnesses in this way by the prosecution to enable the two of them to highlight the salient points in the offensive document is rather strange, and that evidence should have been taken with a grain of salt. The co-ordination of the two pieces of evidence so dovetailed that the story looks too good to be true and should have excited the curiosity of any judge. At any rate if I were the trial judge my curiosity would have been excited.
If the judge had adverted his mind to these matters in his evaluation of the evidence of the ninth and the tenth prosecution witnesses, he could not have rated their evidence all that high.
Looking at it from my point of view, their evidence appears very rehearsed. Their evidence sound like coming from suborned witnesses. The finding of the trial judge on this point can be classified as perverse and on that ground reversed. And I would so treat it.
In the light of this I would hold that there was no publication in this present case and that the prosecution should have failed. For this reason and the other reasons I have given above I would allow the appeal of the first accused, quash his conviction and sentence, and substitute therefore a verdict of acquittal and discharge. If no offence was committed by the first accused then it follows that the second and third accused could not have aided and abetted him. Their appeals are also allowed, their convictions and sentences are quashed and in their places are substituted acquittal and discharge.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
