IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – AD.2026
CORAM: LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)
AMADU JSC
PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
KULENDI JSC
GAEWU JSC
KWOFIE JSC
AMALEBOBA JSC
WRIT NO. J1/20/2023
18TH MARCH 2026
1. MENSAH THOMPSON
2. ALLIANCE FOR SOCIAL EQUITY PLAINTIFFS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (ASEPA)
VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL ………. DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
TANKO AMADU JSC:-
INTRODUCTION
1. My Lords, in this action, the Plaintiffs have invoked the original jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the Constitution 1992, seeking against the Defendant the following reliefs:
a. A declaration that persons holding public office under article 286(5) of the 1992 Constitution, who did not submit a written declaration of properties, assets, and liabilities to the Auditor-General before taking office contravened article 286(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution;
b. A declaration that to the extent that section 1(4) of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) defers the period for submitting the written declaration of properties, assets and liabilities by six months, it is inconsistent with, or in contravention of article 286(1) of the 1992 Constitution;
c. An order striking out the words, “and shall be submitted not later than six months of the occurrence of any of the events specified in this subsection,” as contained in Section 1(4) of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) as being inconsistent with, or in contravention of Article 286(1) of the 1992 Constitution;
d. An order striking out the words, ‘as at date of making declaration’ and ‘at date of making declaration as contained in the Second Schedule of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) as being inconsistent with, and a contravention of Article 286(1) of the 1992 Constitution;
e. An order directing all persons holding public office under article 286(5) of the 1992 Constitution who submitted their declarations based on the unconstitutional instructions contained in the Second Schedule of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) to resubmit same in compliance with the terms of article 286(1) within such reasonable time as this Honourable Court may decide; and
f. Any other orders and directions that this Honourable Court may consider appropriate for giving effect to the declarations so made.
2. When the matter came up for hearing on the 5th day of November 2025, the Plaintiffs prayed the court to strike out relief (d) endorsed in the writ and issue 2 contained in the memorandum of issues filed by the Plaintiffs on 9th November 2023. The court adopted the two issues as set out in the joint memorandum of issues filed by the Plaintiffs and Defendants on 15th January 2025.
3. The gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ action is a challenge to the consistency of certain provisions in the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) with Article 286(1) of the Constitution 1992, specifically Section 1(4) of Act 550, which allows public office holders a six (6) month grace period after assuming office before the declaration as well as a phrase in the second schedule to Act 550 requiring the declaration as well as “as at the date of making the declaration”.
4. The Plaintiffs contend that, those provisions of Act 550 defeat the letter and spirit of Article 286(1), which mandates asset declaration before taking office, and seek relief including a declaration of unconstitutionality of all such provisions found as inconsistent with Article 286(1) of the Constitution. The Plaintiffs further seek consequential orders for retroactive compliance of any orders this court may make. Significantly, in the statement of case filed by the Defendant, the Defendant (Attorney General) concedes that, Section 1(4) of Act 550 is unconstitutional and should be struck down. However, the Defendant urges on this court that, the second schedule of Act 550 also under attack can be read consistently with the Constitution, and further that, no retroactive re-submission of post declarations be made.
BACKGROUND
5. The key issue in contention revolves around Ghana’s assets declaration regime for public office holders, as governed by the Constitution 1992 and its implementing statute, Act 550. Article 286(1) of the Constitution imposes a duty on specific public office holders including the President, Ministers, Members of Parliament, Justices of the Superior Courts of Judicature and other Senior Public Officers listed under Article 289(5) to submit to the Auditor General written declarations of all their properties, assets and liabilities “before taking office”, and at periodic intervals as well as at the end of their term of office.
6. It is provided under Article 286(1) as follows;
“(1) A person who holds a public office mentioned in
clause (5) of this article shall submit to the Auditor-General a written declaration of all property or assets owned by, or liabilities owed by, him whether directly or indirectly;
(a) within three months after the coming into force of this Constitution or before taking office, as the case may be,
(b) at the end of every four years; and
(c) at the end of his term of office.
(2) Failure to declare or knowingly making false
declaration shall be a contravention of this Constitution and shall be dealt with in accordance with article 287 of this Constitution.”
7. This constitutional requirement has the effect of promoting transparency and accountability by establishing a reference point or baseline of a public office holder’s assets and liabilities at the time of assuming office against which any unexplained accretion of wealth during tenure can be detected. The relevant constitutional provision is explicit and emphatic on the timing, except for those already in public office when the Constitution came into force.
8. In pursuance of Article 286(1) and generally Chapter 24 of the 1992 Constitution, Parliament enacted Act 550 in 1998 with the stated objective of providing for asset declarations by public office holders “in conformity with Chapter 24 of the Constitution”. Act 550 sets out the procedures and forms for declaration. However, the Plaintiffs assert, and the Defendant ultimately, in a turnabout concedes that, Section 1(4) of Act 550 introduced a timeline that, is at variance with the constitutional requirement.
9. Section 1(4) of Act 550 provides that, the required declaration shall be made by the public officer (a) before taking office, (b) at the end of every four-year interval, and (c) at the end of the term of office, “and shall in any event be submitted not later than 6 months of the occurrence of any of the events specified”.
10. In effect, Act 550 grants the affected public office holders up to a period of six-months after assuming office and similarly after the other triggering events to submit their asset declaration forms. This six-months grace period is the crux of the instant challenge, as it ostensibly allows public office holders to assume office and serve for a period of six (6) months before complying with a duty of the Constitution intended to be fulfilled prior to taking office. The Plaintiffs contend that, this timeline “defeats the purpose of asset declarations in the first place,” because a delay for as long as six (6) months not provided for by the Constitution itself, creates opportunity for undisclosed accumulation or transfer of assets, thereby undermining or compromising the constitutional prescription.
JURISDICTION
11. It is important from the onset to ascertain the jurisdiction of the court within the context of the reliefs being sought by the Plaintiffs in order not to embark on a mere academic exercise of determining an issue which does not fall within the ambit of the constitutional provision. In the case of GHANA BAR ASSOCIATION VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 259, this court per Edward Wiredu JSC (as he then was), held that; “The court as a repository watchdog of the constitution, is enjoined to protect, defend and enforce its provision and should not allow itself to be diverted to act as an independent arbiter of the Constitution.”
12. Under Article 130(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this action. The provision is as follows:
“Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
(a) All matters relating to the enforcement or
interpretation of this Constitution;”
Article 2(1) of the Constitution also provides thus:
“(1) A person who alleges that;
(a) An enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment; or
(b) any act or omission of any person; is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”
13. The Attorney-General (Defendant herein), in an initial Statement of Case filed in January 2024, opposed the action. In that earlier statement of case, it was argued in essence that, Act 550 was a good-faith implementation of Article 286 and that the six-month allowance was a practical measure within Parliament’s power to prescribe details of the declaration regime. The Defendant, at that time, appeared to urge the Court to interpret Article 286(1) liberally or contextually so as not to invalidate the statutory timeline.
14. However, in a complete turnaround the Attorney-General filed another Statement of Case on 30th April 2025, revising the Defendant’s position. In the April 2025 statement, the Attorney General conceded that Section 1(4) of Act 550 cannot be defended in the light of the clear language of the Constitution and indicated that, the State would no longer defend the six-month grace period. The Attorney General’s updated position now falls in tandem with the Plaintiffs’ on the unconstitutionality of Section 1(4) of Act 550 which also urged on the court that, once that offending provision is struck down, the remaining parts of Act 550, including the wording of the Second schedule, can be interpreted in conformity with Article 286.
15. Crucially, in the new statement of case, the Attorney-General opposed the Plaintiffs’ request for a blanket order for a retrospective re-submission of asset declaration forms by all affected public office holders. The Attorney General contended that, such an order would be impracticable and unnecessary, given that, the primary relief would be the nullification of the inconsistent provision going forward.
16. Notwithstanding the consensus on the main point of law, this Court must still perform its constitutional duty to interpret and enforce the Constitution. The mere agreement of the parties cannot on its own nullify a statute; it is the prerogative of this Court to pronounce on the constitutionality or otherwise of the provision of an impugned statute, as the case may be.
17. Before turning to the legal issues, we acknowledge the standing of the Plaintiffs to bring this action. Mr. Mensah Thompson sues as a citizen of Ghana, together with the 2nd Plaintiff Alliance for Social Equity and Public Accountability; (ASEPA), a Civil Society Organization devoted to accountability. Article 2 of the Constitution grants standing to “any person” to initiate an action to enforce the Constitution against any contravention, and this has been affirmed in our jurisprudence as an important mechanism to uphold the rule of law. As was observed in TUFFUOR VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 637, every Ghanaian citizen has the right to invoke jurisdiction to protect the constitutional order from subversion. This Court reiterates that public-spirited Plaintiffs have locus standi to invite the Court’s intervention when an enactment or act is alleged to violate the Constitution, and such actions serve to strengthen our constitutional democracy by ensuring that no inconsistency or breach of the constitution prevails.
18. In their joint memorandum of issues filed on 15th January 2025, the parties have set out the following issues for determination;
i. Whether by providing that the period for submitting the written declaration of properties, assets and liabilities is six months, Section 1(4) of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) is inconsistent with, or in contravention of article 286(1) of the 1992 Constitution?
ii. Whether the list of properties, assets and liabilities that persons holding public office under article 286(5) of the 1992 Constitution are required to declare is the list of properties, assets and liabilities existing as of the date of making the declaration?
19. However, for a better appreciation of the context within which the Plaintiffs’ reliefs have been formulated, we shall set out the specific questions that arise for determination in order not to leave any relevant consequential matter in doubt.
The questions are as follows:-
i. Whether Section 1(4) of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550), which permits a public officer to submit the prescribed assets declaration “not later than six months” after assuming office or other triggering events, is inconsistent with Article 286(1) of the 1992 Constitution, which requires such declaration to be submitted before taking office (and at specified intervals thereafter), and if so, whether Section 1(4) should be struck down as null and void.
ii. Whether the wording in the Second Schedule of Act 550, particularly the phrase “as at date of making declaration” used in reference to the assets being declared, is inconsistent with the letter or purpose of Article 286.
iii. Whether the Court should, in the exercise of its powers under Article 2(2) (to make orders to give effect to a declaration of unconstitutionality), direct all public office holders who had previously declared their assets under the six-month grace period (now alleged to be unconstitutional) to re-submit their asset declaration forms reflecting their assets as at the time they took office.
20. We propose to address each of these questions seriatim in the analysis by applying the relevant constitutional provisions, interpretative principles, and case law precedents. However, before this, an appreciation on international best practice regarding asset declaration would be relevant in this delivery.
A HISTORICAL EXCURSES AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS PERTAINING TO THE DECLARATION OF ASSETS
21. The obligation of public office holders to disclose their assets and liabilities has long been regarded as an essential mechanism for promoting transparency, deterring corruption, and safeguarding public trust. Historically, while sporadic practices existed earlier, the evolution of comprehensive public disclosure systems gained momentum in the post-World War II era.
22. In the United States, by 1969, at least eleven states had enacted laws mandating financial disclosure by public officials, with momentum gathering across the 1970s. Western Europe followed in subsequent decades. Notably, the United Kingdom had already taken a pioneering step with the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1889. By the early 1980s, countries like Spain, Italy and Portugal had adopted statutory regimes requiring asset and income disclosures from elected or appointed officials.
23. It must be observed however that, many of the early European regimes lacked the complexity, breadth of coverage, and enforcement rigour evident in the American model. Nevertheless, these developments marked an international shift toward embedding asset declaration frameworks into national governance systems.
24. On the international scene, this trend crystallised with instruments such as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), which encouraged states to institute registries of public officials’ income, assets, and liabilities. In this regard, Article IX on Illicit Enrichment states that;
“Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party that has not yet done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an offense a significant increase in the assets of a government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his functions.”
25. Further, Article III(4) encourages member states to establish “Systems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons who perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law and, where appropriate, for making such registrations public.”
26. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) similarly mandates State Parties to require asset declarations on assumption of office, during tenure, and upon exit from public service. Most significantly, Article 8(5) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003) calls upon states to “Each State Party shall endeavour, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to establish measures and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials.”
27. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has noted, asset declaration regimes have become a globally endorsed anti-corruption tools, fostering transparency, accountability, and early detection of illicit enrichment. Ghana, through Article 286 of the 1992 Constitution and statutory enactments such as Act 550, participates in this global normative consensus. Accordingly, judicial interpretation of such provisions must be informed not only by local constitutional imperatives, but also by the broader international standards that fall in line with best practices in democratic accountability.
ANALYSIS
28. On the first question concerning the constitutionality of Section 1(4) of Act 550, Article 1(2) of the 1992 Constitution proclaims the fundamental supremacy of the Constitution. It provides thus: “This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.” In the realm of constitutional adjudication, this Court’s primary function is to uphold that supremacy by testing impugned legislation against the yardstick of the Constitution. This is variously upheld by this court in cases like DAASEBRE ASARE BAAH III & ORS. VS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL & THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION WRIT J1/8/2009 DATED 18TH FEBRUARY, 2010; SAM (NO.2) VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2000] SCGLR 305; ERNEST ADOFO AND ANOTHER VS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ANOTHER WRIT J1/3/2004 DATED 20TH APRIL, 2005. I am guided by these foundational principles in assessing the constitutionality of Section 1(4) of Act 550.
29. The Section 1(4) of Act 550 under scrutiny permits a public office holder to submit the mandatory declaration of assets and liabilities within six-months after assuming office and similarly within six-months after each four-year interval or upon leaving office.
30. In contrast, Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution stipulates that, a person who holds any of the specified public offices “shall submit to the Auditor-General a written declaration of all property or assets owned by, or liabilities owed by, him… before taking office” (emphasis added). The constitutional text is unambiguous, the declaration must precede the assumption of public office or, conversely, no person should assume such office without first declaring their assets and liabilities.
31. The rationale is self-evident as it ensures that from the first day of holding public office, there is a record of the public officer’s financial position, creating a baseline for accountability. By requiring this declaration upfront, the Constitution seeks to foreclose the possibility that, public officers may acquire wealth illicitly immediately upon taking office and then include same in a later declaration as if it were part of their initial assets owned prior to assumption of office.
32. It is immediately apparent that, the six-month period granted by Section 1(4) of Act 550 directly undermines the constitutional mandate of prior declaration. The statutory language “shall in any event be submitted not later than 6 months” after the triggering event effectively sanctions post hoc declarations which invariably allows an official to be in office for up to half a year before compliance. This is a substantive departure from the timing expressly required by Article 286(1).
33. With due regard to the interpretative disposition of our courts as expressed in Section 10 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) and further espoused by this court in cases like PROFESSOR STEPHEN KWAKU ASARE VS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL WRIT NO.3/2002 DATED 28TH JANUARY, 2004; REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT (FAST TRACK DIVISION) ACCRA; EX-PARTE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (RICHARD ANANE INTERESTED PARTY) [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 213; DANSO-ACHEAMPONG VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2009] SCGLR353 AND COMMISION ON HUMAN RIGHT AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE VS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BABA KAMARA WRIT NO.J1/3/2010 DATED 6TH APRIL, 2011, no amount of purposive interpretation or benevolent construction can reconcile “before taking office” with “within 6 months after taking office”, the two being plainly at odds.
34. In interpretative terms or in other words, the inconsistency is patent and irreconcilable. The framers of the Constitution used the phrase “before taking office” must be given its ordinary meaning, as nothing in the context suggests a special or technical meaning. It signifies that, the act of declaration is a condition precedent to entering office, not a retrospective duty that can be fulfilled at the pleasure of a person after assumption of office.
35. As aforesaid, in an earlier statement of case, the Attorney-General had defended Section 1(4), but in subsequent, statement of case filed on 30th April 2025, the State rightly conceded that, the grace period “cannot stand side by side” with the constitutional provision. Indeed, the Attorney-General, as the foremost legal officer of the State, ultimately acknowledged his duty ex officio to uphold the supremacy of the constitution by agreeing with the Plaintiffs that, Section 1(4) violates Article 286(1). We do take note of that concession, which in our view was properly made, as it accords with a proper constitutional intent and not the legislative prescription.
36. In light of the foregoing, we have no hesitation in holding that Section 1(4) of Act 550 is unconstitutional to the extent of its inconsistency hereinbefore set out. By purporting to allow what the Constitution forbids (asset declaration after assumption of office rather than before), Section 1(4) contravenes Article 286(1)(a). Pursuant to Article 1(2) of the 1992 Constitution and consistent with the duty of this court in cases such as NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1993-94] 2 GLR 35; ADJEI AMPOFO VS. ATORNEY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS [2011] 2 SCGLR 1104, we declare the impugned provision in Section 1(4) of Act 550 null and void to the extent of its inconsistency with the provision of Article 286 1(a) of the 1992 Constitution. It is accordingly struck down.
37. For completeness, we note that, Section 1(4) of Act 550 encompassed not only the initial declaration upon assumption of office, but also declarations “at the end of every four years” of service and “at the end of [the] term of office,” likewise with a six-month extension. Although the Plaintiffs’ primary emphasis has been on the timing of the initial declaration the six-month grace period is equally problematic in those other contexts vis-à-vis the constitutional text. Article 286(1) (b) and (c) require declarations “at the end of every four years” and “at the end of… term of office,” respectively. The natural meaning of “at the end of” an event is, again, immediately upon the event’s occurrence i.e. promptly when a four-year period concludes, and when one’s tenure concludes. A built-in delay of up to six months after those points is inconsistent with the idea of making the declaration at those occurrences.
38. Indeed, the doctrine of separability will be instructive in application here. In DAASEBRE ASARE BAAH III VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, [2010] SCGLR 463 AT 470 Georgina Wood, CJ explained the point succinctly as follows;
“The presumption is that every enactment by the legislature is presumed to be valid and constitutional, until the contrary is proven. A law would not be adjudged unconstitutional, unless the case is so clear as to be devoid of any doubts. Indeed the legal principle in criminal law which enjoins doubts to be resolved in favour of accused persons, works in much the same way in this area of the law. The principle is hallowed that it has been observed that to doubt the constitutional validity of a law, is to resolve it in favour of its validity. In other words, doubts are resolved in favour of constitutionality and not the person challenging it. In my judgment, it is perhaps in the area of judicial review of legislative action that on the principle of severability of impugned legislation, it becomes absolutely essential that the rule be strictly observed… On the basis of this principle, the offending parts of legislation may be severed and struck down, leaving other parts intact and unaffected by the exercise.”
39. Further, in the case of REPUBLIC VS. YEBBI AND AVALIFO [2000] SCGLR 149, although this Court struck down a part of Section 24(1) of Act 459, the court upheld the remaining parts of the section, namely, clauses (a),(b) and (c) to be consistent with Article 143(1) of the Constitution.
40. This court per Ackah-Yensu, JSC further clarified the judicial attitude of the court in the case of DERRICK ADU-GYAMFI VS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, WRIT NO.J1/18/2022 DATED 8TH NOVEMBER 2023; in the following words;
“It is important to point out that when a party has challenged the constitutionality of an enactment for being inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution, the party must make out a clear case of inconsistency of every part of the impugned enactment as an enactment usually comprises parts each of which is capable of independent legal validity and therefore severable. There is a presumption of law that enactments made by the legislature are valid unless proven otherwise so where provisions of an enactment are severable, it is only the parts that are clearly inconsistent with the Constitution that may be struck down leaving the other parts that do not contravene the Constitution to stand. For that reason, article 1(2) of the Constitution limits the invalidation of an impugned enactment only “to the extent of the inconsistency”.
41. Therefore, the unconstitutionality of Section 1(4) does not extend to its entirety as subsections (a), (b) and parts of (c) are consistent with Article 286. Thus, the offending six-month proviso cannot be saved for other scenarios, if it is void for the initial declaration. The remaining provisions of Act 550, which are not challenged, can function without those parts of Section 1(4) which is challenged. Indeed, the Act’s own purpose clause envisioned conformity with the Constitution, so this decision in effect exercises the discordant note from an otherwise constitutional framework.
ISSUE 2;
42. The next issue concerns the Second Schedule to Act 550, which contains the standard Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Form to be used by public office holders in making the required declaration. This form, as prescribed by Section 1(2) of Act 550, requires the declarant to fill in various particulars. Notably, for each category of assets and liabilities, the form’s instructions refer to the assets held “as at the date of making declaration.” For example, the form will prompt: “Properties [owned] as at date of making declaration”, “Bank accounts balances as at date of making declaration”, etc.
43. The Plaintiffs argue that, this phrasing could be read as allowing or even encouraging declarants to list Assets as at a potentially much later date, since the Act permitted a six-month delay, rather than as of the time they took office. In the Plaintiffs’ view, the phrase might be interpreted to mean the relevant date for the declaration, is the date on which the official happens to fill the form, which under Section 1(4) could be months after assuming office, thereby defeating the intent that the declaration must capture one’s assets as they stood upon assumption of office. The Plaintiffs therefore sought a declaration that, on the face of Article 286, any declaration of assets must reflect the public office holder’s assets position before taking office, not at the time of declaration if that time is later. Essentially, they invite the Court to construe or, if necessary, modify the language of the form to ensure fidelity to the Constitution.
44. The Defendant’s position in the second Statement of Case is that, once the unlawful six-months leeway is struck down, the phrase “as at date of making declaration” in the form can and should be understood in a manner consistent with Article 286. The Attorney-General argues that, the form’s wording need not be excised because it can be interpreted to mean nothing more sinister than the declarant stating his assets as of the moment he is fulfilling the constitutional obligation, which moment, by law, must coincide with or precede assumption of office, or the end of the relevant interval.
45. In other words, if the timing provision is fixed to comply with the Constitution, then “the date of making the declaration” is effectively the same as the constitutional deadline for e.g. the date the person assumes office, or immediately after leaving office, so that the form’s phrasing would cause no divergence from the constitutional requirement.
46. Accordingly, we find merit in the Attorney General’s reasoning on this point. The Court’s task is to interpret legislation in a manner that upholds the Constitution wherever possible, rather than hastily invalidating statutory provisions that are capable of a constitutional construction. This principle of harmonious or benevolent interpretation has been part of our constitutional jurisprudence. As Sowah JA (as he then was) said in SALLAH VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL G and G (Vol. 11, Pt 2) 493, at 506 SC:
“I consider that the best guide to interpretation is the letter and spirit of the Constitution if the intention of the Assembly (which drafted the Constitution) can be collected from the words used and if that intention, when so collected, is in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution, then there is no need for further aids.” See also; TUFFUOR VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 637.
47. By extension, when interpreting a statute enacted to give oxygen to the Constitution, courts should endeavor to read it in a way that conforms with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, rather than those that conflicts, provided such a conforming reading is reasonably possible and not result in an absurdity.
48. In the instant case, the impugned phrase “as at date of making declaration” is, on its face, neutral as to the timing of that declaration. The phrase itself does not specify when the declaration must be made; it merely indicates that the information provided as the list of assets or liabilities, should be true and accurate as of the date the form is completed. The mischief arose only because Act 550 erroneously allowed that date to be delayed far beyond what the Constitution permits. With Section 1(4) now excised, any declaration “made” under the Act must coincide in time with the constitutional requirement i.e., before office, etc.
49. Stating one’s assets “as at” that date is perfectly consistent with what Article 286(1)(a) demands. Likewise, for an official who has served four years continuously, Article 286(1)(b) requires a declaration at that four-year mark; if they fill the form on that day or very shortly thereafter, as practically feasible, the assets they declare “as at the date of making declaration” are essentially their assets at the four-year endpoint, which again is in line with the Constitution. We are in agreement that, the wording of the Second Schedule can be upheld. There is no need to strike down the phrase “as at date of making declaration,” because it is not in itself repugnant to Article 286 when the statute is properly administered. For it is “trite law that all the provisions of a statute are intended to have effect and such construction should be made that, if possible, all such provisions have effect. It is also trite law that the courts must always interpret a statute ut res magis valeat quam pereat.” See REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ACCRA EX-PARTE; REPUBLIC BANK LIMITED (CIVIL APPEAL NO.J5/45/2014) DATED 17TH DECEMBER 2014.
50. In this regard, the 1992 Constitution itself expects implementing legislation for Chapter 24 (Code of Conduct for Public Officers) to fill in procedural details. Act 550 was intended to serve that function. By nullifying the offending portion (Section 1(4)), Act 550 has been restored to the path of constitutionality. There is nothing inherently offensive about requiring a declarant to list assets “as at” a certain date. The Second Schedule, properly applied, furthers that spirit by documenting the assets at those critical instances.
51. It follows that, we decline the Plaintiffs’ invitation to declare the phrase “as at date of making declaration” null and void, as we do not find it “inconsistent” with the Constitution when construed as above. On the contrary, we construe it as being in harmony with Article 286.
52. Finally, a significant point of divergence between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant pertains to the appropriate remedy consequent upon our finding of unconstitutionality. The Plaintiffs urge the Court to go beyond a declaratory relief and issue a mandatory order directed at all affected public office holders to re-submit their previous asset declarations that were made under the void six-month rule, this time ensuring that each declaration reflects the assets held at the moment the person assumed office.
53. In practical terms, this would mean, for example, that any Minister or official who took office in the past (and who, relying on Act 550, filed their declaration several months later) would now have to file a fresh form indicating what their assets were at the time they assumed office. The Plaintiffs believe this sweeping remedial measure is necessary to give true effect to Article 286(1) and to remedy the lapse caused by the unconstitutional grace period. They argue that, without such an order, the record will forever be incomplete or distorted for those past and current public office holders who did not declare at the proper time. The Attorney-General, however, strongly resists this request, characterizing it as impractical, overbroad, and unnecessary.
54. The Defendant submits that, the Court’s primary duty is to strike down the offending law and ensure compliance going forward, not to police past conduct of potentially thousands of office holders in retrospect. It is pointed out that, since Act 550 came into force in 1998, countless declarations have been filed under its regime; requiring all those to be redone would be a herculean task with uncertain benefit. Moreover, some individuals who once held office have since died or left office long ago; others may have already left office by the time of this judgment, etc. Enforcing a blanket re-submission could raise more problems than it solves. In fact, it will in all probability not be complied with, or at the very best may be administratively chaotic.
55. The Defendant also contends that, the constitutional breach in question is essentially a systemic one (created by the statute) rather than individual malfeasance by public office holders, and thus the cure should address the system (i.e., align the law with the future) rather than penalize or burden individuals after the fact.
56. Having given quite anxious consideration to this issue, we are persuaded that, an order for retroactive re-submission of all past declarations is neither feasible nor necessary to vindicate the constitutional principle. Consequently, we decline to grant that relief for the following reasons.
57. First, on a practical level, such an order would indeed be exceedingly burdensome to implement. Over the past twenty-seven (27) years (1998 to date), every President, Vice-President, Minister, Parliamentarian, Justices of the Superior Court of judicature, and a plethora of other officials have been subject to the asset declaration requirement. Many of them likely complied with Act 550 by declaring within the six-month window rather than strictly before assumption. Even if we were limiting it to public office holders under the current administration, to identify and compel each such official to make a fresh declaration at the time of taking office would be daunting.
58. The Auditor-General’s office, which is the recipient of these declarations, would be conceivably hard-pressed in determining declarations which were presented timely and those which were late, given that, under the old regime, no record was made of non-compliance as long as it was presented within six months. In effect, the Court would be rewinding the clock on nearly three decades of governance and asking for a do-over of administrative formalities. In my view, such a potential scenario must not arise from a reasonable and judicious exercise of judicial power especially when weighed against the likely benefits.
59. Second, the primary purpose of Article 286 is prospective or forward-looking, to ensure accountability through transparency during and after the tenure of a public office holder. While it is true that a late declaration is a technical breach, the harm to the public interest arises principally from the potential concealment or confusion about baseline assets. Now that this decision clarifies the correct baseline i.e., assets as at assumption of office must be declared timely, the objective moving forward will be met.
60. For the past cases, particularly those where the official is no longer in office, a retroactive declaration at this stage serves little concrete and practical purpose. It might satisfy a mere academic objective or principle on paper but would not necessarily lead to any actionable consequences unless there is reason to suspect unaccounted wealth in the interim. In the absence of specific allegations of illicit enrichment, ordering thousands of past public office holders to re-declare their old assets amounts to a symbolic gesture with high administrative cost. We will rather be cautious by issuing effective relief, not symbolic ones that may prove pyrrhic.
61. Third, without using more words and overly complicating what has already been said, Ghanaian constitutional jurisprudence acknowledges that remedies for constitutional violations should be effective yet proportionate. The Constitution in Article 2(2) empowers this Court to make “orders and directions” as may be necessary to give effect to its declarations. This provision gives us a broad discretion to shape remedies that fit the circumstances of each case. It does not follow that in every instance of a law being void, all acts done under that law must be undone.
62. Therefore, in appropriate cases, especially where third parties have acted in good faith reliance on a statute or where undoing past acts would cause disorder, the Court may exercise restraint and not disturb settled matters. Finally, we consider that, the relief of striking down Section 1(4) of Act 550 and our clarification of the declaration form is sufficient to address the core constitutional inconsistency.
63. The constitutional order is vindicated by removing the offending provision from our statute books. This ensures that, going forward no public office holder can evade the timely declaration rule. This in our considered view, resolves the legal inconsistency which is the gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ action. In concluding on this point, we decline to order a retroactive re-submission of asset declarations made under the previously existing regime. To that extent, we make no blanket order compelling all past and present public office holders to re-declare assets as of their assumption dates.
64. However, for the avoidance of doubt, any public office holder who as of today is in breach of Article 286(1), for example, a person currently in office who has not yet made any declaration at all, and was hoping to do so within a now-non-existent six-month window is already in violation of the Constitution. Such a person must take immediate steps to comply forthwith.
65. Although it does not bear on the outcome of the substantive issues, the Court finds it imperative to address the conduct of the Defendant in the management of this case, specifically the filing of two diametrically opposed Statements of Case at different stages. The Attorney-General’s January 2024 Statement of Case defended the constitutionality of Act 550, whereas the April 2025 Statement of Case conceded the unconstitutionality of the very provision earlier defended, effectively abandoning the initial position.
66. While we take judicial notice of the change of government on 7th of January, 2025 and the coming into office of a new Attorney-General, this flip-flopping of indirectly abandoning one statement of case in preference for a new Statement of Case could have been properly and procedurally done by the leave of this court first obtained.
67. We find the procedure adopted by the Defendant as one that can have significant implications for the proper and orderly administration of justice. Be that as it may, it is equally the path of honour and professional ethics to concede to a constitutional anomaly as the Attorney-General has done in this matter.
CONCLUSION
68. Against the background of the foregoing, we hold that, Article 1(4) of the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550) is inconsistent with Article 286(1) of the 1992 Constitution, and to the extent of that inconsistency, the same is struck down as unconstitutional. The other reliefs endorsed in the Plaintiffs’ writ are hereby dismissed.
69. The Plaintiffs’ action therefore, succeeds in part.
(SGD.) I. O. TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) PROF. H.J.A.N MENSA-BONSU (MRS)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) E. Y. GAEWU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) H. KWOFIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) H. AMALEBOBA
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
ISMAEL ANDANI ABDULAI ESQ. FOR PLAINTIFFS.
SYLVIA ADUSU (DR.) (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY) FOR THE DEFENDANT WITH MOTHER TERESA BREW (STATE ATTORNEY).
