NANA ANTOBRE PREMPEH SUBST. BY SAMUEL GYAMERA vs. EMMANUEL BORQUAY KROWEY & ANOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA- AD. 2026

CORAM: LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)

GAEWU JSC

KWOFIE JSC

DARKO ASARE JSC

DZAMEFE JSC

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. J4/34/2026

22ND JULY, 2026

NANA ANTOBRE PREMPEH ………… PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/

(SUBST. BY SAMUEL GYAMERA) RESPONDENT

VRS.

1. EMMANUEL BORQUAY KROWEY ………. DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/

2. JOAN FREDUA AGYEMANG APPELLANTS

_____________________________________________________________

J U D G M E N T

_____________________________________________________________

MAJORITY OPINION

GAEWU, JSC:

We are called upon in this appellate invocation to determine whether the Court of Appeal, in refusing to extend time for the submission of written arguments, correctly calibrated the delicate scales of judicial discretion, or whether it allowed procedural rigidity to eclipse the clear demands of substantive justice. This instant appeal directly stems from the unanimous ruling of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Accra, delivered on the 5th day of March, 2025. By that determination, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal rejected an application brought by the Defendants/ Appellants/Applicants (hereinafter referred to as “the Applicants”) seeking an extension of time within which to file their Written Submissions in support of their appeal against the substantive judgment of the High Court, dated 12th July, 2019. Dissatisfied with this summary disposal, the Applicants timeously lodged a Notice of Appeal before this apex Court on the 21st day of March, 2025, praying for an order setting aside the ruling of the Court of Appeal and an ancillary order granting them leave to file their written arguments out of time.

I. BACKGROUND

A retrospective evaluation of the record reveals that the Applicants were the defendants in the foundational suit out of which these current proceedings flow. The litigation originally culminated in a judgment of the High Court delivered on the 12th day of July, 2019, concerning the administration and distribution of the Estate of the late Nana Ankobea Konadu (also known as Nana Ama Adusah or Naa Borteley Krowey). Dissatisfied with the determination of the trial court, the Applicants invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. Following the transmission of the record of appeal, the Applicants were required under the structural rules of engagement to file their written arguments within the strict timelines textually mandated by court procedure.

It is the uncontroverted case of the Applicants that their counsel’s clerk was served with Civil Form 6 on the 8th day of August, 2023, a date falling squarely within the statutory legal vacation. Counsel for the Applicants indicates that upon his attention being drawn to the process, the Written Submission was compiled and filed on the 3rd day of October, 2023. It was subsequently discovered that this filing had run afoul of the procedural timelines, having technically occurred out of time. Consequently, on the 8th day of April, 2024, the Applicants filed a Motion on Notice for an extension of time to regularize the situation. This application was heard and determined by the Court of Appeal on the 5th day of March, 2025.

Significantly, despite the explicit fact that the Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the Respondent”) chose not to offer any opposition to the application, the Court of Appeal proceeded to dismiss the motion. The intermediate appellate court held that the intervening delay of five months was fundamentally inordinate and devoid of a sustainable or reasonable explanation. In delivering its text, the Court of Appeal remarked:

“Even though Counsel for the Respondent has indicated that he is not opposed to the application and thus did not file any affidavit in opposition, that does not mean that the application should automatically be granted. Applications for extension are not granted for the action. The delay must not be inordinate and the Applicant must explain to the Court the reason for the delay. From the affidavit evidence, and the oral submission of Counsel for the Applicants, we are of the view that the five (5) months delay has not been reasonably explained. The application is therefore refused.”

It is against this definitive exercise of judicial discretion that the Applicants have launched the instant appellate challenge before us.

II. GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The Appellants submitted two primary grounds of appeal for our consideration, which they argued together:

1. The ruling is against the weight of the Affidavit evidence.

2. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held that the Appellants did not reasonably explain the five (5) months delay in filing the application for extension of time within which to file the Written Submission.

III. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

The central issue is whether, on the facts and circumstances disclosed, the Court of Appeal properly exercised its discretion in refusing the Appellants’ application for extension of time.

IV. SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL

Arguments on Behalf of the Applicants:

Learned Counsel for the Applicants, Irene Aborchie-Nyahe (Mrs.), contended that the Court of Appeal failed to exercise its judicial discretion in a proper and balanced manner. She submitted that the record is devoid of any indices of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to delay the stream of justice. She emphasized that the Applicants had actually filed the Written Submission as early as the 3rd day of October, 2023, under the bona fide, albeit erroneous, impression that they were acting within time because service of Civil Form 6 was effected during the legal vacation. Once the procedural misstep was discovered, they acted with reasonable dispatch to regularize the situation. Invoking the landmark decision of this Court in Eku alias Conduah III v. Acquaah [1963] 1 GLR 271, which adopted the principles enunciated in Schafer v. Blyth [1920] 3 K.B. 140, Counsel argued that the primary question in applications for an extension of time is whether the delay is unreasonable, inexcusable, or fundamentally lacking in bona fides. She urged this Court to hold that the Applicants acted in good faith and that the refusal of the extension would prevent an arguable appeal on crucial succession law matters from being heard on its substantive merits.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent:

Conversely, Learned Counsel for the Respondent, Fred Kwasi Coch Esq., resisted the appeal, contending that the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion fairly and perfectly within standard practice. He cited Republic v. High Court, Kumasi; Ex Parte Atumfuwa and Another [2000] SCGLR 72, reinforcing the proposition that non-compliance with procedural rules bars the further prosecution of a case unless waived via a proper exercise of judicial discretion. Furthermore, relying on Almeen Kassardjian v. Addy [2003-2004] SCGLR 1031, Counsel submitted that a court cannot compromise basic statutory requirements under the guise of exercising its discretion, even where both counsel agree to waive such compliance. He contended that the Applicants had shown a lack of diligence, pointing out that the High Court judgment was delivered nearly seven years prior, and urged us to maintain the integrity of the ruling of the Court of Appeal.

V. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This Court is being called upon to review and potentially upset the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court of Appeal. It is a trite and foundational postulate of our law that an application for an extension of time is addressed to the judicial discretion of the court. Discretion, however, is not an untamed horse; it must be exercised judicially, rationally, and upon sound legal principles. In Num Kofi Dwomo v. Hon. Joe Danquah (MP) (2011) (CA), Court of Appeal, No. H1/3/2011, delivered on 1st April, 2011, the court articulated the constitutional boundaries governing discretionary power, holding as follows:

“The law on the exercise of discretionary power by Judicial Officers in this country is firmly enshrined in Article 296 (a) and (b) of the 1992 Constitution which states as follows:

‘Where in this Constitution or any law discretionary power is vested in any person or authority–

(a) that discretionary power shall be deemed to imply a duty to be fair and candid;

(b) the exercise of discretionary power shall not be arbitrary, capricious or biased either by resentment, prejudice or personal dislike and shall be in accordance with due process of law.’”

Similarly, in Baffour Awuah & Others v. Nana Damoah–Agyemang, (Court of Appeal), Civil Appeal No. H1/27/2013, delivered on 22nd March, 2013, Tanko Amadu J.A. (as he then was) captured the philosophical essence of judicial discretion in the following terms:

“Since judicial discretion is said to be a science of understanding, to distinguish between falsity and truth between wrong and right, shadow and substance, equity and colourless glosses and pretences and it is not to be exercised in accordance with the will and private affections of the judge, it is of the very essence of the proper exercise of judicial discretion that, it be exercised according to relevant rules of law and practice and in accordance with the rules of good reason and justice and not according to private whims or caprice, humour or sentiment.”

In the practical invocation of that discretion, the court is legally required to weigh an array of relevant factors, including the length of the intervening delay, the legal sufficiency of the reasons advanced in explanation, the bona fides of the applicant, any structural prejudice likely to be suffered by the respondent, and the overarching demands of substantial justice.

Ordinarily, an appellate tribunal is exceedingly reluctant to interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower court. The jurisprudence in this domain is settled. As Baddoo JSC observed in Kyenkyenhene v. Adu [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 142 at 154, referencing Charles Osenton & Co v. Johnston [1942] AC 130 HL:

“The law as to the reversal by a Court of Appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-established principles in an individual case. The appellate tribunal is not at liberty merely to substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the judge. In other words, appellate authorities ought not to reverse the order merely because they would themselves have exercised the original discretion, had it attached to them, in a different way. But if the appellate tribunal reaches the clear conclusion that there has been a wrongful exercise of discretion, in that no weight or no sufficient weight has been given to relevant considerations, such as those urged upon us by the appellant, then the reversal of the order on appeal may be justified.”

This principle was recently reinforced by this Court in Lawrence Yaw Ntaadu v. Stephen Boakye [2024] Civil Appeal No. J4/32/2024. In the Baffour Awuah case (supra), the court noted the operational exceptions to this general rule of non-interference:

“Though an appeal court is reluctant to interfere, it will do so if in the exercise of its discretion the trial court acted under a mistake of the law or in disregard of principle or under a misapprehension of facts or has taken into account irrelevant matters or where the discretion has worked hardship or injustice on a party as this case clearly portrays.”

These operational exceptions were consolidated in Sappor v. Wigatap Ltd [2007-2008] SCGLR 676 (Holding 1), where this Court unanimously held that an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of discretion where the court below applied wrong principles, reached a conclusion that works manifest injustice, or exercised its jurisdiction on wrong or inadequate materials. See also Nkrumah v. Serwaa [1984-85] 1 SCGLR 190 and Ballmoos v. Mensah [1984-86] 1 GLR 724 at 725, where the Court of Appeal reiterated:

“The Court of Appeal would not interfere with the exercise of the trial court’s discretion save in exceptional circumstances. An appeal against the exercise of the court’s discretion might succeed on the ground that the discretion was exercised on wrong or inadequate materials if it could be shown that the court acted under a misapprehension of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or omitted to take relevant matters into account; but it is not an appeal from the discretion of the court to the discretion of the appellate tribunal.”

Applying these legal metrics to the instant appeal, it is clear that the Court of Appeal’s foundational reason for refusing the extension is that the five-month delay has not been reasonably explained. However, a meticulous study of the record reveals that this conclusion fails to account for the unique context of the delay. The record confirms that service of Civil Form 6 was effected during the legal vacation on 8th August, 2023. It is an established tradition and general understanding among practitioners that procedural timelines are typically paused during this period to preserve the administrative balance of the courts. While Rule 20(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) mandates filing within 21 days, the Applicants’ counsel acted with demonstrable diligence by filing the Written Submission on the 3rd day of October, 2023, immediately upon the resumption of the legal year.

Even if this filing was technically out of time, it demonstrated an active, persistent attempt to comply with the rules. This is not the case of a slothful litigant who slept on their rights or treated judicial processes with disdain. The written arguments had actually been compiled, processed, and placed within the court’s registry as far back as October 2023. To visit the technical misapprehension of counsel regarding the running of time during vacation against a blameless client is a classic case of visiting the “sins of counsel” on an innocent client. In Sowah v. Bank for Housing and Construction [1982-83] GLR 1324, this Court explicitly stated: “The court should not visit the sins of counsel on the litigant where there is an arguable or meritorious appeal and no miscarriage of justice will be occasioned.” (See also Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex Parte Tiwaa (1975), Court of Appeal, delivered on 10th November, 1975).

Furthermore, in Halle & Sons S.A. v. Bank of Ghana and Warm Weather Enterprise Ltd (SC), Civil Appeal No. J4/37/2009, delivered on 7th July, 2010, this Court emphasized that procedural rules must not be converted into structural instruments of injustice. Rules of procedure are the handmaidens of justice, not its dictatorial mistress. Where a procedural omission does not inflict irreparable prejudice upon the opposing party, the court must always lean heavily toward the administration of substantial justice on the merits rather than terminating actions on technicalities.

It is also of significant weight that the Respondent did not oppose the application before the Court of Appeal. While we validate the Respondent’s citation of Almeen Kassardjian v. Addy to the proposition that a court cannot trade off statutory commands merely because of parties’ consent, the complete absence of opposition from the Respondent is directly relevant to the issue of prejudice. If the principal beneficiary of the High Court judgment did not raise any complaint of hardship, delay, or structural disadvantage, and elected not to file any affidavit in opposition, the Court of Appeal ought to have considered this as a factor pointing toward the absence of any miscarriage of justice. Shutting the door on the Appellants under these circumstances was an overly rigid and perverse exercise of discretion.

To properly evaluate the exercise of discretion in this matter, it is essential to appreciate the deliberate, harmonious procedural philosophy that animates the administration of justice across all tiers of the Ghanaian judiciary. Our rules of civil procedure have undergone a profound, progressive evolution, transitioning decisively away from strict, dry technicism and toward the attainment of substantial justice.

At the trial court level, this policy is firmly anchored in Order 81 Rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47). Order 81 of C.I. 47 establishes that any failure to comply with the rules whether in respect of time, place, manner, form, or content shall be treated as a mere irregularity and shall not nullify the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings, or any document, judgment, or order therein. Under C.I. 47, the High Court is empowered with the broadest mandate to rectify procedural non-compliance, with few exceptions, provided such rectification does not cause irreparable injustice to the opposing party. This procedural safeguard ensures that substantive disputes are decided on their actual merits rather than being summarily extinguished by procedural traps.

This progressive policy of curing procedural infractions scales all the way up to our apex court. At the supreme level, Rule 79 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16) mirrors this exact philosophical framework. Rule 79 of C.I. 16 vests this Court with wide, discretionary authority to waive any non-compliance with our rules, including constraints of time, on such terms as we deem fit. When read together with Rule 63 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19), which contains an analogous provision on waiver, these statutory instruments form an unbroken statutory chain of equity. They signal a clear, unified legislative and judicial mandate: courts must not allow procedural missteps to shut the gates of justice against litigants who present arguable, bona fide claims.

It is an unyielding principle of law that every judicial discretion exercised by a court must be tailored to avoid working an injustice onto the parties. As Collins MR beautifully observed in Re: Coles v. Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1 at page 4:

“The relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress and the Court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which are after all only procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case.”

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In the final analysis, we find that the Applicants did not exhibit any bad faith or calculated intent to frustrate the court processes. The delay in filing the application for an extension of time arose out of a genuine, albeit mistaken, construction of the operational effect of the legal vacation on Civil Form 6 timelines, a misconception that was immediately cured upon discovery. The proposed Written Submission annexed to the motion highlights triable and arguable issues of law regarding succession that deserve a full, substantive hearing on their merits. The Court of Appeal’s outright refusal to grant the extension under these circumstances represents a wrongful exercise of discretion that prioritized form over substance, and technicism over substantial justice. Operating under the restorative powers embedded in Rule 79 of C.I. 16, Rule 63 of C.I. 19, and Order 81 of C.I. 47, this Court is fully cloaked with the jurisdiction to waive such non-compliance to prevent a failure of justice. We are convinced that this is a situation where the non-compliance by the Applicants ought to be fully waived.

Accordingly, the appeal succeeds. The ruling of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 5th day of March, 2025, is hereby set aside. The application for an extension of time within which to file the Applicants’ Written Submission is granted. Leave is hereby granted Applicants to file their written submission before the Court of Appeal within 14 days hereof. There shall be no order as to costs.

(SGD.) E. Y. GAEWU

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) H. KWOFIE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) S. DZAMEFE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

DISSENTING OPINION

DARKO ASARE JSC:

This appeal once more presents the recurring and important question concerning the proper limits of appellate intervention in the exercise of judicial discretion, bringing into sharp focus the fundamental distinction between an appellate jurisdiction to review discretion and an impermissible jurisdiction to substitute one court’s discretion for that of another.

The appeal stems from a decision by the Court of Appeal Accra dated the 5th of March 2025, dismissing the Appellant’s application for extension of time to file Written Submissions in support of appeal.

FACTS

The background facts giving rise to the appeal are that on 8th April 2024, the Appellant applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time within which to file his Written Submissions. His explanation for the default was that although his Counsel had complied with the initial directions relating to the transmission and compilation of the record of appeal, the subsequent Civil Form 6 was served on Counsel’s clerk during the legal vacation and was brought to Counsel’s attention only belatedly, with the result that the Written Submissions were filed out of time albeit without leave, on the 3rd of October 2023. He therefore sought an extension of time to regularise that default.

The Court of Appeal, notwithstanding that the application was unopposed, declined to exercise its discretion in the Appellant’s favour, holding that the explanation advanced did not satisfactorily account for the delay, which it deemed to be excessive. The Appellant, being dissatisfied with that conclusion, has appealed to this Court.

Grounds of Appeal

The Ruling is against the weight of affidavit evidence

The Learned Justices erred when they held that Appellant did not reasonably explain the five (5) months delay in filing the application for extension of time within which to file Written Submissions

Before considering whether this Court is justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Court of Appeal in this instant appeal, it is necessary to restate the settled principle that an appellate court will not lightly disturb a discretionary decision.

Such intervention is warranted only where it is demonstrated that the discretion was exercised upon a wrong principle of law, under a misapprehension of the material facts, by taking into account irrelevant considerations, by failing to consider relevant matters, or where the decision is plainly unreasonable and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The above principles are amply exemplified by a wealth of bedrock authorities like Crentsil v Crentsil [1962] 2 GLR 171 SC; Sappor v. Wigatap Ltd [2007 – 2008] SCGLR 676 at 679; Kyenkyenhene v Adu [2003 – 2004] 1 SCGLR 142; In re Paramount Stool of Bamiankor; Effiah IV & Another v. Nana Taiba II & Others [2010] SCGLR 37 at 46 – 47; Adu (Per Attorney) Akonnor v. Ghana Revenue Authority [2013 – 2014] 2 SCGLR 1176 at 1190; Kojach Limited v. Multichoice Ghana ltd [2013 – 2014] 2 SCGLR 1494 (H 2); and Ward v James ([1965] 1 All ER 563 at p 570

The rationale underlying this well-established restraint is that the law entrusts the primary exercise of judicial discretion to the court before which the application is made, and an appellate court does not sit to substitute its own view merely because it might itself have exercised the discretion differently.

To do otherwise would undermine the discretionary authority vested in the lower court and erode the settled distinction between appellate review and the fresh exercise of judicial discretion.

Measured against these well-established principles, I will proceed to test the impugned Court of Appeal decision, against the established facts on record, in order to ascertain whether or not the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion improperly.

The chronology of events disclosed on the record reveals that while the Appellant sought to attribute the initial default in filing Written Submissions, to the delayed communication of Civil Form 6 during the legal vacation, that explanation, even if accepted at face value, accounted only for the lateness in filing the initial Written Submissions on the 3rd of October 2023. It did not address the far more material period of inactivity that followed.

Having become aware of the default by the 3rd of October 2023, as demonstrated by the filing of the initial Written Submissions on that date, the Appellant offered no explanation whatsoever for waiting until the 8th of April 2024, some five months later, before seeking the Court’s indulgence to regularise the prior irregular filing. This means that, on Appellant’s own showing, the affidavit in support of the application was conspicuously silent on the very period that called most urgently for explanation.

Given the relatively short period of twenty-one (21) days prescribed by the provisions of Rule 20, of the Court of Appeal Rules 1997 C.I. 19 (as amended), for the filing of Written Submissions, it seems quite plain that a further delay of about five (5) months before seeking the Court’s indulgence was not merely substantial, but manifestly excessive and grossly disproportionate to the procedural default sought to be excused.

Such an inordinate delay inevitably called for a cogent and comprehensive explanation, which was plainly lacking, in this case.

It is elementary that an Applicant seeking the equitable and discretionary remedy of an extension of time bears the burden of placing before the court a full, candid and satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of delay.

A partial explanation which leaves substantial periods of inactivity unexplained cannot ordinarily furnish a proper basis for the favourable exercise of judicial discretion.

In the present case, the Appellant’s manifest failure to satisfactorily account for the subsequent and considerably longer delay in invoking the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction left the Court of Appeal with an unexplained and substantial period of inactivity which it was fully entitled to regard as excessive.

Consequently, when the Court of Appeal concluded that the delay of approximately five (5) months was both unreasonable and inadequately explained, it cannot be said that it acted upon any erroneous principle or ignored any material consideration. On the contrary, it applied the correct legal test to the facts before it and reached a conclusion that was plainly open to it.

Far from exercising its discretion capriciously, the Court of Appeal faithfully applied the settled principles governing applications for extension of time, while giving due regard to the importance of maintaining procedural discipline under the Rules of Court, regardless of the fact that the Appellant’s application stood unopposed. See the case of Aimeen Kassardjian v Addy [2003-2004] SCGLR 1031.

It is a basic principle that a litigant who seeks the equitable indulgence of the Court must himself demonstrate vigilance and expedition. Equity, it is often said, aids the vigilant and not those who, without satisfactory justification, sleep upon their procedural obligations.

The insistence upon compliance with prescribed procedural timelines is neither technical nor arbitrary. As felicitously expressed by Vida Akoto-Bamfo JSC in the case of Buckman v Ankomayi [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1372, at 1379:-

“Rules of Court are not ornamental pieces. They are meant to be complied with.”

Rules of Court that prescribe time limits for procedural steps are an essential part of the orderly and efficient administration of justice, promoting certainty, finality, equality among litigants, and the expeditious disposal of cases. Accordingly, routine excuses for substantial and unexplained breaches will undermine procedural discipline, encourage disregard for mandatory timelines, and weaken the administration of justice as emphasised by Bamford Addo JSC in Oppong v Attorney-General [2000] SCGLR 275 at 279.

In the absence of any demonstrated error in principle or manifest unreasonableness in the exercise of the Court of Appeal’s discretion, there exists no proper basis upon which this Court may substitute its own view merely because it might itself have reached a different conclusion.

The conclusion I have reached is further reinforced by the Appellant’s failure to demonstrate, by affidavit, any specific miscarriage of justice arising from the absence of his Written Submissions from the record. This omission is of particular significance, because the Court of Appeal determines appeals by way of a rehearing, requiring it to undertake an independent consideration of the entire record and all relevant questions of fact and law. Whilst Written Submissions assist the Court, their absence is not, without more, necessarily fatal to the determination of the appeal, nor has the Appellant shown that any prejudice would thereby be occasioned.

In the end, it is important to reiterate the point that the appellate jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions is certainly not substitutive. It is not the function of an appellate court to rehear an application for extension of time afresh or to replace the lower court’s discretion with its own preferred assessment where the discretion has been exercised judicially and upon proper principles. Intervention in such circumstances would amount, not to appellate review, but to an impermissible usurpation of the discretionary function entrusted to the court below.

After a careful review of the record in this instant appeal, I am satisfied that the Appellant has failed to establish that the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion injudiciously or upon wrong principles. The complaint against the Court of Appeal’s exercise of discretion in this case consequently fails, and with it the appeal.

(SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

IRENE ABORCHIE-NYAHE ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/

APPELLANTS

FRED KWASI COCH ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT