NATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE KENTE AND ADINKRA WEAVERS ASSOCIATION vs. REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVES [1981] GLR 821
28 July 1980 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 12 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 34Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667, C.A. (full bench).
(2) Benneh v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 78.; on appeal [1971] 2 G.L.R. 354, C.A.; [1974] 2 G.L.R. 47, C.A. (full bench).
[p.823] of [1981] GLR 821
(3) Attorney-General v. Aspinall (1837) 2 My. & Cr. 613; 7 L.J.Ch. 51; 1 Jur. 812.
(4) Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd. v British Celanese Ltd. [1953] Ch. 149;
[1952] 1 All E.R 1326; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1013; 96 S.J. 263.
(5) Mould v. de Vine [1962] 1 G.L.R. 533.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION by the Registrar of Co-operatives to an application on notice for an interim order of injunction against him. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
S. K. Boafo for the plaintiff.
Mrs. G. A. Orleans, Principal State Attorney for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The plaintiffs in this suit are a co-operative association with limited liability registered under sections 4 and 5 of the Co-operative Societies Decree, 1968 (N.L.C.D. 252). In compliance with the provisions of section 8 of the Decree, the plaintiffs have registered their bye-laws. In their statement of claim, they aver that the association they registered was originally composed of two unions from two regions of Ghana and made up of seven societies, but that after registration and in keeping with their bye-laws they admitted new societies which covered the Eastern, Volta and Ashanti Regions.
By their statement of claim, they would seem to be maintaining that, once they have registered their association, they are entitled to conduct the affairs of the association in accordance with their registered bye-laws. They also seem to claim that by their bye-laws they have authority to admit new members to the association to the exclusion of the defendant and any other authority. In this suit, they say that the defendant has been interfering with their conduct of their affairs contrary to the bye-laws and the provisions of the Decree and that he has been usurping their powers of admitting new members, by himself admitting new members. The present action was therefore instituted, inter alia, for “Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants or agents from interfering with the day-to-day affairs of the plaintiffs and also from registering non-members of the association.”
In an interlocutory application on notice for an interim order of injunction, counsel for the Registrar of Co-operatives, Mrs. Orleans, has raised a preliminary objection contending that an injunction is not a permissible remedy to be prayed against a servant of the Republic and therefore the interlocutory application should be dismissed in limine. The argument she put forward ran like this;
[p.824] of [1981] GLR 821
The post of Registrar of Co-operatives was established by N.L.C.D. 252. Under the Decree, apparent from reading it, the Registrar of Co-operatives hereinafter described as the registrar, is charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper and efficient administration of the Decree. That apart, the registrar is a civil servant working in the Department of Co-operatives under the Ministry of Local Government, Co-operatives and Consumer Affairs. Counsel submitted that under section 68 of N.L.C.D. 252 his remuneration is charged to the Consolidated Fund. She referred me to the definition of public officer in article 213 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. The articles reads:
“ ’public office’ includes an office the emoluments attaching to which are paid directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of moneys provided by Parliament and an office in a public corporation established entirely out of public funds or moneys provided by Parliament.”
In the light of this, she submitted that a public officer is a servant of the Republic having regard to section 24 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51), which has defined a public servant in relation to the Republic as including “any public officer, a member of the armed forces, and a Minister.”
Having thus submitted that the registrar is a servant of the Republic, counsel then referred me to section 13 (2) of Act 51. The section reads:
“13. (2) The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order against a servant of the Republic if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order would be to grant relief against the Republic which could not have been obtained in proceedings against the Republic.”
Counsel then submitted that this provision and two cases which she cited are authority for the proposition that an injunction cannot be properly granted against the registrar. The cases she then cited and the cyclostyled judgments of which she made available to me are Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun reported in [1968] G.L.R. 667, C.A. (full bench) and Benneh v. The Republic reported in [1971] 2 G.L.R. 354. C.A. She read from p. 673 of Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun (supra) where Amissah J.A. reading the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal (full bench) said, “In our judgment, where a statute clearly enjoins a person to perform an act, he has to do it even if its performance is incompatible with the strict rules of natural justice.”
[p.825] of [1981] GLR 821
There are no doubt pronouncements in the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun (supra) when considering section 13 (2) of Act 51 which would seem to indicate that an injunction against the registrar acts as an injunction against the Republic. The analysis of the peculiar position of the Chief Justice at p. 678 in that case as, inter alia, “the chairman of the agency of the Republic responsible for all questions affecting the [legal] profession,” leads me to the view that on the applicability of section 13 (2) of Act 51, the Quashie-Idun case must be confined to its own facts. Apart from the fact that the applicability or otherwise of section 13 (2) of Act 51 was not necessary to sustain the decision, the Quashie-Idun case was decided on 22 July 1968, long before the promulgation of the Constitution, 1969, which gave the citizen ample right to obtain all appropriate reliefs from the Republic when his rights are infringed by the tortious acts of the Republic acting by its servants.
Furthermore, the majority decision of the full bench of the Court of Appeal in Benneh v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 47 at p. 79, to be discussed presently, would seem to be in conflict with the Quashie-Idun case in so far as it can be said to have decided that an injunction does not lie against the servant of the Republic in the circumstances unless the Quashie-Idun case is confined to its peculiar facts.
In examining the argument of counsel, 1 must make a preliminary observation that the contention of counsel that the remuneration of the registrar is a charge on the Consolidated Fund by virtue of section 68 of N.L.C.D. 252 is clearly untenable, although the point is not necessary for a decision in this case. This is because the said section 68 is incapable of sustaining the submission. The section reads:
“68. In relation to the duties to be performed by the Registrar under this Decree the Commissioner responsible for Labour and Social Welfare may determine the fees to be paid to the Registrar by any society and may require the society to pay into the Consolidated Fund, and shall have the power to recover, such fees together with any expenses incurred by the Registrar in the performance of his duties.”
In Benneh v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 354, C.A., in pursuance of an entry of judgment in favour of the Republic, the deputy sheriff, as the second respondent, caused a writ of fi. fa. to issue attaching the properties of the appellant. The entry of judgment
[p.826] of [1981] GLR 821 was not on the authority of a judgment of a court but pursuant to the Investigation and Forfeiture of Assets (Further Implementation of Commissions’ Findings) (No. 3) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 400). The Republic, it must be noted, was the judgment-creditor and the first respondent. An application at the High Court for injunction against the Republic and the deputy sheriff failed. At the High Court, Aboagye J. held in the case, reported as Benneh v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 78, that since the appellant, then the plaintiff before the High Court, claimed that N.L.C.D. 400 was repugnant to the fundamental human rights provisions enshrined in articles 12 and 18 of the Constitution, 1969, then having regard to article 2 of the said Constitution, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The proper forum he would seem to have decided was the erstwhile Supreme Court. Article 2 (1) of the Constitution, 1969, read:
“2. (1) Any person who alleges that an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, any provision of this Constitution may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”
It was when the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal that, in delivering the majority judgment for himself and Anin J.S.C., with Lassey J.A. dissenting, Koi Larbi J.S.C. at p. 360 said:
“1 … [we] agree with the conclusion reached by the learned High Court judge that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit; but, instead of the reason advanced by him in support of his decision, we would justify his conclusion on the simple ground that, having regard to the mandatory terms of section 13 (1) proviso (a) and 13 (2) of Act 51, the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the only relief of injunction claimed and that the court could not stultify itself by being called upon to make an order it could not lawfully decree against the defendants herein.”
It seems to me, with respect, that the ratio decidendi supporting the conclusion arrived at by the court is vulnerable on logical grounds and conflicts with the statute said to be its foundation. The said statutory provision reads:
“13. (1) In any civil proceedings by or against the Republic, the court shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have power to make all such orders as it has power to make in proceedings between private persons, and otherwise to give
[p.827] of [1981] GLR 821 such appropriate relief as the case may require:
Provided that (a) where in any proceedings against the Republic any such relief is sought as might in proceedings between private persons be granted by way of injunction or specific performance, the court shall not grant an injunction or make an order for specific performance, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaratory of the rights of parties.”
In the Benneh case, before the Court of Appeal, assuming that the said Act 51 was applicable, the proviso clearly enjoins that the court should not grant an injunction, but in lieu thereof it should make an order declaratory of the rights of the parties. It seems to me therefore that jurisdiction in the sense of competence to entertain the suit was not ousted although power to make a particular order was taken away and in its place an alternative power was substituted by legislation. The decision therefore would seem to be given per incuriam.
In my respectful opinion, before the promulgation of the Constitution, 1969, there was no power in the court to grant an injunction against the Republic having regard to the provisions of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51). This is also the practice in England where section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, denied the citizen the right of an injunction against the Crown. As against public officers or public authority exercising statutory functions, the citizen affected by the exercises has always had a right under English law to restrain ultra vires acts alleged to be in purported exercise of statutory powers: see Attorney-General v. Aspinall (1837) 2 My. and Cr. 406 and the Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd. v. British Celanese Ltd. [1953] Ch. 149.
In the said Pride of Derby case the award of injunction against a local authority was called in question but the Court of Appeal re-affirmed in clear terms the propriety of such a remedy. It seems therefore that although the English Crown Proceedings Act disallowed injunctions against the Crown, this was never understood to extend to servants of the Crown as such. In any case, under the provisions of article 211 of the Constitution, 1979, provisions in substance adopted from article 170 of the Constitution, 1969, with no alteration in form or substance, the citizen has a general right to enforce civil claims against the government as if the government were a private person of full age and capacity. There is no constitutional provision that a claim for an injunction is an exception to
[p.828] of [1981] GLR 821 this general right. The provisions of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, denying the citizen a right to obtain an order of injunction against the Republic would seem to be inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore by virtue of article 1 (2) of the Constitution, the said provisions of Act 51 are void and of no effect. Article 1 (2), also culled from the Constitution, 1969, provides:
“1. (2) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.”
I am persuaded in taking this view of the law by an examination of the majority decision of the full bench of the Court of Appeal in Benneh v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 47. In that case in dismissing the further appeal of the appellant, the full bench then exercising the appellate function of the then abolished Supreme Court, was studiously silent about the ratio decidendi that found favour with the ordinary bench per Koi Larbi and Anin JJ.S.C. On the contrary at p. 79 Apaloo J.A, as he then was, in dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant the relief by way of injunction as arose in the case, did not even consider it necessary to canvass the reasons why the view of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal denying jurisdiction of the High Court must be considered erroneous. He very firmly and rightly stated, “We feel no doubt that the High Court was clothed with jurisdiction to determine and grant a relief in a claim such as the present.” Indeed, in the Benneh case it seems, as appears at p. 97 of the full bench decision, that an interim order of injunction was given against the Republic and the court saw nothing wrong with it.
I must observe though that in this case the relief by way of injunction is against the registrar and not the Republic. The registrar has statutory functions to perform; if he misconceives these functions and proceeds to exercise functions contrary to the enabling statute, I conceive, he can be compelled by injunction to refrain from his purported exercise of non-existent statutory functions and can furthermore be compelled by mandamus as Jiagge J., as she then was, did in Mould v. de Vine [1962] 1 G.L.R. 533, to carry out his statutory functions.
I think, strictly speaking, the registrar in discharging his statutory functions is not acting as a servant of the Republic. He can be said to be a servant of the Republic in the broad context in which all public officers are servants of the Republic. But a servant, strictly speaking, must, in contemplation of law, be interpreted in the domain of master and servant relationship, where the servant is
[p.829] of [1981] GLR 821 in fact an agent doing at a given moment of time, that which the master can also do but which he delegates to him to do. That is not so with the Republic and the registrar in regard to his functions under the Decree. In the absence of an enactment in that behalf, the Republic per any other person cannot perform the registrar’s functions and therefore, vis-à-vis the registrar’s functions, the relationship of master and servant does not exist. The registrar acts in his statutory capacity as registrar.
In the result, I hold that if he acts in a manner ultra vires the enabling provisions of N.L.C.D. 252 he can be restrained by recourse to the remedy of injunction. The preliminary point of law taken by counsel that the action be dismissed in limine is therefore misconceived.
The plaintiff-applicant is therefore entitled to apply for an interim order of injunction, but as the motion has not been fixed for hearing, I shall adjourn the matter for the vacation judge to deal with. The motion is therefore adjourned sine die for the registrar to fix it before the vacation judge. Order accordingly.
DECISION
Preliminary objection overruled.
D. R. K. S.
