NORGA AND OTHERS vs. KHADIJATU AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 443
10 December 1985 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 9 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 34Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Cleare v. Cleare (1869) L.R. 1 P & D 655; 20 L.T. 497; 17 W.R. 687.
(2) In the goods of Davies (1843) 3 Curt. 748.
(3) Yankah v. Administrator-General [1971] 2 G.L.R. 186, C.A.
(4) Wright v. Sanderson (1884) 9 P.D. 149; 50 L.T. 769.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim contesting the validity of the will and codicil of their late father on the ground that they had not been duly interpreted to the testator. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Ampiah J.
COUNSEL
W.A.N. Adumua-Bossman for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Nii Odoi Annan (with him G. A. Mensah) for the defendant-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
Ampiah J. delivered the judgment of the court. By a document dated 11 October 1967 purporting to be the will of one Alhaji Norga of Cow Lane, Accra, the testator disposed of his properties to some named beneficiaries. On 7 November 1967 the said testator is alleged to have made further dispositions of his properties to other persons by a document purporting to be his codicil. Alhaji Norga, the testator, died on 16 May 1973. On 30 July 1973 two of the named executors of both the alleged will and codicil obtained probate of those documents.
[p.445] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 443
The plaintiff-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) who are the children of the late Alhaji Norga disputed the will and codicil of their father. Accordingly, on 12 November 1979 they took out a writ of summons against the defendants-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) claiming:
“1. A declaration that the will dated 11 October 1967 of Alhaji Norga, deceased, late of Accra, probate of which was granted by the High Court, Accra to the defendants on 30 July 1973, is null and void as not having been duly interpreted to the said deceased who was illiterate in English.
2. A declaration that the purported first codicil dated 7 November 1967 to the said will is likewise null and void for the reasons aforesaid.
3. In the alternative, a declaration that the said will and codicil were each procured by undue influence on the part of the first defendant and are accordingly null and void.
4. Further or other relief(s) as in the circumstances may be just, including all necessary enquiries and accounts.”
The first respondent is also a child of the late Alhaji Norga. The second and third respondents are the executors of the disputed will.
On 29th October 1981, the appellants applied for and obtained leave of the court to amend their statement of claim. By that amendment, the appellants alleged further:
“8 (a) Again further or in the alternative the will is null and void by reason that it was not duly attested in the presence of the witnesses present at the same time who in the presence of the testator and of each other signed the will as witnesses thereof.”
On the pleadings and evidence the issues that arose for determination were in our opinion: 1. Whether or not the testator as a moslem had capacity to depart from the family provision disposition laid down by the Koran.
2. Whether or not the will and codicil were null and void because neither had been duly interpreted to the testator.
3. Whether or not the will and codicil had been procured by undue influence.
4. Whether or not the will had been properly attested.
The trial judge found that:
1. Since there was no evidence that any of the marriages of the testator had been registered, the testator had capacity to dispose of his properties in any manner he chose. Consequently, he could dispose of his properties in the way he did in will and codicil.
[p.446] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 443
2. There had not been any undue influence.
3. The will and codicil had been interpreted to the testator before he thumbprinted them. 4. There was proper attestation of the will.
Upon these findings, the trial judge dismissed the appellants’ claims.
It is against this decision that the appellants have appealed to this court. Even though counsel for the appellants still disputed that there had been any proper interpretation of the will and codicil, the substance of his argument was that there had not been a proper attestation of the will and that the trial judge was wrong in her finding. Counsel, however, conceded that the codicil had been properly attested. It is not his case that the thumbprints on the documents were a forgery.
Unfortunately we do not have the privilege of seeing the original of the will. The evidence shows, however, that the original will was tendered in evidence as exhibit Y. The respondents also had a copy which was attached to the probate. This was also tendered as exhibit 1. The trial judge had a look at the original will. She therefore had a basis for coming to her conclusions.
Admittedly, the attestation clause did not state who had interpreted the will and in what language this had been done. The evidence of Dr John Cletus Dettey (the first plaintiff witness) one of the attesting witnesses was to the effect that the contents of the will had been translated to the testator. Under cross-examination by the court, the first plaintiff witness said:
“Q. Do you know if the will was translated to him?
A. I know it was. I asked him. He said the lawyer explained the contents to him before he asked me to come and sign it.”
The attesting witnesses need not know that the document is a will, but they must be capable of attesting a legal document. It is the testator’s signature, not his will, which is required to be acknowledged. All those who allegedly attested the will were positive that it was the will of the testator they were witnessing. It has not been alleged that they were incapable of attesting as witnesses. The law is that, where there is proof of a testator’s signature, it is presumed that he knew the contents and effect of the will: see Cleare v. Cleare (1869) L.R. 1 P & D 655. Since the appellants do not say that the thumbprints appearing on exhibit 1 (and for that matter exhibit Y) were forgeries, it could be presumed that the testator knew of the contents of the will. Besides, the court has power to grant probate of a will where it is satisfied that the will as read over to the deceased before its execution as provided by Order 60, r. 29 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). In the instant case, the court initially granted probate of the will
[p.447] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 443 in common form. The court was satisfied on the face of the will that the contents had been interpreted to the testator before he affixed his thumbprints to the will. Although it is not clear in which language the contents had been interpreted to the testator, the evidence of the first plaintiff witness was that the testator had told him that the will had been read over and interpreted to him. In whatever language the contents had been interpreted, it can reasonably be presumed that the testator understood the contents before thumbprinting. There was thus evidence in support of the trial judge’s finding. Regarding the codicil, there is evidence on the face of it that the document had been interpreted to the testator by one Herbert Jones. Even though this man never gave evidence, there is evidence that this man was a legal practitioner and could speak English. The first plaintiff witness admitted that when he went to see the testator they spoke in pidgin English. Whatever that was, the testator understood him well. The second plaintiff witness also admitted that the testator could speak more than one language including pidgin English. On the totality of the evidence, the trial judge was satisfied that the two documents, namely the will and the codicil, were properly interpreted to the testator before the latter thumbprinted them.
The real controversy is with the attestation. Even though we have not seen the original will, the trial judge who saw it was satisfied that there were three attesting witnesses to the will. Exhibit 1 which was also tendered in evidence and attached to these proceedings states on the face of it that there were three attesting witnesses.
The Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will. 4 & 1, Vict. c. 26) which the court found was applicable to the facts, required two attesting witnesses for the validity of the will as provided by section 9 of the Wills Act, 1837.
Learned counsel for the appellants tried to demonstrate, with some obvious difficulties, since the original will was not available, that the third defendant witness, one of the three alleged attesting witnesses, had, in fact, not been an attesting witness. He based this submission on the positioning of the third defendant witness’ signature on the will and also by the words “W/M” which counsel explained could only mean that he was a witness to the mark of the attesting witnesses and not the testator. The third defendant witness who gave evidence showed how he had been called in by the testator to come and attest the will. He had gone in with the other attesting witness, one Dey, who unfortunately was deceased at the time of the trial. The third defendant witness’ evidence was that he and Dey had witnessed the signature (thumbprint) of the testator. There was however some uncertainty about which of the two (the third defendant witness and Dey) had attested first. The trial judge scrutinised the signatures and the evidence and was satisfied that
[p.448] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 437-449 three persons had witnessed the testator’s thumbprint. The Wills Act, 1837 does not say on what part of the will the witnesses shall subscribe. So they may sign their names on any part of the instrument provided it is clear that the signatures are meant to attest the testator’s signature: see In the Goods of Davies (1843) 3 Curt. 748. The evidence of the first plaintiff witness shows, however, that he had been called later to witness the will. This evidence further shows that the first plaintiff witness could not have attested the will in the presence of the other two witnesses. Even though the first plaintiff witness said there were other persons in the room at the time he went in to attest the will none of those present attested the will. Since the law requires that two witnesses were sufficient, the first plaintiff witness could not have been a proper attesting witness. The trial judge held that “ . . . the additional third signature coming from Dr. Dettey was superfluous and unnecessary in the circumstances.” She accepted the evidence of the third defendant witness and held that there was proper attestation of the will.
On the face of the will everything appears to have been done properly. The evidence of the first defendant witness and the affidavit attached to exhibit 1 showed an anxious and intelligent desire to do everything regularly. In Yankah v. The Administrator-General [1971] 2 G.L.R. 186 at 187, C.A., it was held, inter alia, following the decision in Wright v. Sanderson (1884) 9 P.D. 149 that:
“If it appears on the face of a will that it has been properly executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, the presumption by law is that the testator duly acknowledged it.”
The court did not accept the evidence of rebuttal. The trial judge was therefore entitled to find on the presumption of law. We feel that the decision of the judge was right. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the court below.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed
M.C.N. -N.
