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[1979] SLR (HC) 50High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

NYAME AND ANOTHER vs. MENSAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 338

8 June 1979 · HAYFRON J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 50
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OSCOLANYAME AND ANOTHER v MENSAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 338 [1979] SLR (HC) 50
APANYAME AND ANOTHER v MENSAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 338, [1979] SLR (HC) 50 (Ghana).
BluebookNYAME AND ANOTHER v MENSAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 338, [1979] SLR (HC) 50 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Luguterah v. Interim Electoral Commissioner [1971] 1 G.L.R. 109.

(2) Osman v. Tedam, Court of Appeal, 25 February 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 41.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by originating summons by the plaintiffs to determine, inter alia, whether he defendant was qualified to file nomination papers as a candidate for parliamentary elections. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

F. A. Anto Bonsu (Antwi Nimoh with him) for the plaintiffs.

W. Y. Oppong for the first defendant.

No appearance by or for the second defendant.

JUDGMENT OF HAYFRON J.

On 27 April 1979, the plaintiffs issued a joint originating summons asking for the determination of the following questions:

“(1) Whether, upon the true construction of the Elections and Public Offices Disqualification Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 206) and the Elections and Public Offices Disqualification (Disqualified Persons) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 216), Joseph Henry Mensah is qualified to file nomination papers as Popular Front

Party candidate for Sunyani Constituency for the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

(2) Whether or not such filing of his nomination papers as Popular Front Party candidate for Sunyani

Constituency for the forthcoming parliamentary elections is also (a) valid or (b) void.”

They also asked for other reliefs.

In support of the originating summons the first plaintiff acting for herself and the second plaintiff filed an affidavit stating, inter alia:

“(2) That I have the power and consent of the second plaintiff to swear to this affidavit.

[p.340] of [1980] GLR 338 (3) That I am the People’s National Party candidate for the Sunyani Constituency for the forthcoming parliamentary elections and the second plaintiff is also the Third Force Party candidate for the same constituency and both of us have filed our nomination papers for the coming elections.

(4) That on or about 24 April 1979 the first defendant, filed his nomination papers as Popular Front Party candidate for the Sunyani Constituency for the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

(5) That I am advised and verily believe same to be true that the first defendant under the law is disqualified.

(6) That I am further advised and verily believe same to be true that the filing of the first defendant’s nomination papers on the day in question was wrongful and contrary to law.

(7) In the premises I swear to this affidavit praying this honourable court to make an order deleting the first defendant’s name from the nomination register with the Electoral Commissioner.”

To this there was no affidavit in opposition. Copies of the summons and affidavit were served on the defendants on 30 April and 7 May 1979 respectively. The first defendant entered appearance on 21 May 1979; the second defendant did not appear. On 21 May 1979 an hour before the first defendant filed his appearance, Mr. F. O. Anto Bonsu, solicitor for the plaintiffs, filed a motion on notice under Order 13 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), asking for leave to enter judgment in default of appearance against the defendants.

When the matter came up on 4 June 1979 Mr. Antwi Nimoh, counsel for the plaintiffs applied to withdraw the motion for leave to enter judgment and to argue the question of law raised on the summons. The motion was accordingly dismissed. Mr. Nimoh then argued that the plaintiffs were candidates for the forthcoming parliamentary elections and were as such interested parties in the elections in the Sunyani Constituency and that the first defendant is disqualified from being elected to Parliament by the Elections and Public Offices Disqualification (Disqualified Persons) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 216), as saved by the Elections and Public Offices (Disqualification) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 224), and that he is number 7 on the schedule to the former Decree. He argued further that upon a true construction of S.M.C.D. 224 Joseph Henry Mensah is not qualified to file his nomination papers for parliamentary elections: that his filing of his election papers was in breach of S.M.C.D. 216 and consequently void.

[p.341] of [1980] GLR 338

Mr. Oppong, counsel for the first defendant, argued contra, that there is nothing in S.M.C.D. 216 which says that no nomination papers shall be accepted from a person who is disqualified. He argued that the Electoral Commissioner could not refuse to accept the nomination papers of anybody who is disqualified. He admitted however that at the time Mr. Joseph Henry Mensah filed his nomination papers there was a Decree stating that he was disqualified from being elected, but he contended if elected he could not be unseated.

What then is the meaning of the expression “disqualified from being elected” in section 1 of S.M.C.D. 216? That is the crux of the matter. The 1934 edition of the Pocket Oxford Dictionary defines “disqualify” as “Make or pronounce unfit or ineligible (for office, task & c).” The Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary defines “disqualify” at p. 305 as “to deprive of the qualities or qualifications necessary for any purpose: to make unfit: to disable: to debar: to declare to be disqualified.” The Pocket Oxford Dictionary defines “debar” as “exclude from admission or right, to preclude from doing.” It appears to me that S.M.C.D. 216 in stating that certain persons were “disqualified from being elected” means that those persons are disqualified from the elections. The argument that the Electoral Commissioner could not refuse to accept the nomination papers of a disqualified person under S.M. C.D. 216 is to me unattractive. In Luguterah v. Interim Electoral Commissioner [1971] 1 G.L.R. 109, Kingsley-Nyinah J. (as he then was) found that Mr. Tedam was disqualified under the Political Parties (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 347). His lordship said at p. 113:

“…the nomination and subsequent victory of Mr. Tedam were both inherently tainted by reason of his disqualification under the relevant decree. All his successful votes have therefore fallen and with that fall the popular will of the electorate has also been declared nullified and of no legal constitutional effect whatsoever … It is my further view that the entire election results of 29 August 1969 for the Chiana-Paga constituency must stand upset.”

The argument here as I understand it is that this action is premature and therefore this court should apply “a wait and see rule” which has been the philosophy of post-election petitions. The plaintiffs in this case did not apply that rule. The reason as I see it is that that rule would have the effect of causing the plaintiffs to spend time and money to campaign for one election and then if Mr. Joseph Henry Mensah is elected, spend more time and money in having him unseated; after which they would have to spend more time and money in campaigning all over again. This no doubt will enure to

[p.342] of [1980] GLR 338 their financial and physical detriment. As I remarked during argument, it appears to me that the effect of the expression “disqualified from being elected” is to provide a remedy in the nature of a quia timet injunction to prevent the consequences of an election which is bound to be nullified. In the course of its judgment in the case of Osman v. Tedam, Court of Appeal, 25 February 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 41, the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement, “The effect of article 71 (2) (k) of the Constitution, 1969 and the Political Parties Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 345), and the Political Parties (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 347), is that the defendant has no right to be a member of the National Assembly.” Mr. Tedam was therefore prevented from taking his seat in Parliament. Following that train of thought I conclude that the effect of S.M.C.D. 216 is that the defendant has no right to be elected as a member of Parliament and should therefore be prevented from being elected, i.e. from standing for election to Parliament. The effective way to prevent him from doing so is to have his name removed from the list of candidates for election in the Sunyani Constituency. In the result, I find that upon the true construction of S.M.C.D. 216, Joseph Henry Mensah is disqualified from filing nomination papers as a candidate for Sunyani Constituency for the forthcoming parliamentary elections, and his filing of such papers is a nullity.

If I am wrong, it is a notorious fact that Mr. Joseph Henry Mensah was a prominent member of Parliament and a minister in the first government of the Second Republic. When that government was prematurely brought to an end by the military coup d’etat of 1972 his assets were investigated by the Taylor Assets Committee which found that some of his assets were acquired unlawfully. He is therefore caught squarely by the Elections and Public Offices (Disqualification) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 224), cited in argument by Mr. Antwi Nimoh. Section 4 of that Decree provides:

“4. (1) No person who has held any of the public offices specified in subsection (2) of this section shall be eligible to stand as a candidate for election as President, Vice-President of Ghana or member of the National Assembly or Parliament unless his assets acquired while he was the holder of any office so specified have been investigated by a Commission appointed under the Standing Investigation of Assets and Other Matters Commission Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 225) and found to have been lawfully acquired.

[p.343] of [1980] GLR 338

(2) The public offices referred to in subsection (1) of this section are …

(g) Minister, Regional Commissioner, Regional Chief Executive, Deputy Minister or Ministerial Secretary in any civilian Government of Ghana since the 6th day of March, 1957.”

Until the Commissions and Committees of Inquiry (Findings) Review Tribunal set up by the Commissions and Committees of Inquiry (Findings) Review Tribunal Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 223), reverses that finding it remains in full force and effect. He is as at the time of the filing of the summons and as at present disqualified from election to the National Assembly under the schedule to S.M.C.D. 224. In view of the findings I have made and to prevent the mischief which the S.M.C.D. 216 and S.M.C.D. 224 seek to prohibit, I order that the Electoral Commissioner shall delete from the list of candidates for election in the Sunyani Constituency in respect of the forthcoming elections the name of Mr. Joseph Henry Mensah.

The plaintiffs will have as against the first defendant costs of ¢210 and as against the second defendant costs of ¢73.50.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Order accordingly.

D. R. K. S

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