OHENE-MENSAH vs. SUBIN TIMBERS LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 601
9 December 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 9 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Evans v. Evans (1853) 22 L.J.Ch. 785; 21 L.T.O.S. 14; 1 W.L. 215; 448 E.R. 957, C.A.
(2) Arthur v. Bokenham (1708) 11 Mod. Rep. 148; 88 E.R.957.
(3) Minet v. Leman (1855) 7 De G.M. & G. 340; 3 Eq. Rep. 783; 24 L.J.Ch. 545; 25 L.T.O.S. 284; 1 Jur. N.S. 692; 20 Bear 269; 109 R.R. 155; 52 E.R. 606.
(4) River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 App.Cas. 743; 47 L.J.Q.B. 193; 37 L.T. 543; 42 J.P. 244; 26 W.R. 217; 3 Asp. M.L.C. 521, H.L.
(5) National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson [1952] 2 Q. B.468, [1952] 2 T.L.R. 11; 116 S.P. 428; 960 S.J 414; [1952] 2 All E.R. 255.
(6) New Balkis Eersteling Ltd. v. Randt Gold Mining Co.[1904] A.C. 165; 73 L.J.K.B. 384; 90 L.T.
494; 52 W.R. 561; 20 T.L.R. 396, H.L.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION raised against the issue of a writ of summons against a state-owned limited liability company for damages in respect of a road traffic accident. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Darko-Mensah for the plaintiff.
Miss Sutherland for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
In pursuance of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981, a law was promulgated entitled Forfeiture of Assets and Transfer of Shares and Other Proprietary Interests (Subin Timbers Co., Ltd. and Central Logging and Sawmills Limited), 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 31). Section 1 of the law provides that “All assets and bank accounts of Subin Timbers Company Limited and Central Logging & Sawmills Limited are hereby vested in the State free from all encumbrances whatsoever.” And section 7 provides that:
“Subin Timbers Company Limited and Central Logging & Sawmills Limited shall hereafter be amalgamated and be known as Western Timbers Limited until the said name is further altered in accordance with the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179).”
The present proceedings before this court are to ascertain the amplitude of the said P.N.D.C.L. 31 and thereby determine whether this piece of legislation does in anyway affect a legal action for damages for negligence in a road traffic accident which had been filed against Subin Timbers Ltd. prior to the promulgation of the law. The plain import of these two provisions is that Western Timbers Ltd., which is an amalgam of Subin Timbers Ltd. and Central Logging & Sawmills Ltd., is allowed to operate as a limited liability company under the provisions of Act 179, but that the State becomes the sole owner of all the assets and shares and other proprietary rights of the company free from all encumbrances. The word “encumbrance” is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary to mean: “claim, mortgage, etc. on property.” The word encumbrance is not defined in Act 179, but it is defined in the Mortgages Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 96). Section 24 of the latter enactment states that an “encumbrance” includes a mortgage, a lien and a charge, and “encumbrancer” includes any person entitled to the benefit of an encumbrance. In Evans v. Evans (1853) 22 L.J.Ch. 785, C.A. Lord Cranworth L.C. said at p. 790:
“The word ‘encumbrance’ has no strictly technical meaning; but what is usually understood is, that where a person has a right at his pleasure to charge £3,000 upon an estate, that is an incumbrance. In such a state of things nobody could say he had an
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estate free from incumbrances while his estate was liable at any time to be charged with such a sum of money.”
From the foregoing analysis it is quite clear that an encumbrance relates to property and not to a person. It is a liability attached to someone’s property, not to the person who owns the property. Therefore to say that the assets of a company are taken free from all encumbrances means nothing more or less than that all mortgages, liens and charges on the assets or properties of the company are extinguished and the assets cannot be clogged by any such mortgage or lien or charge. The plaintiff in this case is not a mortgagee or chargee of any property or asset of Western Timbers Co. Ltd. The action he has instituted is for a claim for damages for a tort committed by a servant of the defendant-company.
The company is therefore being sued in its personal capacity, i.e. in its legal personal capacity as a corporate body that can sue and be sued. Section 32 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), defines a “person” as “person” includes a body corporate (whether a corporation aggregate or corporation sole) and an unincorporated body or persons as well as an individual.” A distinction should always be drawn between a person and his assets or properties.
Coming back to P.N.D.C.L. 31, some observation is called for. There is nothing in P.N.D.C.L. 31 which suggests, even faintly, that the Provisional National Defence Council intended to change the existing law that a company being a body corporate with legal personality can be sued. There has always been a presumption against the changing of existing law in the absence of clear and unambiguous provision to that effect in a statute. In Arthur v. Bokenham (1708) 11 Mod. 148, 88 E.R. 957 at p. 958, Trevor C.J. said:
“The general rule in exposition of all Acts of Parliament is this, that in all doubtful matters, and where the expression is in general terms, they are to receive such a construction as may be agreeable to the rules of common law, in cases of that nature; for statutes are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law, further or otherwise than the Act does expressly declare.”
And the headnote of the case of Minet v. Leman (1855) 52 E.R. 606 at p. 607 reads:
“The general words of a statute are not to be so construed as to alter the previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meaning can be put upon those words consistently with the intention of preserving the existing policy untouched.”
For other authorities: see River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 App. Cas. 743 and National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson
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[1952] 2 Q.B. 648 at p. 659 where Lord Goddard C.J. quotes with approval the headnote in Minet v. Leman (supra). In my judgment, therefore, P.N.D.C.L. 31 cannot be construed so as to alter the existing common law in Ghana that a person can be sued in tort. The view held by counsel for the defendants which seems to suggest that P.N.D.C.L. 31 adversely affects this existing common law is clearly unacceptable.
Section 3 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 31 provides that:
“(2) The Provisional National Defence Council may give such directions as it may think necessary for the discharge of any obligations, and liabilities attached to the shares, debentures, securities and proprietary rights transferred to the State under section 2 of this Law.”
This provision talks of the consequences that normally flow from the transfer of shares, debentures, securities, obligations, etc. of members of limited liability companies. Persons to whom transfer of these items are made are called transferees of shares, etc. A shareholder may not have made full payment of the shares he holds at the time of the transfer.
Therefore problems arise as to how the transferee of the shares or debentures may discharge his liabilities or obligations attached to the items transferred to him. These problems are dealt with under section 37 of Act 179: see also Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 6, para. 52 and the case of New Balkis Eersteling Ltd. v. Randt Gold Mining Co. [1904] A.C. 165, H.L. Once the interests and rights and obligations of one set of persons are transferred to another set, the modalities for the smooth transfer and consolidation of things transferred must be worked out. It is in this respect that the Provisional National Defence Council is given discretionary powers to give directions as it may think necessary. There is therefore nothing to suggest that P.N.D.C.L. 31 repudiates ordinary liability in tort.
Counsel for the defendants finally submitted that in view of the government’s take over of the company, any legal action against it should be instituted against the Republic in accordance with the procedure laid down by the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51). I hold the view that the Western Timbers Ltd. falls within the category of a State enterprise. First of all, by section 1 of P.N.D.C.L. 31 the State owns all the assets and shares and proprietary interests of the company. Section 4 of the law makes the government responsible for the management and administration of the company. Obviously, the business of the company would be financed by the treasury and profits would accrue to the State. But although it is a State enterprise, the Western Timbers Ltd. is a limited liability company. Section 1 (1) of Act 51 made the fiat of the Attorney-General a pre-condition for
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the institution of any action against the Republic of Ghana. This prevailed during the First Republic. This fiat was abolished by the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352), in respect of cases which arose on or after the first day of May 1969 and substituted in its place a requirement that the Attorney-General be given one month’s notice before an action could be commenced. The latter Decree was also repealed by the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 406), Sched. II.
What then is the legal effect of the repeal of N.L.C.D. 352? What happens when an enactment which had repealed an earlier enactment is itself repealed by a subsequent enactment. At p. 19 of Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed.), the legal position is that:
“Where an Act is repealed and the repealing enactment is then repealed by another, which manifests no intention that the original Act shall continue repealed, the common law rule was that the repeal of the second Act revived the first ab initio.”
In England this common law rule has been abolished by section 11 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict., c. 63). That section provides that:
“11. (1) Where an Act passed after the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, repeals a repealing enactment, it shall not be construed as reviving any enactment previously repealed, unless words are added reviving the enactment.”
Unfortunately, Ghana has not made any enactment to abolish the common law rule and it appears that the rule still operates. It is submitted that section 8 of our Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), which deals with the legal effect of repeal or revocation or cesser of enactment does not cover the situation because our section 8 is the verbatim reproduction of section 38 of the English Act, an entirely different enactment. It would appear, therefore, that the Attorney-General’s fiat was brought back to life by N.L.C.D. 406. It is to be observed that N.L.C.D. 406, Sched. II also amended Act 51, s.3 by substituting for it a new section as follows:
“3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the liability of the Republic shall be the same as that of a private person in respect of claims for the appropriation or recovery or restitution of any movable or immovable property.”
And the State Proceedings Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 59), subsequently introduced the Attorney-General’s fiat in respect of actions in contracts and debts. The present legal position therefore seems clearly to be that no action in tort other than claims in respect of appropriation
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or recovery or restitution of any movable or immovable property requires a fiat. For these reasons, I would hold that the plaintiff’s action does not require a fiat of the Attorney-General. The action is competent.
DECISION
Objection overruled.
J. A. A.
