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[1978] SLR (HC) 30High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

OKOE vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 137

17 March 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 30
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OSCOLAOKOE v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 137 [1978] SLR (HC) 30
APAOKOE v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 137, [1978] SLR (HC) 30 (Ghana).
BluebookOKOE v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 137, [1978] SLR (HC) 30 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Baddoo v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 1012, C.A.

(2) R. v. Clemens [1898] 1 Q.B. 556; 67 L.J.Q.B. 482; 78 L.T. 204; 14 T.L.R. 273; 42 S.J. 326; 19 Cox C.C. 18; 46 W.R. 416, C.C.R.

(3) Heaven v. Crutchley (1903) 68 J.P. 53; 1 L.G.R. 473.

(4) Croydon R.D.C. v. Cowley (1909) 100 L.T. 441; 73 J.P. 205; 25 T.L.R. 306; 7 L.G.R. 603; 22 Cox C.C. 22.

(5) R. v. Dyer (Raymond) [1952] 36 Cr. App. R. 155, C.C.A.

(6) Peki v. The Republic [I 979] G. L.R 61.

(7) Donkor v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 598, S.C.

(8) U.S. v. Wiltberger 5 Wheat 76; 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against conviction and sentence for causing unlawful damage. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Appellant in person.

Miss Florence Okine for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

I have already allowed this appeal. I am now only giving reasons for so allowing it. The appellant in this case was arraigned before the circuit court on two counts charging him with forcible entry contrary to section 202 (A) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), as inserted by the Criminal Code, 1960 (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 47), and causing damage contrary to section 172 (1) (b) of Act 29. He was acquitted on the first count charging him with forcible entry but convicted on the second count charging him with unlawful damage and sentenced to one day’s imprisonment and a fine of ¢3,000 or in default four years’ imprisonment with hard labour.

The court made a further order for ¢2,500 of the amount, if paid, to be given to the complainant. However on the application of counsel for the appellant and pending the filing of an appeal the court made a further order suspending sentence pending the hearing and determination of an

[p.139] of [1979] GLR 137 appeal, if any were to be filed. The appellant was then granted bail in the sum of ¢5,000 with two sureties to be justified with a further order that the appeal, if any, should be filed within one week from the date of the conviction.

Four days after the conviction he lodged his appeal. In order to understand the issues raised in this appeal it is necessary to understand the facts which the prosecution established and which were never challenged by the appellant. Indeed the appellant virtually admitted the substantial case which the prosecution made and so the only matter to decide is whether or not the prosecution, case discloses an offence of causing unlawful damage contrary to section 172 (1) (b) of Act 29.

The prosecution led evidence that the complainant bought two plots of land from the Bubiashie mantse for ¢600 and that he commenced building a house on the said land and fenced the house. The Bubiashie mantse is caretaker of the Asere stool and he sold the land on behalf of the said Asere stool some time in 1969. The building had practically reached roofing level and the complainant had spent about ¢3,000 an the said construction. On 14 August 1972, the appellant claiming that the land belonged to his family and acting for his family hired a caterpillar and went on the land. The complainant and his workmen were not on the site. The appellant stood away from the land and ordered the driver of the caterpillar to raze the building to the ground and the building was accordingly demolished.

The appellant explained why he acted like he did. He said about 1948 his family took action against, inter alia, the Asere stool in respect of the land in dispute. The High Court gave judgment in favour of his family and granted an injunction restraining the Asere stool from selling any portion of the said land. In the judgment of the High Court, however, the right of the appellant’s family to dispose of the land was also restricted. Dissatisfied with the restriction the appellant’s family appealed successively to the West African Court of Appeal and the Privy Council. The Privy Council varied the restriction imposed by the trial court and adjudged the appellant’s family to be owners in possession of the land in question. It was accepted that the judgment of the Privy Council delivered on 24 July 1961 was adopted by the then Ghana Supreme Court in November 1961. The said judgment declaring the appellant’s family’s rights in the said land were all tendered in evidence. The appellant’s case in effect is that he acted as he did on the instruction of his family.

The complainant’s case and the appellant’s defences were all satisfactorily established.

In convicting the appellant the learned circuit court judge referred to the case of Baddoo v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 1012, C.A., where judgment was delivered by Amissah J.A., as authority for the proposition that:

“it may be reasonable to break down a wall to express disgust and to warn the complainant from continuing with his building operation

[p.140] of [1979] GLR 137 but to go beyond what is reasonably necessary is another matter even if the person is claiming the land as his absolute property as in this case.”

I must confess that I find the distinction a little difficult to appreciate. The learned circuit court judge has reduced the argument to this: If a person erects one wall on land belonging to A., A. can demolish the wall and this is reasonable. If he erects a number of walls for the building up to roofing level then it will not be reasonable to demolish it. I do not know whether it is the roofing level stage which the walls have reached which makes the demolition unreasonable or the number of walls and not just one wall which is the deciding factor. Whichever is the case the distinction becomes very capricious and unless a statute or case law advocates it, I can find no justification for it. Baddoo v. The Republic (supra), the Court of Appeal decision delivered by Amissah J.A., is a case of forcible entry not unlawful damage to property and it drew no such distinction. I think the distinction is unreal and an improper consideration for deciding this case.

In Baddoo v. The Republic (supra), which as I have said is a case of forcible entry, not unlawful damage, Amissah J.A. put the case of the appellant thus at p. 1014: “The essence of that case being simply, that he was in possession of the land when he found that the complainant had built a wall on it so he demolished it.” This being the case Amissah J.A. asked a rhetorical question; he said at p. 1013: “The simple question for determination is: Does the law allow him to do this?” and although he did not answer yes or no, by the decision of the court it was held that the law allowed it. The case is no authority for the distinction sought to be drawn. I reject the distinction. It is not realistic.

The second matter which led the learned circuit court judge to convict the appellant is this: Referring to the case of R. v. Clemens [1898] 1 Q.13. 556, C.C.R. he ruled that on the authority of that case, a defence of bona fide claim of right would not avail the appellant because “he did more damage than he could reasonably have supposed to be necessary for the assertion of his right.” R. v. Clemens (supra) did indeed so decide and in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th ed.), p. 902, Heaven v. Crutchley (1903) 68 J.P. 53 and Croydon Rural District Council v. Crowley(1909) 73 J.P. 205 are both quoted as authority for the proposition. How far does this principle disable the appellant from relying on a claim of right in good faith? In order to answer this it is necessary to advert to the charge which the appellant faced, and to remember that English authorities although helpful in cases where the provisions of a statute or of a code are in pari materia with English statutes, the English interpretation can never oust the force of our statutes if their language and content are clear and unambiguous. In this case I must preface my exposition with the preliminary observation that our relevant statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous. The English authority R. v. Clemens (supra) cited by the judge and the supporting authorities in Archbold are consequently not useful. I now proceed to apply the facts to our statutory law.

[p.141] of [1979] GLR 137

The particulars of the charge founded on section 172 (1) (b) of Act 29 we as follows:

“Ashalley Okoe, trader on or about 14 August 1972 at Bubiashie, Accra, in the Eastern Circuit and within the jurisdiction of this court intentionally and unlawfully caused damage to one building value ¢3,627.00 the property of one Vincentia Asinyo.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Sections 172 (1) (b), 174 (1) and (5) of Act 29 provide as follows:

“172. (1) Whoever intentionally and unlawfully causes damage to any property by any means whatsoever:—. . .

(b) to a value exceeding £100, shall be guilty of second degree felony.”

“174. (1) A person does an act or causes an event unlawfully, within the meaning of the provisions of this Code relating to unlawful damage, in any case in which he is liable to any civil action or proceeding, or to fine or other punishment under any enactment, in respect of his doing such act or causing such event, or in respect of the consequences of the act or event, or in which he would be so liable if he caused the event directly by his own act, or in which he is liable to be restrained by injunction or any other proceeding from doing such act or causing such event.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I as to mistake of law, a person shall not be liable to punishment in respect of his doing anything which in good faith, he believes that he is entitled to do.”

In view of these provisions it is clear that the act of the appellant in demolishing the building can only be punishable if it is done intentionally and unlawfully and if he did not in good faith believe that he is entitled to demolish the building. Furthermore it seems to me the prosecution must show that the building was lawfully on the land. For if it is not lawfully on the land, removing it cannot be unlawful, it will be lawful, a conclusion that Amissah J.A. arrived at by his decision in the Baddoo case (supra).

In this regard one may safely say that if the act of’ the appellant is lawful then an essential ingredient of the offence is missing and a conviction cannot stand. Furthermore if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether his act is lawful or unlawful there the prosecution have not discharged the legal burden of proof which rests with them and as a result a conviction cannot be sustained.

Is the complainant’s building lawfully erected on the land? In R. v. Raymond Dyer (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 155, C.C.A. the English Malicious Damage Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., c. 97), s. 51 which is similar to our section 172 although it is differently worded fell to be construed. The English provision is as follows, “Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously commit any Damage, Injury, or Spoil to or upon any Real or Personal property whatsoever, either of a public or private Nature, . . .

[p.142] of [1979] GLR 137 shall be guilty of a misdemeanour . . .” In R. v. Dyer (supra) the appellants who were mere commoners were convicted of malicious damage to a notice board and its supporting scaffolding on their common. The board which had been erected on the common pursuant to a resolution by the parish council only indicated the name of a firm of building contractors and the routes to their building site. At the close of the case for the prosecution the defence made a submission of no case. The defence submitted on behalf of the appellants that it had not been proved by the prosecution that the board was lawfully on the common and that accordingly the appellants who were commoners were entitled to remove it. This submission was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeal in construing the statute which gave the parish council authority to provide in its management of the common “for the prevention of nuisances and the preservation of order,” held that the council had no authority to authorise the placing of a notice board with such supporting scaffolding since that had nothing whatsoever to do with the prevention of nuisance and the preservation of order. It held therefore that the appellants as commoners were entitled to remove the board and structure and consequently it quashed the convictions holding that the trial court should have accepted the submission of no case. Lord Goddard C.J. in delivering the judgment of the court remarked at pp. 159-160:

“It was for the prosecution to show that the board and scaffolding were lawfully on the common, as otherwise the placing of it on the common was a trespass which the commoners were entitled to abate . . .

We are unable to find that the council had any right whatever to give the permission which they purported to give for its erection . . . Accordingly, we can find no warrant for saying that it was legally there or that the commoners exceeded their rights in removing it.”

In this case the judgment of the Privy Council and the acceptance of that judgment by the Supreme Court declared ownership in the appellant’s family. The building was put on the land without the consent of the family. It cannot be lawful to put up a building on another person’s land without that person’s permission or authority. Such an erection must in the contemplation of the law be considered a nuisance and the rightful owner of the land is entitled to abate it. To succeed in proving unlawful damage it was therefore up to the prosecution on the persuasive authority of the Dyer case, first to establish that the building was lawfully on the land. This was never established. At most it can be said that the lawful nature of the building on the land was left in considerable doubt having regard to the Privy Council judgment and such doubt must be resolved in favour of the appellant.

Furthermore if the provisions of section 174 (1) of Act 29 are carefully studied, it can be seen that any civil action taken against the appellant’s family in respect of the land can be successfully defended and defeated by a plea of res judicata. The appellant’s family had already obtained an injunction restraining the complainant’s vendors and having regard to the Privy Council judgment it is highly improbable that the

[p.143] of [1979] GLR 137 appellant’s family can be restrained by injunction from asserting their title to the land. Section 174 (1) of Act 29 is accordingly a good defence for the appellant and renders his act not unlawful and his conviction wrong.

In any event from the highly authoritative nature of the judgments which the appellant’s family exhibited, it is obvious that in demolishing the building the appellant did something which in good faith he believed he was entitled to do and under section 174 (5) of Act 29 this also is a perfect defence to the charge thus rendering the conviction unsupportable in law.

In all the circumstances of this case I think the conviction is erroneous. It was for these reasons that I allowed the appeal in this case, quashed the conviction, set aside the sentence, cancelled the bail bond and acquitted and discharged the appellant.

Now I wish to say a word about the grant of bail in this case. I have already given a decision this morning in Ayiku Peki v. The Republic (1979] G.L.R. 61 in which I have given sufficient reasons based on the clear provisions of section 26 (5) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), why it was wrong for convicted persons in the position of this appellant to be given bail and respite of sentence before they lodged their appeals. Such convicts are not appellants and it is dangerous for such persons to be given bail pending probable appeals quite apart from the lack of legal authority for such a course of action by inferior courts of summary jurisdiction. I concede as Ollennu J.S.C. remarked in Donkor v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 598 at p. 602, S.C. that it is an injustice to him in all cases where a convict serves part of his sentence only to be ultimately acquitted on appeal. This however is the price which every judicial system must pay where the machinery of justice is operated by fallible human beings. The remedy if any is in legislation. Although I deprecate and condemn the grant of bail before the lodging of appeal, I think, nevertheless that the whole legal basis for the prosecution leaves much to be desired. Like Lord Goddard C.J. in the Dyer case, I cannot help expressing regret that the act of the appellant was made the subject of criminal prosecution.

The conduct of the appellant may very well be callous and it is possible to speculate that the legislature will frown on it and may wish now that section 172 of Act 29 could encompass it. Indeed it will not be an abuse of language to consider it atrocious. But the great principle of our criminal law is nulla poena sine lege and leaving aside the question of contempt which is covered by the proviso to article 20 (11) of our Constitution, 1969, the principle is firmly enshrined in the said article 20 (11) as follows, “No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written law.” The principle has been accepted in many common law jurisdictions. The language of section 172 of Act 29 does not cover the actus reus of the section. As Chief Justice Marshall said in United States v. Wiltberger 5 Wheat 76 at pp. 95-96 (1820) (see Criminal Law and its Administration by Michael and Wechsler, p. 1078):

[p.144] of [1979] GLR 137

“To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorise us to say so. It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in expounding criminal law, it has been in cases of considerable irritation, which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents following a general rule for other cases.”

In my respectful opinion, this is clearly a civil case and police officers ignorant of civil remedies should endeavour in such cases to seek advice from the law officers of the state so as to avoid subjecting the Republic to unnecessary expenses in mounting prosecutions. The complainant ought to have been advised to seek his remedy, if any, in the civil courts and face the costs involved instead of putting a strain on public funds, which the tax payer justifiably expects should be used in much needed development or for public projects and purposes.

As I have already indicated I have already allowed this appeal and the considerations I have been at pains to canvass in this judgment are the reasons for so allowing it.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. D.

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