OKYERE AND ANOTHER vs. THE REPUBLIC [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; [1960] 2 WLR 669; [1960] 1 All ER 805, HL.

(2) R v Browne [1962] 1 WLR 759; [1962] 2 All ER 621; 46 Cr App R 334, CCA.

(3) Timitimi v Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA 374.

(4) Nanevie v Agboyibor [1963] 1 GLR 440, SC.

(5) Tawiah III v Ewudzi (1936) 3 WACA 52.

(6) Otwiwa v Kwaseko (1937) 3 WACA 230.

(7) State v Buem Krachi Native Appeal Court; Ex parte Obeng, G & G Vol 2, Part 1, 118.

APPEAL to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing the appellants’ appeal against their conviction for forgery by the Ashanti Regional Public Tribunal on the grounds that

[p.427] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 the conviction was borne out by the evidence and that although there was a defect in the composition of the tribunal during the trial, it was bound by section 24(2) of the Public Tribunals Law, 1984 (PNDCL 78) to sustain the conviction of the appellants by the tribunal. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Adzoe JSC.

Asare-Bediako for the appellants.

Anthony Gyambiby (Principal State Attorney) for the respondent.

Adzoe JSC. Delivered the judgment of the court. In July 1992 the appellants herein and two others were arraigned before the Ashanti Regional Public Tribunal on various charges of conspiracy to commit forgery, forgery, altering a forged document and abetment of forgery. The case was The People v Agnes Ansah, Kwame Amponsah Okyere, Adu Gyamfi Kumaning and Benjamin Kofi Andoh. The offences were in connection with a will purported to have been prepared by the first appellant herein, Kwame Amponsah Okyere, a legal practitioner, for the deceased John Emmanuel Ansah. The complainant who claimed to be the customary successor of the deceased claimed that the will was not the will of the deceased and his suspicion was that the accused persons conspired to forge a will bequeathing a house to the first accused, Agnes Ansah, one of the daughters of the deceased. The suspicion of forgery centred largely on the signature which purported to be that of the deceased testator. According to examinations carried out at the Police Forensic Laboratory, the signature on the will was not that of the testator, but it was also not shown to have been made by any of the accused persons. The issues for trial, as rightly identified by the tribunal itself, were:

(1) whether the will was forged or not; and

(2) if it was forged, was it done by the accused persons?

Much of the evidence relating to these two issues were mere rumours and suspicions founded on rumours. When the prosecution evidence showed that none of the accused signed the will, the tribunal observed: “But is this conclusive that the forgery was not committed by any of them? The answer is that the fact that the forged signature was not set down by any accused is not in itself evidence that the forgery was not committed by them. They

[p.428] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 need not personally sign. All they need to do is to cause somebody else to sign what is purported to be the signature of the deceased. In any case if it were the accused who forged the signature they would definitely make sure they do not supply a specimen signature to the police which is likely to implicate them.”

Elsewhere, the tribunal made one very important finding. It noted that the prosecution’s case was also based on the allegation by a prosecution witness that a Mr Owusu Ansah had alleged that his wife told him that the will was prepared in her house by the first and second accused and one Twumasi but the prosecution failed to call Owusu Ansah and his wife who were material witnesses. The tribunal concluded that the failure to call Owusu Ansah or his wife was fatal to the prosecution’s case against the first accused; and upon that the tribunal acquitted and discharged the first accused. Curiously, however, the tribunal did not use the same yard-stick in measuring the case against the other accused persons and found them guilty, saying that the second accused (the first appellant) was the real culprit who committed the forgery. A careful study of the evidence will leave no one in doubt that the convictions were based on the fact that the appellants were unable to explain how and by whom the offending signature could have been affixed to the will.

The appellants were not satisfied with their conviction and therefore appealed to the National Public Tribunal. The appeal could not be heard before the Constitution, 1992 came into effect and with the new Constitution in place the appeal had to come before the Court of Appeal. Original ground (1) before the Court of Appeal was that the conviction was unreasonable in view of the evidence on the record. Two of the three judges of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on this ground, holding that the conviction was supported by the evidence; the third judge however came to the conclusion that “there was not a scintilla of evidence” to support the charges and that the accused deserved to be acquitted. The appeal was accordingly dismissed on the strength of the majority decision. The appellants have therefore come before this court as the final arbiter.

The original ground filed in this court is that the dismissal of the appellants’ appeal by the Court of Appeal was unreasonable in view of the evidence on the record. The issue raised by this ground of appeal is whether the charge of forgery was made out at the trial. The offence is under section 159 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act

[p.429] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423

29) which provides:

“159. Whoever forges any document whatsoever, with intent to defraud or injure any person, or with intent to evade the requirements of the law, or with intent to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, any crime, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.”

Section 164 of Act 29 defines the species of forgery disclosed by the facts of this case. Section 164(a) of Act 29 provides that:

“(a) a person forges a document if he makes or alters the document, or any material part thereof, with intent to cause it to be believed—

(i) that the document or part has been so made or altered by any person who did not in fact so make or alter it; or (ii) that the document or part has been so made or altered with the authority or consent of any person who did not in fact give his authority or consent; or

(iii) that the document or part has been so made or altered at a time different from that at which it was in fact so made or altered.”

The offence of forgery is rather complex and its essential ingredients are not very easy to prove. The prosecution must prove that the accused has made or altered a document or part of it with the intent to make it appear as genuine and with the further intent to defraud another person or injure another person, or evade the requirements of the law, or commit a crime or facilitate the commission of a crime. The definitions suggest that forgery in our law does not very much depart from the English principle that a forged document is a document which “tells a lie about itself”: see Russel on Crime (11th ed), p 1400. The definitions also indicate that two alternative intents are contemplated, and the presence of any one of them will constitute the offence of forgery. The intention must be to defraud or to injure another person. The intention to defraud implies the obtaining by false representations some material or financial gain from someone, while the intent to injure may mean simply that some person may act to his detriment or loss. In both cases the victim of the forgery must have acted upon the forged document to the prejudice of any person in the belief that the forged document is

[p.430] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 genuine. In that sense, the definition of forgery in our law can be said to cover both an intent to defraud and an intent to deceive as explained in Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1960] 2 WLR 669, HL. It is therefore necessary for the prosecution in a case of the nature of the present appeal to prove that the accused made or altered the document, with the intent that it would be accepted as genuine, knowing that someone is likely to act upon it to the prejudice of someone else. The prosecution was unable to prove that the accused persons or any of them forged the will. Whatever evidence was before the tribunal in support of the charge of forgery was a mere pack of rumours and suspicions. The majority of the Court of Appeal, like the trial tribunal, mistook the probability for the reality and were wrong in finding the charges proved by the prosecution when there was no evidence to justify the finding of guilt.

We have accordingly unanimously decided to uphold the submissions of the appellants and allow the appeal because we are satisfied that the evidence on record did not support the convictions recorded against the appellants. Indeed, the learned Principal State Attorney, Mr Anthony Gyambiby, who appeared for the State conceded that he could not support the convictions and the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal. He concluded his submission saying: “In my opinion, therefore, the minority judgment should be preferred and the appeal allowed.” The court endorses the learned principal state attorney’s stance and will accordingly allow the appeal.

This conclusion would have been the end of the appeal, but it is the view of the court that we consider the problem created by section 24 (2) of the Public Tribunals Law, 1984 (PNDCL 78) under which the appellants were tried. The section appears to raise a serious question of procedural fairness.

The appellants were tried by the regional “public tribunal”, one of the tribunals established under PNDCL 78. That tribunal was intended to be composed of a panel, but the Law did not prescribe any quorum for the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The only provision is contained in section 6(1) of the Law and it reads as follows: “A Regional Public Tribunal shall be composed of such persons as the Council may appoint.” By “Council” is meant the Provisional National Defence Council, the government at the time. On the other hand, section 6(2) of PNDCL 78 provided that the tribunal in its appellate jurisdiction must “consist of five members.”

[p.431] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423

Whether the omission to stipulate a quorum for the exercise of the tribunal’s original jurisdiction was intentional or an oversight on the part of the draftsman does not concern us now.

The fact remains indisputable that when the case of the appellants went before the tribunal three members were empanelled to hear and determine the matter; and at each sitting only three panel members did sit. The record shows that those who actually constituted the panel were the chairman, Kofi Addo, who was a lawyer, Nana Siaw Antwi and Warrant Officer Class II Joe Adjei. I will refer to them as the original panel. In all, the tribunal held twelve sittings to complete the hearing. The original panel sat at nine of these hearings. But the membership of the panel was varied during the other three sittings. On 17 September 1992 when the third accused, who is the second appellant herein, and the fourth accused (now deceased but he was the third appellant) opened and concluded their defence, Nana Siaw Antwi was absent and his place on the panel was taken over by one Nana Owusu Afriyie. The tribunal itself called one witness described as the first tribunal witness,Yaw Brefo Darkwa-Dwamena. He testified on 21 September 1992. On that day also Nana Siaw Antwi was not present and Nana Owusu Afriyie, for the second time, sat in his place. Then on 5 October 1992 when the tribunal sat to hear the address of defence counsel on behalf of the accused persons Warrant Officer Class II Joe Adjei was absent and Nana Owusu Afriyie again joined the panel. The regular panel later heard the address of the prosecutor on 7 October 1992 and proceeded to deliver judgment on 20 October 1992. It means that Nana Siaw Antwi who did not hear the evidence of the second appellant and the first tribunal witness, and Warrant Officer Class II Joe Adjei who did not hear counsel’s submissions on behalf of the accused persons, joined the chairman to decide the case whilst Nana Owusu Afriyie who was present at three sittings of the tribunal had no hand in the final decision. They found the appellants guilty and convicted them.

The appellants appealed against their convictions, and, in the Court of Appeal they raised the issue of the changes made in the tribunal panel and sought to impugn the proceedings. Counsel argued two additional grounds in the Court of Appeal. These were that:

(a) The hearing of the case at the court below by differently constituted panel members occasioned substantial and

[p.432] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 gross miscarriage of justice.

(b) It was against the cardinal principles of natural justice for this case to have been tried by differently constituted panel members.

He contended first that each time one of the original members dropped and had to be replaced, the panel was not properly constituted and secondly, that the changes affected a proper assessment of the evidence adduced at the trial and thus occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.

Two of the Court of Appeal judges did not accept that there was a miscarriage of justice. This is what Amuah JA said:

“Assuming that a member did not sit throughout with the other members in this case, the chairman is a lawyer and sat throughout with another member. The proceedings were accurately recorded and the chairman gave reasons for the findings arrived at. I have read the proceedings and considered the issues raised. In my opinion the procedural error has not occasioned any substantial miscarriage of justice to warrant the appeal being allowed.”

On his part, Essilfie-Bondzie JA had this to say:

“It is however significant to observe from the record of proceedings that the chairman of the panel who was a lawyer by profession and one other member sat consistently and regularly throughout the trial. It was the chairman, the lawyer, who recorded all the proceedings. And since there has not been any dispute as to the accuracy of the evidence adduced by the parties and their witnesses appearing on the record, it is my view that there was a correct assessment and evaluation of the evidence. Aside from this, the second accused is a lawyer by profession and he and the other accused persons were represented by counsel. So that, in my opinion, if their case had been prejudiced in any way they would have raised any objection during the trial. But throughout the proceedings before the tribunal, none of the counsel for the accused challenged the composition of the panel which tried them. In my view the changes in the members of the panel did not occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice.”

In contrast with these views was the opinion of Afreh JA. This is

[p.433] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 what he said:

“In my opinion when a panel member cannot attend a sitting it should be adjourned. If he is unable to continue sitting, a new panel should be constituted and the trial started de novo. The only time when a new person may be allowed to replace a member is when it is necessary to do so to perform a purely formal function like adjourning the case or reading a judgment already arrived at, written and signed by those who tried the case. Except in such cases, any change in the composition of a panel of a tribunal amounts to, in my opinion, a breach of the rules of natural justice: see for example Nanevie v Agboyibor [1963] 1 GLR 440 at 443, SC. Normally the judgment in such a case should be quashed.”

All the judges of the Court of Appeal felt bound by the provisions of section 24(2) of PNDCL 78, which, according to Afreh JA “does not allow us to quash a conviction merely because of any defect in the composition of the tribunal or in the appointment of any member thereof.”

It is these views expressed by the learned judges of the Court of Appeal which constrain us to take a closer look at section 24(2) of PNDCL 78. As I have already pointed out, counsel for the appellants has not raised this legal issue before us, but if we ignore it and allow the appeal simply because it is conceded that the evidence does not support the conviction, the opinions expressed on the law in the Court of Appeal might prevail and continue to confuse litigants and their lawyers. The task of the Supreme Court is to seek stability and growth of the law, and I think that it is the duty of the Supreme Court at all times to declare its opinion if the opinion may usefully settle the law. This is what is envisaged in the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 16) where section 6(7)(b) provides that in deciding an appeal, the court should not confine itself to the grounds set forth by the appellant in his grounds of appeal, or be precluded from resting its decision on a ground not set forth by the appellant. It is therefore necessary to examine section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 which the Court of Appeal had to grapple with. That section must be properly understood.

I start by asking, what does the section mean? It provides:

“(2) No decision, order, finding, ruling or proceeding of a Public Tribunal set up under this Law shall he regarded as

[p.434] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 invalid by reason of any defect in the composition of the Tribunal or in the appointment of any member thereof.”

In his judgment, Essilfie-Bondzie JA expressed the view that, “by the clear provisions of section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 this court is disabled from deciding that the proceedings in this case is invalid by reason of any defect in the composition of the tribunal or in the appointment of any member thereof.” In the same vein, Afreh JA lamented:

“Normally, the judgment in such a case should be quashed. But we are bound by the law which governed the proceedings of the public tribunal. Section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 does not allow us to quash a conviction merely because of any defect in the composition of the tribunal or in the appointment of any member thereof.”

I have already pointed out that PNDCL 78 does not say how many persons should constitute the tribunal when it is exercising its original jurisdiction. Since there is no required quorum the impression is that for any given case the council would determine the number of the panel members. I think, therefore, that the phrase “a defect in the composition of the tribunal or in the appointment of any member thereof” must be carefully considered. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (4th ed), Vol 2 at p 723 defines the word “defect” as meaning “a lack or absence of something essential to completeness.” This is the sense in which “defect” can be meaningfully construed in the present appeal.

As a general rule whenever a certain number of persons constitute a court and start hearing a case those persons must hear the case to conclusion and give judgment. They constitute the court and are clothed with jurisdiction. If during the trial one member dies or falls sick or is compelled by circumstances to leave the jurisdiction, so that he cannot sit with the others on the panel, there arises a defect in the composition of the court; the absence of the one member renders the composition of the court incomplete. The court will lack jurisdiction because of the absence of the one member.

But the apparent purpose of PNDCL 78 is to reverse this general view that a reduction in the number of the panel constituting the court must necessarily take away the court’s jurisdiction; and section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 aims at that objective. By virtue of section 24(2), the withdrawal or absence of a member of the tribunal

[p.435] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 during a trial should not have any adverse effect on the court’s jurisdiction. The other remaining members of the panel may proceed with the hearing and no taint of irregularity or nullity will attach to the proceedings or the final decision reached in the matter. The phrase “defect in the composition of the Tribunal” which appears in section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 must be interpreted to make sense so as to be consistent with other parts of the Law. When so constructed it should mean no more than what I have suggested.

This scenario is not unusual. It is analogous to the case where statute permits a trial to continue even though a juror withdraws during the hearing. The case of R v Browne [1962] 2 All ER 621, CCA is quite apposite here. The appellant, Browne, was tried and convicted before Brickinghamshire Quarter Sessions for fraud and false pretences. He appealed against the conviction on a point of law. The point was one of procedure. He complained that during the trial one juror did not turn up in court on a certain day when the weather was very bad. But on that day his own counsel and the prosecutor signed a certificate pursuant to section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925 which provided that where a juror was incapable of continuing to act, “15 . . . the jury shall nevertheless, subject to assent being given in writing by or on behalf of both the prosecutor and the accused and so long as the number of its members is not reduced below ten, be considered as remaining for all the purposes of that trial properly constituted, and the trial shall proceed and a verdict may be given accordingly.”

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal because they did not find anything wrong with the trial in the face of the law which enabled the trial to proceed in the absence of the one juror.

In the attempt to place what transpired before the tribunal within the proper legal context of PNDCL 78, we must draw a clear distinction between a court’s jurisdiction and the rules of procedure. When a statute creates a court, it usually prescribes the court’s powers and functions and regulates its procedures as well. The court’s jurisdiction is the authority it has to hear and determine matters litigated before it. The popular view is that a court acts without jurisdiction if it is not properly constituted. In Timitimi v Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA 374 at 376, Sir Henley Coussey had this to say “A court is said to be of competent jurisdiction with regard to

[p.436] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 a suit or other proceeding when it has power to hear or determine it or exercise any judicial power therein.”

The exercise of the court’s judicial power is regulated by rules. We have rules of pleading and rules of evidence. These form part of the rules of procedure. Sir Frederick Pollock in his book Jurisprudence and Legal Essays at p 43 describes these rules as follows:

“Rules of pleading are those which the parties must follow in informing the court of the question before it for decision and in any case of difficulty enabling the court to define the questions or questions. Rules of evidence are those by which the proof of disputed facts is governed and limited.”

Rules of procedure must accord with the principles of natural justice. And the courts must not merely require judicial bodies to comply with the procedure prescribed for them by the statute which creates them, but must go further and insist that they keep faith with those procedural safeguards that general practice and our accepted notions of justice dictate as necessary for the attainment of fairness. Thus in PNDCL 78, section 24(2) deals distinctly with the tribunal’s jurisdiction while the issue of procedure is dealt with in section 13 which is headed “Mode of Trial.” Section 13(11) for instance pro vides that—“A Public Tribunal shall, in its proceedings and decisions, be guided by the rules of natural justice.” And section 13(17) contains this important provision: “Non-compliance with the rules governing the mode of trial shall not render a trial invalid unless a substantial miscarriage of justice has been occasioned.”

In my opinion, it is section 13 of PNDCL 78 which is applicable to the proceedings before the regional tribunal. In a trial before the tribunal constituted by a panel, each panel member plays the vital role of judge and jury. Together they determine the issues of fact and law. If they have a chairman who happens to be a lawyer by profession, his presence is only a special advantage to the other members of the tribunal who would be guided by his advice and directions on points of law. But ultimately the final decision is to be made by all the members of the tribunal. In that regard, section 13(22) of PNDCL 78 provides that “The decision of a Public Tribunal shall be either unanimous or by a majority. . .” So therefore, if a panel member does not hear all the evidence and see all the witnesses the only reasonable impression is that he has disabled himself from properly evaluating the evidence upon which he is

[p.437] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 expected to rely for a fair decision in the matter. Whatever decision he gives cannot be based on his own assessment of the evidence There are several authorities which condemn as improper and invalid the procedure where during the trial of a case, the panel constituting the court is varied and some members of the court who do not hear the whole evidence join others in deciding the judgment of the court: see Nanevie v Agboyibor [1963] 1 GLR 440, SC, Tawiah III v Ewudzi (1936) 3 WACA 52; Otwiwa v Kwaseko (1937) 3 WACA 230 and State v Buem Krachi Native Appeal Court; Ex parte Obeng, G & G Vol 2, Part 1, 118.

These authorities combined together the issues of jurisdiction and procedure and expressed the same view based on the general principles that the withdrawal or absence of the panel member renders the court improperly constituted and divests it of jurisdiction to hear the case. The view expressed in almost all the cases is the same as that stated by Ollennu J (as he then was) in the Buem Krachi Native Appeal case (supra) at 118 that:

“Since . . . the number of panel members required to be present at the hearing of a case is three or five, the court will not be properly constituted if on anyone of the days on which a particular case is heard anyone of the three or five members of the panel before whom the hearing started, is absent. It means de jure that on that day only two persons authorised to constitute the court for the hearing of that case can be said to be present, even though they sat with another member who is also appointed under section 4 of the Ordinance. On that day therefore there was no native court duly constituted, and vested with jurisdiction to hear the suit, and there is total absence of jurisdiction, and the proceedings and judgment before that body are not only irregular. . . but absolutely null and void.”

It must be observed that the above position which all the courts have taken is too broad to be applicable to the instant case because by virtue of section 24(2) of PNDCL 78, the absence of a member of the court does not take away the tribunal’s jurisdiction. But one other consideration which definitely influenced the decisions in the cases cited above is the fact that at least one member of the court joined the panel later during the trial and so did not hear the witnesses who testified before his appearance on the bench, but that he participated in the judgment of the court. This view is also

[p.438] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 expressed in the Buem Krachi Native Appeal Court case (supra). Ollennu J (as he then was) again at 118 said:

“The native appeal court themselves found that one Kwame Addo who did not sit on the case throughout the proceedings joined in the end to give judgment; therefore the proper order they should have made upon allowing the appeal was to declare the proceedings before the trial native court null and void . . .”

In Tawiah Ill v Ewudzi (supra) Kingdon CJ also referred to arguments of counsel for the appellants, and concluded at 55 that:

“This [meaning the argument] was to the effect that the whole proceedings before the Tribunal were a nullity, because all the members who sat upon the case and gave judgment were not present throughout the hearing. I am reluctantly compelled to uphold this contention. In two recent cases . . . this Court has upheld a similar contention. In the present case it is clear that at least two of the Tribunal members who gave judgment were not present throughout the proceedings, and did not hear all the evidence. This vitiates the whole trial, . . .”

The law is quite settled that a member of a court who has not heard all the evidence must not participate or appear to participate in the court’s decision. And in the instant case, the trial before the regional tribunal was not infected with invalidity because a member of the tribunal was absent at one time or the other; similarly invalidity does not attach to the proceedings simply because a new panel member at one time replaced a regular member who started the hearing.

The proceedings are essentially irregular because at least one member of the panel who took part in the judgment did not hear all the witnesses. The new member who joined the panel during the trial did not stay on to give judgment; but two of the original members later absented themselves during some of the sittings and yet returned to give judgment. That is the problem created by Nana Siaw Antwi who started the hearing and absented himself on two occasions and did not hear some of the witnesses but participated in the giving of judgment. It is his role in the giving of judgment which vitiates the decision of the tribunal.

His conduct in the trial is caught by section 13(17) of PNDCL 78 as having occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. Clearly, if he had not gone back to give judgment the proceedings might have

[p.439] of [2001-2002] 1 GLR 423 been protected by section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 because his absence from the trial simpliciter would have been a defect under the said section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 and would not produce any adverse effect on the trial. The position of Warrant Officer Class II Joe Adjei is a little less damaging to the decision of the tribunal; he was absent at only one hearing. That was on the day counsel for the accused addressed the court. But he, at least, heard all the witnesses and might justifiably take part in the giving of judgment.

In sum, I hold the view that it is section 13(17) of PNDCL 78 and not section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 which ought to apply in this case. The Court of Appeal was wrong in holding itself and the trial tribunal bound by section 24(2) of PNDCL 78 and disabled from declaring the trial invalid. Section 13(17) compels me to hold that the procedure adopted by the tribunal was so gravely irregular that it occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice which renders the proceedings and the judgment invalid. The argument advanced in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeal that there was no miscarriage of justice because the chairman of the tribunal who was a lawyer sat regularly throughout the trial and accurately recorded the proceedings is rather abstruse, as the diligence and devotion of the chairman cannot excise the sense of injustice which any reasonable observer would feel. No man who is convicted of a crime will ever be convinced that he has had a fair trial when a man who did not hear all the evidence against him pronounced him guilty.

The appeal is allowed. The convictions are set aside, and the appellants acquitted and discharged.

Bamford-Addo JSC. I agree.

Ampiah JSC. I agree.

Adjabeng JSC. I agree.

Acquah JSC. I agree.

Appeal allowed.

JNNO