OPPONG vs. FRY-NARTEY [1984-86] 1 GLR 256
4 February 1983 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 15 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 21Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Sackey v. Kumah [1978] G.L.R. 361.
(2) Tackie v. Bannerman [1979] G.L.R. 44.
(3) Owusu v. Asante [1973] 2 G.L.R. 220.
(4) Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613.
(5) Bassil v. Sfarijlani, High Court, Accra, 1 October 1966, unreported: digested in (1967) C.C. 20.
(6) Saad v. City Food Supply (Ghana) Ltd., High Court, Accra, 21 November 1966, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 33.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the rent magistrate, Sekondi ordering the ejectment of a tenant from rented premises. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Ebo Dawson for the appellant.
R. E. Gaisie for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
This matter was originated by a complaint to the rent officer of the Sekondi-Takoradi City Area by the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) as against the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the tenant). The complaint lodged reads as follows:
“Mr. Oppong who is the proprietor of Pakos Lodge rented the first floor of my storey-building for his bandsmen. The bandsmen of late became a nuisance to the inmates of the house and those around us. Each time they returned from dance fully intoxicated [p.258] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 with alcohol and Indian hemp smoking, they turned the whole area upside down. Some engaged themselves in fighting over girls they brought along with them, whilst others went to the extent of throwing bottles and other missiles. There was an occasion when one of the bandsmen pulled out a knife to stab another bandsman and had it not been for the timely intervention of a passer-by who was attracted by the unusual noise to the scene it would have been fatal. As I would not like myself to be called upon as a witness in any future brawl I am taking this precaution by ejecting the bandsmen and then turn the entire house into a family house to house my eleven children and two nephews who have now been transferred to Takoradi.”
Upon this complaint, both the landlord and the tenant appeared before the Senior Rent Officer, J. K. Annor, on 22 October 1980. The landlord gave evidence on oath in support of his complaint, among other things, as follows:
“I am the owner of house No 53/3, Takoradi. The tenant rents a portion of this house for occupation by his bandsmen. In recent times his men have been creating a lot of nuisance in the house. For example, they have been quarrelling among themselves on account of women thereby breaking some glass louvres. They sometimes fight with missiles such as bottles and knives, not mentioning the fact that they keep the place very dirty; they do not know who is to sweep. In view of these reasons, I served him with six months’ notice to remove his men. The notice has expired but he has not made any effort to do so. In the circumstances, I have brought this case and humbly pray that the tenant’s men are ejected from the premises forthwith.”
The tenant, who appeared not to be challenging any part of the landlord’s complaint as outlined supra, stated: “I have no objection to the complainant’s request for recovery of possession.” He only talked about his problem in securing accommodation for eight men and asked for two years to search for a new place for them. The rent officer then stated:
“Since the tenant has no objection to the complainant’s request for recovery of possession, I advise him to remove his bandsmen from the complainant’s premises on 31 October 1981. In default the case will be referred to the rent magistrate for an order of ejectment.”
It is quite clear from the landlord’s evidence before the rent officer that he was asking for immediate ejectment of the tenant’s bandsmen. This he failed to get because the rent officer rather advised the tenant to vacate within a period of one year. Not being satisfied with that advice,
[p.259] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 the landlord appealed to the Rent Magistrate, District Court Grade I, Sekondi who after hearing both parties, ruled in favour of the landlord and ordered the tenant’s bandsmen to vacate the premises by 22 April 1981. The rent magistrate made this order on 12 March 1981. It is against this order that the appeal before this court has been lodged.
The original ground of appeal filed on 14 April 1981 is as follows: “The judgment is unreasonable having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial.” The additional ground of appeal filed by learned counsel for the tenant reads:
“The learned trial magistrate erred in law in entertaining the appeal by the complainant, the order of the rent officer having been made without jurisdiction and in contravention of sections 5 (1) and 17 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220).”
Arguing this appeal before this court, learned counsel has submitted that the rent officer had no authority to order on 22 October 1980 that the tenant should give up possession without first making reference to the rent magistrate. The rent magistrate, counsel submits, has exclusive power to order ejectment, and refers to section 17 (1) of Act 220. Counsel submits further that the rent officer in ordering that the tenant should give up possession by 31 October 1981, did so without jurisdiction as conferred by section 17 (1) of Act 220. Counsel further refers to the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), especially regulation 13 (1) and submits that the rent officer can only forward to the rent magistrate an opinion for the magistrate’s determination: see Sackey v. Kumah [1978] G.L.R. 361 and Tackie v. Bannerman [1979] G.L.R. 44. Counsel argued further that if the landlord required his premises for his family, as he seemed to have claimed, then he should have shown that he reasonably required the premises for that purpose. There being no evidence as to that, any ejectment order made on that basis was illegal. Counsel referred to Owusu v. Asante [1973] 2 G.L.R. 220. The appeal must therefore be allowed.
Learned counsel for the landlord has submitted on the other hand that the rent officer only advised on the complaint brought to him; he did not make an order and therefore said if his advice was not heeded he would refer the matter to the rent magistrate for an order of ejectment. He submits that section 5 of Act 220 shows the functions of the rent officer. The rent officer, he submits, has power to investigate the complaint referred to him, as he did in the instant case, and make a determination: see Sackey v. Kumah (supra). See also section 6 (1) (b) of Act 220 which empowers the rent magistrate to decide by an order any matter determined by the rent officer. See also L.I. 369, Form 13; the rent magistrate is empowered to look into ejectment matters either on application by a tenant or a landlord or on reference by the rent
[p.260] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 officer. Counsel submits that this was a simple complaint of nuisance and the landlord fully brought himself within the provisions of section 17 (1) of Act 220. The appeal must therefore be dismissed. Counsel for the tenant refers in reply to Form 14 provided by rule 18 of L.I. 369 and submits that a declaration of interest must be filed first with the rent magistrate. If the rent officer or rent magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter a plea of liability would not confer jurisdiction.
The main ground of appeal argued with a good deal of force, apparently supported by decisions of eminent and highly respected judges of the High Court, by learned counsel for the tenant is that the rent officer had no power or authority to order on 22 October 1980 that the tenant should give up possession without first making a reference to the rent magistrate. That the rent magistrate has exclusive power to order ejectment as provided under section 17 (1) of Act 220.
There appearing to be no reported Court of Appeal decision on the point at stake, both counsel referred to only High Court decisions on the matter; the latest of which being Tackie v. Bannerman (supra), in which Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) discussed the earlier three decisions of the High Court, being Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613; Bassil v. Sfarijlani, High Court, Accra, 1 October 1966, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 20, and Saad v. City Food Supply (Ghana) Ltd., High Court, Accra, 21 November 1966; unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 33. The learned judge who seemed persuaded by the decisions in the Bassil and Saad cases (supra) stated at 52-53:
“The rent magistrate’s court is a special creature of the Rent Act, 1963, with express jurisdiction under section 6 (d) to make ejectment orders and under section 17 to make orders for recovery of possession against tenants. The rent officer in exercising the jurisdiction under section 5 of Act 220 constitutes himself as an inferior tribunal and has only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on him by the Act creating him. Section 5 should therefore not be construed to include actions brought under section 17 of Act 220. I therefore hold in my judgment that section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220 under which the landlord purported to have acted in lodging his complaint to the rent officer does not confer any such right. The complaints which the rent officer is entitled to receive and deal with under section 5 cannot include ones for recovery of possession or ejectment.”
The interpretation or construction which Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) placed on section 5 (1) (b) seems to disapprove the construction Archer J. (as he then was) placed on the same section 5 (1)
[p.261] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256
(b). For Archer J. (as he then was) held in Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah (supra) at 615 as follows:
“Section 5 (1) (b) empowers the appropriate rent officer in mandatory terms by the use of the word ‘shall’ to investigate in such manner as he may think fit complaints by a landlord against a tenant in respect of arrears of rent and in respect of any other matter and he shall make a determination thereon. Briefly, under this section he must not only investigate but should also determine the matter, that is, make findings. Complaints are not restricted to arrears of rent.”
With the greatest respect to both learned judges, I seem more persuaded by the wider interpretation of section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220 in Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah (supra) than the narrow one in Tackie v. Bannerman (supra). I think I am fortified in this view by the combined effect of and force in the provisions of section 5 (1) (a) and (b); 6 (1) (a) and (b) of Act 220, and regulation 15 of L.I. 369. Section 5 (1) of Act 220 provides:
“5. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the appropriate Rent Officer may discharge all, or any of, the following functions— (a) may assess the recoverable rent of any premises (whether or not such premises are occupied) on an application made by any landlord, tenant or person interested in the premises, after such enquiry as he may think fit;
(b) shall investigate, in such manner as he may fit, complaints by a landlord against a tenant in respect of arrears of rent and complaints by a landlord, tenant or person interested in the premises against any other person in respect of any other matter mentioned in this Act and shall make a determination thereon. . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
I think a careful perusal of the above quoted sections of the Act indicates that the rent officer is empowered thereunder not only to deal with questions concerning assessment of recoverable rent and arrears of rent but also with any other matter mentioned in the Act, for example, as under section 17 (1) of Act 220, order for recovery of possession or order for ejectment. In all such cases, it is my view that the Act empowers the rent officer to investigate when a complaint thereof is placed before him, in such manner as he may think fit and he shall
[p.262] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 make a determination thereon. That is he should make a finding of fact and express his opinion or make a decision on same. If the opinion so expressed or decision given is not acceptable to any of the parties, then, the rent office is bound to make a reference thereof to the appropriate rent magistrate who shall hear the matter by considering the case stated and hearing the parties afresh or both, and whereupon the rent magistrate may affirm, amend, or reverse the opinion expressed or decision already made by the rent officer. I think this view is supported by regulation 15 of L.I. 369, Form 13:
“From: The Rent Officer for To: TheRent Magistrate for . . . In the matter of (Appellant)
Versus (Respondent)
WHEREAS, AB, a landlord/tenant/interested party to the above proceedings being aggrieved by the determination in the matter, has requested that certified copies of all the relevant documents and a statement of the facts of the matter and the reason for such determination be forwarded to you for your determination:
NOW, THEREFORE, in compliance with such request and in pursuance of the provisions of the Rent Act, 1963, I forward herewith certified copies of the relevant documents and a statement of the facts of the matter and the reasons for such determination (Attach as appendices).
The Court is now respectfully requested to:— (a) affirm the decision or (b) amend or reverse the decision; and (c) make such order as to costs or in connection with the proceedings as the Court sees fit.
Rent officer for”
Undoubtedly, the rent officer has no power to make a binding order as the rent magistrate has under section 17 (1) of Act 220 for recovery of possession and ejectment, but it is obvious here that the rent officer is empowered to make a decision which the rent magistrate may, upon reference to him affirm, amend or reverse. It is my view that section 5 (1) (b) therefore clothes the rent officer with jurisdiction over complaints by a landlord, a tenant, or any other person interested in premises against any other person in respect of any other matter (apart from assessment of recoverable rent, and complaints in respect of arrears of rent), such as are mentioned in Act 220, eg. matters
[p.263] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 mentioned under section 17 (1); recovery of possession and ejectment. The rent officer’s decision, however, has not the force of a binding order which the rent magistrate may make under the provisions of section 17 of Act 220.
I am of the view that when a complaint is put before the rent officer in such matters, he is bound to hear the complaint and make a determination thereon. If the decision is acceptable to both parties, the matter ends there. It is only when one of the parties in the matter is dissatisfied and aggrieved by the rent officer’s determination, that he gives notice of his intention to appeal to the rent magistrate against the said determination as under regulation 14 (1), Form 11 and thereafter the statement of appeal against the decision of the rent officer is sent to the rent officer as under regulation 14 (2), Form 12. It is upon this, that the rent officer states the case to the rent magistrate and forwards to him certified copies of the relevant documents and statement of facts of the matter and the reasons for such determination, which the rent magistrate, after full consideration of the entire matter as he thinks fit, may affirm, amend or reverse. The moment the rent officer’s decision is viewed unpalatable to one of the parties, it becomes subject to an appeal to the appropriate rent magistrate who has power to review the whole complaint afresh. Thus, one of the functions of the rent magistrate under section 6 (1) (b) of Act 220 is that the rent magistrate may by order, on an appeal by any landlord, tenant or person interested in the premises from any determination of the appropriate rent officer under this Act on any other matter, decide such matter. I am firmly of the view that the jurisdiction of the rent officer is not restricted to questions affecting assessment of recoverable rent and arrears of rent only. He may make his determination in any other matter mentioned under Act 220 but his determination may have no binding force.
Counsel for the tenant further argued that if the landlord required his premises for his family as he seems to have stated in his letter of complaint to the rent officer, then he should have led evidence that he reasonably required the premises for that purpose. Counsel submitted that the landlord failed to lead any evidence as to that and his claim ought to have been disallowed; the order for ejectment is, therefore, illegal. Counsel cited Owusu v. Asante (supra), where the complaint was rejected on appeal because the landlord could not bring himself within the provisions of section 36 of Act 220, since a nephew is not under section 36 included in the category of members of the landlord’s family.
A perusal of the short proceedings before both the rent officer and the rent magistrate will show that the landlord did, throughout the proceedings, complain mainly under section 17 (1) (c) and (e), i.e. of
[p.264] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 nuisance, deterioration, waste and damage to and neglect in keeping the premises tidy and in tenantable condition. If the landlord established any one of these complaints he would be entitled to an order of ejectment under section 17 (1) of Act 220 which empowers the rent magistrate to make an order for recovery of possession and ejectment in any of the instances given under section 17 of Act 220. It follows therefore that if the landlord sought recovery of possession and ejectment on complaint of nuisance under section 17 (1) (c) and complaint of using the premises for immoral or illegal purpose, and the landlord is able to establish only one of the two complaints, he will be entitled to an order for possession and ejectment.
The following is the main part of the judgment from which this appeal has been brought. The learned magistrate stated as follows:
“In exercising his discretion to grant time within which the defendant should vacate the premises the rent officer should have taken into account the extent of damage the bandsmen are causing to the landlord’s building. In fact, the rent officer gave no reason for granting twelve months. I am of the view that his discretion was not properly exercised. At least he should have given reason for granting twelve months. For tenants to behave in a house as described by the landlord is very bad. They have abused their responsibility as tenants. As tenants they must keep the house neat and in tenantable condition. I am of the view that the twelve months given by the rent officer must be set aside. I set aside the order of twelve months, and in its place give the tenant six months within which to vacate the premises. These six months takes effect from 22 October 1980. They are to vacate the premises on 22 April 1981. The appeal is thus allowed with costs of ¢200 for the landlord.”
Though it was an appeal the rent magistrate did conduct, as he was entitled to do, a rehearing of the whole matter and heard the parties again. There was evidence and he found himself satisfied that the landlord was entitled to an order of possession and ejectment, and he did rightly make the order. He did so by allowing the appeal from the rent officer’s decision (not order) and amended the twelve months’ period to six months, which expired on 22 April 1981. In fact, nothing has been urged upon this court to show that the six months’ period given by the rent magistrate was unreasonable or illegal and I have no reason to disturb same. In any event, the tenant himself did offer to leave the landlord’s premises within two years’ period, as from 22 October 1980. The period of two years he asked for expired on 31 October 1982 and I do not see why the tenant should complain now. He
[p.265] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 256 has even had three more months’ period of grace due to the time the two appeals have taken. It would seem therefore that he must be ready to move his men out now.
I do, on the whole, hold the view that this appeal has failed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with the landlord’s costs assessed at ¢1,200. Court below to carry out.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
Ejectment order affirmed with costs.
J.A.A.
