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[1979] SLR (HC) 56High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

OWUSU vs. NYARKO [1980] GLR 428

5 July 1979 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 4 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 56
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OSCOLAOWUSU v NYARKO [1980] GLR 428 [1979] SLR (HC) 56
APAOWUSU v NYARKO [1980] GLR 428, [1979] SLR (HC) 56 (Ghana).
BluebookOWUSU v NYARKO [1980] GLR 428, [1979] SLR (HC) 56 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Abebreseh v. Kaah [1976] 2 G.L.R. 46.

(2) Sackitey’s Caveat, Re [1962] 1 G.L.R. 180.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the decision of a district court granting a concubine one-third share in a cocoa farm she helped cultivate. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

D. Gwira for the appellant.

Dr. Tackie Otoo for the respondent.

[p.429] of [1980] GLR 428

JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J

This is an appeal against the judgment of the District Magistrate Grade II, Wasa-Akropong. The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) claimed against the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) one-third share of a cocoa farm she helped the defendant to cultivate whilst she lived with him for seven years as husband and wife during which three children were born to them. The plaintiff based her claim on customary law. Apart from the evidence of the plaintiff and that of her father as to the nature of the association between the plaintiff and the defendant, which evidence was strongly challenged in cross-examination, there was no independent testimony as to whether the defendant and the plaintiff contracted a valid customary law marriage or that they lived in concubinage.

That piece of evidence was vital to the respective interests of the parties in any properties they acquired during cohabitation. With regard to this therefore this court called Nana Kwaku Osei, the linguist of the Omanhene of Wasa-Amanfi Traditional Area, where the plaintiff comes from and where the land the subject-matter in dispute is situated. He said among the Wasa-Amanfi people who are Akans where there is a valid customary law marriage the wife on dissolution of the marriage is not entitled to a share of any farm she helped her husband to cultivate.

This is in line with the customary law position among the Akans for as a fundamental principle of customary law, a son or a wife is a dependant of a husband and that the family law required, indeed it is a responsibility, that a son should assist his father and a wife should work with or for her husband and the property acquired with such assistance is the individual property of the man: see Abebreseh v. Kaah [1976] 2 G.L.R. 46 at p. 52. On the other hand where the parties live in concubinage the woman on separation is entitled to one-third share of the farms she cultivated with the man. This evidence of the linguist corroborates that of the plaintiff’s father.

In the instant case, the defendant did not satisfy the essential prerequisites of a valid customary law marriage as laid down by Ollennu J. (as he then was) in Re Sackitey’s Caveat [1962] 1 G.L.R. 180. The plaintiff’s father told the parties to go and live together as he realised the defendant was not in a position to perform the customary rites. There was no formal meeting of the families of the plaintiff and the defendant. In my view, a father telling a man and his daughter to go and live together without more does not satisfy the requirements of consent by the family of the woman and mere cohabitation is not enough.

There must be a clear and unequivocal act of consent by the two families concerned. There is no evidence in this case of the family of the man even knowing of the existence of the plaintiff. I hold therefore that the plaintiff and the defendant lived

[p.430] of [1980] GLR 428

in concubinage. On separation and according to the custom of the locality the plaintiff was entitled to one-third share of the farm she helped the defendant to cultivate as claimed by her.

I do not believe the farms the plaintiff and the defendant cultivated belonged to the defendant’s brother alone. The brother Kwasi Jardon admitted in cross-examination that the farm was divided into three parts and one part was given to the plaintiff, the other parts to the defendant’s first wife and another. Subsequently, another part of the farm was given to her by the defendant’s brother. The defendant certainly has a share otherwise I do not see the reason for giving his wives portion of the farms. I hold therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to her claim. She must have one-third share of the farms she helped the defendant to cultivate. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Costs assessed at ¢200. DECISION Appeal dismissed with costs.

D.R.K.S.

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