HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1967
BEFORE: ARCHER J.
COUNSEL
K. A. Sarpong for the appellant.
Amui, Assistant State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.
The appellant was charged with the offence of stealing four pieces of wax print valued at N¢76.80 the property of one Araba Kakraba. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge but after hearing evidence, the trial magistrate at the Cape Coast District Court Grade I found the appellant guilty and convicted him and sentenced him to one day’s imprisonment and a fine of N¢180.00 or in default nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour and ordered that N¢80.00 should be given to the complainant.
[p.552] of [1967] GLR 551
When the appeal came on for hearing, Mr. Sarpong, learned counsel for the appellant, informed the court that the certified true copy of the proceedings supplied to him indicated that the appellant was convicted of dishonestly receiving. After reading the certified true copy of the record of proceedings supplied to the court, I detected that the appellant was convicted of stealing, the original offence with which the appellant was charged. Mr. Amui, the learned state attorney, agreed that there was a conflict as to what the trial magistrate found . . .
The main question I have to answer is what was pronounced in court? I think what constitutes a judgment in summary trials is clearly provided in section 177 (1) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as follows:
“(1) The Court, having heard what each party has to say and the witnesses and evidence so adduced, shall consider and determine the whole matter and may either convict the accused and pass sentence upon or make an order against him according to law or acquit him, as the case may be, and the Court shall give its decision in the form of an oral judgment, and shall record the decision briefly together with the reasons for it, where necessary . . .
(3) The conviction or order may, if required, be afterwards drawn up and shall be signed by the Court making the conviction or order, or by the clerk or other officer of the Court.”
It follows from the above subsections that the judgment should be orally delivered in court and mayafterwards be drawn up for signature by the court. In my view it becomes obvious that only what is pronounced in court may afterwards be drawn up. There is no licence to draw up an order substantially different from the verdict pronounced in court. The prosecuting officer’s affidavit discloses that the trial magistrate found the appellant guilty of dishonestly receiving. The trial magistrate has been informed by the state attorney of what the prosecuting officer heard and recorded on the police docket but the trial magistrate has not, either by himself or by his court clerk, assisted this court by denying the contents of the three affidavits before this court. I must confess that I find the whole episode shrouded in mystery. The appellant has a record of proceedings certified to be true and containing one verdict whereas the appellate court has another record of proceedings also certified to be true but containing a different verdict. It is impossible to say which was the verdict pronounced orally in court.
[p.553] of [1967] GLR 5
Before I take a decision in this appeal I wish to remark that it is not permissible for a trial magistrate to pronounce one verdict orally in court to the hearing of the public and later to re-write and alter the verdict in chambers after discovering a flaw in the judgment. Once the verdict has been pronounced orally, it is final and only an appellate court can alter it. Nevertheless in the interest of justice and to save costs to be incurred by a convicted person a trial magistrate who has second thoughts after delivering his verdict is at liberty to report the second thoughts to a High Court judge to enable him to exercise his revisionary powers under paragraph 58 of the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84).
A trial magistrate may also correct obvious omissions and grammatical errors in his written judgment after it has been orally pronounced in court but it is not open to him to alter his findings or verdict later on in chambers. He may have the best of intention in altering his findings but unfortunately he has no statutory power to do so. Moreover such subsequent substantial alterations especially in the verdict are bound to be misconstrued by members of the public who have tidy minds and who expect the stream of justice to flow uncontaminated by judicial irregularities which clearly amount to miscarriage of justice. I am not in any way impugning the integrity of the trial magistrate in this appeal with the above remarks. I have read the judgment in the record of proceedings supplied to this court very carefully and it seems to me that the judgment and the reasons given do not support a verdict of dishonestly receiving as recorded in the certified true copy supplied to the appellant. Both records have been certified as true copies of the record of proceedings although the verdict in both records are at variance. Moreover the three affidavits have raised serious doubts as to what was pronounced in court and I therefore hold that there is no certain judgment before this court which can be considered. The appeal is therefore allowed.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
S. Y. B.-B.
