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[1978] SLR (CA) 20Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

PRACTICE NOTE: KWAKU GRUNSHIE vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 177

19 May 1978 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (CA) 20
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OSCOLAPRACTICE NOTE: KWAKU GRUNSHIE v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 177 [1978] SLR (CA) 20
APAPRACTICE NOTE: KWAKU GRUNSHIE v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 177, [1978] SLR (CA) 20 (Ghana).
BluebookPRACTICE NOTE: KWAKU GRUNSHIE v THE REPUBLIC [1979] GLR 177, [1978] SLR (CA) 20 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

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COUNSEL

K. S. P. Jantuah for the appellant.

Hayfron-Benjamin, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.

[p.178] of [1979] GLR 177

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

Francois J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. On 25 June 1968, Kwaku Grunshie faced a charge of murder at the Sunyani Criminal Sessions. Before the trial commenced his counsel pleaded that he should be sent for medical observation. He urged that the accused was exhibiting clear signs of persecution mania. The state attorney associated himself with the application and the learned judge (Sampson Baidoo J.) ordered the accused to be subjected to psychiatric observation at the Mental Hospital, Accra. The case was then adjourned pending the specialist psychiatrist’s report.

At the resumed hearing about a year later, the state attorney sought leave of the court to discontinue the case and urged a committal of the accused to the mental hospital as a criminal lunatic under section 134 (4) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), which he invoked. Counsel for the accused expressed agreement with the course contemplated by the state attorney, adding, “The case falls under section 134 (4) (b) of Act 30.”

The learned judge in acceding to the application ruled as follows:

“The accused herein is charged with the murder of one Kwadjo Grunshie committed on 13 November 1967 at Wamawiem near Wamfie. The summary of evidence and the facts of the case as stated by the state attorney show that the accused seized his own fourteen month-old son from his wife and started rushing towards the bush. He was chased but before he could be caught the acused struck the head of the child against the ground. The child was rushed to hospital where he died shortly after. Before the incident the accused had exhibited clear signs of insanity by talking to himself and behaving strangely. According to the psychiatrist, Dr. C. C. Adomako who examined the accused, the accused was ‘labouring under persecutory delusion’ and was insane.

Order:

In view of the state attorney’s application, I order that the accused Kwaku Grunshie who is charged with the offence of murder be detained in custody as a criminal lunatic in hospital until the pleasure of the National Liberation Council is known, as provided under section 137 of Act 30.”

Assailed by doubts on the security aspects of the order, the learned judge relying on section 408 of Act 30 later amended his committal order to place the accused “in custody in any of the state prisons within reasonable distance of a mental hospital to facilitate such further medical treatment by a psychiatrist as may be found necessary from time to time as the need arises.”

Some years have now elapsed and fresh counsel for the accused with fresh ideas now challenges the order of the learned judge on the grounds that the statutory provisions contained in section 134 were breached. Learned counsel expresses himself in a formulation appearing in his additional grounds of appeal:

[p.179] of [1979] GLR 177

“(a) The order for the detention of the appellant made by the learned trial judge dated 23 July 1969 was unlawful or a nullity or both and the consequent order by warrant (if any) of the Minister was likewise unlawful or a nullity or both in that the said learned trial judge did not before making the said order comply as he was bound to do with the provisions of section 133 (2) and section 134 (4) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30).

(b) The learned trial judge had no jurisdiction to make the said order under section 137 of the said Code as he purported to do.”

To understand counsel’s argument we must refer to section 133 (1), (2), (4) and (5) of Act 30. They read:

“133. (1) When in the course of a trial or preliminary proceedings the Court has reason to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, it shall enquire into the fact of such unsoundness by causing him to be medically examined and shall thereafter take medical and any other available evidence regarding the state of the accused’s mind.

(2) If the Court is Satisfied from evidence on oath that there is a prima facie case against the accused, but is of opinion that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence it shall record a finding to that effect and postpone further proceedings in the case.”

“(4) If the case is one in which bail may not be taken, or if sufficient security is not given, the Court shall order the accused to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as it may think fit and shall transmit the Court record of a certified copy thereof to the Minister through the Judicial Secretary.

(5) Upon consideration of the record the Minister may by warrant under his hand directed to the Court order that the accused may be confined as a criminal lunatic in a lunatic asylum or other suitable place of custody and the Court shall give any directions necessary to carry out such order. Any such warrant of the Minister shall be sufficient authority for the detention of the accused until the Minister shall make further order in the matter or until the Court finding him incapable of making his defence shall order him to be brought before it again in the manner provided by sections 134 and 135.”

It was urged for the accused that no valid committal could be made without a satisfactory finding “from evidence on oath” that a prima facie case had been made against him.

In the instant case, no evidence was taken. The full thrust of counsel’s argument consequently is that the statutory provisions designed to prevent the loss of liberty arising from a certification as a criminal lunatic where no offence has been committed but the accused is unable because of a mental incapacity to protest his innocence were breached.

Indeed in his statement to the committing magistrate, the accused maintained that he was rushing his sick child to hospital when the child

[p.180] of [1979] GLR 177

fell and sustained the injuries from which he died. He asserted he had no intention of killing his own son. Without evidence on oath, therefore, material did not exist to establish his defence of accident or the necessary ingredient of intent which the prosecution must establish to sustain a murder charge. All that was before the learned judge was an exhibition of the accused’s mental unbalance. Under section 133 (1) this was sufficient to conclude for the purpose of the section on the accused’s mental state, but more was required under section 133 (2) to conclude on his involvement in the murder charge.

Section 134 (4) (b) on which the court was persuaded by the state attorney and the accused’s former counsel to act is couched in the following terms:

“(4) If the Attorney-General informs the Court that the State does not intend to continue the proceedings then—. . .

(b) in any other case, the Court shall make a note on the record to that effect, and the person may thereafter be dealt with in like manner as a criminal lunatic under subsections (3) to (5) of section 137.”

It must be observed that section 134 can only follow when section 133 has been complied with.

The whole tenor of section 137 suggests a trial, at the conclusion of which, a special verdict might be returned if the accused is found to be guilty but insane.

It is clear therefore that no person can be labelled a criminal lunatic when evidence on oath has not been first advanced to demonstrate, prima facie at least, his clear involvement with the crime charged. Expressed another way, purely being mad is not a crime for which one should be put away as a criminal lunatic.

The answer of learned attorney for the state is short. He urges that section 134 (4) (b) read in conjunction with section 133 (1) of Act 30 short-circuits the process of determining a criminal lunatic. A positive demonstration of lunancy affords the prosecution the alternative of dispensing with a trial. In such a case the accused is treated as a criminal lunatic and the certification and warrant of incarceration follow as a matter of course. Further, learned counsel for the defence in associating himself with all that transpired must have acquiesced in dispensing with evidence on oath, and must be deemed to have conveyed to the court that the accused’s criminal involvement in the matter was beyond dispute.

We think the fallacy in this argument lies in the attempt to whittle down the effect of the clear mandatory language contained in section 133 (2). We are of the view that the provision admits of no ambiguity and that a prima facie case must be made against an accused person “on oath” before any of the sections can be pressed into service.

What then of the accused’s counsel’s conduct in the court below? And the related question whether this court would be justified in letting out onto an unsuspecting public a highly demented person, should the appeal succeed?

[p.181] of [1979] GLR 177

As to the first issue, we are of the view that the statutory requirement of the taking of evidence on oath cannot be waived or compromised. It is for very good reason, as we have endeavoured to show in this judgment, that that provision was made.

On the second score we do not have to rely on Lord Mansfield’s famous dictum—that the law must take its course whatever the consequences. There are a number of ways of suppressing the mischief. We adopt the most appropriate of ordering a trial and remanding the accused meanwhile in custody at the mental hospital till the trial commences in terms of section 135 (1) of Act 30.

We recommend that if the appellant is found fit to plead, the State may before re-commencing proceedings in pursuance of section 135 of Act 30, take into consideration the fact that the appellant has been in custody for a period of over ten years.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. D.

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