QUANSAH vs. QUANSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 718
19 June 1986 · AMPIAH JA · ≈ 8 min read
[1986] SLR (CA) 16Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Vanderpuye v Nartey [1977] 1 GLR 428, CA.
(2) Preston v Luck (1884) 27 ChD 497, CA.
(3) Punjabi Brothers v Namih (1958) 3 WALR 381.
(4) Bramwell v Halcomb (1836) 40 ER 1110.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a decision of the High Court dismissing a wife’s application for an interim injunction against her husband in respect of the matrimonial home. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
[p.720] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 718
COUNSEL
De Graft Aidoo for the appellant.
Dr Ekow Daniels for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.A.
On 12 June 1986 we dismissed this appeal and reserved our reasons. We now proceed to give our reasons. On 4 October 1985 the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) instituted an action against the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) claiming:
“1. declaration that the plaintiff is the lawful and legal owner of the house No PVL 290A, Akotokyir, in the Cape Coast District;
2. an order for continued possession;
3. injunction restraining the defendant, his agents, servants, employees and assigns from in any way interfering with the plaintiff’s quiet and peaceful enjoyment and possession of the said house;
4. an order for account of the plaintiff’s property left in the said house and the general household effects; and 5. damages.”
Soon after the writ of summons had been issued, the plaintiff filed an application for an order of interim injunction praying the court to – “grant an injunction by an interlocutory order restraining the defendant, his agents, servants, employees and concubines from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and quiet enjoyment of the plaintiff’s house No PVL 290A, Akotokyir, in the Cape Coast District together with all its belongings and the plaintiff’s personal effects left in the said house . . .”
The trial judge heard this application and on 30 October 1985 he dismissed it. It was this dismissal of the application which was appealed against. It was the contention of the plaintiff that:
“(a) the trial judge misunderstood the nature of the declaratory action instituted by the plaintiff.
(b) the trial judge took into consideration matters which are not relevant for the determination of the application before the court;
(c) the trial judge ignored incontrovertible facts which support the plaintiff’s claim; and
(d) the ruling or decision is against the weight of the facts deposed to in the affidavit.”
[p.721] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 718
On 22 April 1986, the plaintiff filed an additional ground in which she contended that, “the ruling blurs the distinction between interlocutory injunction and perpetual injunction.”
The plaintiff’s case as contained in her statement is that on 6 September 1981 the defendant made a customary gift to her of house No PVL 290A, Akotokyir, in the Cape Coast District. She offered aseda and the defendant accepted this in the presence of many people including very prominent personalities. She in pursuance of this gift took possession of this house which had been furnished with various items and put in her own belongings. She claimed that this house was thence recognised as her own property. It should be noted that the parties are man and wife married under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap 127 (1951 Rev). The plaintiff’s claim was that even though they had occasionally lived in this house when they had come down from Accra, this house had remained her bona fide property and had never been thought of as the matrimonial home. Her complaint was that since August 1982 the defendant who had told her that “…he needed to be temporarily separated from the plaintiff to cool off has moved into the said house No PVL 290A, Akotokyir … and is cohabiting there in adulterous and bigamous union with the said Aggie, sometimes called Agnes Nunoo and sometimes called Agnes Nunoo Spio.”
She contended that the defendant’s acts had been a calculated invasion of her legal right and property. She therefore applied to the court to restrain the defendant and his said concubine.
The defendant’s case was that even though he had in September 1981 during the opening ceremony of the disputed house made a samansiw or nuncupative will declaring that the said house was for his wife and children, the plaintiff had openly and publicly some time thereafter renounced her interest in the said house which he claimed to be a matrimonial home, and that the plaintiff had since 25 October 1981 or thereabout deserted the matrimonial home and collected away her property and general household effects from the house. He contended that as the legal owner, he was entitled to the occupation of his house and that even though he had commenced proceedings for the dissolution of his marriage with the plaintiff, he was entitled to stay in the house first as the owner and secondly, as a husband in the matrimonial home. He complained that an order ejecting him from the house or restraining him from the use of the house would cause hardship to him.
In his ruling, the trial judge observed:
[p.722] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 718 Though we did not have the submissions made by counsel on the application at the court below, it appeared that counsel for the defendant had relied considerably on the provisions of sections 4 (1) and 7 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD 175). He contended that since the alleged customary gift was not recorded in writing it was invalid. He contended further that even if there was a customary grant, the defendant was entitled for good cause to revoke the gift. The trial judge seemed to have been convinced by this submission. In his ruling he stated, “At the present time the title the plaintiff is seeking to assert is of no effect because it is not recorded in accordance with section 4 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973.”
This aspect of the judge’s ruling had prompted counsel for the plaintiff in his submission that the judge seemed to have misunderstood the nature of the declaratory action instituted by the plaintiff and also that the ruling blurred the distinction between interlocutory injunction and perpetual injunction. Counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that since the defendant’s counsel had not challenged the facts as deposed to in the supporting affidavit and in the statement of claim in his argument, the trial judge should have relied on the unchallenged facts rather than the effect of the NRCD 175 provisions to rule on the application since the application was not meant to decide the issue in the matter but simply to preserve the status quo ante to avoid hardship to the applicant.
NRCD 175, s 4 (1) provides:
“4. (1) An oral grant of an interest in land under customary law shall be recorded in the form contained in the First Schedule, or as near thereto as circumstances permit….”
And section 7 (1) of the same Decree also provides, “An oral grant made under customary law shall be of no effect until it is recorded under section 4.” We are of the view that the effect of the provisions of sections 4 (1) and 7 (1) of NRCD 175 on the matter before the court could only be determined after full evidence had been taken. Similarly, whether or not the defendant was entitled to revoke whatever grant he had made to the plaintiff of the house would depend upon the evidence to be given at the trial. At that stage of the proceedings, what the court was called upon to decide was whether or not on the evidence before the court, it was just or convenient to grant the application for
[p.723] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 718 injunction. Order 50, r 7 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), under which the application was brought provides:
“7 (1) The court may grant a mandamus or an injunction or appoint a receiver by an interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do.
(2) Any such order may be made either conditionally or on such terms or conditions as the court thinks just.”
In Vanderpuye v Nartey [1977] 1 GLR 428, the Court of Appeal held (as stated in the headnote at 429) that:
“The governing principle was whether on the face of the affidavit there was need to preserve the status quo in order to avoid irreparable damage to the applicant, provided his case was not frivolous or vexatious.”
On this principle, the court would grant an order for interim injunction if there is a serious question to be tried between the parties: see Preston v. Luck (1884) 27 ChD. 497 and Punjabi Brothers v. Namib (1958) 3 WALR 391. The court must also consider the relative convenience or inconvenience which would result to the parties from granting or withholding an interlocutory injunction: see Bramwell v. Halcomb (1836) 40 ER 1110.
Even though counsel for the defendant had relied substantially on the provisions of the law as stated above in his argument, there was an affidavit in opposition filed by the defendant in which the defendant averred to certain facts. The trial judge in the circumstances was enjoined by law to look at the totality of the evidence before him, including the defendant’s affidavit in considering the application before him.
The evidence disclosed that even though divorce proceedings had begun between the parties, they were still married. In paragraph 12 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim she averred:
“12. The plaintiff states that since the house numbered PVL 290 A Akotokyir was built she has always lived there first, as a wife and mother and secondly, as the legal owner and the sole beneficiary of the said house.”
This means that even if the matrimonial house was in Accra, the parties have also lived in this house as a matrimonial home when they were at Cape Coast. The evidence also showed that the plaintiff had left the house for some time and that the defendant was in possession. At that stage when the relative interests of the parties in the house had not been determined, it would be unjust to deprive the defendant of the
[p.724] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 718 use of a house he had claimed to be his and in which house they had spent part of their matrimonial life. From the evidence it appeared the plaintiff’s real concern was with the living in the said house by the defendant and his alleged concubine. It should be noted that the grant of an application for interim injunction is at the discretion of the judge. Provided there were facts upon which the court refuse the application, it could not be said that the discretion had not been exercised judicially.
We were of the view that there was sufficient evidence upon which the court could refuse the application. In the circumstance we were unable to disturb the order made by the trial judge. We accordingly dismissed the appeal.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J.A.A.
