QUARCOO vs. ALLOTEY [1980] GLR 788
10 December 1979 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 17 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 60Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Quartey v. Quartey (1951) D.C. Land ‘48-’51, 401.
(2) Amoa v. Wesleyan Methodist Mission Society (1929) D.Ct. ‘29-’31, 7.
(3) Thorne v. University of London [1966] 2 Q.B. 237; [1966] 2 W.L.R. 1080; [1966] 2 All E.R. 338, C.A.
(4) Lartey v. Mensah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 410.
(5) Yerenchi v. Akuffo (1905) 1 Ren. 362.
(6) Abakah v. Ambradu [1963] 1 G.L.R. 456, S.C.
(7) Botchway v. Solomon, Divisional Court, 7 December 1935, unreported.
(8) Estate of Kwabena Appianin (Decd.) In re; Frimpong v. Anane [1965] G.L.R. 354, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for declaration that plaintiff was still a joint head of family. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.
The parties to this suit are the principal elders of the Onamrokor Adain family of Accra. The evidence shows that this family is a wing of the royal house of the Gbese stool and is by all standards possessed of men of good educational background. The family according to the evidence has an accountant and operates its own banking account. It is therefore unfortunate that within a stretch of less than three years members have had to engage themselves in headship litigation twice.
The present action was originally commenced in the names of the present plaintiff and one Quao Otoo. The latter of the plaintiffs [p.790] of [1980] GLR 788 did not survive the trial of this case. The first plaintiff, B. A. Quarcoo, who is the one alive will for the purpose of this judgment be referred to simply as the plaintiff.
The plaintiff and the first defendant were until the events which sparked off the present action the joint heads of the family following upon the compromise of a family litigation effected as a result of a reference of that case by Abban J. to Mr. Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu and the La Mantse, Nii Anyetei Kwakwranya II some time in 1974. By that same compromise the late Quao Otoo and the remaining defendants were to constitute themselves as counsellors and elders of the family to aid the two heads. The facts before the court show that these elders are the respective heads of the six branches which constitute the Onamrokor Adain family and, in fact, they were responsible for the appointment of the plaintiff and the first defendant as joint heads of the family. And the facts which seem to have provoked the present action are that on or about 11 June 1976 invitations were sent out to the parties to this suit as principal members convening a family meeting. It took the form of letters addressed to the two joint-heads with copies to all the counsellors. The said letter took the following form:
“The Onamrokor Adain Family c/o The Secretary of the Council, P.O. Box 4290, Accra.
11 February 1976.
Manye Adorkor Allotey, Mr. B. A. Quarcoo, (Joint-Heads), The Onamrokor Adain Family, Accra.
Dear Sir, I am directed by the Onamrokor Adain family council to invite you to a meeting of the whole family to be held at the residence of Manye Adorkor Allotey, Korle-Wo-Kon, Accra at 9.30 a.m. on Saturday, 14 February 1976.
It would be my greatest delight if you could make it a point to attend this all important meeting.
All members of the council are hereby instructed to inform all family members of the respective branches they represent to attend this meeting.
[p.791] of [1980] GLR 788 AGENDA To discuss the conduct and administration of the family’s affairs generally and to examine certain complaints made by members of the family council against Mr. B. A. Quarcoo one of the joint-heads of the family in connection with his conduct and administration of the family’s property and affairs. Mr. B. A. Quarcoo has already been informed in writing of the nature of these complaints, and if he fails to attend this meeting, then the meeting will go in to examine the complaints and take such action on them as may be resolved upon at the meeting.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) D. W. Amarteifio.
Secretary.
ONAMROKOR ADAIN FAMILY COUNCIL. cc: To all Counsellors.”
The evidence shows that prior to sending this letter, written complaints about the administration of family property had been made against and sent to the plaintiff and one of the items on the agenda of this meeting was to examine these charges.
The meeting was, in fact, held on 21 February 1976, in the house of the first defendant with all the parties to this suit being present as well as some other junior members of the family. Present at that meeting also was the representative of the Gbese mantse in the person of one Nii Aryee described as Akwashong mantse and who testified as a witness for the defendants. It is the result of this meeting which according to the defendants culminated in the customary removal of the plaintiff as a joint-head. During the pendency of the suit the competency of this court to entertain the plaintiff’s action was raised. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that the matters raised on the face of the pleadings were matters within the exclusive competence of the family to determine. Learned counsel for the defendants therefore invited the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for want of jurisdiction.
On 19 February 1979, I noted that the pleadings raised a triable issue as to the propriety of the alleged deposition. The ruling on this issue did recognise the incompetence of the courts to arrogate to
[p.792] of [1980] GLR 788 themselves decisions which customary law and the common law have for centuries reposed in the families themselves but it also recognised that such meetings as are initiated to remove a head of family or a successor embark on quasi-judicial duties. It was therefore the duty of the courts to examine the procedural aspects of such meetings where the validity of the proceedings were put in issue to determine that no fundamental principle of the administration of justice was violated, especially the rules of natural justice: see Quartey v. Quartey (1951) D.C. Land ‘45-’51, 401 at p. 403. Other cases which support the principle that discretionary judgments within the jurisdiction of domestic bodies must not be interfered with by the courts unless there is a breach of natural justice are: Amoa v. Wesleyan Methodist Mission Society (1929) D.Ct. ‘29-’31, 7 and Thorne v. University of London [1966] 2 Q.B. 237, C.A.
So the issue settled for determination at this trial was narrowed down to the determination of the question whether the meeting held on 21 February 1976 in the house of the first defendant to go into charges preferred against the plaintiff did result in the customary deposition of the plaintiff as required by law?
To answer the above question, we shall attempt to examine the requirements of the customary procedure for the appointment and removal of a head of family or a successor and then examine the evidence in the instant case to see how far the defendants’ contention is made out. These requirements are:
(a) a meeting of the family must be convened;
(b) the purpose of the meeting must be spelt out, i.e. to consider complaints brought against the head or successor; and
(c) all principal members of the family entitled to be invited must be so invited.
Such principal members are those recognised by the family as are qualified to take part in the appointment of a successor or head: see Lartey v. Mensah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 410; Yerenchi v. Akuffo (1905) 1 Ren. 362; Abakah v. Ambradu [1963] 1 G.L.R. 456, S.C. and Botchway v. Solomon, Divisional Court, 7 December 1935, unreported. And in the case of In re Estate of Kwabena Appianin (Decd.); Frimpong v. Anane [1965] G.L.R. 354, S.C. it was held (as stated in the headnote) that:
“. . . in matters such as the appointment and removal of a head of family which are of vital importance to a family, all the principal members of the family are entitled to a hearing, and opportunity should be given to all of them so that those of them who wish to be heard can exercise their right. This means that notice of the proposed meeting and the gist of the purpose of the meeting
[p.793] of [1980] GLR 788 should be given to all the principal members. On the evidence in this case, the trial judge was right in his finding that a family meeting complying with the above requirements had been convened and that it had properly deposed the defendant as successor and head of family and appointed the plaintiff in his stead.”
In addition to the above, I venture to add the following:
(d) the decision is taken by vote by the majority of the principal members present. (This is always done in conference by consultation); and
(e) the proceedings must not violate any fundamental principle of the administration of justice.
It is also desirable that the charges must be set forth in advance before the meeting day if they are in written form. Where the head is informed first of the charges on the day of the meeting an adjournment should be acceded to at his request in order to afford him a reasonable opportunity to answer the charges. Having attempted to lay down the essential requirements we shall now proceed to examine the evidence in this case.
The evidence shows that on 21 February 1976 pursuant to the notices convening the meeting, all the principal elders of the family including the plaintiff assembled in the house of the first defendant. The meeting was formally opened and the second defendant, Mr. Amarteifio, was chosen as the secretary and spokesman for the family. He read the charges and elaborated on the substance of each charge to give a clearer information to the plaintiff. His evidence shows that there were four charges; on three of which the plaintiff joined issue but referred charge No. 2 to his elder brother, one Addo Quarcoo, as the proper person to answer that charge. The evidence further shows that during the proceedings the plaintiff produced a written answer to the charges which he handed to the second and the first defendants. The evidence of the first witness for the plaintiff, Samuel Allotey, and that of the second defendant as to what happened in the course of the proceedings are pertinent. The first plaintiff witness said:
“After the plaintiff had handed over the document to the second defendant I heard someone say ‘Gbeedjuloi’ meaning ‘You thieves.’ I heard one of my uncles by name Tafo Ahele Quarcoo reply ‘You are rather the thieves.’ The first person who said ‘you thieves’ then got up and moved towards the direction of my uncle, Tafo Ahele. As the other man was moving towards my uncle some of the members of the family held the two men who
[p.794] of [1980] GLR 788 were about to exchange blows and others entreated them to stop. Things later died down. When things died down the second defendant said that they had considered the plaintiff as unsuitable for administration of the family property. The plaintiff and some members of the family who came with him protested and left. When the plaintiff and some of his followers left I remained. When the plaintiff left there was a vote and the vote was carried by show of hands in favour of the removal of the plaintiff as a co-administrator of the family property.
After this, gin was brought and libation poured. A sheep was later brought and I left. At the time of voting the plaintiff had left. It is correct the plaintiff was not cross-examined on any of the charges.”
On the same issue this is what the second defendant had to say:
“Atta Addo started giving the history of the quarry but he was stopped because the family was asking for accounts and not history. Atta Addo then said he remembered receiving between ¢140 and ¢160 from the quarry but could not be sure of the exact account. At this juncture the first plaintiff produced two envelopes and handed over one to me and the other to the first defendant. After handing over the envelopes the plaintiff left the meeting with William Quao Otoo. Efforts were made from different directions to persuade the plaintiff to return but he refused. The first defendant witness was among those who tried to persuade the plaintiff to return. In fact when the first defendant witness sent a message that plaintiff should return he paused for a while and went away. After the plaintiff had left, I opened the letter he gave to me. When I opened the letter, I saw that it contained written answers to the charges. In that letter the plaintiff had refuted all the allegations in the charges against him. The meeting however continued without the first and the second plaintiffs. We discussed the letter the plaintiff wrote, his attitude in leaving without offering us the opportunity of going through his written answers to the charges and the fact that he had sent copies of his answers to the registrar of this court and Mr. Nelson-Cofie who are no members of the family. The family considered this behaviour of the plaintiff questionable and decided to remove him as head of family. A question was put to this effect to the members of the family ‘whether in view of the behaviour of the plaintiff at the meeting we should retain him as joint-head.’ Hands were raised against retaining him
[p.795] of [1980] GLR 788 as joint-head. A sheep was slaughtered and after libation had been poured two messengers were sent to the plaintiff’s house with one hind leg of the slaughtered sheep and a copy of the resolution deposing the plaintiff were sent to inform him of his removal and deposition.”
In cross-examination the second defendant said:
“It is correct that when Addo Quarcoo had explained about the quarry money Victor Quarcoo retorted ‘You thieves you have been stealing our lands and selling them.’ It is correct when Victor Quarcoo uttered these words Ahele Tafo alias Anoi Kofi Kye replied that ‘You are the bigger thieves.’ At this juncture there was a social disorder at the meeting. It is correct that it was at this stage amidst the confusion that the plaintiff left.”
(The emphasis is mine.) There is also the evidence that during the hold-up someone asked the plaintiff to leave the meeting.
It must be borne in mind at this stage that the sole issue raised for trial here is whether the meeting which allegedly removed the plaintiff ended abruptly or came to a conclusion as required by law.
It is clear from the above facts that on 21 February 1976 a meeting of the family was convened to hear the plaintiff on charges connected with the administration of family property. It is also clear that in the course of the proceedings the meeting developed into what the second defendant described as a social disorder adding that it was at this stage amidst the confusion that the plaintiff left. (The emphasis is mine.) There is also some evidence that when the plaintiff was leaving attempts were made to invite him back but this was unsuccessful. I have picked on the evidence of the second defendant and paid more attention to it because not only did he have a voting right as a principal member of the family, he also acted as the spokesman of the family and was the secretary at the meeting and in the present proceedings he testified on behalf of all the defendants who have the burden of proving that the one-time joint-head of the family had been removed customarily. On the above circumstances, I consider his evidence to be of the utmost importance and ought to be given the greatest weight it deserves.
It must also be mentioned that the other witnesses who testified in this case told the court in different forms what happened. The one common area of agreement among them is that they all agree that at some stage the proceedings were brought to a standstill as tempers rose among some of the members of the family present. It is also
[p.796] of [1980] GLR 788 agreed that the events which provoked the near exchange of blows at the meeting and brought the meeting to a halt were the act of some junior members of the family. I sensed from the evidence of the plaintiff that he was deeply touched and did not take lightly the accusation by Victor Quarcoo, an accusation which provoked the “social disorder.”
From the sum total of the evidence one cannot help but be tempted to say that the atmosphere even after the exchange of words between Ahele Tafo and Victor Quarcoo had calmed down was not conducive for further continuation of the proceedings and the evidence shows that soon after the plaintiff had left, some comments on his behaviour in leaving was raised by a member in condemnation and so was his conduct in sending copies of his answers to non-members of the family in like manner condemned and a vote for his deposition put there and then.
In order to determine this case at this stage it is necessary to consider the following:
(a) whether in such an atmosphere as has been described by the second defendant, an independent impartial observer would say that the plaintiff was not justified in leaving despite calls from other members of the family not to leave;
(b) whether native custom consisting in the performance of what is reasonable in the circumstance would consider it in the particular circumstance of this case proper for the meeting to have continued after the confusion which had caused the plaintiff to leave the meeting;
(c) whether the question put to vote was appropriate in the circumstances; and
(d) whether the manner in which the votes were carried was in accordance with custom.
On issue (a) viewed from the totality of the evidence and especially the evidence of the plaintiff, the second defendant and the circumstances in which the plaintiff found himself, I am of the view that he was the obvious object of attack by Victor Quarcoo who even though is from the plaintiff’s branch of the family was at that time a free member of the family to choose where he belonged. Whilst not laying down a general principle that whenever there arose a disorder at a family meeting a person whose conduct or administrative activities of family property was being investigated had a licence to leave the meeting, the particular facts of this case where it is not disputed that the meeting developed into a “social disorder” and confusion and
[p.797] of [1980] GLR 788 especially where such a person found it unsafe for his person to remain, a fear which I can reasonably deduce from the plaintiff’s evidence and demeanour that he genuinely entertained (for as he put it he doubted the honesty of the call to him to remain) he would be entitled to leave especially as the commotion itself was neither his making nor under his instigation. He himself said he thought the meeting would be reconvened at another date. I therefore find in my judgment that the plaintiff’s departure amidst the confusion of the type described by the second defendant was not meant to slap the members of the family assembled in the face nor can I find any manoeuvre to frustrate the meeting in his conduct. I hold from the above that this is not a case where the plaintiff and his supporters’ conduct in leaving was intended to obstruct the conduct of family affairs by their departure. It also follows from the above that I find it improper for the proceedings against the plaintiff to have continued after his departure since even though the perpetrators of the commotion had been calmed down, tempers for that brief moment and events following soon thereafter are shown to have weighed on the minds of some of the principal members so as to impair their duty of objective impartial assessment of the evidence free from prejudice.
On issue (c) the question as put to vote made it difficult for any one to sever the instant condemnation of the plaintiff’s departure and also sending copies of his answers to non-members of the family from a consideration of the charges preferred and the answers offered. I am not here to be taken to mean that the court must be satisfied as to whether the charges were proved or were answered. The point here is that the two former condemnations were done without offering an opportunity to the plaintiff to explain why he left and why he sent copies of his answers to non-members of the family. An explanation, which, if opportunity had been offered, may prove the good faith of his conduct.
On issue (d) the general principle is that only the principal members of the family who take part in appointing a head of family have a voting right to remove him and hence the necessity to invite all such principal members: see In re Estate of Kwabena Appianin (Decd.) (supra). The evidence on the procedure of the vote adopted in this particular case reveals that the question was put at the general meeting and all present were asked to show by hands one way or other. This procedure may seem democratic in so far as it purports to receive the acclamation of all present but it is not the usual practice. First because not all members of family were invited to this
[p.798] of [1980] GLR 788 meeting. Even the invitations convening the meeting on its face envisage the normal customary practice of giving voting rights in this particular instance to the electoral college system formed in the instant case by only the principal elders. A departure therefore from this rendered the vote cast voidable at the instance of the person whose conduct was being investigated. Then there is also to be considered the dangers involved in the general acclamation vote adopted in this instance. To give voting right to all those who attended the meeting even though not invited because they being junior members and therefore need not be invited, would be to overlook the rights of other junior members who did not even hear of the meeting, and would give undue advantage to junior members staying in the house where the meeting is held over others. Secondly, there is the other danger that those members who came in just when the question was put would be entitled to vote even though such members did not follow the proceedings and the evidence. As far as the principal elders who were invited are concerned they must be deemed to know why they were assembled and it is clear from the preparations for this meeting that the voting right intended to be adopted was the orthodox one by the principal elders and this not having been followed, I think the plaintiff is entitled to challenge the customary validity of his deposition.
I hold in my judgment therefore from the conclusions above, that the meeting held on 21 February 1976 to go into the charges brought against the plaintiff which allegedly removed the plaintiff did not come to a conclusion as required by law. I would therefore enter judgment for the plaintiff and grant his relief that he is still a joint-head of the family.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
S. O. K. O.
