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[1985] SLR (CA) 36Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS LTD. vs. FOSUA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 334

30 July 1985 · SOWAH JSC · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 36
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS LTD. v FOSUA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 334 [1985] SLR (CA) 36
APAREAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS LTD. v FOSUA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 334, [1985] SLR (CA) 36 (Ghana).
BluebookREAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS LTD. v FOSUA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 334, [1985] SLR (CA) 36 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Omaboe v. Kwame [1978] G.L.R. 122, C.A.

(2) Daws v. Daily Sketch & Sunday Graphic Ltd. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 126; [1960] 1 All E.R. 397, CA.

(3) Carr v. Berriman (J.A) Pty (1953) 27 A.L.J. 273.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra decreeing specific performance of contracts for the sale of two houses in favour of the respondents. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Sowah J.S.C..

COUNSEL

J. K. Agyemang for the appellants.

Nana Otoamfom Bekoe (Peter A. Adjetey) for the respondents.

[p.337] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.

Sowah J.S.C delivered the judgment of the court. The facts of this case are uncomplicated and straightforward. The respondents (hereafter called the plaintiffs) Madam Ama Fosua and her husband Kwaku Bo, also known by several other names including Major K.K. Biney of the Ghana Army, are man and wife. And the appellant company (hereafter called the defendant) is a real estate developing company and operates under the name and style of Real Estate Developers Ltd.

The plaintiffs being desirous of acquiring housing properties approached the managing director of the defendant company which was building houses in Tema. The approach was made by Ama Fosua who from the evidence knew the defendant’s managing director prior to the transaction which had brought the parties to court.

The plaintiffs both negotiated with the defendant’s managing director for the purchase of a house each. Madam Ama Fosua paid the sum of ¢245,000 for her house and the second plaintiff Kwaku Bo paid ¢255,000 for his. The houses were uncompleted at the time but the plaintiffs were, according to the evidence, obliged to pay the full purchase prices because of the representations made by the defendant company’s managing director that the house to be purchased by Madam Ama Fosua would be completed within three months and the other within six months from the dates of payment.

The receipt dated 22 November 1978, exhibit D, reads, “Received with thanks from Madam Ama Fosua the sum of two hundred and forty-five thousand cedis being full settlement of Plot No. 6 Home Type AT74…” Exhibit E is the agreement entered into between the company and Madam Ama Fosua also on 22 November 1978. There was a similar agreement between the defendant company and the second plaintiff, Kwaku Bo (except for the price and time of completion) in identical terms vide exhibits A and B. In the agreement with Kwaku Bo the period was six months (subject to the general conditions of business thereto attached).

The first house by simple arithmetic ought to have been completed by 1 April 1979 and the second by July 1979. On 29 October 1980 the plaintiffs in identical but separate letters wrote to the defendant company inviting their attention to the terms of the agreements. The defendant company reacted almost immediately. In its reply dated 7 November 1980, exhibit 9, the company blamed the scarcity of supply of building materials and inflation for the delay and warned that there would be upward adjustments in the prices already agreed to. The plaintiffs indicated in rejoinders that the contents of the letters of 7 November 1980 were unacceptable. Nevertheless on 6 February 198

[p.338] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334 the defendant company by exhibits C3 and J communicated the final prices to the plaintiffs, i.e. ¢440,545 for each house less the sums paid by the plaintiffs. By 13 October 1983 the cost of the houses as per exhibit M had escalated to ¢750,000 each.

The dispute finally found its way to the court. Two separate writs were issued against the defendant; the first being writ No. 1694/81 in respect of Madam Fosua and the other was suit No. 1695/81 in respect of Kwaku Bo. The plaintiffs claimed similar reliefs, namely (a) specific performance by the defendant of its contractual obligation to deliver unto the possession of the plaintiff the house type AT 74 of plot No. 6 at Tema already completed, and (b) damages for detention. The writs were filed by the same counsel and the defence in both suits settled by the same defence counsel. The only distinguishing features of the writs were the purchase prices and the dates of completion of each of the houses. In our view if ever there were causes or claims for which consolidation could be applied for and granted they were these two suits.

But to continue with the narrative of events, by 16 June 1982 the cases were ripe for hearing; the second plaintiff Kwaku Bo entered the witness-box. However, by reason of several adjournments both plaintiffs closed their cases on 29 March 1984. The actual number of hearing days therefore was four. In between these hearings there was an inordinate number of adjournments almost wholly at the instance of the defence. It must also be mentioned that the judge was himself absent from court for a period of ten months. Be that as it may, it did appear from the record that the defence was not anxious to have the cases concluded. There was one excuse after the other for adjournments. Counsel was more frequently absent from court for the trial than one would consider reasonable.

However, the learned judge observing the delay tactics of the defence called upon the defendant company to open its case. Counsel was absent but the defendant company acting by its managing director was present. He too was called upon to lead evidence but declined and gave as reason for his refusal the absence of his counsel from court and the judge rightly in our view closed the company’s case and proceeded at an adjourned date to pronounce his judgment.

On this score we affirm that the learned judge acted on sound principles. We will only refer to Omaboe v. Kwame [1978] G.L.R. 122, C.A. where in very similar circumstances the trial judge was obliged to close the case of a defendant and to deliver his judgment. Delivering the judgment of the court Apaloo C.J. observed at 125:

[p.339] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334

“As we said, that judgment was obtained in the presence of the party who seeks to set it aside. He was afforded an opportunity to meet his opponent’s case by such evidence as he had. He declined to do so. No blame of any sort can be attributed to the respondent or indeed the court.”

In fairness to Mr. Agyemang, counsel for the defendant company, it ought to be stated that this appeal is not from the refusal of the High Court to set aside its judgment; it is an appeal on the merits. Indeed, learned counsel endeavoured to hold the bull by the horns, if we may use a popular expression, and to pull it down. He accordingly stands or falls by his ability and strength to succeed in that enterprise.

Mr. Agyemang starts by attacking what may be described as procedural defects in the conduct of the case. He submits that the learned High Court judge had no power to transfer a case pending before another judge to himself; that the power to do so rested in the Chief Justice. The short answer to that submission is that the Constitution, 1979 established only one High Court of Justice: vide article 115. For the purpose of administration and judicial convenience there are divisions of the High Court established in almost all the regional capitals. There was therefore no transfer by Anterkyi J. when he became seised with that suit.

The second submission which appears to have some substance was against the judge’s order of consolidation of the suits Nos. 1694/81 and 1695/81. As already observed the two suits were eminently suitable for consolidation. If I understand the submission of Mr. Agyemang, he argued that the order of consolidation at the stage they were consolidated was premature; that one case had reached the summons for directions stage while in the other, only a defence had been filed. Secondly, the consolidation was ordered without regard to proper procedure in that there was no written application by way of motion or summons.

The omnibus answer to these submissions is contained in Order 70, (the effect of non-compliance) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). But we will proceed further to hold that these submissions are untenable. Counsel for the parties were present when the order was made. On 1 March 1982 the plaintiff in suit No. 1694/81, Madam Ama Fosua, applied under Order 14, r. 1 L.N. 140A for judgment in default of defence. There was a similar application in suit No. 1695/81 before another division of the High Court.

Upon an oral application by counsel that the two suits be brought before the same court and for an order of consolidation the learned judge granted the application. Subsequently the two suits were

[p.340] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334 consolidated and the trial proceeded. The applications before the court for summary judgment were then struck out and the trial proceeded with the suits as consolidated. Mr. Bob Anane, counsel for the defendant (who was at all material times in court), raised no objection.

In any event counsel has been unable to show how prejudiced or damnified his client company was by the consolidation. It seems to us that the debate whether or not the consolidation was properly applied for and ordered is a sterile one. Speaking for myself, I would observe that these rules are ordained to be a handmaid of justice and unless counsel can demonstrate from the record that his client has suffered real or substantial injustice by reason of its non-compliance. I would not suffer it to have any effect on the appeal.

Mr. Peter Ala Adjetey, now known as Nana Otoamfom Bekoe, counsel for the plaintiffs, rightly pointed out that if counsel for the defendant thought that the consolidation was improper or prejudicial, he had over two years within which to apply for the deconsolidation of the suits. Frankly I do not think, with respect, that there is any substance in Mr. Agyemang’s submission on procedural defects.

In passing, I may mention the case of Daws v. Daily Sketch & Sunday Graphic; Darke v. Same [1960] 1 All E.R. 3978, C.A. where it was held that consolidation which had been ordered was improperly done. In that appeal the appellants were from the onset of the application totally opposed to the application. When the actions were consolidated they appealed against the order. In allowing the appeal the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that consolidation was prejudicial to the interest of the appellants. Mr. Agyemang has been unable to indicate the manner or how his client’s interest was prejudiced. His predecessor in the case consented to the consolidation and we think he was right in so doing.

Turning now to the merits of this case Mr. Agyemang submitted that the learned judge failed to advert his mind to the agreements, exhibits A and E, which the parties had entered into and which governed their business relationship in respect of the contracts.

The facts have already been set out as a preface to this judgment. The High Court judgment reproduced, indeed, the whole of the pleadings, and evidence both in-chief and cross-examination. It appears that the agreements, exhibits B and E (with their annexures), indicate that the general conditions of business are on standard forms. Some of its provisions are inapplicable. A careful study of the whole of the agreement indicates that its provisions together with the general conditions were intended for a hire purchase agreement and did not envisage situations when full payments have been made before construction or for such circumstances as exist herein. Nevertheless, it

[p.341] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334 is the agreement of the parties, and the plaintiffs in evidence said they read and understood them. It was they who tendered them each in support of the case. We will therefore apply those parts which are applicable. Clauses 1 to 3 of the preamble are applicable. We find that only part of clause 1 of the main agreement is applicable, namely that the client shall make full payment of the total of ¢245,000 in the case of exhibit B and ¢255,000 in exhibit E. The rest of that clause is wholly inapplicable since the receipts, A and D, from the company to the plaintiffs do confirm that full settlement had been made for the houses.

In clause 4 of both agreements A and E, the defendant undertook to complete the buildings within six months and three months respectively. That is also applicable. There are various provisions in the general conditions of business annexed to the agreement which were wholly inapplicable to the transaction entered into by the parties.

It seems to us that the only provisions which should call for consideration are those relating to the costs of the houses and whether or not the defendant could vary the costs of the houses which have been fully paid; further, whether it could absolve itself from the consequences of the delay.

There is no doubt in our minds and from a study of the agreement that the plaintiffs made full payments for the two houses and that the provisions relating to variation of prices in certain conditions are not applicable. As observed, the agreement form is drafted for hire purchases.

The next question which arises is whether or not time is of the essence in this agreement. The evidence before the court was that the defendant company agreed to complete the house of Ama Fosua within three months and that of Kwaku Bo in six months. That before the plaintiffs paid the full cost of the houses they inspected the buildings and the materials for their completion and were satisfied that the houses could be so completed. Nevertheless, judging from the conduct of the plaintiffs, they would have been happy if they had obtained possession of them within reasonable time. It took them nearly two years to react to the delay. In all the circumstances it is safe to conclude that time was not of the essence. The defendant company should have however completed the buildings within a reasonable time.

In Hudson’s Building & Engineering Contracts (10th ed.) at p. 604, there is a citation of an Australian case Carr v. J.A. Berriman Property Ltd. (1953) 27 A.L.J. 273 and I quote:

“Where a contract contains a promise to do a particular thing on or before a specified day, time may or may not be of the essence. If it is, the promise is entitled to rescind, but he may elect not to

[p.342] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334 exercise the right and an election will be inferred from any conduct which is consistent with the contract remaining in being. If not of the essence or no longer of the essence because of election, rescission is generally only permitted after giving a notice requiring performance within a specified reasonable time, and after non-compliance with the notice.”

What is reasonable time in the circumstances of this case especially when the defendant company had represented to the plaintiffs by words and deeds that it was in a position to fulfil its obligations within the stipulated time? We think at the very outside it should be up to 28 October 1980 when they demanded the keys to the houses: vide exhibits C and D. The defendant company must have known the general condition of its trade when it undertook to complete the houses within the time stipulated. Since it had the building materials on the site at the time, any variations in prices of building materials could not therefore have affected the completion of the houses. We do not think that the defendant company is entitled to benefit from its breach and default (even if prices had changed), of which there was no evidence on record.

The defendant company had endeavoured to protect itself from the consequence of delay but we think it cannot be absolved where the delay is unreasonable and unconscionable. It ought to have given an explanation of the causes of delay which it did not.

We think the learned judge came to the right conclusion on both the documentary and oral evidence before him and we so endorse it. In coming to this conclusion we are not unmindful that the learned judge indulged himself in violent and vituperative language against the defendant company and its managing director. It appears to us that these were the result of his exasperation with the conduct of the defence and its counsel. We however consider that (shorn of the language complained of, which with great respect is immodest and undesirable in the character of a judge) he came to the right conclusion.

We now turn our attention as to whether the plaintiffs could be entitled to both specific performance of the contract and damages for detention. In the circumstances of this case the plaintiffs had alternative remedies either specific performance or rescission and damages for breach of the contracts to complete the building at the due date.

As already observed the plaintiffs elected to keep the contract alive and therefore claimed for specific performance which has been granted. They also claimed for damages for the detention of the said property until the same is delivered to the plaintiffs.

An action for detention is an action for detinue and it presupposes that the plaintiffs have vested in them either the legal estate or a right to immediate possession, which they have not until the building is

[p.343] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334 completed and ready to be handed over. Both the legal estate and possession are in the defendant company. This is not to say that the plaintiffs are not entitled to general damages for breach of contract.

After the expiration of three months and six months respectively the plaintiffs, Ama Fosua and Kwaku Bo, were entitled to possession of the completed houses but they did not exercise that right until 28 October 1980 when in identical letters they called on the defendant company to release the keys of the houses but which were by implication refused. The defendant company reacted by forwarding to the plaintiffs letters purporting to vary the costs of the building upwards and requesting them to pay the difference before collection of the keys.

Upon these facts the learned judge awarded the most startling damages. In suit No. 1694/81 he awarded ¢200,000 damages to the plaintiff Ama Fosua plus an amount of ¢145,000 unrefunded by the managing director, Buachie Kessie, in respect of the payment on behalf of Kofi Donkor Adjei, making a total of ¢345,000. In suit No. 1695/81 he awarded to Kwaku Bo ¢250,000 damages for unlawful retention or detention of the said property or its possession for the period of five years.

The plaintiffs failed to lead evidence as to the purposes for which they were purchasing the house: whether they intended living in or letting them out for commercial purposes; if for commercial purposes the rent each house would attract per annum. As already observed, there was absolutely no basis for the damages or upon which it could be estimated. They probably relied on the law that damages follow the event. The learned judge fell into that error and awarded damages which are outrageous in all the circumstances. They are not based on any known principle.

In the first instance, that is in the case of Ama Fosua, the learned judge by simple arithmetic awarded ¢40,000 per annum for five years and ¢50,000 per annum to Kwaku Bo also for five years. It is true in principle that damages follow the breach of a contract but it does not follow that there must be no basis for the award, especially when exemplary damages are being contemplated or awarded.

We think the judge on this score must have been influenced by the other consideration exemplified in the language of his judgment. On no less than three occasions and without just cause he stigmatised the defendant company and its managing director as “rogues.”

For these reasons we would set aside the award in both suits 1694 and 1695 and substitute therefor damages for ¢3,000 per annum from the period of demand and refusal to hand over the key to Ama Fosua and ¢3,000 to Kwaku Bo.

[p.344] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 334

Counsel for the plaintiffs has conceded that there was also no basis for the award of the sum of ¢145,000 to Ama Fosua and we accordingly set that aside. We now turn our attention to the award of costs which has always been in the discretion of the trial judge, but we think the learned judge in considering it must have again taken extraneous matters into deliberation. A perusal of the record shows the actual number of hearing days were four days but there were a great number of adjournments as already observed, at the instance of the defendant company and its counsel. However, on those occasions the learned judge awarded substantial costs.

Be that as it may, an impartial reading of the judgment cannot but reveal the emotional state of mind of the judge when he made these orders. In suit No. 1695/81 he assessed costs of ¢100,000 in favour of Kwaku Bo and in 1694/81 costs of ¢150,000 in favour of Ama Fosua. We think there was no basis for these awards; even if the learned judge did exercise his discretion, it was not based on any known judicial principles. The actual number of days for hearing were four days. Further, some costs had already been awarded by the learned judge for adjournments at the instance of the defence. The two cases were consolidated, the facts in each case were similar, the same counsel for both plaintiffs in suits Nos. 1694/81 and 1695/81 and for the defence. It is quite clear he was out to punish the defendant company and its managing director, for their “roguery” if we may use the judge’s language. We accordingly set aside the award of costs and substitute therefor ¢2,500 in suit No. 1694/81 and ¢2,500 in suit No. 1695/81.

In this court we will award no costs as the defendant company has partly but substantially succeeded in the appeal.

In conclusion we affirm the decision of the High Court judge on the issue of liability but vary the award of damages and costs as indicated above.

DECISION

Appeal allowed in part.

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