REPUBLIC v. ASAFU-ADJAYE [1968] GLR 245
13 March 1968 · EDUSEI J · ≈ 4 min read
[1968] SLR (HC) 79Other citation styles and permanent link
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DIVISION: HIGH COURT, ACCRA
DATE: 13 MARCH 1968
BEFORE: EDUSEI J.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
RULING on the right of Attorney-General or his representative to address the court in proceedings under the Corrupt Practices (Prevention) Act, 1964 (Act 230).
COUNSEL
S.M. Boison, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
Sir Edward Asafu-Adjaye (with him J. Arthur and K.F. Asafu
Adjaye) for the accused.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.
The procedure for dealing with cases under the Corrupt Practices (Prevention) Act, 1964 (Act 230), is set out in the Corrupt Practices (Prevention) (Procedure) Regulations, 1967 (L.I. 571). Regulation 11 of the regulations states:
“The Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) shall, subject to these regulations, apply to the institution and conduct of proceedings under section 4 of the Act to the extent specified in Part II of the Schedule to these Regulations.”
My construction of this regulation is that where no express provisions have been made in respect of a particular matter of procedure in these regulations, then the provisions of Act 30 in so far as they are not excluded by Part II of the schedule to these regulations shall apply. In other words section 132(2) of Act 30 which gives the Attorney-General and his law officers a right of reply in all cases shall, subject to these regulations, apply to the conduct of these proceedings. Regulation 8 of L.I. 571 which deals with addresses to the court is as follows:
“(1) Where the accused has been allowed to call any additional witnesses under section 6 (2) of the Act the Attorney-General may, with the leave of the Court, address the Court at the conclusion of the evidence of the accused or such additional witnesses, whichever is later.
(2) The accused or his advocate may, with the leave of the Court address the Court before evidence is given by or for him or after such evidence is given as the accused thinks fit.
(3) The accused or his advocate may, with the leave of the Court, address the Court on evidence given by additional witnesses called by the Court or the Attorney-General under section 6(1) (b) of the Act.”
It would appear that the Attorney-General may address the court only when the accused has either given evidence or called additional witnesses, and even in such a situation he can only do so with the leave of the court. There is no right conferred on the Attorney-General to address the court as of right; he can only do so with the leave of the court. The phrase, “subject to these Regulations” in regulation 11 of L.I. 571 is of very great significance. The said regulation 11 simply means that where no provision as regards addresses to court has been made in L.I. 571 then the procedure in Act 30 concerning addresses shall apply, if, of course, a particular provision of Act 30 has not been excluded: see Part II to the Schedule of L.I. 571. The accused in the instant proceedings has neither given evidence nor called any additional witnesses, and I do not see my way clear in allowing the Attorney-General or his representative (chief state attorney in this case) in terms of regulation 8(1) to address the court. My discretion to permit an address from the Attorney-General in these circumstances is excluded. Where even the accused has either given evidence or called additional witnesses the Attorney-General is not, as of right, entitled to address the court. He can only do so with the leave of the court. If this is so I fail to appreciate the force of the arguments of the learned chief state attorney that the Attorney-General has a right of reply in all cases in the instant proceedings which are regulated by a special procedure (L.I. 571). If his argument is correct then the practical importance of regulation 8(1) of L.I. 571 is defeated. His argument means that whether the accused has called additional witnesses or not the Attorney-General has a right of reply because by section 132(2) of Act 30 he has a right of reply in all cases including situations that arise in regulation 8(1) of L.I. 571. Such an interpretation about the applicability of section 132(2) of Act 30 to the instant proceedings will make nonsense of regulation 8(1) of L.I. 571. In the result I rule that the Attorney-General in these circumstances has no right of reply.
DECISION
Submission on the right of the Attorney-General to address court overruled.
F. S. T.
