REPUBLIC v. MAIKANKAN AND OTHERS [1972] 2 GLR 502
HIGH COURT, ACCRA
Date: 5 SEPTEMBER 1972
BEFORE: ABOAGYE J.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R. v. Zonyra [1959] G.L.R. 26, C.A.
(2) Commissioner of Police v. Afari [1962] 1 G.L.R. 483, S.C.
(3) R. v. Millard (1813) Russ. & Ry. 245; 186 E.R. 78, C.C.R.
(4) R. v. Moore (1858) 1 F. & F. 73; 175 E.R. 631.
(5) R. v. Smith (1827) 2 Car. & P. 633; 172 E.R. 287.
(6) Groths v. Payne (1839) 11 Ad. & El. 131; 3 Per. & Dav. 107; 9 L.J.Q.B. 34.
(7) R. v. Harris (1927) 20 Cr.App.R. 144, C.C.A.
(8) State v. Otchere [1963] 2 G.L.R. 463.
(9) R. v. Adamu [1960] G.L.R. 91, C.A.
(10) State v. Kassena (Ali) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C.
(11) R. v. Osabu (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 180, C.A.
(12) R. v. Ojojo [1959] G.L.R. 207, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
RULING on a submission of no case to answer by persons accused on various charges of, inter alia,
conspiracy to defraud the Bank of Ghana by false pretences. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
K. A. Sekyi, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.
H. P. Swanker for the first accused.
Ofosu-Asante for the fifth accused.
P. A. Adjetey for the fourth and sixth accused.
Kwaku Boateng (with him A. B. K. Quartey) for the seventh, eighth and ninth accused.
JUDGMENT OF ABOAGYE J.
The ten accused persons are charged with various offences, namely, (1) conspiracy to defraud contrary to sections 23 (1) and 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29); (2) conspiracy to contravene the restrictions imposed by section 6 of the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 7 1); (3) conspiracy to commit forgery contrary to sections 23 (1) and 159 of the Criminal Code, 1960; (4) forgery, contrary to section 159 of the Criminal Code, 1960; (5) uttering forged documents, contrary to section 169 of the Criminal Code, 1960; (6) defrauding by false pretences contrary to section 131 of the Criminal Code 1960; (7) making illegal payments outside Ghana, contrary to section 6 of the Exchange Control Act, 1961, and paragraph 5 (1) of Part II of the Fourth Schedule to the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71). There are 515 charges in all and each of the accused persons has pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him.
The case for the prosecution is simple: it is that the accused persons, all in the cattle business, conspired to defraud the Bank of Ghana by false pretences and they did in fact defraud the bank in its foreign exchange reserves by making illegal payments outside Ghana. Acting as cattle dealers or agents of importers of cattle into Ghana, the accused [p.505] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 persons transferred the various sums of money stated in the charges abroad on the strength of exchange
control forms Al approved by the Bank of Ghana. The documents which supported the applications for the approval, namely, veterinary permits, customs bills of entry, agency agreements, and tax clearance certificates, were all forgeries and the accused persons knew of the falsity of the documents. In some cases the exchange control forms Al were themselves forged by some of the accused persons.
At the close of the case for the prosecution learned counsel for the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove any of the charges against their clients.
It has also been submitted that apart from the charges of forgery, none of the charges against the sixth accused had been established.
Since all the charges arose from the transfers of moneys to persons abroad who allegedly brought cattle to Ghana to sell, it is necessary to state the procedure laid down by the Bank of Ghana for transferring the proceeds of the sale of cattle. The procedure as stated by officials of the Bank of Ghana, the Ghana Commercial Bank, the Standard Bank (Ghana) Ltd., the Customs and Excise Department and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Health Division, called by the prosecution is as follows: When a person imports cattle into Ghana for sale, the animals are quarantined for nine days at the border. After the quarantine period the importer is issued with a veterinary permit to import livestock by an official of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Health Division. The importer then obtains a customs bill of entry from an official of the Customs and Excise Department at the border. The customs and excise bill of entry is referred to as form C. 63. On this form is entered the type of animals and the quantity imported, their country of origin, the total value of the animals, the name of the importer and the amount of duty payable on the cattle. The originals of the veterinary permit and form C. 63 are given to the importer and copies thereof are sent to the head offices of the Animal Health Division, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Customs and Excise Department in Accra. Other copies are retained in books kept at the border.
When the importer wants to transfer the proceeds of sale of the cattle abroad, he takes the original of the form C. 63 to the headquarters of the Customs and Excise Department where it is received by an official.
The original is compared with the duplicate kept at the headquarters to make sure that the original is a true copy of the duplicate. If the original tallies with the duplicate, a certified true copy is issued from the duplicate copy and endorsed by an official of the Customs and Excise Department for exchange control purposes. The original and the duplicate are date stamped and the certified true copy is endorsed and handed over to the importer or the person who presented the original. The original is initialled by the official in the date stamp in question and then handed over to the importer or the person who presented it. [p.506] of [1972] 2 GLR 502
The importer takes the original of the veterinary permit to the head office of the Animal Health Division where an officer checks it against the duplicate in his possession. If the two agree, he makes an entry in a book and cancels the duplicate with a straight line drawn across it. The duty officer then stamps the back of the original permit with the rubber stamp of the veterinary department and then takes it together with the book to the head of the department. The head of department checks the original against the entries in the book and when he is satisfied that everything is in order he signs the original with the rubber stamp impression. The duty officer collects the book and the original permit back from the head of department and gives the original permit back to the importer. After the importer has received the certified true copy of the form C. 63 and the stamped original of the veterinary permit to import livestock, he takes the two documents to his commercial bank and fills in an exchange control form Al for an approval by the Bank of Ghana to transfer the proceeds of sale of the cattle abroad. The form Al is supported by the veterinary permit, form C. 63, an agency agreement, a tax clearance certificate and an operation statement prepared and signed by an accountant. The Al form is signed by the importer as applicant, and it is taken together
with the supporting documents by a messenger of the commercial bank to the Bank of Ghana where it is received by an employee of that bank and processed by some senior staff of the bank. The supporting documents are examined and if they are found to be in order the Al form is approved and taken back to the commercial bank by a messenger of the commercial bank. The supporting documents are retained by the Bank of Ghana. A copy of the agency agreement is, however, sent to the commercial bank together with the approved Al form. The approved Al form is kept at the foreign department of the commercial bank and when the applicant or his agent goes to the bank he is informed, upon inquiries made by him, that an approval has been given for the transfer of his money. The applicant or his agent then fills in a telegraphic transfer form for the amount approved by the Bank of Ghana and pays the money to the commercial bank. The transfer is then made to the beneficiary named on the Al form.
After the Al form has been approved, if an alteration of any part of it is desired, an application for the
alteration is made to the manager of the commercial bank by the applicant. Such application has to be supported with good reasons. The manager of the commercial bank then forwards the approved Al form back to the Bank of Ghana with a request for the alteration. If the alteration is approved, it is stamped and authenticated by an official of the Bank of Ghana and the form returned to the commercial bank where it is retained.
There is evidence from the thirty-ninth prosecution witness, Mr. Ohene, that the Ghana Commercial Bank has agreed to an arrangement whereby the applicant importers could have their moneys transferred [p.507] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 to them abroad through the accounts of their local agents. The arrangement was made to assist the applicants to transfer their moneys abroad.
Whenever an applicant submits an application, that is, an Al form to a commercial bank for the approval of the Bank of Ghana, his name is entered in a register kept by the bank.
The submissions of no case made on behalf of the accused persons mentioned above should be considered in the light of the evidence of the bank officials who gave evidence in the case and the procedure for transferring the proceeds of the sale of cattle as stated above.
Count 1 charges all ten accused persons with the offence of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to sections 23 (1) and 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The offence of conspiracy to commit a crime is contained in section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960, which states:
“If two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime, whether with or without any previous concert of deliberation, each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet that crime, as the case may be.”
In the statements which the accused persons made to the police, each accused person stated that the
importers of cattle or their agents who brought the cattle to Ghana processed all the necessary papers for the purpose of obtaining the approval of the Bank of Ghana for the transfer of the proceeds of sale of the cattle and submitted exchange control form Al to the Bank of Ghana themselves for the approval of the Bank. It was after the Bank of Ghana had given its approval for the transfer of the money that they, as agents, or sub-agents of the applicants, came in to transfer the moneys to the principals abroad.
I must state that the defence at this stage are not challenging the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the veterinary permits, agency agreements, and the forms C. 63 which supported the applications for the approval of the Bank of Ghana were forged. From the statements of the accused persons to which I have referred it is clear that what each accused person is saying is that he had nothing to do with the forms C. 63 and the other documents which supported the Al forms and that they were not the persons who submitted the forms. The Al forms were submitted to the banks by the principals—the applicants on the forms —and all they did was to transfer the money to the principals for a commission. They did not know that the documents were forged.
From the words of section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960, it is clear that for the prosecution to
succeed on count 1 against the ten accused persons there must be evidence that the accused persons
agreed or acted together with a common purpose to commit the offence of defrauding by false pretences.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, both documentary and oral, I cannot find any evidence that the accused persons agreed or acted together to commit any offence. In [p.508] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 R.v. Zonyra [1959] G.L.R. 26, C.A. cited by counsel for both the prosecution and the defence it was held that for the prosecution to succeed on a charge of conspiracy they must produce evidence that the persons charged concerted together to commit a crime. In the later case of Commissioner of Police v. Afari [1962] 1 G.L.R. 483, S.C. Azu Crabbe J.S.C., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the then Supreme Court, stated at p. 485 as follows:
“In the opinion of this court, the Ghana law of conspiracy is wider in scope and in content than the English law on the subject. It consists not only in the criminal agreement between two minds, but also in the acting together in furtherance of a common criminal objective.”
Both authorities make criminal agreement or acting together or in concert for the purpose of committing a crime the basis of a criminal conspiracy and in the absence of these two factors I find count 1 not proved against any of the ten accused persons.
On the charges of illegal payments, it was submitted by learned counsel for the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth accused persons that inasmuch as the transfers were made after the approval of the Bank of Ghana had been obtained the charges must fail. Section 6 of the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71), under which the charges of making illegal payments outside Ghana were laid reads: “Except in such circumstances as may be prescribed, no Ghana resident shall make any payment outside Ghana to or for the credit of an external resident.” Section 5 (1) of Part II of the Fourth Schedule to the Act makes the contravention of the restriction imposed by section 6 of the Act a punishable offence. Regulation 7 (a) of the Exchange Control Regulations, 1961 (L.I. 133), made by the Minister in exercise of his powers under section 38 of the Exchange Control Act, 1961, states, “The prohibition imposed by section 6 of the Act shall not apply — (a) where the Bank of Ghana has consented to the payment.”
In his reply Mr. Sekyi for the prosecution submitted that the approvals of the Bank of Ghana for the
transfers of the moneys were obtained by deceit and therefore by section 14 (b) of the Criminal Code,
1960, all the approvals were void.
It is the contention of the prosecution that the officials of the Bank of Ghana who gave the approvals for the transfers were deceived by the documents which supported the applications for the transfers. The documents were believed by the officials to be genuine whereas in fact they were forged. It is clear from exhibits 863 and 864, the registers in which the names of the applicants are recorded, that with the exception of two cases in respect of the fourth accused to which I will shortly refer, none of the Al forms which forms the subject of the charges of illegal payments against the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons was signed by them as applicants. On the contrary, the
[p.509] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 registers and the Al forms themselves show that the applicants were persons other than the five accused just mentioned. The two Al forms (exhibits 410 and 414) which bear the name of the fourth accused as applicant, were according to the evidence of Ekudi, the fifty-first prosecution witness, forged by the sixth accused person.
Among the supporting documents in each case is the operation statement prepared by accountants and auditors. It is not the case of the prosecution that the operation statements are forgeries. If that were so the accountants who prepared them would have been in the dock with the accused persons. In the operation statement the accountants state that the statement has been prepared from the documents annexed thereto and from verbal information and explanations given to them by the importers of the cattle, the proceeds of sale of which are to be transferred, and whose names appear on the statement and who have signed the relevant Al forms as applicants.
With his usual frankness, Mr. Sekyi stated in his reply to the submissions by the defence counsel that the approval given by the Bank of Ghana would be void only if the accused persons had knowledge of the falsity of the supporting documents.
The question of the knowledge of falsity of the documents is the crux of the whole prosecution since it affects not only the facts of the charges of illegal payments but also of all the charges of conspiracy,
uttering forged documents and defrauding by false pretences. On proof of knowledge of the falsity of the supporting documents I cannot do better than borrow the words of the first few sentences in paragraph 2186 of Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice (36th ed.), “Knowledge of falsity. This is not capable of direct proof. It is in nearly all cases, therefore, proved by evidence of facts from which the jury may presume it.” Mr. Sekyi cited the case of R. v. Millard (1813) 168 E.R. 783 and submitted that the case is an authority for the proposition that if it is proved that in a number of transactions at different times money has been transferred outside the country on the strength of forged documents then it must be presumed that the person who effected such transfers knew that the documents were false. Learned principal state attorney followed his proposition with this sentence:
“If there had been only one transfer by any of the accused persons knowledge of the falsity of the documents might not have been presumed but once it is proved that more than one transfer had been made on forged documents, knowledge may be presumed.”
I have read the case of R. v. Millard (supra) very carefully and nowhere in the report is it stated that
whenever a prisoner is charged with uttering a forged document and it is proved that he had previously uttered a similar forged document, it must be presumed that he knew the falsity of the document which is the subject of the prosecution. What I gather from the case is that it is permissible to adduce evidence of a previous uttering of a forged document in an attempt to establish guilty
[p.510] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 knowledge in a subsequent prosecution. Mr. Sekyi no doubt adopted what has been stated in paragraph 2186 of Archbold (36th ed.) in the case of Millard without reading the report itself. In my view Mr. Sekyi was misled by Archbold in the same way as he was misled in relation to the case of R. v. Moore (1858) 175 ER. 631 also cited in Archbold. In the later case of R. v. Smith (1827) 2 Car. & P. 633 it was held that if a subsequent uttering is made the subject of a distinct indictment, it cannot be given in evidence to show guilty knowledge in a former uttering. The case of R. v. Smith (supra) was followed by Tindal C.J. in the case of Griffiths v. Payne (1839) 11 Ad. & El. 131. On the authority of R. v. Smith (supra) once each of the supporting documents has been the subject of a separate and distinct indictment or charge, the prosecution cannot use them to prove guilty knowledge even if Mr. Sekyi’s interpretation of R. v. Millard (supra) is taken to be good law.
Mr. Sekyi relied solely on the interpretation he put on Millard’s case to establish that the accused persons knew of the falsity of the documents which supported the Al forms. Except in the case of the first accused he did not point out any pieces of evidence from which knowledge of the falsity of the documents could be presumed against the accused persons. The operation statements supported the stories of the accused persons as contained in their statements to the police that they had nothing to do with the application for the approval of the Bank of Ghana for the transfer of the proceeds of the sale of cattle and that they did not know of any forgeries committed by the applicants. The accountants have named the persons who presented the forged forms C. 63, the agency agreements and the veterinary permits to them and they (the accountants) have stated in no uncertain terms that they interviewed those persons and obtained verbal information and explanations from them. There is no evidence that any of the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons accompanied any of the importer applicants to the accountants at the time the papers were submitted to them or that they knew of the preparation of the papers.
Exhibits 863 and 864 and the Al forms themselves also support the story of the accused persons. The two registers and the forms show that the accused persons were not the applicants for approval so far as the charges before this court are concerned. The thirty-fourth prosecution witness Abbew, a clerk at the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra, gave evidence in cross-examination from which it can be said that the Al forms with the supporting documents were submitted by the applicants themselves and that their local agents merely came in after the approval of the Bank of Ghana had been given for the transfer of the moneys involved. There is plenty of evidence on record that the accused persons acted as agents or sub-agents for their principals abroad. There is evidence from Mr. Ohene, the thirty-ninth prosecution witness, that arrangements were made, whereby importer applicants could appoint local agents who would see to the transfer of their moneys to [p.511] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 them abroad. That evidence is also supported by the thirty-fourth prosecution witness, Abbew, on the falsity of the supporting documents. As far as the fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons are concerned, there is no evidence of any kind from which guilty knowledge can be inferred or presumed. If anything at all, there is evidence from which it can be inferred or presumed that the four accused persons did not know of the falsity of the documents. Exhibits 863 and 864 and the operation statements are, in my opinion, the seeds of destruction of the case for the prosecution so far as guilty knowledge is concerned.
As regards the first accused, the prosecution led direct evidence to establish guilty knowledge against
him. The prosecution called their eleventh witness, Imoru Adams, who gave evidence that upon the
introduction of one Alhaji Baba who is supposed to be in Great Britain now, he (Imoru Adams) gave
some forged or unofficial forms C. 63 and veterinary permits to Alhaji Baba to be given to the first
accused and that the said Alhaji Baba later brought him some money in respect of the documents. On a subsequent date he met the first accused at the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra, and after they had exchanged greetings the first accused gave him ¢10.00. The prosecution also led evidence of a meeting held at the office of Mr. Anno, the forty first prosecution witness, at which the first accused was supposed to have said that he could tell a forged document from a genuine one. Imoru Adams was severely cross-examined by Mr. Swaniker for the first accused and it came out from the cross-examination that he had made three statements to the police in connection with the forged documents found in his possession and that he did not mention the first accused in any of the said statements. Imoru Adams was charged with possessing forged documents, namely, forms C. 63 and veterinary permits, rubber stamps and ink pads, and he was put before the Circuit Court, Accra, for trial.
For reasons best known to the prosecution, the charges against Imoru Adams were withdrawn on or about 6 July 1970. The three statements which Imoru Adams made to the police were tendered in evidence as exhibits 713, 714 and 715 and their contents differ from the evidence he gave in court. On the authorities of R. v. Harris (1927) Cr.App.R. 144, C.C.A. and State v. Otchere [1963] 2 G.L.R. 463 once it has been proved that Imoru Adams has made three previous statements to the police the contents of which are inconsistent with the evidence in court the effect of his evidence is negligible. The evidence of Imoru Adams was so badly shaken under cross-examination that it will be most unsafe for any jury to act upon it. He denied having made statements which two respectable prosecution witnesses, the twelfth prosecution witness (A.S.P. Korankye) and the thirteenth prosecution witness (Detective inspector Apedo) admitted that he had made to them. Alhaji Baba was not called by the prosecution to support the evidence given by Imoru Adams and when the person and premises of the first accused were searched no incriminating documents or stamps were found. [p.512] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 On the meeting in Mr. Anno’s office the evidence of the thirty-sixth prosecution witness, Prince Issifu Musah, was that at the meeting, the first accused did not claim to be able to tell a forged document from a genuine one. All the witnesses called by the prosecution at this meeting, the fortieth prosecution witness (Aninakwa), the forty-first prosecution witness, (Anno), and the forty-second prosecution witness (Mireku) admitted that at the meeting the first accused spoke in Hausa and what he said was interpreted to the bank officials in English by Prince Issifu Musah. The officials also spoke to the first accused by the same process. None of the bank officials understood Hausa and there is evidence from the thirty-sixth prosecution witness and the fourth prosecution witness (Mr. Olympio), that the first accused is a complete illiterate. The thirty sixth prosecution witness (Prince Issifu Musah) was not treated as a hostile witness.
In R. v. Kwame Adamu [1960] G.L.R. 91, C.A. it was held that where a prosecution witness gives
evidence which supports the case of an accused person at least a doubt is created and that doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused person. Prince Musah was the interpreter at the meeting and his evidence on what was actually said by the first accused at the meeting is very material and must be preferred to the evidence of the other witnesses who merely told the court what the first accused is supposed to have told them through Prince Musah. In the instant case the evidence of Prince Musah completely exculpates the first accused from any guilty knowledge. There is therefore no evidence other than the negligible evidence from Imoru Adams from which guilty knowledge can be inferred. In conclusion, therefore, I rule that the prosecution has failed to prove guilty knowledge against any of the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons on all the charges against them which require proof of knowledge of the falsity of the supporting documents.
Upon my ruling that the prosecution have failed to prove that the five accused persons, namely, the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons had any knowledge that the documents upon which the officials of the Bank of Ghana acted in giving approval for the transfer of the moneys were forged, in my opinion, all the charges of uttering forged documents and defrauding by false pretences against the five accused persons must fail and so must all the charges of conspiracy to defraud, conspiracy to contravene the restrictions imposed by the Exchange Control Act, 1961, and conspiracy to commit forgery fail.
Further, there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the persons charged with the conspiracy
offences agreed or concerted together to commit the crimes charged. As regards the forgery charges against the fifth accused person, although there are some alterations on some of the Exchange Control Al forms which are the subject-matter of the charges, from the evidence of Mr. Abbew, the thirty-fourth prosecution witness, and Mr. Ohene, the thirty-ninth prosecution witness, both of the Ghana Commercial [p.513] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 Bank, and from the evidence of Mr. Ocansey of the Bank of Ghana, the fortieth prosecution witness, one cannot say that those alterations were made by the fifth accused person since he could not have had access to the said Al forms even after they had been returned to the commercial bank by the Bank of Ghana. Mr. Ohene stated quite positively that, (a) when an alteration is required on an Al form after the approval of the Bank of Ghana has been given, the applicant approaches an officer of the exchange control department of his commercial bank and the officer takes up the matter with the Bank of Ghana; and (b) the applicant does not have to go to the Bank of Ghana for the alteration. Once an Al form has been approved it does not get into the possession of the applicant.
Upon such evidence, how can it be said that the alterations on the Al forms were made by the fifth
accused person? No person, not even the applicants themselves, could have possession of the forms after they had been submitted to their commercial banks for the approval of the Bank of Ghana. The alterations must have been made by either officials of the commercial banks or the Bank of Ghana upon the request for the same made by the applicants and not the fifth accused person. The alterations complained of are the insertion of the words “C/O R. K. HAYFRON CTE. 651. 030/W,” between the names of the beneficiaries abroad and the names of the foreign banks described in the beneficiary column on the Al forms. The money approved by the Bank of Ghana to be transferred abroad was meant to go to the beneficiary or to the persons named as beneficiaries on the Al forms, and the alterations in the beneficiary columns on the forms did not affect the beneficiaries to whom the moneys were to be sent abroad. I cannot therefore see how the prosecution can say that the fifth accused person made the alterations with intent to deceive officials of the Ghana Commercial Bank. One may ask, what was the deceit which the fifth accused person intended? The evidence on record does not answer that question; for the Bank of Ghana had given an approval for moneys to go to specific beneficiaries and the fifth accused person had transferred the sums to those beneficiaries through the banks approved by the Bank of Ghana.
The charges against the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons are based on nothing but suspicion that either they themselves forged the documents which supported the applications for the approval of the Bank of Ghana to transfer the moneys, or that they were privy to the forgeries of the documents. But, as has been said in a number of cases, one cannot put a multitude of suspicions together and make proof out of it. See State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C. at p. 153 where Azu Crabbe J.S.C. delivering the judgment of the then Supreme Court, said, “The accumulation of facts proved amounts to no more than mere suspicion, and however strong suspicion may be, it cannot form the basis for continuing a trial after a submission of no case.” [p.514] of [1972] 2 GLR 502 I find the submissions of learned counsel for the five accused persons well-grounded and on the
authorities of R. v. Osabu (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 180, C.A.; R. v. Ojojo [1959] G.L.R. 207, C.A. and State v.
Ali Kassena (supra), the five accused persons should not be called upon to answer the charges against
them. Each of the first, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth accused persons is accordingly acquitted and
discharged on all the charges against him.
Although no submission of no case was made by Mr. Kwaku Boateng on behalf of the ninth accused person, on the evidence so far I do not see why his case should be different from that of any of the five accused persons against whom I have ruled that the prosecution has failed to make a case. I therefore rule that none of the charges against the ninth accused has been established and the ninth accused person should not be called upon to answer them. He is accordingly acquitted and discharged on all the charges against him.
As a result of the acquittal of the first, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth and ninth accused persons the
conspiracy charges against any of them and any of the remaining accused persons must fail. Accordingly counts 10, 40, 175, 184, 191, 198, 204, 211, 218, 219, 227, 237, 355, 364, 371, 380, 387, 396, 405, 418 against the sixth accused person, Alhaji Alhassan Labaran, must fail and he is acquitted and discharged on those counts. In the same way count 109 against the second accused, Audi Zabrama, must fail and he is acquitted and discharged on that count. Counts 479, 490, 498 and 506 against the third accused, M. K.
Zakari, must also fail and the third accused is acquitted and discharged on those counts.
Count 270 charges the first accused and the tenth accused person, Mr. Zakari, with conspiracy to
contravene the restrictions imposed by the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71). That charge must fail and the tenth accused is accordingly acquitted and discharged on count 270.
I have already held that count 1 has not been proved against any of the ten accused persons. The second, third, sixth and tenth accused persons are accordingly acquitted and discharged on count 1.
Apart from those charges on which I have specifically acquitted the second, third, sixth and tenth accused persons I find a prima facie case against each of them on the remaining charges and each is called upon to answer them.
DECISION
Submission of no case upheld.
