HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST
Date: 14 FEBRUARY 1975
EDWARD WIREDU J
CASE REFERRED TO
Aikins alias Mensah v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 170, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
COMMITTAL for sentence under Act 30, s. 178 upon summary conviction.
COUNSEL
Kyei for the Republic.
First and second accused in person.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.
The convicts in this case were arraigned before the Dunkwa District Court Grade II on 21 May 1974 charged with the offences of conspiracy to steal and stealing. They pleaded guilty to the two charges and were convicted accordingly. They were remanded in custody to appear on 30 May 1974 to enable the prosecution to provide any information about their antecedents.
On that day, the court was informed of the first convict’s three previous convictions for stealing and one for the second convict. The record of proceedings shows that they both admitted their previous convictions whereupon the court had this to say:
“The accused persons have pleaded guilty and have been convicted. Having regard to the previous convictions, all for stealing, which they have admitted and having regard to the fact that both had their last convictions at Nkawkaw — a fact that would seem to show that they might have been operating together for some time now—the accused are remitted to the High Court, Cape Coast, for sentence, vide section 178 (1) of Act 30, 1960.”
[p.154] of [1975] 1 GLR 153
When the case was first mentioned before me the learned state attorney who appeared for the Republic informed this court that the convicts had been committed for sentence under section 3 of the Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act, 1963 (Act 192). I therefore caused preliminary investigations to be conducted into their background with a view to deciding whether this was a fit and proper case to sentence them under Act 192. This was accordingly done: see Aikins alias Mensah v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 170, S.C.
A subsequent perusal of the record of proceedings revealed that the convicts were committed to this court not under Act 192 but rather under section 178 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). This section empowers the district court to commit to the circuit court for sentence where having regard to the evidence, the character and previous conduct of a convict, the district court forms the view that its maximum punishment would be insufficient.
Section 178 (1) and (2) read as follows:
“178. ( 1) Where, upon the summary conviction of a person for any offence, the District Court is of opinion that, having regard to the evidence, and to the character and record of the offender, the maximum punishment which the District Court is empowered to impose would be insufficient, the Court may commit the offender for sentence to a Circuit Court and any enactment relating to the powers of any Court upon committal for trial shall apply so far as relevant to such committal for sentence.
(2) The Circuit Court shall have power to deal with the offender as if he had been convicted on indictment by that Court of the offence, and the conviction and sentence shall be subject to appeal as if he had been so convicted.”
The question which arises for consideration here is whether the convicts having been brought erroneously to this court under section 178 of Act 30 which specifically names the circuit court as the appropriate court for sentencing, it would be proper for the High Court, which by section 96 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), has concurrent jurisdiction with district courts, to refer the matter to the circuit court as the proper forum to deal with the case? The determination of the above also calls for a consideration of the extent to which the High Court can competently exercise the jurisdiction conferred on circuit courts and district courts.
Section 96 (1) of Act 372 which confers on the High Court concurrent jurisdiction with district courts is in the following language:
“No jurisdiction conferred upon any District Court shall in any way restrict or affect the jurisdiction of the High Court or a Circuit Court and each of these Courts shall have in all cases and matters, civil and criminal, an original jurisdiction concurrent with the jurisdiction of a District Court.”
The ordinary language of the above provision of Act 372 on its proper construction does not confer on the High Court any concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court. The scope and the extent of section 96 confers
[p.155] of [1975] 1 GLR 153
on the High Court original jurisdiction competently exercisable by district courts. But by section 14 (1) (a) of Act 372 the High Court has an unlimited original jurisdiction in all matters. This section enables the High Court to deal competently with any matter within the original jurisdiction of a circuit court. The power of circuit courts under section 178 (2) of Act 30 however is a special one peculiar to that court. It is exercisable within the strict language of section 178. The High Court in my ruling has no power to exercise any powers conferred by section 178 of Act 30 on a circuit court.
The question which arises for consideration is, if the High Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the instant committal proceedings should it strike out the case for want of jurisdiction or remit it back to the district court with directions to commit the same to the circuit court? Under section 100 (1) of Act 372 this court has power to report this case to the Chief Justice who can order a transfer of it to the circuit court. Under section 44 (6) of Act 372 a High Court judge may on his own motion review a decision of a magistrate within three months from the date of that order: see section 44 (5). In exercising this power the High Court judge may by subsection (1) (b) of section 44 set aside the order or modify it on such terms as he thinks fit.
It is apparent from the record of proceedings that the three months’ permissive period for the exercise of the judge’s powers under section 44 of Act 372 has long elapsed and therefore I am disabled from exercising my jurisdiction thereunder. The only other available provision to act on is section 100 (1) of Act 372. This may involve some administrative delay but there is no other choice. I will therefore order that this matter be reported to the Chief Justice for transfer to the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, for sentence to be passed. In making this order I must mention that I am not unaware of the powers of the Chief Justice under section 101 (1) which are subject to subsection (2) exercisable by judges of the High Court: see section 101 (1) of Act 372. The language of section 101 (1) excludes transfer from the High Court to circuit courts and section 102 of Act 372 refers to only civil causes or matters pending before the High Court.
The pending of this case therefore is ordered to be reported to the Chief Justice for necessary action.
DECISION
Order accordingly.
S. Y. B.-B.
