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[1981] SLR (HC) 29High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; EX PARTE APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 276

12 January 1981 · ANTERKYI J · ≈ 43 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 29
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; ex parte APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 276 [1981] SLR (HC) 29
APAREPUBLIC v ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; ex parte APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 276, [1981] SLR (HC) 29 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v ACCRA CIRCUIT COURT; ex parte APPIAH [1982-83] GLR 276, [1981] SLR (HC) 29 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School (1978)3 W.L.R. 736;(1979) 1 All E.R. 365, C.A.

(2) Joseph William & Sons v. Jebeile Brothers, Court of Appeal, Accra. 5 May 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 98.

(3) Republic v. James Town Circuit Court: Ex parte Markham (1977) 1 G.L.R. 388.

(4) Owusu v. The Republic (1972) 2 G.L.R. 262.

(5) Instrumatic, Ltd. v. Supabrase. Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 519; (1969) 2 All E.R. 131; 113 S.J. 114, C.A.

(6) Akill v. White Cross Insurance Co., Court of Appeal, Accra. 26 June 1967, unreported.

(7) R. v. Paddington North and St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Perry [1956] 1 Q.B. 229;

[1955] 3 W.L.R. 744; [1955] 3 All E.R. 391; 119 J.P. 565; 99 S.J. 816; 53 L.G.R. 670, D.C.

(8) Davies v. Price [1958] 1 W.L.R. 434; [1958] 1 All E.R. 671; 102 S.J. 290.

(9) Kuruma v. R. [1955] A.C. 197; [1955] 2 W.L.R. 223; [1955] 1 All E.R. 236; 119 J.P. 157; 99 S.J.

73; [1955] Crim. L.R. 339,P.C.

(10) State v. Tongo Atia [1966] G.L.R. 765, S.C.

(11) Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the ruling of the Circuit Court, Accra wherein the judge overruled the objection of the applicant to the admissibility of certain documents in the trial of the applicant for extortion. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for the applicant.

A. L. Djabatey, Deputy Attorney-General, for the Republic.

[p.280] of [1982-83] GLR 276

JUDGMENT OF ANTEKYI J.

Pursuant to leave granted on 11 November 1980 the applicant applies for an order of certiorari “to quash the ruling of his Honour Judge Owusu-Sekyere in the case Republic v. J. E. K. A. Appiah dated 5 November 1980 and for such further or other orders as to this honourable court may seem meet”. His affidavit filed on 11 November 1980 verifying the facts states:

“2. That I have been charged with the offence of extortion contrary to section 239 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) for demanding and receiving from Messrs H. K. Djaba and E. K. Owusu the sum of 1,000 pounds and 10,000 pounds respectively.

3. The case is now pending before his Honour Mr. Owusu Sekyere, Circuit Judge, Accra, Court A.

4. That during the hearing, the prosecution called one Mr. Opata, Superintendent of Police, CID

Headquarters, Accra, who in his evidence said he received an envelope containing:

(i) Two Barclays Bank International, London, cheques for 1,000 pounds each numbered 156773 and 156774.

(ii) Giro (paying slip) dated 12 December 1979 for 1,000 pounds.

(iii) Giro (paying slip) dated 11 January 1980 for 10,000 pounds.

(iv) Bank Statement No. 1980/1.

5. That Mr. Opata sought to tender these documents in evidence.

6. That my leading counsel, Enoch D. Kom, objected to the admission of the said documents on several grounds, inter alia, that: a. the documents sought to be tendered are bank documents and as such caught by section 165 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323). b. the documents, some of them at least, infringe section 165 of the Evidence Decree 1975; c. that no sufficient foundation has been laid for the tendering of the documents; d. that as Mr. Opata is not the author of the documents, he cannot be cross-examined as to the contents of the documents: e. that the documents cannot and should not be admitted as proof of their contents.

7. That the honourable Deputy Attorney-General, Mr. A. L. Djabatey, who was leading the prosecution made a lengthy reply.

[p.281] of [1982-83] GLR 276 8. That my counsel’s submission and those of Mr. Djabatey are contained in the records of the court.

9. That the learned circuit judge Mr. Owusu-Sekyere, in a rather short ruling held that the documents were admissible and were admitted and marked exhibits U, V, W, X and Y.

11. That I am informed by my counsel and verily believe same to be true that there is an apparent error on the face of the record by the wrongful admission of the said documents”.

In arguing the application, Mr. Kom for the applicant, submits that his complaint is with regard to error of law on the face of the record. Referring to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11, he contends that the old view was that error of law should be a matter which goes to jurisdiction.

He refers to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 1, para. 84, cites from Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School (1978) 3 W.L.R. 736, C.A. the dicta of Lord Denning and contends that on those authorities certiorari had lain to quash error of law on the record even though such did not go to jurisdiction. He contends that for detection of error of law on the face of the record, the view has now been widened by authorities to embrace a perusal of the judgment or ruling and all the materials taken notice of in the decision, citing William Joseph & Sons v. Jebeile Bros., Court of Appeal, Accra 5 May 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 98, C.A. and Republic v. James Town Circuit Court; Ex parte Markham (1977) 1 G.L.R. 388 at p.389.

He therefore submits that in the present application based upon an error of law on the face of the record what must be considered are :

1. the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness, Opata;

2. submissions of counsel on both sides;

3. the ruling of the trial court; and 4. the exhibits tendered in evidence (as U, V, W, X, and Y).

He further submits that the error of law on the face of the record in the present application embraces three factors:

1. admitting inadmissible evidence;

2. wrongful exercise of judicial discretion; and 3. failure to give reasons for the ruling of the court.

Counsel bolsters this submission by a reference to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed), Vol. 1, p. 74, and a submission that there are three types of error of law, namely: (a) admitting inadmissible evidence; (b) giving inadequate reasons to fulfil an express duty to give reasons and (c) wrongful exercise of judicial discretion.

[p.282] of [1982-83] GLR 276

With regard to admitting inadmissible evidence, counsel made reference to exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y which were admitted in evidence in the proceedings, and contended that even though, as it appears at page 6 of the record, there were stated objections by counsel for the accused and a reply by the Deputy Attorney-General for the prosecution, the ruling of the court at page 11 of the record gave no reasons for overruling the submissions of counsel for the accused before the exhibits were accepted in evidence.

Repeating all his submissions in the trial court to the effect that the exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y were inadmissible, counsel contends that the evidence afforded by each is hearsay and states that two of them are bank giro paying-in slips, two are cheques purported to have been drawn by the (accused) applicant and one a bank statement dated 22 April 1980 purported to be the bank statement of the accused (applicant).

The argument or submission that these exhibits afforded hearsay evidence was to the effect that:

1. The sixth prosecution witness was not the author of those documents and could therefore not be cross-examined about their contents.

2. The sixth prosecution witness was not a representative of the relevant bank and in his evidence he laid no foundation.

3. As the documents purport to emanate from the bank, the representative of that bank would be the proper person to tender them and answer questions on them.

4. With regard to each of exhibits W and X a copy would be with the bank and a copy with the payers Djaba and Owusu, and only each of them could legally give evidence to tender them in evidence.

In this regard counsel refers to the case of Owusu v. The Republic [1972] 2 G.L.R. 262 and also the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), s. 176 with regard to banks operating in Ghana; and it is contended that if those provisions relate to banks operating in Ghana, more stringent evidential consideration must be taken in relation to documents emanating from banks operating outside Ghana.

In reference to Owusu v. The Republic (supra), it is contended that in that case in which the police officer even did collect the bank statements from the relevant bank, the High Court ruled the evidence afforded by the statement as being hearsay. The documents in question in the present case, as found by Opata, the sixth prosecution witness, on his table merely and tendered in evidence, should have, a fortiori, been rejected as hearsay and therefore inadmissible. The failure of the trial court to so reject those documents constituted an error of law. And upon paragraph 57 of Vol. 1 of Halsbury’s Laws of

[p.283] of [1982-83] GLR 276

England (4th ed.), it was contended forcefully that this admission of the hearsay evidence afforded by the exhibits was of illegal evidence, and therefore the admission into the proceedings of such hearsay evidence constituted an error of law which gives ground for certiorari proceedings.

Counsel made reference to Phipson on Evidence (11th ed.), para. 638 as to the meaning of hearsay, and it was his contention that if Opata, the sixth prosecution witness, tendered in evidence those documents as what was found on his table then in receiving them into evidence the court did receive them as things; but if he tendered them to establish their contents, the contents are hearsay and inadmissible. He resorted to Phipson on Evidence (11th ed.), para. 639 in asserting that the rule which applies to hearsay also applies equally to a document and to relevancy as to its authenticity, and that “documents must be proved and where it is sought to establish the facts related in them the maker must be called.”

Thus ended the argument with regard to error of law by admission of inadmissible evidence.

With regard to wrongful exercise of judicial discretion as giving rise to certiorari proceedings, resort was had to NRCD, 323, s. 52 (b) which states:

“52. The court in its discretion may exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by – (b) the risk that the admission of the evidence will create substantial danger of unfair prejudice or substantial danger of confusing the issues.”

Upon these provisions of the Decree, Mr. Kom contended that even assuming that the evidence of Opata, the sixth prosecution witness, and the documents were admissible to establish that Opata received the documents in the envelope, the admission of such evidence would create substantial danger of confusing the issues to the prejudice of the accused, and therefore the trial judge should have exercised his discretion to exclude the evidence (of Opata and the exhibits). Such failure by the court to exercise the discretion in this regard did amount to wrongful exercise of discretion. In support, the case of Instrumatics, Ltd. v Supabrase Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 519 was cited.

The third ground of error of law was, it was contended, a failure of the trial judge to give reasons (for his admitting those exhibits into evidence), and that for this failure certiorari would lie.The submissions were interspersed with a plethora of decided cases on error of law on the face of the record.

[p.284] of [1982-83] GLR 276

Arguing against the grant of the order the learned Deputy Attorney-General cited some decided cases pertinent to error of law, and contended that opposing counsel has not shown or pointed out any error on the face of the record and that error of law if there be, the applicant had his remedy by way of appeal. (But I would not go with him on the last leg of that submission).

As to the ruling of the court, his submission was that it was merely an interlocutory one, and that wrongly admitted hearsay evidence did not give ground for certiorari proceedings. Relying on Simon Akill v. White Cross Insurance Co., Court of Appeal, Accra, 26 June 1967, unreported, he submitted that the judgment in that case supported what the trial court did in the instant ruling; for, the judge was merely giving an interlocutory ruling, and that the ruling by itself could not be an error on the face of the record. He argued further that a trial judge might in error admit inadmissible evidence but if he did so the matter which would arise was the extent to which the inadmissible evidence did influence or affect his final judgment in the case – whether or not in the final determination he relied on that inadmissible evidence.

Referring to sections 168, 169 and 170 of NRCD 323, he contended that if those exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y were not originals as submitted by counsel for the accused then they did fall under these sections; and that, under the first leg of section 168, there was in the criminal proceedings no available judicial procedure to obtain the originals of the documents from Britain; and that under the second leg of that section notice was served on the applicant to produce the originals.

He submitted that the application was misconceived and must be dismissed, after relying on the dicta of Lord Goddard C.J. in R. V. Paddington North & St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Perry [1956] 1 Q.B. 229 at p. 237, and of Lord Parker L.J. in Davies v. Price [1958] 1 All E.R. 671 at p. 676. He therefore contended that where an inferior tribunal merely errs in law it is not a ground for certiorari, although, it may be a ground for appeal.

As to the case of Kuruma v. R. [1955] A.C. 197, P.C. he submitted that that case was concerned with relevancy and consequent admissibility of evidence merely, and that the decision was not on evidence illegally obtained. Hence the submission of opposing counsel in relation to that case was irrelevant. For there was no evidence on record that security agents abused or flouted the provisions of the Constitution — there was no evidence either that the mail of the accused was intercepted. Hence the submissions of opposing counsel in that regard were uncalled for.

Relying on the provisions of NRCD 323, s. 170 the Deputy Attorney-General submitted that a charge of extortion was the subject [p.285] of [1982-83] GLR 276 of the criminal action. The question was whether the documentary exhibits in question were or were not closely related to a controlling issue in the court below.

With regard to wrongful exercise of judicial discretion, his submission was to the effect that it was not a ground for certiorari proceedings, and it was not an error apparent on the face of the record; and that whether or not there was a wrongful exercise of judicial discretion would depend on the entire result of the case, and that it would be a matter for appeal if such could be shown.

Finally he submitted that the application should be dismissed as being incompetent and misconceived.

With the arguments and submissions ended, I now proceed to examine the record complained of, together with all the exhibits forming part of the record.

At the outset I would like to observe that in support of his submission that there was an error of law on the face of the record, Mr. Kom, learned counsel for the applicant, cited cases in illustrating merely that (1) admitting inadmissible evidence, (2) wrongful exercise of judicial discretion, and (3) failure to give reasons for a decision, give ground for an error of law on the face of the record. He does not, as contended by the learned Deputy Attorney-General, show on the face of the record, exhibit A, where and how that apparent error can be detected.”

Even though counsel for the applicant referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 1, para. 84 to submit that “looking at the judgment or ruling of the court had been the basis for detecting the error” and that “the record” meant “all the materials taken notice of in the decision”, he does not attempt to show the court that apparent error. He cited William Joseph & Sons v. Jebeile Bros. (supra) and Republic v. James Town Circuit Court; Ex parte Markham (supra) at pp.388 – 389. But he did not bring to bear on the present case any principle enunciated in those cases.

In citing the case of William Joseph & Sons v. Jebeile Bros. (supra) the Deputy Attorney-General pointed out from it the meaning of “error of law on the face of the record” as being that: “the inferior tribunal has propounded some wrong principle of law and that this is manifest to the judges; that looking at the record with judicial knowledge the error on the record is palpable and apparent”

Whatever be the meaning of that phrase, it would be necessary to scrutinise the record of proceedings, exhibit A, and the documentary exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y to find out whether (1) inadmissible evidence was admitted; (2) a judicial discretion was wrongfully exercised; and (3) there was a failure to give reasons, as contended by counsel for the applicant. As the pathfinder for this scrutinisation, the provisions of NRCD 323 must be resorted to.

[p.286] of [1982-83] GLR 276

Now the record of proceedings, exhibit A, with the alleged ruling of the trial court judge, before whom the applicant stood charged with offences of extortion, shows that the sixth prosecution witness, Mr. Opata, a Superintendent of Police, was on 29 October 1980 giving evidence thus:

“On 22 August 1980 I had instructions to see the Commissioner of Police Mr. V. A. T. Marbel. I saw him and he asked me to see the second prosecution witness. I saw the second prosecution witness accordingly who told me something and gave me a report in this case written by the second prosecution witness himself together with some other documents.

The documents are a bank statement bearing the name of the accused person, exhibit H, a cheque with a No.

156773 and bearing account No. 21094501, exhibit M; another cheque with a No. 156774, exhibit N; a document enumerating the accounts of the accused in manuscript – exhibit O; a bank giro cheque for 1,000 pounds, exhibit L; another bank giro cheque for 10,000 pounds, exhibit K; and a bank statement – exhibit J. I examined the documents very closely and found that exhibits M, N, K, L which are cheques reflect in exhibit H, the bank statement. I also observed that exhibit J had got the edges cut as against exhibit H which has computer numbers.

At this stage Mr. Kom, counsel for the defence, raises objection regarding the observation of the witness in respect of the documents in evidence.”

After defence counsel had given his grounds of objection and the Deputy Attorney-General had replied, the ruling of the court was that the case should proceed with the continuation of the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness stating: “I think it is premature for the objection to be raised at this stage.”

On 3 November 1980, as evidenced by the record exhibit A, this sixth prosecution witness continued his evidence thus:

“Exhibit J, that is bank statement sheet No. 1980/4, was alleged to have been supplied by the accused person to the members of the Special Tribunal as a result of exhibit G, that is the letter alleged to have been written by the accused to his bankers. My observations further revealed that exhibits H, J, K, L, M, N have something in common, that is they have account No. 21094501 of the accused person, his name, and the address of Barclays International, London. Then on exhibit K, that is bank giro credit form which bears the account number of the accused person for an amount of 1,000 pounds with a signature which appears to be that of Henry Kojo Djaba which I know very well. I have caused the

[p.287] of [1982-83] GLR 276 signature on exhibit K to be examined with the signature of Mr. Henry Djaba and other documents from the known signatures of Mr. Henry Kojo Djaba. I have also known through investigations that the petitions of Mr. Henry Kojo Djaba and Mr E. K. Owusu were dealt with by the Special Tribunal. (witness at this stage identified signature charts on Henry Kojo Djaba — as identification 6, 7, 8 and 9).

Drawing upon my own experience of having kept an account with Barclays Bank, London when I was on a course I caused the accused person to be brought and instructed that a cautioned statement be obtained from him. I there and then decided that he should be put before court and caused him to be charged with corruption. I put him before court on that same day. I made further investigations from other government departments and organisations in the light of the accused’s cautioned statement and found out that the accused person wrote letters to the government and organisations quite apart from being a special prosecutor.

I have photostat copies of the letters which I found by investigation. Here they are and I identify them as identification 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. I have also received a letter of appointment of the accused person as Special Prosecutor by the erstwhile A.F.R.C. and signed by the erstwhile Chairman and I wish to tender it in evidence. (No objection, accepted and marked T.) On the 25 August 1980, I received an envelope in my office and addressed to me containing the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and exhibit H which I wish to tender in evidence.”

(The emphasis is mine)

It is observed that this evidence in the record, exhibit A (as emphasised by me) had been made the crux of some objections, raised by Mr. Kom for the accused in the court below. These have been repeated among others in the hearing of the present application.

Relative to the admissibility of these documents on the same day, 3 November 1980 the arguments of Mr. Kom for the accused and those of the Deputy Attorney-General for the Republic covered about four pages of the record, exhibit A, in which under date 5 November 1980 the ruling of the court had been:

“Ruling:

I have heard the submission of counsel for the defence in his objection to the tendering of the above documents in evidence. I have also heard the submission of the learned Deputy Attorney-General in reply to the submission in support of the objection by counsel for the defence. It is my humble opinion that the documents be admitted in evidence. I therefore overrule the objection of counsel for the defence. Case to continue.”

[p.288] of [1982-83] GLR 276

And at that stage the record continues that counsel for the defence applied:

“ to the court to be given a week’s adjournment to advise himself in view of the above ruling.

The learned Deputy Attorney-General replies – and submits that this is a criminal prosecution brought by the Republic, the prosecution have not closed their case yet and have also not given any indication of their inability to go on with the case. Indeed, the prosecution is continuing with a witness in the witness box, so there is no legal basis for the application and also no point of injustice raised in the application and so the application be refused.

By Court: I have to complete the above case as soon as possible and unless there is a dire need of adjournment in this case which the present application for adjournment to my mind is not one, I cannot accede to this request by the defence, and it is refused.

Case to continue. Documents are to be marked exhibits U, V, W, X and Y.”

The evidence then continued:

“The sixth prosecution witness — Tetteh Huodji Opata — R. O. H. F. O.

Then on 6 October 1980, I served a notice on the accused person to produce the original of exhibit J because the edges which should bear the computer numbers had been cut off. But the accused had failed to produce the original of that document. Therefore I wish to tender the notice served on the accused in evidence; no objection, accepted and marked exhibit K. In the course of the investigations, I contacted the members of the Special Tribunal and the staff and some government departments including the Registrar-General’s and the Attorney-General Department whom I subpoenaed to give evidence in this case for the prosecution.

Cross-examination by counsel for the defence adjourned to 6 November 1980.”

It was after this adjournment that the applicant on 10 November 1980 filed this application for leave.

This simple ruling referred to above has been made one of the subjects of these certiorari proceedings, and as this ruling was based on relevancy and admissibility, bearing in mind that the rules relative to that matter are what are contained in NRCD 323, I do at this stage refer to Part IV of that Decree headed RELEVANCY, under which it is stated:

[p.289] of [1982-83] GLR 276

“51. (1) For the purpose of this Decree, ‘relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, which makes the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

(2) All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by any enactment.

(3) No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.

52. The court in its discretion may exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by- (a) considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence; or . . .

(b) the risk that admission of the evidence will create substantial danger of unfair prejudice or substantial danger of confusing the issues; or………”

Now it is one of the grounds for applying for the order of certiorari that the trial judge failed to exercise a discretion under section 52 to exclude the documentary exhibits in question.

It is submitted by this court that under section 51, if the evidence is relevant it is admissible, and that such evidence must first be admitted before its probative value can be assessed with regard to section 52 (a) and (b) above referred to, and that the exercise of such discretion only comes into play when the weight of the evidence is being appraised by the court.

And I must observe that in the instant criminal proceedings against the applicant in the trial court, as the court could not at that stage be said to have knowledge of the breadth or width of the overall evidence the prosecution would offer, the provisions under section 52 could not legally be applied. The discretion to exclude relevant evidence is for the trial court which must be deemed to know when it is exercisable.

There was nothing in the proceedings, exhibit A, to indicate that at that stage of tendering those documentary exhibits a matter had arisen which fell under the provisions of section 52 (a) and (b) and which therefore warranted the exercise of the discretion thus given by the section. An exercise by the court of that discretion at that stage to exclude relevant evidence would be a wrongful exercise of it, whereas non-exercise of the discretion in those circumstances would not be a wrongful failure to exercise it.

Furthermore, up to that stage of the proceedings there does not appear disclosed any evidence of surprise by the tendering of those relevant documents in evidence, with the documentary exhibits J, K,

[p.290] of [1982-83] GLR 276

L, M, N, being already in evidence. Nor is there any evidence disclosing specific harm.

As explained in the Commentary on the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N. R. C. D. 323) at p. 34, para. (3) under “Section 52 – Discretion to exclude relevant evidence”:

“This proviso is included to minimise the risk of abuse of discretion in the exercise of this power, and to indicate that a continuance is usually to be preferred to exclusion of the evidence.”

In the instant criminal proceedings, there is on record no evidence of waste of time by the prosecution and no evidence from them that a witness was being subpoenaed from abroad, and therefore of a waste of time.

Relying on the above provision in the Commentary I cannot but uphold that the trial circuit judge properly deferred the exercise of the discretion and continued with the hearing, until a stage at which he might find whether or not it is judiciously exercisable.

As counsel for the applicant has relied on the provisions of section 52, he impliedly admits that at that stage those documentary exhibits tendered were in fact relevant.

And the only question now to be resolved in the present proceedings is whether or not these documentary exhibits tendered were in fact admissible. But I wish to examine, irrespective of the implied admission of Mr. Kom for the applicant that they were relevant, whether they were in fact relevant.

It had been the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness (Opata) on 29th October 1980 that:

“On 22 August 1980 I had instructions to see Commissioner of Police Mr. V. A. T. Marbel. I saw him and he asked me to see the second prosecution witness. I saw the second prosecution witness accordingly and he told me something and gave me a report in this case written by the second prosecution witness himself together with some other documents. The documents are a bank statement bearing the name of the accused person, exhibit H; a cheque with a No. 156773 and bearing account No. 2109501, exhibit M; another cheque with a No. 156774, exhibit N; a document enumerating the accounts of the accused in manuscript — exhibit O; a bank giro cheque for 1,000 pounds, exhibit L; another bank giro cheque for 10,000 pounds, exhibit K; and a bank statement — exhibit J. I examined the documents very closely and found that exhibits M, N, K, L, which are cheques reflect in exhibit H, bank statement. I also observed that exhibit J had got the edges cut as against exhibit H which has computer numbers.”

[p.291] of [1982-83] GLR 276 In this way the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness relates exhibit H to each of exhibits M, N, K, and L.

In my view, the objection raised and its attendant submissions (at that stage of the proceedings) were uncalled for, because what a witness says he sees factually written in a document cannot be said to be hearsay – it is direct evidence of what he sees.

And the sixth prosecution witness continued his evidence on 3 November 1980 thus, inter alia:

“Exhibit J, that is bank statement sheet No. 1980/4 was alleged to have been supplied by the accused person to the members of the Special Tribunal as a result of exhibit G, that is the letter alleged to have been written by the accused to his bankers. My observations further revealed that exhibits H, J, K, L, M and N bore something in common, that is, they have account No. 21094501 of the accused person, his name, and the address of Barclays Bank International London. That on exhibit K, that is bank giro credit form which bear the account number of the accused person for an amount of 1,000 pounds with a signature which appears to be that of Henry Kojo Djaba which I knew very well. I have caused the signature on exhibit L to be examined with the known signature of Henry Kojo Djaba on other documents.”

Thus, the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness is to the effect that:

1. Exhibits G, H, J, K, L, M and N, had earlier been tendered in evidence and had been accepted and so marked by the court.

2. Exhibit G was a letter allegedly written by the accused to his bankers in question. 3. Consequent upon his letter, exhibit G, his bankers forwarded to the accused the bank statement sheet No. 1980/4, exhibit J.

4. The accused surrendered exhibit J to the members of the special tribunal.

5. Exhibit K bearing the account number of the accused was a giro credit form for an amount of 1,000 pounds – and bore the signature of Henry Kojo Djaba as payer whose signature the witness knew. 6. Exhibit H is a bank statement bearing the name of the accused.

7. Exhibit J is a bank statement sheet No. 1980/4.

8. Exhibit K is a bank giro cheque for 10,000 pounds.

9. Exhibit L is a bank giro cheque for 1,000 pounds.

10. Exhibit M is a cheque No. 156773 bearing account No. 21094501.

[p.292] of [1982-83] GLR 276 11. Exhibit N is a cheque with a number 156774.

12. Each of exhibits H, J, K, L, M and N bore on them:

(a) the account No. 21094501 of the accused;

(b) the name of the accused; and (c) the address of Barclays Bank International, London.

The conjoined relationship thus established between exhibits H, J, K, L, M and N afforded evidence that they respectively referred to an account No. 21094501 of the accused at Barclays Bank International, London. They had properly earlier been admitted in evidence as facts relevant to the facts in issue, i.e. the alleged criminal charges against the accused before the trial court.

Hence any other evidence, oral or documentary, which is relevant to each of these documents, and which is not excluded on another legal ground of objection, must be accepted in evidence if so tendered.

I now, on this basis deal with the main ground of Mr. Kom, learned counsel for the applicant, that the acceptance in evidence of the exhibits U, V, W, X and Y amounted to admitting inadmissible evidence.

At the trial circuit court, as the bank is not a witness for the prosecution, the bank statement sheet No, 1980/4 (which the sixth prosecution witness said in his evidence on 3 October 1980 “was alleged to have been supplied by the accused person to the members of the special tribunal as a result of exhibit G, the letter alleged to have been written by the accused to his bankers”) was legally admissible in evidence as what the accused (applicant) did receive from that bank allegedly at his own request by the said letter exhibit G. This bank statement sheet No. 1980/4 had therefore been properly admitted into evidence as exhibit J. It is clear also, from the following evidence of the sixth prosecution witness on 5 November 1980, that exhibit J was legally admissible in evidence, for the sixth prosecution witness stated:

“That on 6 October 1980, I served a notice on the accused person to produce the original of exhibit J because the edges which should bear the computer numbers had been cut off. But the accused had failed to produce the original of that document.”

For even if at all exhibit J was not the original, the following provisions of NRCD 323, s. 167 applied:

“167. Evidence other than an original writing is admissible to the same extent as an original writing to prove the content of a writing if all originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the loss or destruction resulted from the fraudulent act of the proponent of the evidence.”

[p.293] of [1982-83] GLR 276

Here in this criminal case the prosecution is the proponent of the evidence to be afforded by the alleged original of exhibit J; but it had not been proved to have been lost or destroyed by their fraudulent act. The non-production of the alleged original of exhibit J, prima facie, implies a loss of it by the opponent of the evidence, who is the accused applicant.

Besides, NRCD 323 s. 169 (1) applies. It states:

“169. (1) Evidence other than an original writing is admissible to the same extent as an original to prove the content of a writing if at a time when an original was under the control of the opponent of the evidence, the opponent was given express or implied notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the content of the writing would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and on request at the hearing he does not produce it.”

When, as stated above, upon notice the accused (applicant) failed to produce the original of exhibit J on 5 November 1980 this notice was tendered in evidence and accepted by the trial circuit court as exhibit K during the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness.

With exhibit J (the bank statement sheet No. 1980/4) thus legally received in evidence, any other evidence, oral or documentary, which tends to relate to exhibit J itself or to facts in exhibit J must be considered as relevant to a fact relevant to the issue before the court, and is therefore admissible unless such evidence can be excluded on another legal ground – vide NRCD 323 s. 61 (2). I wish to recall again that: Exhibit H is a bank statement bearing the name of the accused (applicant); exhibit K is a bank giro cheque for 10,000 pounds; exhibit L is a bank giro cheque for 1,000 pounds; exhibit M is a cheque No. 156773 bearing account No. 21094501; exhibit N is a cheque with a number 156774. Each of these exhibits bore on them:

1. the account No. 21094501 of the accused;

2. the name of the accused;

3. the address of Barclays Bank International, London; and that those aspects of these exhibits are gathered from the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness given on 22 August 1980.

In continuation of his evidence on 3 November 1980, the sixth prosecution witness stated at the trial circuit court thus: “On 25 August 1980 I received an envelope in my office addressed to me containing the originals of exhibit H which I wish to tender in evidence.”

At that stage Mr. Kom, learned counsel for the accused, raised an objection and made submissions on the admissibility of these exhibits in evidence. The learned Deputy Attorney-General replied. After this

[p.294] of [1982-83] GLR 276

Mr. Kom invited the court to overrule the objection of the Deputy Attorney-General giving his reason that consequent upon the accused’s letter, exhibit G, the documents called for by it could go to the possession of only the accused himself, if such documents had in fact been supplied. The submissions of either side are found at pp.6 – 10 of the record, exhibit A, attached to the application.

Let it be borne in mind that the evidence in the case was being led within the provisions of NRCD 323.

The objections and submissions of Mr. Kom for the accused at that stage were to the effect that the documents to be tendered in evidence did not emanate from proper custody, and that therefore the provisions of sections 52 and 176 of NRCD 323 did apply to exclude them. Per contra, the submissions of the Deputy Attorney-General were to the effect that the documents were relevant, and that section 176 of NRCD 323 did not apply to the situation, insofar as subsection (5) thereof clearly excluded the prior subsections, if the bank in question was not, as in the present case, registered in Ghana.

It is evident, from these submissions of both counsel before the trial court, that they were respectively the same as what was respectively canvassed in the hearing of this application. Upon those submissions the trial judge had ruled, as referred to above, that those documentary exhibits were admissible, and he eventually admitted them into evidence as exhibits U, V, W, X and Y.

Their relevancy is established by the record by virtue of the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness, while tendering them, and stating they were the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and H and by the very affidavit (paragraph 4 thereof) of the applicant filed on 11 November 1980 stating those controversial exhibits to be respectively:

(i) two Barclays Bank International, London, cheques for 100 pounds each numbered 156773 and 156774;

(ii) giro (paying slip) dated 12 December 1980 for 1,000 pounds;

(iii) giro (paying slip) dated 11 January 1980 for 10,000 pounds and

(iv) bank statement number 1980/1.

Relating these descriptions of these exhibits to what was stated in the evidence of the sixth prosecution witness on 29 October 1980 as to exhibits H, J, K, L, M and N, one cannot but come to the conclusion that the relevancy of each of exhibits U, V, W, X and Y was established beyond question. In whatever order they were thus accepted in evidence as U, V, W, X and Y in the ruling, their relevancy cannot be doubted.

And to this end, I wish to advert to Part IV of NRCD 323 dealing with relevancy. The provisions of section 51 are:

“51. (1) For the purpose of this Decree, ‘relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of

[p.295] of [1982-83] GLR 276 a witness or hearsay declarant, which makes the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

(2) All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by any enactment.

(3) No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.”

In relation to this section, it is stated at p.33 of the commentary on the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), para. 3:

“The second question is the one more naturally thought of in connection with relevance, i.e., does the evidence offered make the existence of the fact to be proved more or less probable. This question will turn on the application of reason to facts in evidence and facts known in the light of human understanding and experience. The evidence does not need to be conclusive on the fact to be proved; it need not even be persuasive. It is enough that the evidence has some effect on the probability of the existence of the fact to be proved. To be relevant the evidence need not be sufficient to support a finding of fact … To be relevant the evidence need only constitute a part and not the whole of what is needed.”

And at p. 34:

“Section 51 (2) provides the cornerstone of the law of evidence by making all relevant evidence admissible, subject to the rules of exclusion provided in the Decree and in other enactments.

Section 51 (3) limits the admissibility of evidence to evidence which is relevant. Section 51 (2) and (3) accord with the existing law.”

Now it is evident from the arguments and submissions at the trial court that the learned counsel for the accused prefaces his submissions with a ground as to what would be the weight attachable to those exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y when received. While the learned Deputy Attorney-General was concerned with admissibility of evidence on the grounds of relevancy, learned counsel for the accused does not bring his objections within section 51 (2) with regard to the provisions “except as otherwise provided by any enactment.”

He no doubt does not shut his eyes to the provision of section 176 (5) which makes the provisions of the earlier subsections inapplicable to banks not registered in Ghana as such. But he forcefully contends that “if the Decree makes stringent provisions about banks within the jurisdiction of the court, more stringent evidential consideration must be taken in relation to banks operating outside Ghana.” The answer to

[p.296] of [1982-83] GLR 276 this is simple, and it is this, learned counsel had better have an amendment to this Decree made in Parliament, and not in the courts.

Again, Mr. Kom, learned counsel for the applicant, forcefully further contends that the decision in Kuruma v. R. (supra) adopted in State v. Atia Tongo [1967] G.L.R. 765 is no longer law on the ground that evidence illegally obtained was in conflict with the provisions of articles 25 and 28 of the Constitution, 1979. But he does not show on the face of the record a scintilla of evidence disclosing a breach of any of those multifarious provisions, if at all his submission in that regard could be said to be convincing. But in my view, upon those two cited cases, the law is that evidence, if relevant, is admissible provided it is not excluded on another legal ground, “and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.”

It must be emphasised that when evidence adduced is relevant and is therefore admissible, despite contrary arguments, the court is to concern itself with the provisions of section 51 (1), (2) and (3) of NRCD 323 for purposes of admissibility.

The exercise of the discretion under the provisions of section 52 is, as hereinbefore stated, a matter for the trial court and not for the accused or either party to the action – not for the opponent or proponent of the evidence.

After arguments submitted, against and for the admission of evidence, if the court finds that the provisions of section 51 (1), (2) and (3) are satisfied, it is sufficient for the court to rule simply in terms that “objection is overruled” and, if the evidence is documentary, “document accepted and to be marked exhibit.” If the evidence tendered does not satisfy those provisions, a ruling in terms of “objection upheld,” and, if the evidence is documentary, “document rejected and to be so marked as exhibit” is sufficient.

As to this, section 6 of NRCD 323 states:

“6. (1) In every action, and at every stage thereof, any objection to the admissibility of evidence by a party affected thereby shall be made at the time the evidence is offered.

(2) Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be recorded and ruled upon by the court as a matter of course.

(3) Where a document is produced and tendered in evidence and rejected by the court, it shall be marked by the court as having been so tendered and rejected.”

I cannot read into subsection (2) as regards the words “and ruled upon” an implied obligation on the court to give reasons for the ruling.

Learned counsel for the applicant, in his argument on his third ground on error of law, referred to the cases of Simond Akill v. White

[p.297] of [1982-83] GLR 276

Cross Insurance Co.(supra) at p.10 and Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A. and relied on Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed). Vol 1, para. 63 to contend that error of law includes giving reasons which disclose faulty reasoning, or which are inadequate to fulfil an express duty to give reasons.

Under section 6 (2) of NRCD 323, there is nothing to indicate an express duty on the court to give reasons for a ruling on the admissibility of documents — it may be an error of law if this subsection imposes an express duty on the court to give reasons for the ruling.

The ruling of the trial court, as the subject of complaint that it was without reasons, was in effect, in that way impliedly, that the objection had been overruled. It is immaterial whether or not the submissions of both counsel did cover a considerable number of pages of the record.

It is submitted that a ruling in that way on relevance and admissibility does not give a ground for “error of law on the face of the record,” once the ruling of the court is in keeping with the provisions in the Decree. It is so whether or not the submissions of opposing counsel were at cross – purposes, with opponent of the evidence basing his submissions on the cogency or weight of the evidence, and the proponent of the evidence basing his submissions solely on” relevancy and no other legal ground for exclusion ,” as was done in the court below and during the hearing of this application.

In ruling on the admissibility of evidence, whatever be the length of the submissions or arguments and the number of pages they cover, the court is not minded, or obliged by law, to write a legal monograph or vade-mecum on relevancy and admissibility. It is sufficient if the court makes its ruling in some form or other as indicated above, a fortiori when it is patent to high heaven that the evidence sought to be adduced is relevant and therefore admissible, especially when there is no enactment grounding its exclusion. The court must of course record the grounds of objection and the reply thereto.

I am unable, therefore, to go with Mr. Kom for the applicant in his argument that the submissions of both counsel at the trial court covered four pages and yet the ruling of the court was the little that appeared on the record, exhibit A, and that as that ruling gave no reasons for admitting the documents, an error on the face of the record resulted for it was not in breach of any of the sections of NRCD 323.

All the controversial documents, exhibits U, V, W, X (and if there was any Y as contended by the applicant) were legally admissible upon the relevancy stated, that they were the originals of exhibits L, K, M, N and H, and upon the earlier evidence they bore certain features of relationship.

It must be emphasised that relevancy and admissibility together differ from cogency or weight of the evidence which appertains to the

[p.298] of [1982-83] GLR 276 appraisal of the evidential value to be attached to the evidence – this arises when a decision is to be made on the evidence. It is after this appraisal and its attendant decision that it can be challenged – if challengeable at all – by an action or proceedings in the appropriate forum.

I must state that the decision in Owusu v. The Republic (supra) as relied upon by counsel for the applicant, was not covered by section 176 (5) of NRCD 323 to warrant consideration in the present proceedings; because, that case was decided on the banker’s evidence within the provisions of Order 37, rr. 67 – 76 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) in which there was no provision like NRCD 323, s. 176 (5). These have now been repealed by NRCD 323 s. 180 (2) (a) by which rules 1,4,21,28 and 50 – 84 of Order 37 were revoked.

The provisions of LN 140A rr. 67 – 76 have, however, been substantially enacted in section 176 (1-4) of NRCD 323. Owusu v. The Republic (supra) forcefully applies if the bank in question is registered in Ghana, as it was in that decided case. In the criminal proceedings against the accused section 176 (5) states in the provisions of the earlier four subsections as it is clear that the bank in question is not registered in Ghana.

Mr. Kom for the applicant also contended, with as much force as in the other submissions, but, this time, not without a great deal of emphasis, that all the admitted documents U, V, W, X and Y were hearsay evidence and that their admission constituted an error of law. Referring to Phipson on Evidence (11th ed.), paras. 638 and 639, he read: “When the object is to establish what is contained in the statement it is hearsay and inadmissible.” And he argued:

“Hence if Opata is tendering evidence that he found the documents on his table, that evidence is not hearsay and therefore admissible – but if he is tendering them to establish their contents, the contents are hearsay and inadmissible.”

Referring to paragraph 639, Mr. Kom contended that the rule which applies to hearsay also equally applies to documents and relevancy as to its authenticity. Whether the exhibits in question emanated from the Barclays Bank International, Cockspar Street, London is in issue — since Opata, the sixth prosecution witness did not give evidence as to the authenticity and proof of the documents, the documents are hearsay. He further contended that the documents must be proved and where it is sought to establish the facts related in them the maker must be called. Even though counsel referred to sections 117 and 118 of the Decree, he did not go further to apply their provisions to the matter in hand.

[p.299] of [1982-83] GLR 276

This enunciation of the law in the stated paragraphs of Phipson on Evidence (11th ed.) is no doubt the law. But to it there are certain exceptions:

“practically in most cases on the ground of necessity, but it has invariably taken care that the exception shall be guarded by some security, which makes the evidence really reliable…

The other branch of exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay consists in those arising out of the Evidence Act, 1938… In this connection it should be appreciated (1) that the Evidence Act 1938 applies only to Civil proceedings; (2) that it only serves to admit documentary hearsay matter; but (3) it is in addition to, and does not derogate from any ground of admissibility at common law.”

See Cockles on Evidence (1945), pp. 169 – 170 The Evidence Act, 1938 was adopted in Ghana under Order 37, rr. 59-66 of LN 140A in relation to civil proceedings only, and if those rules 59 – 66 were still operative as not applicable to criminal proceedings, the submissions of counsel could be legally upheld regarding the inadmissibility of those controversial documents, i.e., exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y in criminal proceedings.

As stated above, those rules 59 – 66 then under the rubric “documentary evidence as to facts in issue” have been repealed by section 180 (2) of NRCD 323 which revoked rules 1,4,21,28, and 50 – 84 of Order 37 of LN 140A.

However, under “Part VIII – Hearsay” covering sections 116 – 135 of NRCD 323, those rules 59 – 66 have resurrected in section 118 under the guise of “first hand hearsay” with the implication that they apply to proceedings both civil and criminal. Section 116 defines the terms used in the subsequent sections. Section 117 states the general rule with exceptions thus:

“Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as otherwise provided by this Decree or any other enactment or by agreement of the parties.”

In defining the terms, section 116 states, inter alia:

“(a) a ‘statement’ is an oral or written expression, or conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for oral or written expression;

(b) a ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a statement;

(c) ‘hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement, other than a statement made by a witness while testifying in the action at the trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated;

(d) a ‘hearsay statement’ is a statement evidence of which is hearsay evidence;

[p.300] of [1982-83] GLR 276

(e) ‘unavailable as a witness’ means that the declarant is: . . .

(iv) absent from the trial and the court is unable to compel his attendance by its process; . . .

(f) ‘available as a witness’ means that the declarant is not unavailable as a witness.”

Section 118, dealing with first hand hearsay, states, inter alia:

“118 (1) Evidence of a hearsay statement is not made inadmissible by section 117 if— a. the statement made by the declarant would be admissible had it been made while testifying in the action and would not itself be hearsay evidence, and b. the declarant is:

(i) unavailable as a witness, or . . .”

NRCD 323 applies to all legal proceedings.

It is in the record of proceedings, exhibit A, that the documents exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y had on their faces “Barclays Bank International, London.” This description makes each of the documents purporting to emanate from the bank. Therefore, that bank falls under section 116 (b) and (e) (iv), with the documents exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y falling under section 116 (a), if they purport to emanate from that London bank.

Under section 116 (e) (iv) that London bank is one that cannot be compelled by the court in Ghana by its process to appear to give evidence, a fortiori a representative thereof. Under section 118 (1) (a) and (b) therefore those exhibits U, V, W, X, and Y are admissible, and were properly admitted in evidence by the trial court, and in this regard, I refer again to section 168 of the Decree: “Evidence other than an original writing is admissible to the same extent as an original to prove the content of a writing if no original can be obtained by any available judicial procedure…”

On the first day of the hearing of this application, I urged Mr. Kom, learned counsel for the applicant, to make a research for “any available judicial procedure” for obtaining the originals of the documents complained of, if it was his case that the exhibits in question were copies and they therefore afforded hearsay evidence.

During the second day of the hearing both counsel did not advert to this matter of research. If there in fact should exist such judicial procedure for obtaining originals from that London bank and the prosecution failed to adopt it, they would be caught by this first leg of that section, and the documents would not be admissible in law. But is there such a judicial procedure? The answer to this question lies in

[p.301] of [1982-83] GLR 276 the statutes of general application before Ghana attained its independence as a Republic. Before then there was the procedure either by letters of commission under the Evidence by Commission Act, 1859 (22 Vict., c. 20), or by letters of request under that Act.

Some of these statutes of general application are preserved under section 111 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) in the First Schedule to section 111(1). In the list in this schedule this statute is not mentioned, and is therefore impliedly revoked in so far as the laws between Ghana and Britain are concerned. There does not at present exist any convention between Ghana and Britain by which a judicial procedure exists for obtaining the originals of these documents from that London bank.

As I have in the premises found that the controversial documents were admissible in evidence, there is no room for consideration for error of law on the face of the record. They were not “hearsay statement” evidence falling within the provisions of section 116 (d), because the sixth prosecution witness was not testifying as to what he had seen in those documents without producing them; but falling within first hand hearsay under section 118 (1) (a) and (b) (i) of NRCD 323; for under section 116 (e) (iv) of NRCD 323 the “declarant” bank was unquestionably “absent from the trial and the court is unable to compel his attendance by its process.”

All the decided cases cited by counsel and not mentioned or dealt with in this ruling have no bearing on relevancy and admissibility, within the meaning of NRCD 323, as they were referred to in order to bolster arguments for or against the existence of “error of law on the face of the record”.

I have written thus much to avoid a complaint of an error on the face of the record. For the reasons hereinbefore given, I am unable to uphold that the matter complained of by the applicant did amount to, or disclose an error on the face of the record.

The application for an order of certiorari for “error of law on the face of the record,” was based on the grounds of:

(i) admitting inadmissible evidence;

(ii) wrongful exercise of judicial discretion; and (iii) failure to give reasons, by giving inadequate reasons to fulfil an express duty to give reasons. All these grounds fail and founder with the application itself, on the grounds that:

(1) the documentary exhibits U, V, W, X and Y are legally relevant and admissible; (2) there was neither wrongful exercise of discretion, nor wrongful failure to exercise discretion to exclude them; and [p.302] of [1982-83] GLR 276 (3) the trial court was under no express or implied duty to give reasons for a simple ruling that documents were admissible when it was patent that they were relevant, and therefore admissible as there is no legal ground for their exclusion.

The application for an order of certiorari is accordingly dismissed. The order earlier made in this court staying the criminal proceedings at the trial circuit court is hereby vacated. The applicant herein as the accused therein is ordered to reappear before the trial circuit court for continuation of the criminal proceedings at 8.30 a.m. on 16 January 1981. No order as to costs.

DECISION Appeal Dismissed.

D.R.K.S.

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