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[1980] SLR (HC) 39High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. AWUTU SENYA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE NENYI AMU II [1981] GLR 368

14 March 1980 · OKUNOR J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 39
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v AWUTU SENYA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte NENYI AMU II [1981] GLR 368 [1980] SLR (HC) 39
APAREPUBLIC v AWUTU SENYA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte NENYI AMU II [1981] GLR 368, [1980] SLR (HC) 39 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v AWUTU SENYA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte NENYI AMU II [1981] GLR 368, [1980] SLR (HC) 39 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.

[1924] 1 K.B. 171 ; 93 L.J.K.B. 390; 130 L.T. 164; 88 J.P. 13; 39 T.L.R. 715; 68 S.J. 188; 21 L.G.R. 719, C.A.

(2) R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee; Ex parte Brand (R.A.) & Co., Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 413;

[1952] 1 All E.R. 480; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 476; 96 S.J. 183, D.C. Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.

(4) Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R.

107.

(5) Republic v. Kumasi Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Opoku Agyemang II [1977] 1 G.L.R. 360, C.A.

(6) R. v. Justices of Surrey (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 466; 39 L.J.M.C. 145.

(7) R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B.

380; [1965] 3 W.L.R. 426; [1965] 2 All E.R. 836; 129 J.P. 447; 109 S.J. 475; 63 L.G.R. 353;

[1965] R.A. 177; [1965] R.V.R. 384; 194 Estates Gazette 933, C.A. affirming [1964] 1 W.L.R.

1186; [1964] 3 All E.R. 200; 108 S.J. 692; [1964] R.V.R. 500; 191 Estates Gazette 289.

(8) R. v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Villiers [1936] 2 K.B. 29; [1936] 1 All E.R. 817; 105 L.J.K.B.

792; 154 L.T. 630; 100 J.P. 212; 52 T.L.R. 408; 80 S.J. 426; 34 L.G.R. 203, D.C.

[p.371] of [1981] GLR 368

(9) R. v. Williams; Ex parte Phillips [1914] 1 K.B. 608; 83 L.J.K.B. 528; 110 L.T. 372; 78 J.P. 148.

(10) Jones v. Owen (1848) 5 D. & L. 669.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of prohibition to restrain the Awutu Senya Traditional Council from including in its membership certain named persons on the ground that they were not chiefs. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf for the applicant.

J. B. Short for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF OKUNOR J.

This is an application in which the applicant, Nenyi Kwame Amu II, who describes himself as “Eguasehene of Senya Bereku” seeks an order of prohibition directed to, and restraining the Awutu Senya Traditional Council from including in its membership certain named persons on the ground that they “are not chiefs and their names are not in the national register of chiefs.” To his application is attached an affidavit in the following terms:

“I Nenyi Kwame Amu II, Eguasehene of Senya Bereku, make oath and say as follows:

(1) That I am a member of the Awutu Senya Traditional Council.

(2) That the last president of the council, Odefo Issiw V, died some time in 1975.

(3) That the prerogative of electing a new Omanhene vests in the two asafo companies of Senya Bereku acting with the Tufuhene of Senya Bereku. They have not been able to agree.

(4) That the matter went before the Central Regional House of Chiefs whose decision on the matter is now pending before the National House of Chiefs, Kumasi.

(5) That pending the resolution of that matter, a regent in the person of one Abudulai Esseku II, is now acting president.

(6) That the regent instead of keeping the scales even between the two asafo companies, is siding with one company and in furtherance of that patronage is packing the council.

(7) That recently a meeting of the council was invaded by the police who insisted on searching some members.

(8) That six persons, namely K. A. Larbey, Kwame Okai, Apentey, E. B. Haizel, Michael Abbiw and Kow

[p.372] of [1981] GLR 368

Larbie, all of whom are not chiefs and whose names do not appear in the register of chiefs have been brought in to participate in the business of the council in order to give effect to the wishes of the No. 1 Asafo Company.

(9) That as a result the area is seething with unrest and the situation is pregnant with serious trouble.

There has been arbitrary arrest of members of the council not sympathetic to the No.1 Company.

(10) That in the circumstances I swear to this affidavit in support of an application for leave to apply for an order of prohibition restraining the council from admitting the six persons mentioned.”

It is the case for the applicant that by article 114 of the Constitution, 1969, which was still operative at the time of the application, the High Court can supervise and give orders to the inferior tribunals and grant orders of certiorari and prohibition. Traditional councils are “creatures of statute” with statutory functions and bound by the enabling statute to do only what they are empowered to do. When therefore they do what they are not empowered to do, or do what they are empowered to do in a way not authorised, or expressly forbidden, they are then acting without jurisdiction. Counsel for the applicant then concludes that when it is alleged, as the applicant does, that some persons who do not satisfy the provisions of section 14 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), are sitting as members of the traditional council, “a prima facie case has been made out attracting the powers of the court.” The traditional council, it was argued, was acting in flagrant contravention of the enabling statute, and it is within the power of this court to prohibit it. On the question of locus standi, counsel argued that any person subject to the jurisdiction of the traditional council will be entitled to come to court and complain that the council was acting ultra vires its powers.

What are the circumstances in which prohibition will issue? In R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at p. 205, C.A. Atkin L.J. said that prohibition (and certiorari) may issue: “Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority.. . “ (The emphasis is mine.) Or as Professor Garner put it at p. 183 of his book, Administrative Law (4th ed.), “[I]t is granted by the High Court, … to prevent an inferior court or government agency required to

[p.373] of [1981] GLR 368 act in a judicial manner, from exceeding its jurisdiction.” And a body is required to act in a judicial manner if it can be shown that it was obliged to decide questions of law or fact affecting individual rights and exercise a judicial or limited discretion: see R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee; Ex parte Brand (R.A.) & Co., Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 413, D.C. And this should be distinguished from purely administrative or executive function where there is no duty to afford a hearing to the parties interested. Prohibition will not issue in respect of the proceedings of a deliberative assembly.

Any traditional council, except when it is sitting by way of a judicial committee, engages in purely deliberative business and the specific act of the council complained of, namely “packing the council with persons who are not qualified to sit in the council” can hardly be described as judicial. Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11, at p. 55 says of a “judicial (or quasi-judicial) act” as, “It is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition.” (The emphasis is mine.) Counsel for the applicant quite correctly stated that under article 114 of the Constitution, 1969, the High Court may control the proceedings of the inferior tribunals, but can the traditional council sitting in its full complement be described as a tribunal?

It was the contention of counsel for the applicant that prohibition should not be withheld merely because the respondent was not undertaking a judicial act, and to support this contention, counsel referred to a 1976 case in which Apaloo J.A. (as he then was), had said that the fact that a traditional council is not exercising a judicial function does not afford it immunity from supervision. I am certain that counsel was referring to the case of Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231 in which Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) said at p. 244, C.A.:

“It can hardly be argued that the full traditional council which merely usurped jurisdiction in this case could be immune from the supervisory jurisdiction of the court because it chose to contend that it was not acting judicially or quasi-judicially.”

Counsel’s reliance on the Tiwaa case is obviously displaced. That case like a few others (see for example Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah II [1973] 2 G.L.R. 107 and Republic v. Kumasi Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Opoku Agyemang II [1977] 1 G.L.R. 360, C.A. was one in which the traditional council, sitting in its full complement, and not by

[p.374] of [1981] GLR 368 way of a judicial committee, purported to take a decision to destool and actually destooled the occupant of a stool.

It was contended on behalf of the traditional council in the Tiwaa ease (supra) that the council I did not act in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity and consequently certiorari would not lie. I think that by his argument, counsel in that case admitted himself that the orders of certiorari (and prohibition) can only operate on a judicial or quasi-judicial act. It was in these circumstances that the Court of Appeal pointed out that the actual body clothed by law to determine a chieftaincy dispute is the judicial committee of the council and not the council as such and that by purporting to determine such a chieftaincy dispute the traditional council has merely usurped jurisdiction reserved for the judicial committee and the council cannot be heard to say that because it did not take that decision in a judicial capacity certiorari should not issue. I think it must be borne in mind that the question whether the orders of prohibition (and certiorari) was appropriate in any particular case is determined not so much by the general character of the body that had acted as by reference to the character of the act or decision sought to be attacked. In the Tiwaa case the act which was impugned was the council’s purported determination of a destoolment dispute—a judicial undertaking. In this case the act complained of is the conduct of the council in “packing the council with persons allegedly unqualified to sit on it.” This is purely administrative.

One little point on this aspect of the matter: It is not very clear whether the applicant is making the court to prohibit the council in its general conduct of “packing the house with unqualified persons” or whether he only wants the court to prohibit the already completed act of packing the council with six unqualified participants by way of ex-communicating them. Paragraphs (8) and (10) of the supporting affidavit read:

“(8) That six persons, namely K. A. Larbey, Kwame Okai, Apentey, E. B. Haizel, Michael Abbiw and Kow Larbie, all of whom are not chiefs have been brought to participate in the business of the council in order to give effect of the wishes of the No.1 Asafo Company.

(10) That in the circumstances, I swear to this affidavit in support of an application for leave to apply for an order of prohibition restraining the council from admitting the six persons mentioned.”

Either way, however, the application is incompetent; because, if the former is the case, even where an order of prohibition is

[p.375] of [1981] GLR 368 the appropriate remedy, it would not issue to prohibit the offending body from acting generally. It always issues to prohibit specific acts; and if the latter is the case prohibition will not lie unless something remains to be done which a court can prohibit. Further who is the court to prohibit, the regent or the traditional council? In this regard, paragraph (10) of the applicant’s affidavit may be compared with paragraph (6) of the affidavit which reads, “That the regent instead of keeping the scales even between the two asafo companies, is siding with one company and in furtherance of that patronage is packing the council.

It was quite, obvious from the arguments of counsel for the applicant that it did not sound right to, him that the High Court with all the supervisory powers given it by the Constitution should sit idly by whilst the council did as it pleased with its membership. This argument would carry considerable force if statute did not remedy for the traditional council’s pranks; but it provide any Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) reads:

“14. (1) subject to the provisions of this section, a Traditional Council shall consist, in addition to the President, of the persons shown in the National Register of Chiefs as the members thereof.

(2) Subject to subsection 4 of this section, the membership of a Traditional Council in the first instance shall of that Council immediately be the same as the membership before the commencement of this Act.

(3) As soon as practicable after any change occurs in he membership of a Traditional Council the Council shall notify the Regional House of Chiefs thereof which shall in turn notify the National House of Chiefs and, subject to the following subsection, the National House of Chiefs shall cause the said Register to be altered accordingly.

(4) If the National House of Chiefs is satisfied after consultation with the appropriate Regional House of Chiefs that any person should, or that any person should not, be a member of a Traditional Council, The National House of Chiefs may amend the Register accordingly.”

The applicant in this case have failed to show by reference to the national register of chiefs that the six persons referred to are not members of the traditional council as alleged (counsel relied on a list certified by the Registrar of the regional house of chiefs; and not on the national register). But the point I wish

[p.376] of [1981] GLR 368 to make under this head is that it is quite clear from section 14 (4) that an aggrieved person is not without remedy provided he chooses the right remedy and the right forum.

Referring to an aggrieved person naturally leads me to the question of locus standi. It is the contention of Mr. J. B. Short, counsel for the applicant, that “any person subject to the jurisdiction of the traditional council will be entitled to come to court and complain that the council is acting ultra vires its powers. On the other hand, Mr. Joe Reindorf, counsel for the respondent, submits that a person applying for an order of prohibition must show by acceptable averment that he is a person aggrieved by the proceedings about which he is complaining, i.e. he has a personal interest in the proceedings which go beyond what is possessed by all other members of the public, and that this normally meant that he must be a party to the proceedings or that the outcome of the proceedings are likely to affect him. If he is a stranger he has no locus standi; it was stressed.

The orders of certiorari and prohibition have many characteristics in common but I think it is right to say that one of the areas in which they are not exactly bedfellows is legal capacity, i.e. who has the legal capacity to apply for the order? The desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him have jostled so long for position and with such varying fortunes that Professor de Smith writing under the heading “Locus Standi in relation to Prohibition” in his book Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.), p. 367 declared:

“The perplexity of the nineteenth century authors who doubted whether any legal question has ever given rise to so great a conflict of judicial opinion is more readily understandable than the confident assertion by another authority that the question has now been set at rest.”

It would appear that in the race for supremacy, the order of certiorari, can boast of a larger measure of success in holding the courts to a more restricted interpretation of the expression “person aggrieved” whilst locus standi in prohibition has been content with more liberal tests.

Even though there are dicta to the effect that a “stranger” may be awarded certiorari: see for example R. v. Justices of Surrey (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 466 where Blackburn J. mentioned at p. 472 “the very analogous case of prohibition;” the courts it is stated,

[p.377] of [1981] GLR 368 have found no reason to doubt the soundness of Lord Denning’s observations in R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380, C.A. when he said at p. 401 that “the court would not listen, of course, to a mere busybody who was interfering in things which did not concern him.” And Professor de Smith states categorically in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.) at p. 369 that “in no reported English case has an application brought by such a person been successful,” and goes on at the same page to state the present law:

“Certiorari is a discretionary remedy, and the discretion of the court extends to permitting an application to be made by any member of the public. A person aggrieved, i.e. one whose legal rights have been infringed or who has any other substantial interest in impugning an order, may be awarded a certiorari ex debito justitiae … Only in highly exceptional circumstances would the court exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant who was not a person aggrieved.”

It would appear, however, that any person can obtain an order of prohibition and an applicant for the order does not have to show that he is a “person aggrieved,” or has any personal interest in the matter: see R. v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Villiers [1936] 1 All E.R. 817, D.C.

In the circumstances, I would not shut out the applicant. However, having locus to apply for the order is on thing and the exercise of the court’s discretion in favour of such an applicant is another. The right to prohibition may be lost by acquiescence or implied waiver, and acquiescence may take the form of failing to object to the statutory qualification of a member of the body whose act is sought to be attached: see R. v. Williams; Ex parte Phillips [1914] K.B. 608. And one who is guilty of an unreasonable delay in applying for prohibition may lose his remedy even though he did not acquiesce in the original cause of the defect.

The applicant does not state exactly when the acts complained of began but it would appear he has not been happy with the regent since he took office in 1975. If that is the case one wonders as to the reason for this tardy application.

This application has been made allegedly on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction is certainly a recognised ground for which the order of prohibition can be sought but an applicant who, on the face of the record, has waived his right to object to a jurisdictional defect, may be refused an order of prohibition, it being a discretionary relief. I must point out though that in cases of prohibition, a distinction has been drawn between

[p.378] of [1981] GLR 368 those latent defects which can be waived and those which cannot be waived where the want of jurisdiction is “total.” And there is a total lack of jurisdiction where the tribunal qua tribunal is without competence by reason of the status of the parties or the nature of the subject-matter: see the case of Jones v. Owen (1848) 5 D. & L. 669 at p. 674.

In this application it is not the case of the applicant that the Awutu Senya Traditional Council as council had no jurisdiction when they undertook to examine a particular matter before it or that the parties before it in that specific matter belonged to a category of persons who were not amenable to the tribunal’s jurisdiction as conferred upon it by statute. The importance of requesting an order of prohibition only in respect of a specific matter cannot be over-emphasised.

For the reasons given above it is my view that this application should fail, and I dismiss it accordingly. Costs are assessed at ¢250 in favour of the respondents.

DECISION

Application for prohibition refused.

D. R. K. S.

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