REPUBLIC vs. BEKWAI DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE 1; EX PARTE GYAMFI [1981] GLR 388
19 March 1980 · QUASHIE-SAM J · ≈ 9 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 37Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 283.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to rectify an order of the court granting leave for an order of certiorari by belatedly filing a statement which ought to have accompanied the ex parte application. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
[p.389] of [1981] GLR 388
COUNSEL
Letsa for the applicant.
Agbanu for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF QUASHIE-SAM J.
The applicant applied by motion ex parte for leave to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the conviction and sentence by the District Magistrate, Grade I, Bekwai; the motion was accompanied by the applicant’s supporting affidavit. Leave ex parte was granted by this court on 14 February 1980. When the hearing on notice of motion came on 3 March 1980 counsel for the applicant informed the court that a statement which should have accompanied the application at the ex parte stage for leave, and which was omitted by error, had been filed that morning to regularise the application. He referred to Order 59, r. 2 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which required that such a statement shall accompany the application and invited the court to invoke the provisions of Order 70 of the same rules in order to put his house in order.
Counsel for the respondent opposed this invitation and called upon the court to dismiss the application in limine, on the ground that it is the statement which forms the basis in such an application, the statement thus being very fundamental and going to the root. He contended that without such a statement in the proceedings for leave, the application was baseless in the first place and that leave as granted by the court on 14 February 1980 was also baseless and a nullity which cannot be regularised or saved by the application of Order 70 of the rules aforementioned.
Counsel for the applicant then referred to the case of Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 283. In that case the applicant had been arraigned before the Special Circuit Court, Accra, charged with two offences of possessing Indian hemp and attempting to export Indian hemp contrary to sections 47(1) and 57 of the Pharmacy and Drugs Act, 1961 (Act 64). At the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial circuit judge ruled that there was a case to answer and called upon the applicant to enter his defence, thus overruling a submission of no case made on behalf of the applicant. This occasioned an application by the defence for leave to bring certiorari to quash the ruling. In the proceedings a copy of the ruling sought to be quashed was not exhibited to the affidavit in support of the application. In its ruling, the court said that the absence of a copy of the ruling was of course not fatal to the application having regard to the provisions of Order 59, r. 7 (1) of L.N. 140A. Those provisions are:
[p.390] of [1981] GLR 388
“7. (1) In the case of an application for an order of certiorari to remove any proceedings for the purpose of their being quashed, the applicant shall not question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record, unless before the hearing of the motion or summons he has lodged a copy thereof verified by affidavit in the Registry, or accounts for his failure to do so to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge hearing the motion or summons.”
In its ruling the court, no doubt, might have taken into consideration and been satisfied of the fact, as stated in the applicant’s affidavit, that he could not exhibit the relevant proceedings because they had not yet been made available by the trial court.
Relying on these circumstances, counsel in the instant application invited this court to liken it to Republic v. Accra Special Circuit Court; Ex parte Akosah (supra), to the extent that paragraph (1) of the applicant’s affidavit satisfies what is required in a statutory statement as to the name and description of the applicant; that paragraphs (6), (7) and (9) of the affidavit detail out the relief sought as also the motion itself before the court. He submitted that taking all these together the omission of a statutory statement under the rules would not be fatal to the application so as to render void the leave granted on 14 February 1980.
On the other hand counsel for the respondent contended that the Akosah case under reference has no application in the present instance. He submitted that even an oral judgment can properly be the subject of such an application; therefore failure to exhibit a judgment or ruling complained of will not be so fatal as it does not go to the root of the application; but failure in the instant application does where the omission is a mandatory statutory requirement. Counsel referred to the Guide to the Practice of the Crown Office and Associates Department by J. O. Griffiths on application for leave to apply for certiorari, where it is provided at p.74 that:
“A statement has to accompany the application containing the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought; . . .
An affidavit or affidavits verifying the facts relied on must accompany the statement. The facts should be stated in the affidavit, not the statement verifying by affidavit. An affidavit must also be filed in the [Crown Office and Associates] Department exhibiting the order, warrant, or record, or a copy thereof complained of, which affidavit may be filed at the time the ex parte motion is made, and must be filed before the hearing of the notice of motion or summons.”
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(The emphasis is mine.) Relying on these rules which are the same in our courts, counsel for the respondent submitted that in such applications as before the court, the statutory statement is the very prop, the affidavit or affidavits which accompany it being ancillary, so that if such an application for leave is devoid of the statutory statement, it has no foundation, is improperly before the court and will not be entertained.
It is significant to observe that in the Akosah case what was omitted was not the statutory statement but the ruling complained of which should have been exhibited to the applicant’s affidavit that accompanied the statutory statement. Indications from the ruling in that matter are not that the court did or could have dispensed with a statutory statement as a requirement under the rules. What it did was to declare that the absence of the relevant ruling was not fatal to the application by virtue to Order 59, r.7 (1) of L.N. 140A; despite that declaration, the court went further at p. 289 to register its disapproval and dissatisfaction in these certain terms:
“In spite of this provision and in order to enable me to appraise the precise nature of the complaint, I thought the affidavit ought to have embodied the main features of the ruling. These are also absent and yet I am to give leave to apply for certiorari to quash the said ruling when it is not specifically shown in what respect the ruling is erroneous as to warrant being quashed by certiorari.”
In the light of these observations, I would not rank a statutory statement as required under the rules with an affidavit and exhibits, which, as counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed out, are ancillary and merely verifying the facts relied on in such applications. The two must be distinguished. I would therefore not subscribe to the proposition by counsel for the applicant to, as it were, substitute for an omitted statutory statement the affidavit of the applicant which is itself also one of the requisite documents in such an application.
As I have already observed in this ruling, this exercise is the result of the admission of the applicant’s counsel a to the deficiency of the application ab initio, and his invitation to the court to rectify that deficiency by the application of Order 70, r.1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 which provides:
“1. Non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the Court or a Judge shall so direct, but such proceedings may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court or Judge shall think fit.”
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In the peculiar nature of these proceedings, there are two stages in the application, namely, the first stage where leave of the court has to be sought ex parte to bring the application for the order of certiorari and the second stage where the application is made to the court by notice of motion. This ruling is in connection with the first stage. It is here that the application for leave was insufficient by the omission of the statutory statement, as a necessary requirement under rule 2 (2) of Order 59 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954. When the first hurdle, that is the leave stage, has been surmounted, Order 59, r. 5 (1) and (2) provides:
“5. (1) Copies of the statement accompanying the application for leave shall be served with the notice of motion or summons, and copies of any affidavits accompanying the application for leave shall be supplied on demand and on payment of the proper charges, and no grounds shall, subject as hereafter in this rule provided, be relied upon or any relief sought at the bearing of
the motion or summons except the grounds and relief set out in the said statement.
(2) The Court or Judge may on the hearing of the motion or summons allow the said statement to be amended, and may allow further affidavits to be used if they deal with new matter arising out of the affidavits of any other party to the application and where the applicant intends to ask to be allowed to amend his statement or use further affidavits, he shall give notice of his intention and of any proposed amendment of his statement, and shall supply on demand and
upon payment of the proper charges copies of any such further affidavits.”
Thus from the foregoing, the fundamental nature of the statutory statement in an application for what is called a prerogative writ cannot be over-emphasised. In my view the rules are so constructed that the statement goes to the very root of such an application. It is therefore my opinion that in the absence of the statutory statement as a necessary requisite, the application for leave ab initio was improperly before the court. It follows therefore that the order made on 14 February 1980 granting leave on that application was made per incuriam. That situation cannot be regularised or rectified by the belated subsequent filing of the requisite statutory statement, nor can the imperfection be cured by the application of Order 70 of the Rules.
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The order of 14 February 1980 granting leave per incuriam is therefore set aside in which case the notice of motion is improperly before the court and is struck out with liberty to apply.
DECISION
Order granting leave set aside.
Motion struck out.
D. F. L.
