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[1984] SLR (HC) 8High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; EX PARTE DZAKAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 741

17 January 1984 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (HC) 8
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; ex parte DZAKAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 741 [1984] SLR (HC) 8
APAREPUBLIC v CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; ex parte DZAKAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 741, [1984] SLR (HC) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE; ex parte DZAKAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 741, [1984] SLR (HC) 8 (Ghana High Ct. 1984).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on preliminary objection to an application for certiorari to quash a judgment obtained in default of appearance. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Togbe Agama Amatta IV for the applicants.

E. K. Amaney for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.

This is an application at the behest of Godzah Dzakah and Goldsmith Akpah praying this court for an order of certiorari to quash the judgment of his Honour C. Adamah, Circuit Judge dated 27 October 1983. The grounds on which the said relief is [p.743] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 741

being sought are contained in the statement of the applicants, i.e. “breach of the principles of natural justice—audi alteram partem.”

Before counsel for the applicants could be heard, counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection as to the propriety of the certiorari application. He contended that the applicants should have applied to the lower court to have the judgment set aside to enable them to be heard, and if such an application was refused, then they could appeal against the refusal, and that apart from that procedure, they were not entitled to come by way of certiorari on the grounds that they were denied the right of being heard and therefore the rules of natural justice had been breached. In Furtherance of this argument counsel relied on the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 36, rr. 16 and 18 and invited the court to strike out the application as not properly before this court.

In reply, counsel for the applicants submitted that Order 36, rr. 16 and 18 cannot prevent the applicants from bringing this instant application, for an aggrieved person is given opportunity to either have a judgment set aside or to have the judgment quashed. Thus where there are several remedies open to an aggrieved person, he is entitled to choose what remedy he thinks fit and proper under the circumstances. He submitted further that this is an application in which the applicants are saying that they were not given a hearing, amounting to a gross violation of the audi alteram partem rule, and when an order or judgment is given in violation of the rules of natural justice, it is open to the aggrieved party to seek leave of the High Court to obtain an order of certiorari to quash the said order or judgment and this is exactly what the applicants have done. Counsel therefore finally submitted that the cause of action adopted by the applicants is in law open to them and they cannot be prevented from seeking their relief under an order of certiorari.

Now Order 36, rr. 16 and 18 of L.N. 140A relied on by counsel for the respondents provide as follows:

“16. If, when a trial is called on, the plaintiff appears, and the defendant does not appear, then the plaintiff may prove his claim, so far as the burden of proof lies upon him . . .

18. Any verdict or judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside by the Court or a Judge upon such terms as may seem fit, upon an application made within fourteen days after the trial.”

It will be noticed that Order 36, r. 17 also empowers the court to proceed to give judgment for the defendant in default of the appearance of the plaintiff.

[p.744] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 741

It seems to me therefore that Order 36, rr. 16 and 17 contemplate situations where both parties are aware of or have been served with hearing notices and yet one party fails to appear at the trial. In such a case the party who fails to appear can be said to have deliberately abstained from taking advantage of an opportunity to be heard and no breach of the audi alteram partem rule can be said to have occurred. It is clear then that it is when such a default judgment has been obtained by one party that the defaulting party can take advantage of the provisions of Order 36, r. 18 and apply to have the said default judgment set aside within fourteen days after the trial. In the instant case, the applicants are saying that no hearing notices were served on them to attend the trial in order to be heard, and since despite this failure by the court to give them prior notice of the hearing date, the court nevertheless proceeded with the case and gave judgment against them, the court had breached the rules of natural justice by denying them the right of hearing.

Now, natural justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly affected by decisions in any judicial proceedings be given adequate notice so that they may be in a position to appear at the hearing and answer the case they have to meet. It is also trite learning that a decision reached in breach of the audi alteram partem rule will be reviewable by means of certiorari or alternatively the usual remedy for breach of the rules of natural justice is certiorari to quash whatever decision was reached in breach of the said rule. Even if the provisions of Order 36, r. 18 were also a remedy open to the applicants the authorities clearly establish that if an applicant claims to be aggrieved by a decision made without jurisdiction or in breach of the rules of natural justice, the fact that he has not taken advantage of other alternative statutory remedies should be regarded as irrelevant and the court ought not to refuse to entertain the application for certiorari because of the existence of the said alternative remedies: see R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation (No. 2) [1966] 1 Q.B. 380, CA; R. v. Wandsworth Justices, Ex parte Read [1942] 1 K.B. 281, DC and R. v. Patents Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte (JR) Geigy SA [1963] 2 Q.B. 728, DC all cited with approval in SA de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd. ed.) at 375.

I hold therefore that the application for certiorari is properly before this court and the objection is accordingly overruled. Hearing to proceed.

DECISION

Preliminary objection overruled.

J. A. A.

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