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[1981] SLR (CA) 11Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. COMMISSIONER FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE NII ADJA KWAO II [1981] GLR 263

13 April 1981 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (CA) 11
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v COMMISSIONER FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER; ex parte NII ADJA KWAO II [1981] GLR 263 [1981] SLR (CA) 11
APAREPUBLIC v COMMISSIONER FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER; ex parte NII ADJA KWAO II [1981] GLR 263, [1981] SLR (CA) 11 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v COMMISSIONER FOR CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER; ex parte NII ADJA KWAO II [1981] GLR 263, [1981] SLR (CA) 11 (Ghana Ct. App. 1981).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant’s motion for an order of certiorari to quash two decisions of the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Jiagge J.A,

[p.265] of [1981] GLR 263

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellant.

Mrs. L. A. Adusa-Amankwa, Principal State Attorney for the first respondent.

T.A. Tagoe for the second respondent.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

This appeal is from the decision of the High Court dismissing the appellant’s motion for an order of certiorari to quash two decisions in which the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs (1) withdrew recognition from the appellant as James Town Mantse, and (2) handed over the James Town stool property to one Nii Aryee Quaye IV.

The appellant, Nii Adja Kwao II, in his affidavit in support of his application for leave in the court below, averred that he was customarily and constitutionally elected and enstooled as James Town mantse in 1959 and was subsequently recognised as such by the Governor-General under L.N. 201 of 1 August 1959.

That in January 1974, a writ of summons was issued against him in the Ga Traditional Council seeking (a) a declaration that his enstoolment was null and void and (b) an order for his destoolment. Subsequently, the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs by the James Town Stool Property (Seizure) Instrument, 1974 (E.I. 85), after reciting the judgment of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs, ordered the District Administrative Officer, Accra, to take over the James Town stool properties. The instrument, E.I. 85 of 1974 was accepted in evidence as exhibit N.A.K. 1.

On 19 August 1974 the judicial committee of the Ga Traditional Council had given judgment against the appellant. He appealed to the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs but the appeal was dismissed on 21 November 1977. On 22 November 1977 he filed a notice of appeal to the National House of Chiefs. On 22 July 1977 the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs ordered Nii Aryee Quaye IV who is the second respondent before this court, to take custody of the James Town Stool properties.

While the appellant’s appeal to the National House of Chiefs was pending, a notice was published on 19 May 1978, indicating that the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs had withdrawn recognition from him as chief of James Town.

After leave was granted in the court below for an order of certiorari, the second respondent filed an affidavit in opposition denying that the appellant was customarily and constitutionally elected and enstooled as James Town mantse and that the judicial committees of the Ga Traditional Area and the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs had declared his alleged enstoolment null and void.

[p.266] of [1981] GLR 263

The Chief Research Officer of the Supreme Military Council, Chieftaincy Division, on the authority of the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs, filed an affidavit in opposition deposing to the following facts:

(1) That the commissioner withdrew recognition in exercise of the power conferred on him by section 48 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), and “in the interest of good government and public order.”

(2) That the commissioner exercised the powers conferred on him by section 29 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act, 370) and ordered the District Administrative Officer, Accra, to take possession of the James Town stool property.

(4) That as the James Town stool property was and still is affected by pending proceedings in respect of a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, the commissioner in exercise of the power conferred on him by section 29 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) “ordered the District Administrative Officer to deliver the James Town stool properties to Nii Aryee Quaye.”

(5) That under the said section 29 (1) the commissioner had power to order “any person” to take possession of any stool property, where such stool property is affected by pending chieftaincy proceedings and that the commissioner considered Nii Aryee Quaye IV the most appropriate person to have custody of the stool properties under the circumstances.

The High Court after hearing argument of counsel held that the commissioner had power to withdraw recognition from the appellant and that on a proper construction of the proviso to section 48 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), and by the employment of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), ss.11 and 12, the power to withdraw recognition was implied. He held that there was nothing in section 51 to show that the report was to be acted upon by the commissioner for the purpose of the proviso. The court held further that a withdrawal of recognition need not be the result of judicial proceedings, that the power to withdraw was exercisable on the grounds of policy and that considerations of factors for its exercise must of “necessity be various and varied;” that the result of any judicial proceeding could be a factor but “it is not a requirement and the stay of execution under section 27 stands on the same footing.” He held further that “the mandate of section 27, cannot apply or control any ministerial action under the proviso under enquiry.”

[p.267] of [1981] GLR 263

Turning to the instrument of withdrawal, exhibit N.A.K. 1, the court held that the recital in the instrument, like a preamble, could neither restrict nor extend the enacting part; that the recital in exhibit N.A.K. 4 was no more than a rehearsal of a matter of history, and that the preamble had no relevance to the provision for stay of execution under section 27. That the words in the second recital made it “manifest that the unlimited discretion is exercised on grounds of executive policy.” The court below found it illogical that the power to withdraw recognition could be exercised only when the person affected had ceased to be a chief as a result of destoolment or from some other cause. The court held further that the question as to the person entitled to custody or possession of James Town stool property was a matter affecting chieftaincy and that Act 370 denied the High Court jurisdiction in such matters. The application for certiorari was dismissed.

There were altogether 31 grounds of appeal filed by counsel for the appellant who argued with great clarity of thought and persuasion. Counsel for each of the two respondents also with great industry and persuasion urged several points in reply. However we do not consider it necessary to list these arguments because they were not very different from those laid before the court below and reproduced at some length in the judgment.

Under section 11 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), as was correctly pointed out by the learned trial judge, power to grant a licence, authorisation or permit includes power to revoke, suspend or amend the licence, etc. In the opinion of the learned judge although “a little undignified . . . in plain terms, government recognition of a customary law chief is nothing but a grant of licence to such chief to enable him to perform statutory functions” and he held accordingly that section 11 was operative in the case of the recognition of a chief and the power to recognise a chief as defined by section 48 (1) of Act 370 and that “government recognition of a customary law chief was nothing but a grant of licence to such chief to enable him to perform statutory functions.”

In my opinion, the judge’s interpretation of the two statutes was erroneous. Article 153 of the Constitution, 1969, guaranteed the institution of chieftaincy. The rights conferred on chiefs by the Act 370, were based on the constitutional guarantee of the institution of chieftaincy. The right of a chief recognised by minister under the proviso to section 48 (1) of Act 370 to perform certain statutory duties is therefore a constitutional right. And to be general rule is that unless a clear and unambiguous intention is expressed in a statute affecting constitutional rights “it should not be construed so as to invade the liberty of the subject or

[p.268] of [1981] GLR 263 so as to confer or take away . . . his constitutional rights”: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 36 at p. 626.

A constitutional right therefore cannot be whittled away by an alleged implied power in a provision in the Interpretation Act, 1960 relating to non-constitutionally based rights. This opinion is buttressed by the fact that in spite of section 11 of the Interpretation Act, 1960, the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81), which came into force after the promulgation of the Interpretation Act, 1960 made specific provisions for the withdrawal of recognition from a chief in clear and unambiguous terms. Section 1 (2) (a) of Act 81 provides:

“1. (2) The Minister may by executive instrument at any time withdraw recognition from a Chief if — (a) the Chief has been destooled and his appeal against his destoolment has been dismissed or the period allowed for appealing has clapsed without an appeal having been brought .

. .”

This provision makes nonsense of the effort to import into section 11 of C.A. 4 by implication, a right specifically provided for in the Act 81, s.1 (2) (a).

The Chieftaincy Act, 1971, s. 48 (1) provides the answer to the question of who is a chief as:

“48. (1) A Chief is an individual who has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name for the time being appears as a Chief on the National Register of Chiefs:

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a Chief for the purposes of the exercise by him of any function under this Act or under any other enactment, unless he has been recognised as such by the Minister by notice published in the Local Government Bulletin.”

The status of a chief under Act 370, is quite distinguishable from his status under Act 81. An individual under Act 81 is a chief who (a) has been nominated, elected and installed as a chief in accordance with customary law, and (b) is recognised as a chief by the Minister responsible for Local Government. Unless the individual elected and enstooled is recognised by the minister he cannot be a chief.

Under Act 370 emphasis is laid on the fact that an individual elected and installed in accordance with customary law is a chief without the recognition of the minister. Recognition as chief by

[p.269] of [1981] GLR 263 the minister as provided under Act 81 was a condition precedent to the acquisition of the status of chief. Act 370 removed this condition. The rationale for this change may be seen in the proposals of the 1968 Constitutional Commission Report which recommended that appropriate steps should be taken to enable chiefs to adapt the institution to withstand:

“ . . . the full impact of the development of modern political, economic and social institutions . . . to equip chiefs . . . with the requisite mental faculties so that when they become chiefs they will be in a position to modernise the institution and re-orientate it to fit into the administrative and social structure of modern democratic government. Without appropriate steps being taken in this direction to give the institution a modern look, chieftaincy as we see it today, will drift progressively into a state of decadency and ultimately become a spent force in our community. The future of chieftaincy thus lies in the hands of the chiefs themselves and of all the stool and skin families throughout the country.”

The removal of ministerial recognition as a condition restores, I think, dignity and respect to customary practices and traditions in relation to election and enstoolment of chiefs.

However, Act 370, s. 48 (1) gives the Minister responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs, discretionary powers to enable chiefs recognised by him to perform certain statutory functions. This provision therefore creates indirectly two classes of chiefs: (1) those recognised by the minister and capable of performing statutory duties and (2) those not so recognised and limited to the performance of customary duties.

Counsel for the appellant argued that the minister’s discretionary powers under Act 370 relate only to recognition of chiefs, and not to withdrawal of such recognition. Counsel for the appellant argued further that even if the power to withdraw was implied its exercise must be in accordance with the provisions of section 51 (1) of Act 370 and that section 51 (1) must be recognised as a condition precedent to the minister’s action as stated in section 52 (1) (a) and (b) Section 51 (1) of Act 370 provides:

“51. (1) All enstoolments, destoolments, abdications and deaths of Chiefs in any Region as well as all such other changes in the status of Chiefs as may be prescribed by regulations made under section 62 of this Act shall as soon as practicable after their occurrence be reported in writing to the Minister by the Regional House of Chiefs of the Region through the National House of Chiefs.”

[p.270] of [1981] GLR 263

Section 52 (1) (a) and (b) provides:

“52. (1) If it appears to him to be necessary so to do in the in interests of public order the Minister may by executive instrument — (a) prohibit any person who is not a Chief (whether or not he was formerly, a Chief) from purporting to exercise any of the functions of a Chief,

(b) require that no person shall treat as a Chief a person subject to such prohibition.”

I do not think that there is anything to support the appellant’s submission that section 51 (1) must be read as imposing limitations on the exercise of the minister’s discretionary powers in the proviso to section 48 (1).

Article 174 (d) of the Constitution, 1969, provided that power conferred to make a constitutional or statutory instrument shall be construed as including the power exercisable in like manner to amend or revoke the constitutional or statutory instrument. The constitutional power to make a statutory instrument defining “who is a chief?” in the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), s. 48 (1) must be construed as including the power exercisable in like manner to amend or revoke such statutory instrument. This in my view, is also applicable to the proviso to section 48 (1). The minister has constitutional authority to withdraw recognition from a chief. However, the discretionary powers of the minister must be exercised in accordance with the law and the rules of natural justice. The law provides that an appeal should operate as a stay of execution. Thus Act 370, s. 27 provides:

“27. An appeal to the National House of Chiefs or to a Regional House of Chiefs shall operate as a stay of execution of the judgment or order appealed against and any other order made consequentially upon it unless the appellate tribunal otherwise directs.”

Furthermore article 173 of the Constitution, 1969, provided the following guidelines for the exercise of discretionary powers:

“173. Where in this Constitution or in any other law discretionary power is vested in an person or authority,

(a) that discretionary power shall be deemed to imply a duty to be fair and candid;

(b) the exercise of any such discretionary power shall not be arbitrary, capricious or biased, either by resentment, prejudice or personal

[p.271] of [1981] GLR 263 dislike and shall be in accordance with due process of law; and

(c) the person or authority, not being a Judge or other Judicial Officer in the exercise of his judicial functions, in whom the discretionary power is vested shall, by constitutional or statutory instrument, as the case may be, make and publish Regulations, not being inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution or of that other law, which shall govern the exercise of that discretionary power.”

This constitutional provision is mainly a repeat of the old rules of natural justice. Article 173 (c) may be considered as an additional precaution also in line with the rules of natural justice. At the time the minister exercised his discretion to withdraw recognition, an appeal was pending. The appellant was entitled to pursue his cause to the highest appellate authority The law is binding on everyone including the minister.

It has been argued by the counsel for the second respondent that the commissioner exercised his discretion to withdraw recognition in the interest of good government and public order and that such exercise of power in no way violated the provisions of section 27 of Act 370.

The notice, withdrawing recognition is exhibit N.A.K. 4 appearing on page 16 of the record and provides:

“GHANA

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BULLETIN

10. Published by Authority ———————————————————————————————————

No. 17 FRIDAY, 19TH MAY 1978

———————————————————————————————————

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

General

15. Notice of Withdrawal of Recognition of a Chief: Re Nii Adja Kwao II

James Town Mantse . . . 109

——————————————————————————————————— GENERAL NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION OF A CHIEF: RE NII ADJA KWAO II,

JAMES TOWN MANTSE

[p.272] of [1981] GLR 263 20. WHEREAS the Judicial Committee of tile Eastern Region House of Chiefs has in its judgment of 21 November 1977 declared that the nomination, election, installation and enstoolment of NII ADJA KWAO II, JAMES TOWN MANTSE, was null and void.

25. AND WHEREAS it is considered inexpedient by the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Matters that in the interest of good government and public order, the said NII ADJA KWAO II, JAMES TOWN MANTSE should continue to exercise any function

30. as a Chief under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) or under any other enactment:

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Matters by subsection (1) of section 48 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), notice is hereby given for the information of the general public that the 5. Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Matters hereby withdraws his recognition from the said NII ADJA KWAO II, JAMES TOWN MANTSE for the purpose of exercising any function under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 or any other enactment.

10. (SGD.) GENERAL I. K. ACHEAMPONG Chairman of the Supreme Military Council and Commissioner Responsible for Chieftaincy Matters.”

If the notice had been without the recital in paragraph 1 it may be an acceptable proposition that the commissioner acted in good faith in the interest of good government and public order and that he was not compellable to disclose the details of the facts at his disposal.

But paragraph 1 of the notice stated, “Whereas the Judicial Committee . . . declared that the nomination, election, installation and enstoolment of Nii Adja Kwao II, James Town Mantse, was null and void.” I do not think any other explanation can, without abuse of language, be given for the purpose of the recital in paragraph 1 of the notice, other than the natural one, that in view of the occurrences in the first, recital, it is considered inexpedient as stated in the second recital, that “in the interest of good government and public order, the said NII ADJA KWAO II, JAMES TOWN MANTSE should continue to exercise any function as a Chief under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) or under any other enactment.”

[p.273] of [1981] GLR 263

I consider the argument that the operative part of the instrument following the words “NOW, THEREFORE” cannot be construed as relevant and related to the recitals in paragraphs 1 and 2 as singularly unimpressive and without merit. I am satisfied that the notice of withdrawal of recognition of Nii Adja Kwao II James Town mantse, was not only published in complete disregard of section 27 of Act 370, but also in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Constitution, 1969, governing the exercise of discretion. The appeal on the issue of withdrawal of recognition of Nii Adja Kwao II should be allowed.

The court below refrained from making a decision on the commissioner’s order in E.I. 85 of 1974 as it was a matter pertaining to chieftaincy. Section 29 (1) of Act 370 provides:

“29. (1) The Minister in consultation with the Traditional Council of the area may by executive instrument published in the Gazette order any person to take possession of any stool property affected by any proceedings under this Act in respect of a cause or matter affecting Chieftaincy.”

In view of section 29 (1) of Act 370, I consider that E.I. 85 of 1974 was issued in proper exercise of the commissioner’s statutory powers, and the appeal on this ground must fail.

As stated above, the appeal on the withdrawal of recognition of Nii Adja Kwao II succeeds. This decision does not in any way affect the judgment of the judicial committee of the Ga Traditional Council delivered on 19 August 1974 nor the judgment of the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs delivered on 21 November 1977. However, the appeal pending before the National House of Chiefs, until finally disposed of, operates as a stay of execution.

In the event, this appeal succeeds in part and also fails in part. The judgment of the court below on the issue of the withdrawal of’ recognition from Nii Adja Kwao II by the commissioner is set aside.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have read the judgment of the president of the court and share her reasons for the conclusions reached in the appeal. However, I wish to say a few words in respect of the applicability of section 29 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), to the stool property in possession of the second respondent, chief of Adadentam and an elder of the James Town stool. Section 29 (1) of Act 370 provides:

“29. (1) The Minister in consultation with the Traditional Council of the area may by executive instrument published in

[p.274] of [1981] GLR 263 the Gazette order any person to take possession of any stool property affected by any proceedings under this Act in respect of a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.”

In view of section 29 (1) of Act 370, I am of the opinion that executive instrument (No. 85 of 1974) which gave possession of the stool property to the second respondent was proper. The section under consideration makes reference to “any person” and the second respondent is any such person, who could be ordered by the Minister or Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs to take possession of stool property when proceedings affecting the James Town stool have travelled all the way from the Ga Traditional Council through the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs to the National House of Chiefs in Kumasi and in the circumstances, the stool property should be in the hands of someone whilst the chieftaincy matter awaits decision. The appellant, no doubt, is anxiously waiting for his appeal to be heard, and determined by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs, having been declared destooled by the judicial committee of the Ga Traditional Council, and his destoolment confirmed by the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs.

In my judgment, any view expressed to the contrary in terms of the plain language of the said section is poppycock. The import of section 29 (1) of Act 370 may be likened to an order of interim injunction in respect of a property which is the subject-matter of a dispute in court. It is beyond doubt that the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs in issuing executive instrument (No. 85 of 1974) acted within his statutory powers and the appeal in respect of this matter fails, and it is accordingly dismissed.

The appeal in respect of the withdrawal of the recognition by the commissioner as stated by the President however, succeeds. In view of article 177 (2) (a) of the Constitution, 1979, “the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief” has become otiose and the appellant has, in the circumstances, won only a pyrrhic victory.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.

I agree with the leading and able judgment just read by the president of the court and the concurring one by my brother Edusei J.A. and have nothing useful to add.

DECISION

Ministerial withdrawal of recognition as a chief set aside.

Appeal allowed in part.

E. P. -T.

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