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[1978] SLR (HC) 34High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

REPUBLIC vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS; EX PARTE WILLIAM OFORI-ATTA AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 218

19 June 1978 · AGYEPONG J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 34
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS; ex parte WILLIAM OFORI-ATTA AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 218 [1978] SLR (HC) 34
APAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS; ex parte WILLIAM OFORI-ATTA AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 218, [1978] SLR (HC) 34 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND OTHERS; ex parte WILLIAM OFORI-ATTA AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 218, [1978] SLR (HC) 34 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Titterton [1895] 2 Q.B. 61; 64 L.J.M.C. 202; 73 L.T. 345; 59 J.P. 327; 43 W.R. 603; 18 Cox C.C. 181, D.C.

(2) Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Ibrahim alias Telley [1977] 1 G.L.R. 7.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on a submission by the applicants as to (a) the effect of E.I. 46 on the detention of the applicants and (b) the validity or otherwise of E.I. 66. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf (with him F. S. Tsikata, N. Kuenyehia, T.T. Tsikata and Mrs. Quayson) for the applicants.

Gyeke-Darko, Director of Public Prosecutions (with him E.M. Yakubu, State Attorney), for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF AGYEPONG J.

After hearing counsel on both sides, I think what I have to decide is: (1) what is the effect of the Preventive Custody (Release) Instrument, 1978 (E.I. 46 of 1978), on the detention of the applicants after the date of the promulgation of that executive instrument? (2) Is the Preventive Custody (Release) (Amendment) Instrument, 1978 (E.I. 66 of 1978), a valid instrument?

It is common ground that the first and second applicants were detained under the Preventive Custody (No. 5) Order, 1978 (E.I. 38), and the third applicant was detained under the Preventive Custody (No. 8) Order, 1978 (E.I. 44). E.I. 38 is dated 5 April 1978, and took effect on the same day. E.I. 44 is dated 20 April 1978, and also took effect on the same day. E.I. 46 is dated 25 April 1978, and took effect forthwith according to paragraph 2 which provides:

“2. For the removal of doubt, and without prejudice to paragraph 1 of this Instrument, all persons held in preventive custody at the commencement of this Instrument under the preventive Custody Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D 2) or any instrument made thereunder and who have been so held since 1974 shall forthwith be released from preventive custody under the said Decree or Instrument.”

Mr. Joe Reindorf, learned counsel for the applicants, contends that since the first and second applicants were detained on 5 April 1978, they were covered by paragraph 2 of E.I. 46 and were entitled to be released with effect from 25 April 1978, a submission which, in the absence of extrinsic evidence, at first seemed to sway the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, learned counsel for the respondents. However, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, on further reflection, parted company with Mr. Joe Reindorf.

Thus while Mr. Joe Reindorf understands the phrase “persons held in preventive custody . . . since 1974” appearing in E.I. 46 to include those detainees who have been held from any point of time as from the beginning of 1974 to the date of the promulgation of E.I. 46, i.e. 25 April 1978, Mr. Gyeke-Darko, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, thinks

[p.220] of [1979] GLR 218 the phrase “persons held in preventive custody . . . since 1974” applies only to detainees who were detained in 1974 and were still in detention up to 25 April 1978.

A reference to the Oxford Dictionary for the meaning of “since” will reveal that both interpretations of the word “since” are correct. Used as a preposition, “since” means throughout or in the period between now and an earlier time or event. In other words “since 1974” could mean throughout the period between 25 April 1978 and 1974 or in the period between 25 April 1978 and 1974. I find therefore that the phrase “all persons held in preventive custody . . . since 1974” admits of the two interpretations canvassed by both counsel.

Of course if I were to put to the first and second applicants the following question: “Since when have you been held in preventive custody?” the answer would probably be since 5 April 1978. But E.I. 46 is addressed to the whole world, and it is legitimate for the applicants to claim that they are covered by that instrument, as they have been held in detention in the period between 5 April 1978 and 1974.

I am being called upon here to interpret E.I. 46. There is ambiguity in that instrument. What then am I to do? It seems to me that I can call in an aid to construction. The aid which, in my view, will assist me is the Preventive Custody (Release) Instrument, 1978 (E.I.11) and the Preventive Custody (Release) Instrument, 1978 (E.I. 12), both dated 31 January 1978. E.I. 11 of 1978 provides as follows:

“2. For the removal of doubt and without prejudice to paragraph 1 of this Instrument, all persons held in preventive custody at the commencement of this instrument under the Preventive Custody Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 2) or any instrument made thereunder and who have been so held since 1973 shall forthwith be released from preventive custody under the said Decree or Instrument.”

E.I. 12 of 1978 also provides:

“2. For the removal of doubt, and without prejudice to paragraph 1 of this instrument, all persons held in preventive custody at the commencement of this Instrument under the Preventive Custody Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 2) or any instrument made thereunder and who have been so held since 1973 shall forthwith be released from preventive custody under the said Decree or Instrument.”

It would appear that the intention of the Supreme Military Council (hereafter called the S.M.C.) in promulgating these instruments was to restrict the effect of the instruments to: (1) those detained in 1972 and still held in detention on 31 January 1978 and (2) those detained in 1973 and still held in detention on 31 January 1978. For if the S.M.C. had the intention of letting E.I. 11 cover persons detained after 1972 and still held in detention on 31 January 1978, the promulgation of E.I. 12 would have been otiose.

In relying on E.I. 11 and E.I. 12, I find support from Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. who said in R. v. Titterton [1895] 2 Q.B. 61 at p. 67, D.C.

[p.221] of [1979] GLR 218 that, “It is . . . proper to refer to earlier Acts in pari materia only where there is ambiguity.” In my view the intention of the S.M.C. is clear in E.I. 11 and E.I. 12 and I would apply the same interpretation to E.I. 46, and hold that E.I. 46 covers only those persons detained in 1974 and still held in detention up to 25 April 1978. The result is that the applicants were not covered by E.I. 46 and that they were therefore not released by E.I. 46. I cannot apply the canon of interpretation favouring the freedom of the subject, because the intention of the S.M.C. is clear.

As I have found that the applicants were not freed by E.I. 46, the question of the validity of E.I. 66 becomes only a matter of academic interest. Yet out of deference to counsel on both sides, I will go into it.

It is common ground that the S.M.C. is empowered by the Preventive Custody Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D 2), s. 2 to promulgate executive instruments authorising the arrest and detention of people under certain conditions. I quote that section:

“2. The [Supreme Military Council] may by executive instrument authorise the arrest and detention of any other person in respect of whom they are satisfied that it is in the interest of national security or in the interest of the safety of the person so to do and any such instrument may amend or repeal the Schedule to this Decree.”

In other words, as Taylor J. said in Republic v. Inspector-General of police; Ex parte Ibrahim alias Telley [1977] 1 G.L.R. 7, the executive instruments are promulgated by the S.M.C. in the exercise of powers conferred by the S.M.C. on the S.M.C., and so this is a case where the S.M.C. has delegated parts of its powers to itself.

In the same way, by N.R.C.D 2, s. 3, as amended by the Preventive Custody (Amendment) (No. 1) Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D 246), the S.M.C. has conferred powers on itself to promulgate executive instruments to amend or repeal the Schedule to N.R.C.D 2 where the S.M.C. directs that a person should be released from preventive custody. Section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D 2 as amended by N.R.C.D 246 provides that:

“(2). Without prejudice to the general effect of subsection (1) of this section, where the National Redemption Council directs that a person should be released from preventive custody, the Council may by executive instrument amend or repeal the Schedule to this Decree for the purposes of such decision.”

The power of release is therefore provided in section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D 2.

It is contended by Mr. Joe Reindorf on behalf of the applicants that these powers conferred on the S.M.C. by the S.M.C. do not include the powers of interpretation, and therefore it could not by E.I. 66 interpret E.I. 46. E.I. 66 is therefore a nullity. The learned Director of Public Prosecutions’ reply is that E.I. 66 is not interpreting E.I. 46 but rather amending it, referring to the marginal notes in support of his contention. The marginal notes, though not part of E.I. 66, are an aid to its interpretation, and speak of amendment. This power of amendment the S.M.C.

[p.222] of [1979] GLR 218 has under section 14 (1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1959 (No. 52 of 1959) E.I. 66 is therefore valid.

In my opinion when an enactment confers power on a body to do something, then by implication, the donee of the power is also given such powers as will enable the thing to be done properly. There is a statutory provision for this, and it is section 10 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) which is wider than section 14 (1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1959. Section 10 (2) of C.A. 4, provides:

“(2) Where an enactment confers power to do any act or thing all such powers shall be deemed to be also given as are reasonably necessary to enable that act or thing to be done or are incidental to the doing thereof.”

If E.I. 66 was really amending E.I. 46, Mr. Joe Reindorf would have no quarrel with it. But learned counsel quoted authority upon authority to prove that the words “shall be deemed to” appearing in paragraph 3 (1) of E.I. 66, could do no other thing than interpret. Therefore E.I. 66 was seeking to interpret E.I. 46, a power not granted by N.R.C.D 2, ss. 2 and 3 as amended by N.R.C.D 246.

It is my view, however, that neither Mr. Joe Reindorf nor the learned Director of Public Prosecutions is absolutely right as regards the purpose of E.I 66. It seems to me that E.I 66 is neither interpreting nor amending E.I. 46. It is rather explaining the ambiguity created by E.I. 46. What E.I. 66 seems to be saying is this: “The Supreme Military Council in E.I. 46 used the phrase ‘so held in preventive custody … since 1974.’ This is capable of two meanings. It can apply to the persons detained in 1974 and so held up to 25 April 1978, or it can apply to the persons held at any point of time from 1974 to 25 April 1978. The Supreme Military Council had the first meaning in mind when promulgating E.I. 46.” The language of E.I. 66 itself supports my view.

Acts of explanation are recognised by Craies on Statute Law (5th ed.), at p. 137 where it is stated, “Sometimes an Act is passed for the express purpose of explaining or clearing up doubts as to the meaning of a previous Act, and is called ‘an Act of explanation’.” After rightly submitting that the S.M.C. had power to clarify doubts in an enactment by legislation, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, quite unexpectedly, allowed himself to be swayed by the marginal notes of E.I. 66, which as stated above, are not part of the executive instrument, to contend that E.I. 66 was an amending instrument instead of an instrument of explanation, resolving the doubt quite properly recognised by him.

The only question that would have been left for me to consider, if it had been canvassed, is whether the S.M.C., as donee of the power to release, not by executive instruments, persons detained, can promulgate executive instruments to release such detained persons. N.R.C.D. 2 says the S.M.C. may authorise the arrest and detention of persons by executive instruments. N.R.C.D. 2, s. 3 as amended by N.R.C.D. 246, does not say that the S.M.C. may direct the release of

[p.223] of [1979] GLR 218 persons by executive instruments; what it says is that the S.M.C. may direct the release of persons from preventive custody: only the Schedule to N.R.C.D. 2, after the direction by the S.M.C. for the release of persons, may be amended or repealed by executive instruments; yet the releases have been done by executive instruments, a thing not authorised by N.R.C.D. 2. The question of the validity of E.I. 11, E.I. 12, and E.I. 46 on the above ground or on any other ground was not canvassed, so I decline to comment further.

But assuming that the S.M.C. had power to promulgate those instruments under N.R.C.D. 2, the Supreme Military Council could quite properly, under section 10 (2) of C.A. 4, above quoted, promulgate E.I. 66 to clarify the doubt in E.I. 46.

The submission of Mr. Joe Reindorf on the invalidity of E.I. 66 on the ground raised by him is untenable by reason of section 10 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4).

I accordingly overrule his submission that E.I. 66 of 1978 is invalid.

DECISION

Submissions overruled.

S. Y. B. – B.

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