REPUBLIC vs. GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE APPIAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 736
8 July 1981 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 10 min read
[1981] SLR (CA) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317.
(2) Levandowsky v. Attorney-General [1971] 1 G.L.R. 49, C.A.
(3) Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66; [1964] A.C. 40; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 935; 127 J.P. 295; 107 S.J. 313;113 L.J. 716, H.L.
(4) Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77; 108 S.J. 896, P.C.
(5) Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1956] 1 All E.R.1; [1956] 1 Q.B. 658; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 311;
100 S.J.73; [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 531, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appeal from the ruling of the High Court, Accra, dismissing an application by the appellants for, inter alia, leave to issue an order of certiorari to quash a government directive ordering their
[p.738] of [1981] GLR 736 dismissal from the employment of a statutory corporation and for an order of injunction in the nature of quo warranto to restrain the corporation from carrying out the purported acts of dismissal. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellants.
No appearance by or on behalf of the respondents
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.
Abban J. delivered the judgment of the court. The appeal is from the ruling of Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J., sitting at the High Court, Accra. The appellants, in an ex parte motion, sought leave to issue an order of certiorari to quash what was described as directives issued by the government purporting to dismiss the appellants from the employment of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. They also asked for an injunction directed against the Attorney-General restraining the government from assuming or usurping the functions of Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation by purporting to exercise the right of dismissing the appellants who are the employees of Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. The third remedy was for an injunction to be directed against the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation restraining the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation from taking any steps against the appellants on the basis of the purported directives.
The application named the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation as the first respondent and the Attorney-General as the second respondent and they will hereafter be referred to as such. After hearing counsel for the appellants, the learned High Court judge refused to grant the appellants leave. Hence this appeal.
Seven grounds of appeal were filed and argued together. The grounds substantially, complained that the learned judge erred in refusing to grant leave and that she was wrong in law in holding that the government was not required to act judicially in giving directives to the management of the first respondent to dismiss the appellants. They also contended that the learned judge erred in applying the provisions of section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51).
We must observe that the learned High Court judge in her ruling appeared to have treated the ex parte motion as if she was dealing with the substantive motion. However, because of the view we have taken of this matter, we will confine ourselves to the issue as to whether there was a prima facie case which entitled the appellants to be granted leave.
[p.739] of [1981] GLR 736
The learned judge’s refusal to grant leave was based on about three main grounds. The certiorari was directed against the second respondent and the learned judge held that it would not lie since the part played by the government was not “tantamount to a decision-making” which could have formed “the subject-matter of investigation and therefore be quashable.”
With respect to the learned judge, the kind of directives as complained of could not have been issued without the government first taking a decision of some sort. A reasonable government like the one represented by the second respondent, with due appreciation of the consequences of its actions, could not have given directives affecting the rights and employment of so many people without any factual basis. Surely, the directives could not have been issued by the said authority without first going through the process of examining and evaluating facts and factors relative to the subject-matter of the directives and then taking a decision on them in one way or the other. The directives could only be the outcome of a decision.
We are, in the circumstances, of the view that the directives emanated from a decision and that that decision was communicated to the first respondent-corporation in a form of directives as described in the appellants’ affidavit. Since some element of decision-making was involved in the issue of the so-called directives, they could form the subject-matter of investigation. Leave should therefore have been granted to allow the second respondent to come in to show that in fact the directives affecting the rights of the appellants were not based on any decision taken by the government and so there was no question of the government having failed to act judicially in the matter; or to raise any other defence that the second respondent might deem appropriate.
Turning now to the injunction sought against the government, the learned judge felt that it was also misconceived. We must briefly state the basis upon which this remedy was sought. The appellants in their affidavit in support of the ex parte application contended that the first respondent-corporation is their employer and that it is a statutory corporation created by the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 207), subsequently amended by the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1970 (Act 354). The provisions of this statute make it clear that only the management of the corporation, headed by the managing director, has authority to employ, discipline and dismiss the employees of the corporation.
The case of the appellants was that the government, by issuing directives purporting to dismiss the appellants, who are employees
[p.740] of [1981] GLR 736 of the first respondent corporation, was purporting to assume the offices statutorily accorded to the officers of the corporation without any lawful basis. The purpose of the injunction was therefore to prevent the government from assuming the duties of this statutory corporation.
This type of injunction, as it was apparent from the affidavit filed and from the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants in the court below, was in the nature of quo warranto. Indeed, the learned High Court judge concede this fact in her ruling and even stated that it required leave. She also stated, rightly in our view, that application for injunction which is the nature of quo warranto “could be tacked on the application for certiorari.”
However, she refused to grant leave in respect of this injunction mainly on the ground that under section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51), no injunction can be granted against the Republic. Section 13 (1) and (2) reads:
“13. (1) In any civil proceedings by or against the Republic, the court shall subject to the provisions of this Act, have power to make all such orders as it has power in proceedings between private persons, and otherwise to give such appropriate relief as the case may require:
Provided that— (a) where in any proceedings against the Republic any such relief is sought as might in proceedings between private persons be granted by way of injunction or specific performance, the court shall not grant an injunction or make an order for specific performance, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaratory of the rights of parties; and (b) in any proceedings against the Republic for the recovery of land or other property the court shall not make an order for the recovery of the land or the delivery of the property, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaring that the plaintiff is entitled as against the Republic to the land or property or to the possession thereof.
(2) The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order against a servant of the Republic if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order would be to grant relief against the Republic which could not have been obtained in proceedings against the Republic.”
Careful reading of the section clearly indicates that the type of injunction referred to in those provisions is the ordinary equitable remedy of injunction. It is the kind of injunction which is envisaged
[p.741] of [1981] GLR 736 under section 13 and not the injunction in the nature of the prerogative writ of quo warranto which the appellants were seeking. The learned judge therefore erred in equating the type of injunction (which the appellants sought against the second respondent) to the equitable remedy of injunction which the section forbids the court to grant against the Republic.
The case of Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317, to which reference was made by the learned judge in her ruling, clearly drew the distinction between these two types of injunction and held, inter alia, that the injunction which the applicant in that case sought was in the nature of quo warranto.
As we have already stated, the injunction as contemplated by section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, is the ordinary equitable remedy of injunction and the section had nothing to do with the injunction in the nature of quo warranto which was asked for by the appellants in their second relief against the second respondent. So that section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, should not have been applied to shut out the appellants.
We may also observe that in the case of Levandowsky v. Attorney-General [1971] 1 G.L.R. 49, C.A. (on which some reliance seemed to have been placed by the learned judge) section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, was never discussed by the Court of Appeal. It was rather section 15 (4) which the court held as barring the applicant in that case from going into execution. In any case, it is even debatable whether section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, is still applicable in view of article 211 of the Constitution,1979.
We now advert to the other injunction which the appellants sought against the first respondent-corporation. Without mincing words, that particular relief was totally misconceived. For in that relief, the appellants were in fact applying for the ordinary equitable remedy of injunction which normally will not lie unless there is a pendency of a substantive suit before the court. The appellants had not issued any writ of summons against the first respondent corporation ; and in any case, such a relief should not have been added to the application since one does not need leave in order to apply for ordinary equitable remedy of injunction. It was therefore wrong for the appellants to use the procedure reserved for prerogative writs to apply for this type of injunction.
At this stage, we would like to comment briefly on the other cases referred to by the learned judge when she was dealing with the relief in respect of the certiorari. This relief was sought against the second respondent and not against the first respondent-corporation, which is the employer of the appellants. The cases included
[p.742] of [1981] GLR 736
Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, H.L.; Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva [1965) 1 W.L.R. 77, P.C. and Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1956] 1 All E.R. 1, C.A. The principles enunciated in those cases are sound but they cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Those cases dealt with contractual relationship between master and servant and held that under normal circumstances certiorari will have no application where a servant has been dismissed by his master in breach of the terms of the contract of service. In those cases, the certiorari was sought by the employees or servants against the decision of their employers dismissing them from the service of the employers. In the present case, however, the appellants sought the certiorari against the government represented by the second respondent and not against their employer, the first respondent-corporation. So that those cases had no relevance to the present case. They might have been relevant if the certiorari had been directed against a decision of dismissal taken by the first respondent-corporation.
As we have said, so far as the reliefs in respect of the certiorari and the injunction against the second respondent were concerned, there was a prima facie case which entitled the appellants to be granted leave. We therefore hold that the learned judge erred in refusing leave. Accordingly, the appeal will be allowed. The appellants are granted leave to apply for an order of certiorari and for the injunction as asked for in reliefs (a) and (b) in their motion paper.
Consequently, the case will be sent back to the court below for the substantive motion to be heard after the respondents have been served with the necessary pursuant notices as required by Order 59 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A).
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. K. E. E.
