SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1986] SLR (SC) 7Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

REPUBLIC vs. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE ODONKORTEYE [1984-86] 2 GLR 148

23 June 1986 · AMUA-SEKYI JA · ≈ 29 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (SC) 7
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v HIGH COURT, ACCRA; ex parte ODONKORTEYE [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 [1986] SLR (SC) 7
APAREPUBLIC v HIGH COURT, ACCRA; ex parte ODONKORTEYE [1984-86] 2 GLR 148, [1986] SLR (SC) 7 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v HIGH COURT, ACCRA; ex parte ODONKORTEYE [1984-86] 2 GLR 148, [1986] SLR (SC) 7 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1986).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.

(2) Ndasuah v. Adazie [1960] G.L.R. 12.

(3) Gbadago v. Tsili (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 219, W.A.C.A.

(4) Frempong v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 76.

(5) Ababio v. Boso Traditional Council [1979] G.L.R. 53.

(6) Healey v. Minister of Health [1955] 1 Q.B. 221; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 222; [1954] 2 All E.R. 580, C.A. (7) Punton v. Ministry of Pensions & National Insurance (No. 2) [1964] 1 W.L.R. 226; [1964] 1 All E.R. 448, C.A.

(8) Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Adjei [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 511, S.C.

(9) Practice Direction (Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court), [1981] G.L.R. 1, S.C. (10) R. v. Barnes; Ex parte Lord Venon (1910) 102 L.T. 860.

(11) R. v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex parte Read [1942] 1 K.B. 281; [1942] 1 All E.R. 56; 58 T.L.R. 88, D.C.

(12) Jonesco v. Beard [1930] A.C. 298; [1930] All E.R. 483, H.L.

(13) Stern v. Friedman [1953] 2 All E.R. 565; 97 S.J. 507.

(14) Dzotepe v. Hahormene III (No. 2) [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 294, C.A.

(15) Wyatt v. Palmer [1899] 2 Q.B. 106; 80 L.T. 639, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to remove into the Supreme Court and to quash the final judgment of the High Court, Accra delivered on 21 March 1986—setting aside the judgment of the judicial committee of the Ada Traditional Council in a chieftaincy matter on grounds of fraud. The facts are sufficiently set out in the rulings of Adade J.S.C. and Amua-Sekyi J.A.

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf for the applicants.

Komatse for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.

On the death of Nene Korle II, occupant of the stool of the Tekperbiawe Division of Ada, a dispute arose between the second applicant and the second respondent as to which of them had been duly nominated, elected and installed as the chief in his stead. The matter came before a judicial committee of the Ada Traditional Council which relying on a document described as “articles of agreement”, found in favour of Sylvanus Ayikpa, the second applicant herein, who

[p.152] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 goes under the stool name of Nene Tetteh Chayi II. Having been worsted in that encounter, the second respondent, Simon Adjaottor, took the matter to the High Court, Accra. He asked for a declaration that the articles of agreement were a forgery or otherwise illegal and, as a consequential relief, that the judgment of the Ada Traditional Council be declared null and void. In spite of objection that having regard to the provisions of section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) and section 15 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) he had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter, Ansah-Twum J. heard the suit and entered judgment for the respondents. He said he was exercising the supervisory powers of the court. The question now is, was he right in assuming jurisdiction?

The supervisory jurisdiction which the High Court has over tribunals vested with exclusive jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters may be invoked if such a tribunal acts without jurisdiction: see Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.; or in excess of jurisdiction: see Ndasuah v. Adazie [1960] G.L.R. 12; or fails to observe the rules of natural justice. The procedure is as laid down in Order 59 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Here, however, it was not the case of the respondents that the judicial committee of the Ada Traditional Council acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or failed to observe the rules of natural justice. The complaint was that the committee came to a wrong conclusion. Thus even though the respondents neither sought to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, nor complied with the procedural rules for invoking it, it was in the exercise of that jurisdiction that the learned High Court judge claimed a right to interfere.

Granting an application for an order restraining Nene Chayi II from holding himself out as a chief, he said:

“This [suit] is not a call for determination of a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. It is only a call to determine whether or not the judgment obtained is regular and untainted or otherwise, and whether or not the alleged document upon which the judgment is said to have been based is a forgery and whether or not any fraud has been perpetrated on the traditional council.”

With respect, all these are matters within the competence of the Ada Traditional Council which, like any other adjudicating body, has power to set aside its own judgment if such judgment is obtained by fraud: see Gbadago v. Tsili (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 219, W.A.C.A. The truth of the matter, however, was that the judicial committee of the council had not been deceived. They had considered the evidence as to whether or [p.153] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 not the articles of agreement were a forgery and had come to the conclusion that they were not. Not only that, but they had given effect to the articles by declaring the second applicant, Nene Chayi II, to be the lawfully enstooled wetsoyi or divisional chief of Tekperbiawe. If the respondents were dissatisfied with that decision their remedy was an appeal.

Our courts have been astute enough to see through and thwart attempts by litigants to circumvent the law giving exclusive jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters to traditional courts. In Frempong v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 76, the appellant was the odikro of Awenade in the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area. He was destooled by the Okyeman and ordered to surrender all stool properties in his possession. One of these was a cocoa farm which the appellant claimed to be his. When he harvested cocoa from the farm, he was charged with stealing, tried and convicted. On appeal to the High Court, Quashie-Sam J. said at 78:

“It is quite clear on the record that the whole of these criminal proceedings were founded on the recovery of an alleged stool property from the appellant as a destooled chief. In my opinion I do not think that a court ought to circumvent the provisions of the Decree [N.L.C.D. 84 paragraph 66] and arrogate to itself jurisdiction which it has not, and from which it is clearly prohibited, by assuming jurisdiction under the colour and guise of criminal proceedings. This I think is precisely what the trial court did, the impropriety of which was carried into the order of injunction against the appellant who was in possession of the cocoa farm and was disputing ownership with the complainants. Indeed, it is this same circumvention by which the trial court purported to order the regent, an opponent of the appellant, to be caretaker of the farm in dispute. The trial court ought to have discerned or perceived the mischief into which it was being led by such a civil matter, touching the recovery of stool property, being instituted before it under the cloak of criminal proceedings.”

In Ababio v. Boso Traditional Council [1979] G.L.R. 53, the plaintiff, who claimed to be Kyidomhene, brought an action in the High Court to recover allowances received by the council from the central government for payment to the Kyidomhene. He produced a Gazette notice according him recognition as Kyidomhene. The council asserted that by their records the plaintiff was the Ankobeahene and produced Gazette notices according him recognition as such and another person as Kyidomhene. Upon objection that the preliminary issue whether the

[p.154] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 plaintiff was the Kyidomhene or the Ankobeahene was not one which the High Court had jurisdiction to try, the court said at 60-61:

“In the case before me, although the plaintiff’s action is for money had and received to his use a genuine question has been raised on the pleadings as to whether he is the Kyidomhene or the Ankobeahene. If he is not the Kyidomhene, then such sums as the defendants have received to the use of the Kyidomhene are not money had and received by the defendants to the plaintiff’s use and his claim must for that reason be dismissed. In my view, this preliminary question ought not be tried in this court, and counsel for the defendants is right in saying that this court is precluded by section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), from doing so.”

The proceedings were accordingly stayed pending the determination of the preliminary issue by the Boso Traditional Council.

The attitude of our courts is fully supported by the cases of Healey v. Minister of Health [1955] 1 Q.B. 221, C.A. and Punton v. Ministry of Pensions & National Insurance (No. 2) [1964] 1 W.L.R. 226, C.A. to which Mr. Reindorf referred. In the former, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaration to challenge a determination by the minister that he was not a mental health officer within the meaning of the National Health Service (Superannuation) Regulations, 1950. The action failed on the ground that the regulations vested in the minister exclusive power to make a determination and that his decision was not subject to review or appeal in the courts. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. In the latter, the proceedings were commenced by originating summons and sought to challenge a determination by the National Insurance Commissioner that under section 13 (1) of the National Insurance Act, 1946, the plaintiffs were disqualified from receiving unemployment benefit. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the claim being one under the Act could only be enforced by using the machinery provided by the Act and regulations, and that the court had no power to override the decision of the commissioner.

The action brought by the respondents in the High Court was nothing more nor less than an attempt to circumvent the law. It was couched as an action for a declaration that the articles of agreement were a forgery or otherwise illegal, but was, in fact, an invitation to the court to exercise an appellate jurisdiction which it had not. Counsel for the applicants was right that by the express provisions of section 52 of Act 372 and section 15 (1) of Act 370, the learned judge was forbidden from entertaining the action brought before him. The proceedings were a nullity and ought to be quashed.

[p.155] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH C.J.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.

I also agree.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

This is in substance an application for certiorari to remove into the Supreme Court and to quash the final judgment of Ansah-Twum J. delivered at the High Court, Accra on 21 March 1986. I am however firmly of the opinion that having regard to the provisions of section 19 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42) the Supreme Court is not properly constituted to hear and give a final decision in this case. The section provides:

“19. The Supreme Court as continued in existence by the Proclamation is hereby reconstituted with a membership of— (a) The Chief Justice who shall be the president thereof; and (b) not less than four other Justices of the Supreme Court; but for the determination of a particular cause or matter, the Chief Justice may request such other Justices of the Court of Appeal as he may deem fit to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”

Clearly by this provision cases can only be heard to a finality by at least a mandatory quorum of the Chief Justice and four justices of the Supreme Court; and it is only when such a quorum exists that the Chief Justice can request justices of the Court of Appeal to sit in the Supreme Court so constituted for the determination of the particular cause or matter in respect of which the request was made. It is obvious to me therefore that final decisions given by the Supreme Court without the requisite mandatory quorum would be null and void. This view of mine is, however, not shared by the other members of this court. Indeed in Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Adjei [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 511, S.C. this court in a majority decision in which I was the lone dissenter, would seem to have held that this apparent absence of a quorum does not disable the Supreme Court from sitting with justices of the Court of Appeal to exercise its original, supervisory and appellate jurisdiction. Reasons have been given for this decision this morning and I have myself given elaborate reasons why I disagree with this majority decision.

I suppose, though, that I ought to concede that the majority decision of the Supreme Court, is the decision of the court that must be

[p.156] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 given binding force until such time as the Supreme Court itself is able to decide otherwise having regard to the provisions of article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979 which provides:

“(3) The Supreme Court may, while treating its own previous decisions as normally binding, depart from a previous decision when it appears right so to do; and all other Courts shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law.”

Left to myself and unburdened by the majority decision in Ex parte Adjei (supra), I would dismiss the application with liberty for the applicant to re-apply when the P.N.D.C. appoints a justice of the Supreme Court to make up the mandatory legal quorum.

I have, however, for pragmatic reasons given much thought to my stance as a lone purveyor of a minority opinion. In this case the actual decision on the merits has the support of two Supreme Court justices. I have also examined the case on its merits and I am persuaded by the able reasoning of Amua-Sekyi J.A., contrary to my initial disinclination, to support the stand of the two Supreme Court justices on the merits of the application. This means that even if another justice of the Supreme Court were appointed and he took a contrary view of the merits, the present decision would be sustained by a three to two majority. For this reason, I have with great hesitation and after much soul-searching taken the alternative view that assuming but without conceding that the decision on the jurisdiction of this court in the Ex parte Adjei case (supra) is not null and void, then I agree with the decision of Amua-Sekyi J.A. that the proceedings before Ansah-Twum J. at the High Court is null and void; accordingly the applicant would succeed and the proceedings and judgment of the High Court delivered on 21 March 1986 would therefore be quashed.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

This is an application asking this court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction to quash the judgment and order made by the High Court, Accra (Ansah-Twum J.) on 17 May 1985 in suit No. 220/85 bearing the title:

“1 Simon Amanortey Adjaottor 2 W. N. Adotey-Akpey Plaintiffs D. P. Glover-Akpey v.

1 Odoe Odonkorteye 2 Nene Tetteh Chayi II Defendants”

The background facts to this application may be thus briefly stated:

[p.157] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148

On 18 April 1984 the applicants (as the plaintiffs) instituted an action in the Ada Traditional Council against the respondents (the defendants) claiming a declaration that Nene Tetteh Chayi II is the duly elected and installed wetsoyi or divisional chief of the Tekperbiawe Division of the Ada Traditional Area. The applicants won that action relying on a document allegedly made on 26 May 1955 and called “articles of agreement.” The said document purports to contain the details of the custom relating to the succession to the Tekperbiawe stool and signed by 48 accredited representatives of the twelve gates into which the three sections of the Tekperbiawe tribe is divided. Before the Ada Traditional Council, the respondents, as the defendants, challenged the said agreement as a forgery. By a majority of two to one, the traditional council in a judgment dated 6 February 1985 found for the applicants.

On 8 February 1985 the respondents appealed to the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs, which appeal is still pending. In spite of the appeal, the respondents on 18 February 1985 filed an action No. 220/85 in the High Court; Accra, for a declaration that:

“(a) the articles of agreement [dated 26 May 1955] which was the basis of the defendants’ action in the Ada Traditional Council, and on which the judicial committee entered judgment for the defendants was a forgery, spurious and . . . fraudulent; and (b) any judgment founded on this articles of agreement which is spurious, unsigned and unauthentic is void ab initio . . .”

The applicants raised two objections in limine to the hearing of the suit by the High Court. They contended that first, because of the Ada Traditional Council judgment of 6 February 1985 the matter was res judicata and could not be reopened by a substantive action; and secondly, that notwithstanding the form of the claim, the action is substantially a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and as such the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Ansah-Twum J. in a ruling dated 17 May 1985 rejected those contentions. The applicants then filed the present motion to stop, by prohibition, the further progress of the case in the High Court, and an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings which culminated in the ruling and order of 17 May 1985.

Somehow the motion delayed in the registry, and as there was nothing stopping him, Ansah-Twum J. proceeded with the case on the merits, and on 14 March 1986 gave judgment for the respondent. Aggrieved by that judgment, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal. That appeal is also pending.

When the motion filed against the intermediate ruling of 17 May 1985 came up for hearing on 20 May 1986, Mr. Joe Reindorf, counsel for the applicant, withdrew the prohibition part, the case having been

[p.158] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 heard to a conclusion, but moved for certiorari. As is customary with him, Mr. Reindorf had put his case in writing in great detail, in a document of 24 pages. His argument may, however, be compacted into three brief statements:

(a) That the subject matter of suit No. 220/85 is strictly a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, and that by section 52 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

(b) That by virtue of the Ada judgment of 6 February 1985, which the plaintiffs in suit No. 220/85 do not dispute, the matter is res judicata, and the High Court should have declined jurisdiction.

(c) That (a) and (b) (supra) constitute patent errors on the face of the record, entitling him to succeed in an application for certiorari.

It has been said time without number that outside clear cases of want of jurisdiction, and flagrant disregard of the rules of natural justice, certiorari will not succeed unless the error of law relied upon is apparent on the face of the record. The error must be clearly visible, and not open to argument. Secondly, certiorari must not be suffered to be used as a cloak for an appeal. The two proceed on different principles, even though grounds for one may be used as grounds for the other, and even though the end result may be the same. Where matters in difference are open to serious challenge, certiorari is generally not the appropriate process, if only because in such a situation it cannot be confidently asserted that the error of law, if there be one, is patently visible on the face of the record.

Before examining the grounds for this application let me dispose of one issue in limine. Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), allows the court to formulate rules of procedure where none exists in a particular case. For all I know no rules have been enacted to govern the exercise of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction, beyond the Practice Direction Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court [1981] G.L.R. 1, S.C. requiring applicants to telescope the two-tier application (the first, ex parte, for leave, and the second for the substantive order) into one made on notice. In the absence of express rules, we are obliged to look elsewhere for help.

Under rule 29 of the English Crown Office Rules, 1906 governing Crown proceedings, certiorari will not be granted if the matter is appealable and the statutory time to appeal has not expired, or if there is an appeal pending. This rule has found its way into the English Rules of Court as Order 59, r. 4 (2): see the 1962 White Book at 1730; and into our High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) as Order 59, r. 3, viz:

[p.159] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148

“3. Leave shall not be granted to apply for an order of certiorari to remove any judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding for the purpose of its being quashed, unless the application for leave is made not later than six months after the date of the proceeding or such shorter period as may be prescribed by any enactment; and where the proceeding is subject to appeal and a time is limited by law for the bringing of the appeal, the Court or Judge may adjourn the application for leave until the appeal is determined or the time for appealing has expired.”

May I caution here that it is not my intention to apply L.N. 140A in this court. All I am doing is to seek guidance from rules applicable in England to Crown proceedings, the name by which the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is known in that country.

In R. v. Barnes; Ex parte Lord Vernon (1910) 102 L.T. 860, the applicant appealed to quarter sessions against a conviction by petty sessions. Whilst the appeal was pending he applied to Chancery Division for certiorari to quash the conviction by petty sessions. Leave was granted ex parte, but before the hearing on notice quarter sessions had heard the appeal and affirmed the conviction. At the hearing the respondent’s counsel drew attention to the fact that the applicant was appealing against the conviction and at the same time asking for certiorari to quash it. It was argued that, “He cannot pursue both remedies”, for by giving notice of appeal the applicant waived his right to proceed by certiorari. The court agreed with these submissions. In his ruling Lord Alverstone C.J. observed at 861.

“The authorities show that in such a case as this, where there is a limited time for appealing and the party has appealed, no certiorari will be granted until the appeal has been disposed of, because in any event the certiorari may be useless. In this case the conviction was affirmed at quarter sessions, and therefore it will be useless to make this rule absolute to quash the order at petty sessions, as the conviction at quarter sessions would still stand.”

Justices Bray and Pickford agreed. Justice Bray even went as far as to warn that if the pendency of the appeal had been brought to the notice of the court at the ex parte hearing, he would have refused leave. In the instant application, we do know on the face of the affidavits that there is an appeal pending. In those circumstances I am of the opinion that the application should fail in limine.

Again in Ex parte Vernon (supra) one other problem was pointed out, i.e. whether even if the application here, being one against the [p.160] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 interlocutory ruling of 17 May 1985, were to succeed, the final judgment of 14 March 1986 would be affected thereby. From the ruling of Lord Alverstone C.J. the answer would seem to be in the negative.

Let me now proceed to examine the grounds canvassed before us. Mr. Reindorf’s first ground in this application is that the subject matter of suit No. 220/85 is a “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy”, and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. I am afraid this ground is highly tenuous. The writ before the High Court in suit No. 220/85 asked for a declaration that a certain document which grounded a judgment in favour of the applicants is a forgery. In other words, that the applicants obtained their judgment by fraud. I believe it to be the law that whatever the subject matter of the judgment may be, a party claiming that it has been obtained by fraud is entitled to bring an action in the High Court to have it so declared and set aside. The party suing assumes the burden of proving:

(a) the fraud;

(b) that it was perpetrated by the defendant; and

(c) that it influenced the court in giving the judgments complained of.

Here the respondents’ position, as I understand it, is that the applicants knowing or having reason to know, as a result of previous proceedings, that a certain document is a forgery, passed that document as a genuine document in the suit before the judicial committee of the Ada Traditional Council, managed to carry the court with them, and obtained judgment. They say therefore that the judgment was obtained by fraud. The respondents therefore filed a substantive action, i.e. suit No. 220/85 in the High Court to have that Ada judgment set aside on grounds of fraud. As this is not an appeal, I have to guard against the temptation to discuss the merits of suit No. 220/85 beyond few references to underscore the true nature of that action. The document itself was produced in the High Court, together with the two majority and minority opinions of the Ada Traditional Council. The minority opinion expressed a view which clearly indicated that the member believed that the document was a forgery. Said he:

“The authenticity of the said articles of agreement has vehemently been challenged by the defendants, but the plaintiff failed to subpoena C. O. C. Amatey said to be the author to come to throw light on the gloomy position even though we understand C. O. C. Amatey is still alive and is in town.

It beats our imagination and sounds ridiculous that a copy of a document containing as many as 25 articles which could serve as a constitution of a renowned or important division such as Tekperbiawe and purported to have been signed by as many as 48

[p.161] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 accredited elders of the division could not be available in any of the twelve gates of the division.”

Can a person do more to convey his conviction that the document he is looking at cannot be genuine? What is the majority view of the matter? To them:

“. . . the main pivot of this delicate matter rests on the purported articles of agreement, which is extracted from an official civil record of the Ada State Council, commanded and approved by the Ada Mantse as president. The police C.I.D. report suggests criminal act but there was no order from any competent court of justice or anywhere else cancelling the said civil record of the Ada State Council containing the minutes that embodied the said articles of agreement. In other words, there is no evidence of proof that the official record from which the articles of agreement is obtained had been cancelled by an order. And since there is no such order, the minutes embodying the said articles of agreement … stands still valid.”

So on this reasoning the Ada Traditional Council, by a majority of two to one, gave judgment for the applicants herein.

Under normal circumstances I should not discuss the merits of this verdict, as I am not sitting on appeal over it. But it is a matter of some concern whether the pronouncements on the document by the Ada Traditional Council as a whole do amount to a definite finding on the character of the document. I am afraid they do not. Rather the council skirted the problem, unable by training, experience or otherwise to come to grips with it. The majority view of the matter, quoted above, shows how little the tribunal understood the issue, and demonstrates how ill-equipped a lay tribunal is to decide matters of law.

The contention by Mr. Reindorf that the tribunal decided the issue of forgery, and that their decision estops the respondents per rem judicatam is, at best, groggy; at worst, insubstantial. In any case, I have never understood a plea of res judicata to be a ground on which to ask for certiorari, particularly so when the applicant is not contending that he has somehow been deliberately tricked into squandering his right of appeal. Even so, other avenues may be open to him to vindicate his rights, basing himself on the matters he considers constitute res judicata against his opponent. As Humphreys J. said in R. v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex parte Read [1942] 1 All E.R. 56 at 58:

“. . . there is no doubt ample authority for saying that this court will not grant orders of certiorari or mandamus where there is some other course equally open to the applicant. . .”

[p.162] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148

The only exception acknowledged in the Read case (supra) is where there is a fundamental breach of a rule of natural justice, as where a court convicts a person without hearing him. In the instant case, the applicants have already appealed.

It seems to me that properly considered, it cannot be seriously maintained that the subject matter of the suit before the High Court is a chieftaincy matter. It is a claim to set aside a judgment of an inferior tribunal on grounds of fraud. The issues fought before that inferior tribunal are immaterial to such a claim. Equally immaterial are the contents of the document impugned. The court is not called upon to decide whether the contents are true or false, real or imaginary, except in so far as the court may consider such an inquiry helpful in coming to a decision whether the document is a forgery or is genuine.

The only issue that may be raised against such a claim may be that it was filed in the High Court, and not in the tribunal which gave the judgment complained of. Even this is highly debatable, providing an additional reason why this case is not suitable to be dealt with on certiorari. Attention has been drawn to Gbadago v. Tsili (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 219, W.A.C.A. to support the proposition that the suit in the High Court should have been commenced in the traditional council because the traditional council has power to set aside its own judgment on grounds of fraud. With the greatest respect, Gbadago v. Tsili (supra) is far from laying down any such law that an action cannot be commenced in the High Court to set aside a judgment of an inferior court on grounds of fraud. The Gbadago pronouncement must be read in the context of the facts of that case. A judgment pronounced orally in open court in favour of the plaintiff was later, in the private house of the president of the tribunal, entered in the record book in terms which favoured the defendant. The plaintiff therefore sued in the same traditional court to have it corrected, alleging that the entry had been fraudulent. The tribunal saw the fraud and amended the record accordingly. The defendant appealed, and argued that the native court had no jurisdiction under custom or under the Ordinance setting it up to set aside its judgment on grounds of fraud. The court held that the native court had an inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment on grounds that it had been obtained by fraud. The case says no more than this; more so, it does not mandate that the action must be filed in the same tribunal.

In Jonesco v. Beard [1930] A.C. 298, H.L. Lord Buckmaster observed at 300:

“It has long been the settled practice of the Court that the proper method of impeaching a completed judgment on the ground of fraud is by action in which, as in any other action based on fraud,

[p.163] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 the particulars of the fraud must be exactly given and the allegation established by the strict proof such a charge requires.”

See also Stern v. Friedman [1953] 2 All E.R. 565 at 568 where Danckwerts J. opined that it is always to be preferred that the issue of fraud is raised by a separate action.

None of these authorities do say that the action must be commenced in the same tribunal which delivered the offending judgment. Indeed, the High Court has original jurisdiction in fraud cases. The facts in this case have striking similarities with Dzotepe v. Hahormene III (No. 2) [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 294, C.A. There, the defendants’ predecessor had obtained judgment in a land suit brought before the Anloga Native Court in 1953. That court had relied on a plan, produced by the defendants, allegedly drawn by a Basel Mission Reverend Minister, Frothwire, in 1906. The Anloga judgment was later, in 1976, successfully used in the Circuit Court, Ho to estop the plaintiffs per rem judicatam. The Ho judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The plaintiffs later discovered that the plan was indeed a forgery. So in 1981 they brought an action in the High Court, Ho for a declaration that the Anloga judgment of 1953 had been obtained by fraud and should be set aside, and with it the Ho judgment of 1976 and that of the Court of Appeal which affirmed it. The plaintiffs led sufficient evidence to establish the forgery, and won in the High Court, Ho. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. In coming to a decision on the matter, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the relevant considerations were whether the plan was indeed a forgery, and whether the Anloga Court relied on the plan in arriving at its judgment in 1953. These matters being proved the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in affirming that the plaintiffs deserved judgment.

In the instant case, it would, given the opinions exhibited, have been inadvisable, indeed a mistake, to have filed the action in the Ada Traditional Council, seeing that that council did not even understand the issue of fraud, let alone deal with it. As I do not agree that the issue in suit No 220/85 is a chieftaincy matter, it is unnecessary to discuss Mr. Reindorf’s second ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. Accordingly the several authorities referred to, dealing as they do with wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, are, respectfuly, inapposite and irrelevant.

Counsel nevertheless argues that so long as the Ada judgment stood, the respondents must not be suffered to relitigate the dispute between the parties in a fresh action in the High Court. This argument would have been valid, were it not for the fact that the suit before the High Court was not a relitigation, on the merits, of the suit before the

[p.164] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148

Ada Traditional Council. There is a world of difference between fighting a case on the merits and seeking to upset a decision on grounds of fraud.

I have said enough to show that the grounds relied on by Mr. Reindorf cannot be sufficient to prop up an application for certiorari. Each of the grounds is better suited to be argued as a ground of appeal. There is, as far as I can see, no error of law apparent on the face of the record. If anything is apparent, it is that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the action, which is one to set aside a judgment on grounds of fraud; that there was no breach of any of the rules of natural justice, and that in all the circumstances certiorari ought to fail, and the case of fraud allowed to proceed. For my part, I would dismiss the application. “As a general proposition,” said Lord Lindley M.R., “I think it dangerous and undesirable to summarily stop an action to set aside a judgment on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud”: see Wyatt v. Palmer [1899] 2 Q.B. 106 at 110.

There is, however, one aspect of this matter which I cannot resist commenting upon, viz the pleadings. Much of the controversy, I nearly said confusion, which has arisen in the course of this application has been due, in a large measure, to the extravagant nature of the pleadings. The writ of summons asked simply to set aside a judgment on grounds of fraud. Instead of limiting himself to matters in support of this, which matters could have been pleaded in no more than four short paragraphs, the plaintiffs, by counsel, in their statement of claim raised all sorts of irrelevant material, pleading the whole history of the relationship between the parties, the custom concerning the enstoolment and destoolment of a divisional chief in Tekperbiawe, the rival claims to the stool of the first plaintiff and second defendant, Act 370, and even the State Council Ordinance No. 8 of 1952. What all this has to do with a claim that a specific document is a forgery beats the imagination. If ever there is a pleading which sins against Order 19, r. 2 of L.N. 140A for “unnecessary prolixity” this is it.

The first rule in pleading (as stated in Order 19, r 4 of L.N. 140A) is that it must contain no more than “. . . a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may . . .” (The emphasis is mine.) The statement must be “…as brief as the nature of the case will admit …” (see Order 19, r. 2). Admittedly, the problem for drafting counsel is identifying the material facts and determining how brief the pleading should be. The degree of success in resolving these is an index of the maturity of the draftsman. Given the nature of the statement of claim one would have expected the defence to apply to strike out about three fourths of it as irrelevant and unnecessary, and taken costs. Unfortunately the statement of defence pleaded specifically to all matters

[p.165] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 148 raised, perhaps out of caution, but in the process, adding to the confusion. Of course, the defence had nothing to lose, and as has happened, a lot to gain. The High Court was blown off course by this prolixity in pleading, and slipped, respectfully, into making pronouncements which left one wondering whether the court was exercising a supervisory jurisdiction, an appellate jurisdiction, or an original jurisdiction.

I am satisfied, however, that the learned judge appreciated the substance of what was before him, that it had nothing to do with a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, but that it was a call to determine:

“. . . whether or not the alleged document upon which the judgment [of 6 February 1985] is said to have been based is a forgery and whether or not any fraud has been perpetrated on the [Ada] Traditional Council.”

In the light of this clear statement of the issue it would seem that several other statements of the learned judge not directed to this are obiter and should be ignored. This case has shown how very important good drafting is to a resolution of matters in difference between parties, and to the proper administration of justice. I have a strong feeling that the respondents have lost this application because of bad pleading. The only redeeming feature of this episode which I can see is that the Ada decision itself is on appeal.

As already indicated, and for the reasons shown, I consider that this is not a proper case to be dealt with by certiorari, and I would dismiss the application.

DECISION

Application of certiorari granted.

L. K. A.

Scroll to Top