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[1982] SLR (HC) 25High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK; EX PARTE CANTIL [1984-86] 1 GLR 237

26 March 1982 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (HC) 25
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK; ex parte CANTIL [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 [1982] SLR (HC) 25
APAREPUBLIC v NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK; ex parte CANTIL [1984-86] 1 GLR 237, [1982] SLR (HC) 25 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK; ex parte CANTIL [1984-86] 1 GLR 237, [1982] SLR (HC) 25 (Ghana High Ct. 1982).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; [1963] 2 WLR 935; [1963] 2 All ER 66, HL.

[p.239] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 (2) Republic v State Transport Corporation; Ex parte Djorhoe [1975] 2 GLR 471.

(3) Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578; [1971] 2 All ER 1278, HL (SC). (4) R v Statutory Visitors to St Lawrence’s Hospital Caterham; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 1 WLR 1158, [1953] 2 All ER 766, DC.

(5) R v Kent Police Authority; Ex parte Godden [1971] 3 WLR 416; [1971] 3 All ER 20, CA. (6) Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497; [1968] 1 All ER 433.

(7) Republic v Ghana Cargo Handling Corporation Ltd; Ex parte Trades Union Congress of Ghana (Maritime and Dockworkers Union), High Court, Sekondi, 29 March 1979, unreported. (8) Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v Silva [1965] 1 WLR 77; [1964] 3 All ER 865; 108 SJ 896, PC. (9) Republic v State Hotels Corporation; Ex parte Yeboah [1980] GLR 875, CA.

(10) State v Asantehene’s Divisional Court B1; Ex parte Kusada [1963] 2 GLR 238, SC. (11) Atta v Ghana Highway Authority [1980] GLR 119.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the dismissal of the applicant by the respondent bank. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Quashie for the applicant.

Mustapha (with him Buadu) for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

Pursuant to leave granted by this court on 25 January 1982 this application has been brought by the applicant herein, asking for an order of certiorari to “remove the dismissal of the applicant by the National Investment Bank on 31 July 1981, to the High Court, Sekondi to be quashed upon the grounds set forth in the affidavit served herewith…”

It seems to me that the main grounds for this application can be found in paragraphs 2, 3,8, 9 and 10 of the affidavit in support, and I do, therefore, reproduce same for easy reference:

“2. That until 1 July 1981, I was employed as an assistant manager at the National Investment Bank, Takoradi and that my appointment was on the said date terminated by the bank by a letter signed by the Director of Administration of the

[p.240] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 said bank which stated, inter alia, `….it has been decided to dismiss you and you are hereby dismissed summarily from the bank . . .’ A copy of the said letter is attached hereto and marked A.

3. That my employment with the National Investment Bank was governed by the `Rules of Service and Pay’ which is a compedia of rules and regulations affecting senior members of staff of the said bank-A copy of the rules and regulations is attached hereto and marked B . . .

8. That it is provided by article 32 of the Rules of Service and Pay thus:

‘when an employee has committed an offence for which he may be summarily dismissed, he shall be given notice in writing outlining the offence committed and shall be allowed 24 hours to reply in writing to such notice and defend himself.

9. That up to the time of swearing to this affidavit I had neither been served with any notice, outlining any offence I had committed, nor had I been invited to appear before any committee of inquiry as required by article 32 of the Rules of Service and Pay.

10. That I was neither interviewed by the investigators referred to in exhibit C, nor did they refer any questions or queries to me to be answered.”

The applicant contends on these grounds that there has been a procedural irregularity with regard to the action taken by the respondents, and they have also infringed the rules of natural justice and, therefore, the purported dismissal cannot stand and must be quashed.

Arguing the motion, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted, inter alia, that the purported dismissal of the applicant must be held to be null and void since the respondents failed to follow the procedure or rules laid down in the Rules of Service and Pay referring particularly to article 32 which reads:

“When an employee has committed an offence for which he may be summarily dismissed, he shall be given notice – in writing outlining the offence committed and shall be allowed 24 hours to reply in writing to such notice and defend himself.”

Counsel submitted further that this also amounted to a breach of natural justice. That the respondents took no steps to fulfil any of the laid down conditions before they wrote the letter of dismissal. That this

[p.241] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 is wrong, and counsel cites Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 50, HL. Failure to follow regulation renders the decision a nullity.

Counsel submits that article 32 quoted supra being mandatory, the purported dismissal of the applicant is a nullity. He also cites Republic v The State Transport Corporation; Ex parte Djorhoe [1975] 2 GLR 471; Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578, HL; R v Statutory Visitors to St Lawrence’s Hospital, Caterham; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 1 WLR 1158 at 116, DC.

Counsel submits further that it appears a decision was taken before the dismissal; that was a judicial hearing, and the applicant should have been given a hearing. He then cited R v Kent Police Authority; Ex parte Godden [1971] 3 WLR 416 at p 421, CA. A decision leading to a compulsory retirement is judicial in character, and must conform to the rules of natural justice, counsel submits.

Counsel submits that in this case the applicant is not a servant of the bank but an assistant manager and accountant, and he is therefore part of the management. He is a managerial officer and could not be dismissed in the manner the respondents purported to do: see Ex parte Djorhoe (supra) at 478. He being an employee of the third category there must be something against him before dismissal: see again Ridge v Baldwin (supra).

Counsel submitted in conclusion that the respondents having taken a decision which results in the premature retirement of an officer they should also have fulfilled all laid down conditions. Counsel submitted further that the applicant is not a servant of the bank but an assistant manager and accountant; the respondents are therefore in breach of article 32 and the rules of natural justice. Therefore, certiorari lies to quash the purported dismissal.

Mustapha, counsel for the respondents, submits in reply that the application appears to be out of time.

Again there is no statement as required under Order 59 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) and the respondents do not therefore know when leave was obtained. That it appears from the court’s notes, however, that the application for leave was filed on 11 January 1982. This was obviously after the six months period had expired, and the applicant should therefore have applied for leave before, and in the circumstances, the application is not properly before the court. (Counsel cites no authority here.) Counsel submits further that service of the motion is irregular since it was served on a branch of the respondents. The respondents being a statutory corporation, established by the National Investment Bank Act, 1963 (Act 163) and having its head office in Accra, the motion ought to have been served at the head office, Accra. Counsel here refers to the Interpretation Act, 1960 (CA 4), s 13 (1) (d) and also Order 9, r 8 (2) of LN 140A; and has submitted that it being an

[p.242] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 irregular service it should be set aside. Moreover the action was commenced in the wrong court, and is therefore not maintainable. He refers to Order 5, r 1 of LN 140A as amended by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (LI 11 07). The head office of the respondents is in Accra.

Counsel for the respondents takes another point that the motion defective since it was filed contrary to Order 59, r 5 (1) of LN 140A. The applicant failed to file and serve on the respondents copies of the statement which allegedly accompanied the application for leave to apply for an order of certiorari as required under Order 59. It is supplied on demand but a demand made since 5 February 1982 has not been complied with. It is mandatory and therefore the failure to supply makes the whole application defective and irregular. The application should on these grounds, therefore, be dismissed.

Counsel submits that the application cannot succeed even on its merits because article 32 of exhibit B attached to the motion is subordinate to article 37, which takes precedence over article 32.

Counsel submits further that Ridge v Baldwin (supra) does not apply in the present case since the terms of the contract of employment in Baldwin’s case is set out by an Act of Parliament. In the instant case, the terms of contract of employment are embodied in exhibit B, the Rules of Service and Pay. Counsel also cites Republic v The State Transport Corporation; Ex parte Djorhoe (supra). Counsel submits further that Malloch’s case (supra) is based on statutory provisions and cannot apply to the present case which is governed by a contract of employment made between the employer and employee.

Counsel submits, as held in Ridge v Baldwin (supra), that where the relationship between the applicant and respondent is that of master and servant, the writ of certiorari will not lie and he cites Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed), Vol 25, p 447, para 871. Counsel further refers to exhibits 7, 8, 9 and B as constituting the contract of employment as between the parties herein. The conditions of service as set out can only govern master and servant relationship as between the parties herein, counsel submits. Counsel here cites Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 1 All ER 433 at 439. Counsel also submits that an employee in a private firm or a corporation is not an officer but a servant and the master has power to dismiss him even summarily. If the dismissal is wrongful then an action lies for damages, but certiorari does not lie.

I think the question whether or not the applicant was a servant to the respondents, that is whether a master and servant relationship existed between the parties herein, is clear from the terms of employment as embodied in the Rules of Service and Pay, exhibit B. It

[p.243] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 is also clear from the manner in which the applicant was employed. According to exhibit 7, the applicant who attended Swedru Secondary School in 1959 and left in 1963 joined Barclays Bank of Ghana Ltd in the same year, 1963. The applicant was 34 years of age when he applied to the respondents for employment by 5 October 1976, ie after he had worked for Barclays for about thirteen years. By exhibit 8, the applicant was offered an appointment by the respondent as an officer grade I on a commencing salary of ¢4,350 per annum. The offer was made subject to satisfactory references and medical clearance certificate. He would be required to undertake such duties as may be assigned to him from time to time by the respondents (bank). The applicant’s employment was to be governed by the bank’s Rules of Service and Pay which has been exhibited as exhibit B in this matter. The applicant did by exhibit 9 accept the offer of appointment on these terms and offered to assume duty on 18 April 1977. It is clear, therefore, that he had worked for the respondents for about four years only when he was dismissed summarily with effect from 1 July 1981.

The applicant himself claims in paragraph 3 of his affidavit in support of this application that his employment with the respondents was governed by the Rules of Service and Pay marked exhibit B. It is therefore undisputed that the terms and conditions of his employment and service are as contained in those Rules of Service and Pay. Clause 1 of these rules provides, inter alia, as follows, “These rules embody the terms and conditions of service in the National Investment Bank and shall apply to all members of the staff of the bank . . .” The applicant was employed as an officer grade 1 and under clause 2 (i) of the Rules of Service and Pay, “officer” means a member of the supervising staff of the bank in the officers grade. The applicant was therefore an employee of the respondent-bank, and clause 11 of the said rules provides, “Every employee shall serve the bank truly and faithfully, and shall maintain the strictest secrecy regarding the bank’s affairs and the affairs of its customers . . .” And clause 26 says, “An employee guilty of infringing rules 11, 12, 22 or 24 renders himself liable to immediate dismissal from the service of the Bank.” It is obvious from the foregoing that the applicant accepted the respondents’ employment with the undertaking that he would diligently and faithfully perform such duties as the respondents may from time to time assign to him. The respondents also reserved the right to dismiss, even summarily in the case where an employee, like the applicant, was guilty of matters of dishonesty, fraud, wilful refusal to obey legitimate and reasonable instructions, and proved gross misconduct, or even neglect of duty: see clauses 31 and 57 of the said Rules of Service and Pay. There is very little doubt here, therefore, that the respondents had power not only to direct what work the applicant was to do, but also

[p.244] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 had control over the manner in which the applicant was to discharge his assigned duties. This, in law, is evident of the existence of master and servant relationship. I am therefore satisfied that the applicant was indisputably the respondents’ servant for all intents and purposes: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed), Vol 25, p 447, para 871: Where the following appears:

“Whether or not, in any given case, the relationship of master and servant exists is a question of fact … but in general the relationship imports the existence of power in the employer not only to direct what work the servant is to do, but also the manner in which the work is to be done.”

Once there exists a contract of service in the instant case, there exists the relationship of master and servant: see again Halsbury’s Laws of England (supra), p 448, para 872:

“The relationship of master and servant is characterised by a contract of service, express or implied, between the master and servant. A contract of service is one in which a person undertakes to serve another and to obey his reasonable orders within the scope of the duty undertaken.”

I think the main complaint laid against the respondents herein is that the purported dismissal of the applicant did not conform to the Rules of Service and Pay as laid down in exhibit B referred to already. That the dismissal was in contravention of the conditions of service under which the applicant was engaged. That failure to satisfy the conditions as laid down under clause 32 of the said rules amounted to a breach of natural justice. Clause 32 of the said rules provides as follows:

“When an employee has committed an offence for which he may be dismissed summarily, he shall be given notice in writing outlining the offence committed and shall be allowed 24 hours to reply in writing to such notice and defend himself.”

Learned counsel for the applicant has contended forcefully that failure to comply with the above-quoted provisions of the rules governing the applicant’s employment as formulated by the respondents themselves rendered the purported dismissal a nullity. The action taken by the respondents without giving the necessary notice in writing outlining the offence committed; allowing him 24 hours to reply in writing; and a chance to defend himself amounted to a breach of natural justice and that, therefore, certiorari will lie to quash the purported dismissal.

[p.245] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237

I still hold the view I took in my judgment in motion No 35/79 instituted In the Matter of Application for an Order of Certiorari: Republic v Ghana Cargo Handling Co Ltd; Ex parte Trades Union Congress of Ghana (Maritime and Dockworkers Union), High Court, Sekondi, 29 March 1979, unreported, that:

“1. At common law a master can dismiss his servant summarily without giving a prior notice or hearing.

If, however, the summary dismissal is wrongful in the sense that it is in breach of the terms of his contract of employment, the employee’s only remedy lies in an action for damages for breach of contract.

2. Where the summary dismissal is the act of a public body set up by a statute and whose power to dismiss an employee summarily or otherwise is stipulated, regulated, directed or both by the statute, affording protection against summary dismissal, an employee can be properly dismissed only in accordance with the provisions of the governing statute which stipulates the procedure to be followed when the employer contemplates a summary dismissal of an employee; otherwise any such summary dismissal will be declared null and void.

3. Where under a statute an employee is given a right to be heard before dismissal, any purported summary dismissal without the employee being given an opportunity to defend himself offends against the rule of natural justice and shall be declared null and void. That is a purported summary dismissal done without the employer following rigidly laid down statutory procedure cannot in law stand and should be declared null and void.”

It seems to us that all the authorities quoted by both learned counsel in this matter support the above statements of the law, for the following is what Lord Reid had to say in Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation (supra) at 1581:

“At common law a master is not bound to hear his servant before he dismisses him. He can act unreasonably or capriciously if he so chooses but the dismissal is valid. The servant has no remedy unless the dismissal is in breach of contract and then the servant’s only remedy is damages for breach of contract.

…In the Public Schools (Scotland) Teachers Act 1882 certificated teachers are said by section 3 to ‘hold office’ under school boards and their dismissal without ‘due deliberation’ is forbidden. In particular it is enacted that no dismissal shall be valid unless three weeks’ notice of a meeting to consider a motion

[p.246] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 for dismissal is given both to every member of the board and to the teacher. I can see no possible reason for requiring notice to the teacher other than to give him an opportunity to prepare his defence, and it appears to me to be implicit in this requirement that the teacher shall be entitled to submit his defence to the board.”

Lord Reid also held at 1584: “But in my view if an employer fails to take the preliminary steps which the law regards as essential he has power to dismiss and any purported dismissal is a nullity.” But Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest held in his dissenting judgment at 1586 thus:

“If the legal basis of the appellant’s employment was that of master and servant, then he has no complaint in law if he was not heard: nor could he complain of dismissal even had it been decided upon for an inadequate reason or for an erroneous reason or even for no reason.”

So in Republic v State Transport Corporation; Ex parte Djorhoe [1975] 2 GLR 471 Edusei J (as he then was) held obiter (as stated in the headnote at 472 that):

“If the collective agreement, which gave the employee something in the nature of a status capable of protection had not laid down the procedure to be followed before dismissal, the court would have held that the remedy open to him was an action for damages for wrongful dismissal.”

See also Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v Silva [1964] 3 All ER 865 at 867, PC where it was held that since procedure by certiorari was not available where a master summarily dismissed or terminated a servant’s employment, certiorari had been wrongly granted.

The Court of Appeal has also recently decided in Republic v State Hotels Corporation; Ex parte Yeboah [1980] GLR 875, CA (as stated in the headnote at 876) that:

“(1) … the collective agreement constituted a contract of service between the parties. The relationship between the corporation and the respondents was therefore that of master and servant. Since article 26 of the collective agreement vested the corporation with the power to dismiss summarily any employee who in its opinion had been found guilty of, inter alia, dishonesty and in the instant case the respondents, themselves admitted their dishonest conduct in defrauding the corporation, the corporation had the power to dismiss them summarily notwithstanding the proceedings at the

[p.247] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 board of inquiry. Dictum of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 at p. 65, H.L. cited.

(2) The remedy of certiorari was not open to the respondents to quash the decision of the corporation to terminate their appointments. If the respondents, as servants of the corporation, thought that their dismissal was wrongful their remedy was to pursue a claim for damages for breach of contract. The trial judge therefore erred in quashing the decision of dismissal. Dictum of Lord Reid in Vidyodaya

University of Ceylon v. Silva [1964] 3 All ER 865 at pp. 867 and 875, H.L. cited.”

Learned counsel for the respondents took the point that the present motion is defective since it was filed contrary to Order 59, r 5 (1) of LN 140A. That copies of the statement which accompanied the application for leave was not filed or served with the notice of motion on the respondents. It is my view that this was an omission on the part of the applicant. It did not in any way prejudice the respondent’s case and it is my view that this could be corrected under Order 70, r 1 since Order 59 r 5(1) seems to permit supply on demand where there is omission to serve the respondents with the statement. It is my view, therefore, that that omission did not vitiate the proceedings.

Another point taken by counsel for the respondents is that since the applicant was dismissed with effect from 1 July 1981, and the application for leave to apply for an order of certiorari was filed on 11 January 1982, it was filed out of time since the application should have been filed within six months. It seems to me that this is a valid point of law, but it was not taken at the proper time. Moreover learned counsel did not cite any authority in support of his contention. It would seem, however, that since by 11 January 1982 the six months period within which the application should have been brought had expired, the only course open to the applicant was to apply for extension of time within which to apply for leave. That was to be on notice. It appears from the authority of State v Asantehene’s Divisional Court B1; Ex parte Kusada [1963] 2 GLR 238 at 240, SC that even the application for leave to apply for the order was not properly before the court, since time for so doing had expired, and there had not been an application on notice for extension of time. For it was held in that case by the Supreme Court (as stated in the headnote at 240) that:

“the High Court should not have entertained the application for the writ of certiorari, for, the applicant had not complied with the conditions precedent for applying for an extension of time and for leave to apply for the writ. Although a judge has an unfettered discretion under Order 64, r. 6 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) to grant an extension

[p.248] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 of time, such a discretion must however be exercised judicially. The discretion had not been properly exercised in this case. An applicant applying for extension of time must give good reasons why the application should be granted. He must also give notice to the person who would be affected if the order challenged were quashed. Neither of these conditions had been fulfilled by the applicant.”

The appeal therefore dismissed and it is my view that if this point had been taken before argument on the motion itself, it might have been upheld.

Counsel had submitted further that service of the motion itself has not been proper as required under section 13 (1) (d) of CA 4 where service should have been done at the registered office of the respondents in Accra but not on a branch office in Takoradi. It would appear under the judgment in Atta v Ghana Highway Authority [1980] GLR 119 that service of the motion in Takoradi instead of at the head office in Accra was defective but it seems to me that that defect has been cured by the acceptance of that service and filing of affidavits in opposition to the application, not under protest, and moreover, allowing the applicant to argue the motion to a close before the point is taken during the course of the respondents’ counsel’s submissions. I have therefore already considered the application on its merits.

The next point taken is that the action was commenced in a wrong court, for Order 5, r 1 of LN 140A as amended by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (LI 1107), r 1 (5), provides that:

“(5) All actions for the specific performance, or upon the breach, of any contract, shall be commenced in the Region in which such contract ought to have been performed or in which the defendant resides.”

I do not think that this is an action for specific performance, or an action brought for damages for breach of contract of service, so it is my view that LI 1107, r 1 (5) will not apply here. It is a writ or an application for a writ of certiorari to prevent the respondents’ agents from throwing the applicant out of the respondents’ bank or office situate here at Takoradi in the Western Region, where the applicant has been stationed. It is my view therefore that the High Court, Sekondi has full jurisdiction over the application brought, and it is therefore properly before the court. The prerogative writs are almost invariably brought for convenience and prompt action. The order, if granted, will be more promptly and conveniently executed here in Takoradi than in Accra. In any case, an action is not lost these days simply because it

[p.249] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 237 has been commenced in a wrong court, because either party is entitled to apply to the Chief Justice, where necessary, for the matter to be transferred to the appropriate forum. This has not been done in this case, and I have therefore given my ruling in the matter.

I have considered the submissions made by both learned counsel on this application in the light of the discussion of the law involved, and I am of the view that the writ of certiorari does not lie here. If the applicant is convinced that he has been wrongfully dismissed, then his remedy lies in an action for damages for breach of contract.

The application is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at ¢1,200. DECISION Application dismissed.

M.C.N.-N.

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