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[1978] SLR (HC) 40High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

REPUBLIC vs. POLICE COUNCIL; EX PARTE KWAGYIRI [1979] GLR 27

17 March 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 14 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 40
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v POLICE COUNCIL; ex parte KWAGYIRI [1979] GLR 27 [1978] SLR (HC) 40
APAREPUBLIC v POLICE COUNCIL; ex parte KWAGYIRI [1979] GLR 27, [1978] SLR (HC) 40 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v POLICE COUNCIL; ex parte KWAGYIRI [1979] GLR 27, [1978] SLR (HC) 40 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kay v. Goodwin (1830) 6 Bing. 576; 130 E.R. 1403.

(2) Miller (T.A.) Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1968]1 W.L.R. 992; [1968] 2 All E.R. 633; 112 S.J. 522; 19 P. & C.R. 263; 66 L.G.R. 39; [1969] R.P.C. 91, C.A.

(3) R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 Q.B. 456; [1965] 2 W.L.R. 89; [1965] 1 All E.R. 81; 108 S.J. 1030, C.A.

(4) Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179; 80 L.J.K.B. 796; 104 L.T. 689; 75 J.P. 393; 27 T.L.R.

378; 44 S.J. 440; 9 L.G.R. 652, H.L.

(5) Wilson v. Esquimalt & Nanaimo Rail. Co. [1922] 1 A.C. 202; 91 L.J.P.C. 21; 126 L.T. 451, P.C.

(6) R. v. War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 C.L.R. 228.

(7) Ceylon University v. Fernando [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223; [1960] 1 All E.R. 631; 104 S.J. 230, P.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the confirmation of a police service disciplinary inquiry by the Police Council. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Dr. Ako Adjei for the applicant.

Sampong for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

This is an application for a writ of certiorari. The applicant, at the relevant time a general police sergeant in the Ghana Police Service, was charged with the disciplinary offence of misconduct contrary to section 17 (k) of the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350), and a service inquiry was commenced into the said misconduct on 3 July 1974, before Mr. A. A. Asare, Assistant Superintendent of Police in charge of the Cape Coast District who was nominated by Mr. J. H. Cobbina, G.M., the then Inspector-General of Police, by letter No. SO. 4434/126 dated 3 June 1974 acting by virtue of the power vested in him under section 19(3) of Act 350, to hold the inquiry. The applicant pleaded not guilty but on 13 August 1974 the service inquiry was concluded and the inquiry officer having

[p.29] of [1979] GLR 27 formed the opinion that the charge had been proved, found him guilty of the charge and convicted him and he recommended as punishment a reduction in rank.

Section 17 (k) of the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350), is as follows:

“17. It shall be a misconduct for a police officer—. . .

(k) to do any other act without reasonable excuse which amounts to a failure to perform in a proper manner any duty imposed on him as such, or which contravenes any enactment relating to the Police Service, or which is otherwise prejudicial to the efficient conduct of the Police Service or tends to bring the Police Service into disrepute.”

The particulars of the service charge which the applicant faced are as follows:

“For that you on 22 February 1974 being the Cape Coast District Paymaster employed temporarily in the Regional Pay Office, Cape Coast, during the absence on leave of Inspector S. A. Nyasiah, the Regional Paymaster, did cause Conveyance Orders Nos.483924, 483925 and 483926 allocated to the Cape Coast District Pay Office to be issued in the name of No. 5868 D/Sgt. P. Y. K. Essel, DSM. Asuadem Builsa and Inspector Grade II S. K. Hammond, who were transferred from Cape Coast to Garu, Upper Region and Tamale, Northern Region respectively and prepared payment vouchers Nos. 804, 805 and 806/73-74 to the tune of ¢551.25 in favour of an alleged transport owner Kofi Anhwere, P.O. Box 46, Cape Coast, and cashed the vouchers for yourself.”

As I have already indicated the inquiry officer convicted the applicant. He forwarded the proceedings together with his findings and recommendation to the Inspector-General of Police and on 9 October 1974, by letter ref. No. SO. 4434/161 the Inspector-General of Police wrote to the applicant through the Assistant Commissioner, Central Region, inter’ alia as follows:

“Following a service inquiry held into your conduct by Mr. A. A. Asare, Assistant Superintendent in accordance with regulation 4 (3) (c) of the Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations 1971 (L.I.

688), on charges of misconduct contrary to section 17 (k) of Act 350/70, and your subsequent conviction, I have after reviewing the record of proceedings and considering the findings of the adjudicating officer imposed a sentence of dismissal from the service on you, in exercise of the power vested in me under section 19 (5) of the Police Service Act 350/70 . . .

If you are aggrieved by the sentence or dissatisfied with the manner in which the inquiry was conducted and wish to appeal to the Police Council, you may do so, provided that notice of your intention to appeal is given and the grounds in support thereto are submitted

[p.30] of [1979] GLR 27 within six weeks from the date on which this decision is communicated to you.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Apparently before the Inspector-General of Police dealt with the matter, a copy of the inquiry proceedings and the findings and recommendation of the inquiry officer were also forwarded to the Central Regional Disciplinary Board and on 25 September 1974, the said board endorsed the recommendation of the inquiry officer and suggested a reduction in rank from general-sergeant to general-corporal with a further recommendation that the applicant be placed salary-wise on the maximum scale of the said rank, and enjoined that the applicant “should not in future be employed on any pay duty or on clerical duty for being a dishonest person.”

On 4 November 1974, the applicant by his counsel, G. K. Acquah, appealed to the Police Council against the sentence of dismissal and the grounds of the appeal were as follows:

“(1) That the Central Regional Board has no power under section 20 (3) of Act 350 and L.I. 688 of 1971 to appoint Mr A. A. Asare to be the adjudicating officer.

(2) That the sentence is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial.

(3) That the conviction was totally bad in law “

This appeal was no doubt brought under regulation 25 (1) of the Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 688). The regulation provides as follows:

“25. (1) The defendant in any proceedings before the Inspector General or other superior police officer or before the Central Board or a Regional Board may appeal to the Police Council against any decision involving the imposition of a penalty, and in any such case the penalty shall not take effect until the appeal is determined.”

On 13 December 1974, the Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 688), were revoked and replaced by new regulations, the Police Force (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 993).

On 2 May 1975 the applicant appeared with his counsel before the Police Council and after Mr. Acquah, his counsel, had made submissions mainly directed at showing that the conviction was erroneous and that it could not be supported having regard to the evidence, the council adjourned the case to 13 June 1975 to enable statements to be taken from Mr. Whyte and Mr. Anhwere as well as officials of the State Transport Corporation. This adjournment it would seem was made, inter alia, for the council to satisfy itself that the police were not indebted to Mr. Whyte.

On the adjourned date, 13 June 1975, the applicant appeared without his counsel. The secretary of the council acting on the instructions of the council read to the applicant statements from Mr. Whyte and from officials of the State Transport Corporation. The persons who made the statements were not called for cross-examination but the applicant said

[p.31] of [1979] GLR 27 he was asked questions about the statements and was thus merely given an opportunity to contradict or explain them. After that the Police Council dismissed his appeal as baseless and accordingly confirmed the conviction and sentence of dismissal.

In these certiorari proceedings the applicant seeks to have the proceedings of 2 May 1975 and 13 June 1975 before the Police Council brought up before this court for the purpose of their being quashed. The grounds of the application are three. First it is complained that the participation of the secretary renders the proceedings a nullity. Secondly it is also contended that the use of statements, admittedly hearsay, instead of calling the persons who made the statements is contrary to law; and thirdly the loss of the opportunity to cross-examine the persons who made the statements was said to be contrary to the rules of natural justice. In his argument in this application for certiorari Dr. Ako Adjei referred me to sections 10 (3), (4) and 19 (5) of the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350), and submitted that the Inspector- General of Police has only power to impose a major penalty but he is not the appointing authority and therefore not the authority to dismiss. He submitted that a person aggrieved by the penalty imposed has a right to appeal to the Police Council under Act 350. The applicant he said properly exercised this right but at the appeal at the Police Council gross irregularities were committed, notably the reading of statements which we hearsay, (statements of Mr. Whyte and those of the State Transport officials) without giving the applicant the right to cross-examine in accordance with regulation 9 (7) of L.I. 993, for it is provided in the said regulation 9 (7) of L.I. 993 that, “He shall be entitled to cross-examine any witnesses against him and to examine any witnesses called by him.” This provision is also all contained without any alteration in wording in regulation 9 (7) of the revoked L.I. 688. Counsel’s submission is that the loss of the right to cross-examine is against the rules of natural justice, it vitiates the proceedings and entitles the applicant to the remedy of certiorari to quash the proceedings.

In his reply counsel for the Police Council referred me to regulation 23 (8) of L.I. 993. The regulation reads as follows:

“23. (8) The Police Council or Inspector-General of Police when considering an appeal under these Regulations may before taking any action refer the proceedings back to the relevant Board or superior police officer for such further investigation and report as the Police Council or Inspector-General of Police may direct.”

This provision existed in regulation 25 (6) (c) of L.I. 688 in regard to the Police Council only as follows:

“25. (6) When considering an appeal under these Regulations the Police Council may—. . .

(c) before taking any action refer the proceedings back to the Inspector-General or the relevant Board or superior police officer for such further investigation and report as the Police Council may direct.”

[p.32] of [1979] GLR 27

He submitted that the provision is authority for the course of conduct which the Police Council took.

Since the course has statutory authority, the question of the breach of the rules of natural justice does not arise.

The arguments of counsel on both sides raise a number of questions that call for determination. The first question is whether the submission that the Inspector-General of Police is not the appointing authority and therefore incompetent to dismiss the applicant is a sound argument. The second question is whether after 13 December, when L.I. 993 came into force, the provisions applicable at the appeal ought to be the revoked L.I. 688 or the new L.I. 993? This second question is far from being academic because if L.I. 993 is the applicable provision as counsel on both sides would seem to maintain, then it may very well be argued that the appeal of the applicant abated and his dismissal was unexceptionable. The reason is because the right of appeal existing under L.I. 993 is drastically circumscribed with regard to forum. The applicant is a police sergeant and the right of appeal spelled out in regulation 23 (1) and (2) of L.I. 993 is as follows:

“23. (1) Where a penalty is imposed on a police officer of the rank of Inspector and above he may appeal to the Police Council against the decision, and the penalty shall not take effect until the appeal is determined.

(2) Where a penalty is imposed on a police officer below the rank of Inspector he may appeal to the Inspector-General of Police against the decision, and the penalty shall thereupon take effect until the appeal is determined.”

He would have no appeal before the Police Council and the present proceedings would be abortive. Besides, whereas under regulation 14 (1) of L.I. 688 it is provided that, “No major penalty imposed on a police officer shall take effect until it has been confirmed by the Police Council,” in L.I. 993 there is no such provision. It seems to me the question is of extreme importance. The third question is whether the statements which are admittedly hearsay evidence are matters which ought to be legally taken into account by the Police Council. In other words whether taking such hearsay statements into account is not an error of law patent on the record, so as to warrant the invocation of the supervisory powers of this court exercised through certiorari, and lastly whether the loss of the opportunity to cross-examine constitutes in the circumstances of this case a breach of the rules of natural justice and thus invites the remedy of certiorari.

I shall deal with these points seriatim. The first argument proceeded on the basis that the inquiry officer, Mr. A. A. Asare, was appointed by the Central Regional Disciplinary Board. This would seem to be an error Mr. A. A. Asare was authorised by Mr. J. H. Cobbina, Inspector-General of Police, by the letter dated 3 June 1974, already referred to herein, to hold the inquiry. The letter indicated that he acted under and by virtue of the power vested in him by section 19 (3) of the Police Service Act, 1970

[p.33] of [1979] GLR 27

(Act 350). Section 19 (3) of Act 350 as consequentially amended is as follows:

“(3) Where the [Chairman of the Supreme Military Council] delegates powers under subsection (2) of this section to the Inspector-General of Police he may authorise the Inspector-General of Police to exercise all or any of the said powers through a disciplinary board or superior police officer authorised by the Inspector-General of Police for that purpose in writing.”

It seems from this provision that the argument that the Inspector-General of Police is not the appointing authority is misconceived.

The second matter is which of the two legislative instruments was applicable to the proceedings before the Police Council? It must be noted that by the time L.I. 993 became law, the applicant had already concluded lodging his appeal and it was then pending before the Police Council. Almost 150 years ago Tindal C.J. in Kay v. Goodwin (1830) 6 Bing, 576 at p. 582 said:

“I take the effect of repealing a statute to be . . . as if it had never passed; and, it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The present position in this country is the same and is regulated by the provisions of section 8 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), as follows:

“8. (1) The repeal or revocation of an enactment shall not—. . .

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed or revoked.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In the circumstance it seems the appropriate and applicable regulations are contained in the revoked L.I. 688 and counsel were in error to dwell on the new and subsisting regulations.

I propose to deal with the third and last questions together. In this regard it must be remembered that regulation 25 (6) (c) of the Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 688), already referred to, does permit the Police Council to obtain further material before taking a decision. The provision as I have indicated is also contained in the new regulations. The provision that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a witness contained in regulation 9 (7) of L.I. 688 is found in the procedure at the actual hearing of the charge; it is not contained in the provisions dealing with appeals.

[p.34] of [1979] GLR 27

In T.A. Miller Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1968] 1 W.L.R. 992 at p. 995, C.A.

Lord Denning M.R. citing R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 Q.B. 456, C.A. said that: “Tribunals are entitled to act on any material which is logically probative, even though it is not evidence in a court of law.” And later on at the same page of his judgment relying on the authority of Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179 at p. 182, H.L he said:

“Hearsay is clearly admissible before a tribunal. No doubt in admitting it, the tribunal must observe the rules of natural justice, but this does not mean that it must be tested by cross-examination. It only means that the tribunal must give the other side a fair opportunity of commenting on it and of contradicting it.”

In his invaluable book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.), pp. 188-189 de Smith quoting Wilson v. Esquimalt & Nanaimo Rail. Co. [1922] 1 A.C. 202 and an Australian case, R. v. War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 C.L.R. 228 states:

“A tribunal may be entitled to base its decision on hearsay . . . In these circumstances a person aggrieved will normally be unable to insist on oral testimony by the original source of the information, provided that he has had a genuine opportunity to controvert that information.”

A very extreme case of this legal position is afforded in the case of Ceylon University v. Fernando [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223, P.C. This was a case like the present involving disciplinary charges. It was held that a fair hearing had been given to the defendant Fernando at the disciplinary proceeding although the witnesses had been heard in his absence. Of course he was given sufficient information as to what the said witnesses said but although he did not confront or cross-examine them, nevertheless it was held the rules of natural justice were not broken.

Applying the principles contained in these authorities it is clear that the admission at the appeal stage of hearsay evidence is warranted by the provision of regulation 25 (6) (c) of L.I. 688. The applicant was made aware of the contents of the material contained in the hearsay statements and as the authorities show since he had the opportunity of commenting on and controverting the material, it is on principle in accordance with the rules of natural justice.

It seems therefore that the applicant has not made a good case to enable me to grant this application for certiorari to quash the decision the Police Council.

The application is therefore refused.

DECISION

Application refused.

J. D.

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