REPUBLIC vs. TEMA DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE I; EX PARTE AKOTIAH [1979] GLR 315
13 July 1978 · AGYEPONG J · ≈ 9 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 42Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Beatty v. Gillbanks (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 308; 51 L.J.M.C. 117; 47 L.T. 194; 46 J.P. 789; 31 W.R. 275;
15 Cox C.C. 138, D.C
(2) Beatty v. Glenister (1884) 51 L.T. 304.
(3) Republic v. Commissioner of Income Tax; Ex parte Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V.
(Fynhout) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 213, C.A.
(4) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1974] 1 G.L.R.
283, C.A. (full bench).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for orders of certiorari and prohibition to inter alia quash a magistrate’s order for the applicants to show cause why they should not give security for keeping the peace. The facts are set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Akotiah in person for himself and the other applicants
W. Amarfio for the informant.
JUDGMENT OF AGYEPONG J.
On 6 April 1978, Nene Akrofi Kubi III, hereinafter referred to as the informant, laid an information by motion ex parte under section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), before the District Court Grade I, Tema, presided over by His Worship Nana Assibey-Yeboah, District Magistrate Grade I, against the applicants herein praying the court to call upon the applicants herein to show cause why they should not be ordered to, execute a bond for keeping the peace.
Section 22 of Act 30 provides:
“22. (1) Whenever a District Magistrate is informed on oath that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public peace, or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public peace, the Magistrate may require him to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace for such period as the Magistrate thinks fit.
(2) Proceedings shall not be taken under this section unless either the person informed against, or the place where the breach of the peace or disturbance is apprehended is within the local limits of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction.”
The main grounds for the informant’s application as far as relevant to the application herein could be seen in paragraphs (3), (7), (9), (12) and (13) of his supporting affidavit which are:
“(3) In February, 1978, in exercise of my customary functions I together with other persons customarily entitled so to do, nominated elected and installed a new Ada Mantse in succession to the late Ada Mantse Nene Dake II.”
“(7) That I am informed and verily believe same to be true that in spite of the foregoing, the respondents herein in particular and others are in the process of installing another person as Ada Mantse contrary to custom and in the face of the new Ada Mantse’s installation.”‘ “(9) That the first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents have joined others to bring action
against the legality of the nomination, election and installation of the present Ada
[p.317] of [1979] GLR 315
Mantse—Nene Kabu Akuaku III before the Eastern Region House of Chiefs—Dodowa.”
“(11) That the second and third respondents have by themselves also filed a challenge to the New Ada Mantse’s installation in the Eastern Region House of Chiefs.
(12) That notwithstanding the averments in the immediately preceding paragraphs showing that the respondents know the way to the proper forum for ventilating their grievances they have now departed from the path of legality and propriety to take the first respondent to ‘Kuenya’ a traditional customary purification shrine, preparatory to installing him as a rival Ada Mantse, whilst the three destoolment proceedings they have initiated are still pending.
(13) That the conduct of the respondents is very likely to conduce a breach of the peace.”
In effect the informant wants the court to stop the applicants from assembling at “Kuenya” to enstool their candidate as this was likely to lead to a breach of the peace.
The learned magistrate, after hearing counsel for the informant, granted the application holding inter alia that:
“if the respondents are preparing to install one of their members as a chief at Ada whilst a chief has already been installed then this is likely to occasion a breach of the peace between their supporters and this has got to be stopped. As the installation of the present chief is being challenged at the appropriate point, it could be better for any malcontent to wait until the chieftaincy suit is thrashed out.”
I understand “their supporters” to mean supporters of the rival candidates to the stool. The learned magistrate therefore ordered that the applicants were to be served to appear before him on 17 April 1978 “to show cause why they should not be made to execute bonds to refrain from installing a new chief which may lead to a breach of the peace.”
The applicants, being aggrieved with the order of the learned magistrate, filed the present application praying for the orders of certiorari and prohibition, the latter seeking to prohibit the learned magistrate from ordering the applicants to execute the bonds. The applicants listed five grounds with the statement they filed on 20 April 1978, pursuant to Order 59, r. 2 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). [His lordship then considered and dismissed these grounds and contained:]
But am I to dismiss the application because all the grounds of the applicants have failed? Mr. Akotiah indeed did contend that the phrase “wrongful act” in section 22 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), meant a criminally wrongful act. And he further argued that since the taking of the first respondent to “ Kuenya” to perfect the installation of the first respondent was not a criminally wrongful act, the information was incompetent. I think that point was of some relevance to the information but it did not go far enough.
[p.318] of [1979] GLR 315
In my view what matter is the manner in which the applicants would take the first respondent to “Kuenya” and there install him as a rival Ada Mantse. There was nothing in the affidavit of the informant that the applicants, for example, would carry guns to “Kuenya,” or that they would themselves in any violent manner install their rival chief. If they behave peacefully in going to “Kuenya” and installing a new chief, the mere fact that the informant and his supporters would oppose the installation and that in that case violence could erupt is immaterial, and cannot ground a conviction for breach of the peace.
In Beatty v. Gillbanks (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 308, members of the Salvation Army marched along a street. An antagonistic mob followed the route of the Salvation Army and caused a disturbance of the peace. This was not the first time that a march of the Salvation Army had drawn antagonistic crowds to cause a disturbance of the peace. Yet it was held that the members of the Salvation Army could not be convicted for unlawful assembly because they themselves did not cause any disturbance during their march; the disturbance was rather caused by the mob that was antagonistic to the Salvation Army. The principle of law was enunciated that persons assembling for a lawful purpose, and with no intention of carrying it out unlawfully, but with the knowledge that their assembly will be opposed and with good reason to suppose that a breach of the peace will be committed by those who oppose it, are not guilty of unlawful assembly. Said Field J. at pp. 313-314:
“The charge against them is, that they unlawfully and tumultuously assembled, with others, to the disturbance of the public peace and against the peace of the Queen. Before they can be convicted it must be shewn that this offence has been committed. There is no doubt that they and with them others assembled together in great numbers, but such an assembly to be unlawful must be tumultuous and against the peace . . .
But it is said, that the conduct pursued by them on this occasion was such, as on several previous occasions, had produced riots and disturbance of the peace and terror to the inhabitants, and that the appellants knowing when they assembled together that such consequences would again arise are liable to this charge.
Now I entirely concede that every one must be taken to intend the natural consequences of his own acts, and it is clear to me that if this disturbance of the peace was the natural consequence of acts of the appellants they would be liable, and the justices would have been right in binding them over. But the evidence set forth in the case does not support this contention; on the contrary, it shews that the disturbances were caused by other people antagonistic to the appellants, and that no acts of violence were committed by them . . . and the finding of the justices amounts to this, that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an unlawful act. There is no authority for such a proposition.”
[p.319] of [1979] GLR 315
In similar circumstances in the case of Beatty v. Glenister (1884) 51 L.T. 304 Lord Coleridge C.J. said at p. 305:
“I am of opinion on the facts stated in this case that there was no evidence of any disturbance of the public peace having been committed by the appellants within the meaning of this Act, on which they could rightly be convicted of an offence against its provisions.”
These authorities explain:
“conduct themselves in such a manner as to cause persons in the neighbourhood reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such assembly needlessly and without any reasonable occasion provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace” in section 201 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).
Since the affidavit of the informant does not disclose that the applicants themselves while going to “Kuenya” or installing their rival candidate at “Kuenya” will be violent and disturb the peace, there is no basis for the learned magistrate’s order that the applicants be served to appear before him on 17 April 1978, “to show cause why they should not execute bonds to refrain from installing a new chief which may lead to a breach of the peace.” There was no material in law upon which the learned magistrate could entertain the information.
It was held in Republic v. Commissioner of Income Tax; Ex parte Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 213, C.A. that a finding that is not supported by evidence becomes a question of law and certiorari would lie to quash the finding. This principle of law was confirmed by the full bench of the Court of Appeal when the matter came on review before the full bench, though the application for review was granted on other grounds: see Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1974] 1 G.L.R. 283 at p. 296.
Since there is no basis for the learned magistrate’s order, it becomes a question of law and certiorari lies to quash it. I will therefore quash learned magistrate’s order, that the applicants be served to appear before him, “to show cause why they should not execute bonds to refrain from installing a new chief which may lead to a breach of the peace.”
Let the said order be brought up to the High Court for the purpose of being quashed and it is hereby quashed. I hereby also prohibit the learned magistrate (and the court) from continuing with the information proceedings.
There will be no order as to costs.
DECISION Application granted.
J. D.
