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[1982] SLR (CA) 17Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; EX PARTE AKYEAMFOUR II [1982-83] GLR 10

23 April 1982 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 23 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (CA) 17
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; ex parte AKYEAMFOUR II [1982-83] GLR 10 [1982] SLR (CA) 17
APAREPUBLIC v THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; ex parte AKYEAMFOUR II [1982-83] GLR 10, [1982] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS; ex parte AKYEAMFOUR II [1982-83] GLR 10, [1982] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R.v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.

[1924] 1 K.B. 171, C.A.

(2) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1974] 1 G.L.R.

283, C.A.

(3) R. v. St. Lawrence’s Hospital Statutory Visitors; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1158. [p.12] of [1982-83] GLR 10 (4) Re K. (H.) (an infant) [1967] 1 All E.R. 226.

(5) Pearlberg v. Varty (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 2 All E.R. 6.

(6) United Engineering Workers Union v. Devanayagam L.R. [1967] 2 P.C. 367.

(7) Ex parte Fry [1954] 2 All E.R. 118.

(8) R.v. University of Oxford; Ex parte Bolchover, The Times, October 7, 1970.

(9) Buckoke v. Greater London Council [1970] 2 All E.R. 193.

(10) R.v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly; Ex parte Haynes-Smith [1928] 1 K.B. 411. (11) R.v. Justices of Sunderland [1901] 2 K.B. 357.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of Agyepong J. dismissing the appellant’s application for an order of certiorari to remove the name of the third respondent as Asokorehene from the National Register of Chiefs. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Francois J.A.

COUNSEL

Adumua-Bossman for the appellant.

Dr. Twum for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

He By his amended application filed on 12 August 1977, Nana Anka Akyeamfour II (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), sought “an order of certiorari to remove the name of the third respondent), Nana Sefa Atweneboa III (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), from the National Register of Chiefs and the Local Government Bulletin No. 27 dated Friday 20 June 1975 for the purpose of quashing the same.” The application was unsuccessfully made at the High Court, Accra. It was the refusal of the High Court to accede to the prayer of the appellant that has provoked this appeal.

The facts are as follows: The appellant and the respondent are two rival claimants to the stool of Asokore in the New Juaben Traditional Area. Both assert claims to due election and enstoolment to the stool by the accredited kingmakers. The stool is an important one as its occupant is automatically the Benkumhene of New Juaben.

The appellant’s case is that as far back as 17 April 1971, he had paid his customary fees and sworn the customary oaths to the Omanhene of New Juaben entitling him to have his name registered in the National Register of Chiefs. His name had, in fact, been submitted to the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs at Dodowa, which had in turn forwarded it to the National House of Chiefs and transmitted it to the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs as required under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), s. 51. His name had been published in the Local Government Bulletin but later cancelled. When it

[p.13] of [1982-83] GLR 10 was re-submitted in 1973, the respondent had instituted proceedings to stop the publication of his name in the Local Government Bulletin. That action is still pending. Also unconcluded are proceedings which the respondent instituted in the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs to test their respective claims to the stool of Asokore.

Pausing for a moment, it would be observed that if the issue of the rightful stool occupant is undetermined then an application which seeks to insert a name in the register as representing the regularly elected stool occupant is as futile as it is false. The appellant’s efforts would appear indirectly to be compelling the court to place on a statutory document a disputed assertion. As the basic principle is that there cannot be two chiefs occupying one stool at one time, the appellant whose name had been cancelled earlier should have realised that he was putting the cart before the horse. In my view, the status of chief should be satisfactorily determined before the matter of registration with its concomitant government recognition is pursued, otherwise the exercise comes too close to a determination of a chieftaincy issue which the High Court is constitutionally precluded from doing.

Be that as it may, the appellant’s grouse is that the respondent’s name has been published in the Local Government Bulletin, No. 27 of June 1975, whilst his name remains struck out despite his prior claims to that title and despite a solemn undertaking to the High Court that no such publication would be made while the two aspirants had their contest undecided in court.

The appellant, therefore, charges the National House of Chiefs and the respondent, with whom they were impliedly in collusion, with a breach of the constitutional requirements under sections 50 and 51 of Act 370, and a further breach of a solemn undertaking to the court, which demonstrated a lack of faith, unfairness and a high-handedness that was not in keeping with natural justice.

In elaboration of his stand, the appellant contends that the constitutional duty laid under sections 50 and 51 of Act 370 carries with it a judicial discretion which renders its performance a quasi-judicial act and consequently places an onus of fairness on the National House of Chiefs.

Our inquiry, therefore, starts with the ascertainment of the duty laid on the National House of Chiefs by Act 370, s. 50 which provides:

“50. (1) The National House of Chiefs shall maintain a register to be known as “the National Register of Chiefs; in this Part referred to as “the Register”

(2) The National House of Chiefs shall cause to be recorded on the Register such particulars relating to chieftaincy

[p.14] of [1982-83] GLR 10 as it may think fit or as may be required by this Act or any other enactment to be recorded thereon.”

It seems to me that the duty to maintain a register as laid down in section 50(1) is purely administrative. No amount of sophistry can change the clear meaning of that section. In Section 50(2), the National House of Chiefs is given a discretion to insert in the register certain information relating to chieftaincy which it may consider necessary or which may be considered desirable by the Act or other legislation. Closely allied to these provisions is section 48(3) which requires the name of any person installed as a chief to be so entered.

By a reasoning which I must confess I am unable to follow, the appellant contends that the above-mentioned sections transform the National House of Chiefs’ functions into a quasi-judicial one to make it amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

It is clear, however, that the Act makes no provision for hearing objections to the registration functions of the National House of Chiefs. In other words, no forum exists for debating the merits of a chief’s registration. No court is established for this purpose. As the issue of what can be termed a court came up in these proceedings, it will be apposite to recall Lord Atkin’s famous dictum in R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171, C.A. That dictum received the approval of the full bench of the Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1974] 1 G.L.R. 283, C.A. There Lord Atkin said at p. 205:

“But the operation of the writs [prohibition and certiorari] has extended to control the proceedings of bodies which do not claim to be, and would not be recognized as, Courts of Justice. Wherever any body of person having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.”

Acting judicially, of course, has been interpreted as an obligation on a body to hear evidence from both sides and come to a judicial decision. “Unless there is an order or a determination which the body has made, the order of certiorari will not lie.” This statement by Lord Goddard C.J. in R. v. St. Lawrence’s Hospital Statutory Visitors; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1158 at p. 1162 was also approved by the full bench in the Fijnhouthandel case (supra).

In the present case, a plain mandatory duty is placed on the National House of Chiefs to record the names of all chiefs transmitted

[p.15] of [1982-83] GLR 10 to it. There is, however, opportunity available under section 50(7), to any person who protests his non-registration as chief to appeal to the Supreme Court. Further, the National House of Chiefs under section 14(3) and (4) can amend the register if changes in the occupancy of a stool have occurred. These are all functions associated with factual recording and do not extend to adjudicating on the merits. A registration committee formed for this purpose in my view is a domestic arrangement of convenience only. True, the requirement to act fairly may even here be recognised. But it is said then to be a moral rather than a legal duty. The view expressed by Lord Parker C.J. in Re K.H. (an infant) [1967] 1 All. E.R. 226 at p. 231 that “if there is no duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially there is no power in the court whatever to interfere.” With respect, it is a correct statement of the law. To the same effect is the statement of Lord Pearson in Pearlberg v. Varty (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 2 All E.R. 6 at p. 17, H.L.:

“ . . . where some person or body is entrusted by Parliament with administrative or executive functions, there is no presumption that compliance with the principles of natural justice is required, although, as ‘Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly’, the courts may be able in suitable cases (perhaps always) to imply an obligation to act with fairness. Fairness, however, does not necessarily require a plurality of hearings or representations and counter-representations.”

In the Privy Council case of United Engineering Workers’ Union v. Devanayagam L.R. [1967] 2 P.C. 367, Lord Guest and Lord Devlin in their joint minority opinion at page 386 discussed some essential requirements of natural justice, namely the right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal, the right to have notice of charges and the right to be heard in answer to those charges, and concluded that these were not necessarily features of administrative decisions. Their lordships went on, “The administrator is not required to be unbiased and his decision may often affect those who have no opportunity of presenting their views.” The answer is that the legislature in its wisdom provides avenues for redress. In Act 370, therefore, statutory means of achieving justice are provided in appeals to the Supreme Court and the process of amendment already referred to. It must be observed here that neither step seems to have been adopted in this matter. In my opinion, the views of the law lords quoted above may provide matter for academic debate by the cognoscenti, but on the facts on record, it cannot be doubted that the National House of Chiefs merely complied with the duty imposed on it by sections 50 and 48 of Act 370.

Turning to section 51 of Act 370, one notes that it creates a duty to transmit all particulars relating to enstoolment, destoolment,

[p.16] of [1982-83] GLR 10 abdication, death or other changes in the status of chiefs to the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs. This must be done “as soon as practicable.” The Commissioner in turn must publish the information in the Local Government Bulletin. The house’s task is administrative, pure and simple.

It was submitted very forcefully that the National House of Chiefs have their judicial functions through their judicial committees in the determination of constitutional issues regarding chieftaincy—in fact they possess exclusive jurisdiction. The need to keep the two functions, judicial and administrative, separate and distinct, cannot therefore be over-emphasised. It would be invidious for the house to assume an investigative and inquistorial role in the exercise of purely collating information for the register when it may be called upon in its judicial capacity to determine the merits of issues affecting the same contesting chiefs. This would be the surest way to stultify the Act. It is obvious the legislature recognised this dichotomy. In my opinion, therefore, even though the National House of Chiefs has a duty to act honestly and fairly, since its function is administrative it cannot be amenable to the prerogative writ of certiorari. Both the Court of Appeal and the full bench of the court in the Commissioner of Income Tax v. Fijnhouthandel case (supra), restated this legal position. This court is bound by those authorities. Had the issue been one of a failure to act on an objection to the performance of its duty, as for instance, a failure to amend when a glaring correction was required, then a quasi-judicial duty would have been created calling for redress by certiorari. No such situation arises in this case. Even if the assumption could be legitimately made that there has been a denial of natural justice in the forwarding of the respondent’s name to the commissioner, the position still remains that the remedy sought is discretionary may still be refused: see Ex parte Fry [1954] 2 All E.R. 118 at p. 121-122; R. v. University of Oxford; Ex parte Bolchover; The Times, October 7, 1970 and Buckoke v. Greater London Council [1970] 2 All E.R. 193 at p. 197. The law is settled that if the decision challenged is intrinsically a perfectly proper one then a mere failure to hear a party would not be a sufficient justification to set it aside, a fortiori where the legislation does not even contemplate a judicial hearing and where the act complained of, viz forwarding the respondent’s name, was performed without qualification in the appellant’s own case.

It is difficult to appreciate the charge of unfairness in this appeal. The National House of Chiefs had a mandatory duty to transmit the names of chiefs reported to the house to the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs. The house, as far as the record goes, acted in accordance with the statutory obligation imposed on it and

[p.17] of [1982-83] GLR 10 transmitted the names of the two chiefs as reported. Perhaps if the register had been kept with punctilious regularity the mistake of passing on to the commissioner the names of two chiefs occupying the same stool would not have occurred. But that does not relieve the house of the duty, devolving on it, of placing on the register all names submitted to it and in due course transmitting the information to the commissioner. Indeed, if the house had adopted an exercise of selectiveness, it would have laid itself bare to the charge of unfairness and illegality as it had no power to pronounce on the merits of the aspirants to the stool.

There is no suggestion that the appellant had brought the apparent double entry to the notice of the house and sought an amendment under section 48 of Act 370, which the house had refused.

Two small strands must now be tied up. On the issue of over-reaching the courts by breaking a solemn undertaking, the answer that was not seriously rebutted was that the information relating to one of the parties’ registration had been sent to the commissioner before the undertaking was actually given in court.

The undertaking in court was made on 18 December 1973 and the information in relation to the appellant himself was transmitted to the commissioner on 3 July 1973. As far as the respondent’s name is concerned, it appears to have followed a settlement attested to by the Omanhene in May 1975 with the subsequent publication in the Local Government Bulletin in June 1975. If there had been a real breach, it is surprising contempt proceedings were never initiated on such an inflammable issue. The publication, of course, was by the commissioner whose duty it was to publish it. This is an executive act which cannot be challenged in these proceedings. It may well be that the state attorney concerned gave an undertaking without checking whether it could be honoured. On the other hand, the undertaking seems to have lapsed by virtue of the settlement alluded to by the Omanhene.

Next, is the assertion that since there was a matter in difference between the appellant and the respondent as to the rightful heir to the Asokore stool, the name of the respondent should never have been submitted. The simple answer was given by the Omanhene of the New Juaben Traditional Area. He swore that the parties had settled their differences and the respondent was therefore the unchallenged heir-apparent.

I agree with the judge of the court below that if the settlement was contested, the appellant should have joined the Omanhene in the proceedings so that his veracity could be tested. A belated affidavit was not enough; it could hardly affect information already transmitted by the National House of Chiefs to the commissioner. Information transmitted to the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs is on form C.D.F. Particulars required on this form include changes in

[p.18] of [1982-83] GLR 10 the status of chiefs (see section 51 of Act 370) and a statement whether an appeal is pending or not in relation to the enstoolment of a chief. On the respondent’s forms are indorsed the information that no appeals were pending. This has provided fuel to the appellant’s complaint of unfairness. He argues that since there were rival claimants to the stool of Asokore to the knowledge of the regional and National Houses of Chiefs, there could not be a valid assertion that an appeal was not pending. “Appeal” in the appellant’s view was not to be taken in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but should imply the existence of a dispute. The appellant, however, glosses over the fact that an interval of, at least, three years appears between the registration of his name and the respondent’s. The extract submitted in these proceedings gives only those two entries and omits intervening entries that may span across many pages. The true picture is consequently not exposed. If indeed several names intervene in the actual register, then an imputation of knowledge that is wilfully suppressed cannot be validly made. The sworn statement of the Omanhene of New Juaben attesting the settlement of the rival claims to the stool of Asokore resulting in the respondent’s success, which allegedly had been gracefully acceded to by the appellant, has been adverted to. Furthermore, the National House of Chiefs was under obligation to perform its duty of registration and transmission of information timeously. Moreover, section 50 (7) provides the avenue of appeals to the Supreme Court. It is a moot point, therefore, whether the designation “appeal” in the C.D.F. form does not refer to an appeal to the Supreme Court. In any case, since such an interpretation is not far-fetched, the National House of Chiefs cannot be charged with deception, if indeed no such appeal had been filed.

In my judgment no sufficient case has been made for reversing the decision of the High Court in its refusal to order certiorari to issue. I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A

This is an appeal from the decision of Agyepong J. dismissing the applicant’s motion for an order of certiorari to remove the name of the third respondent as Asokorehene from the National Register of Chiefs, and as appearing in the Local Government Bulletin No. 27 dated 20 June 1975.

The grounds upon which the order was asked for, as set down in the statement, were far from succinct, and foretold the fate of the application. They were: (a) that the report of the enstoolment of the applicant as Benkumhene to the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs, Dodowa, and to the National House of Chiefs, Kumasi, respectively was prior in time to that of the third respondent, and so it was irregular in the National Register of Chiefs; (b) that the procedure adopted

[p.19] of [1982-83] GLR 10 by the first and second respondents herein was contrary to law and the principles of justice and fair-play; and (c) lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant (to be referred to as the applicant) is Nana Anka Ayeamfour II, a contender to Nana Sefa Atweneboa III, the third respondent, as chief of Asokore and Benkumhene of New Juaben Traditional Area. The principal party against whom the orders are sought is the National House of Chiefs, as the first respondent, and, in a less prominent role, the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs.

The facts, as verified in the various affidavits, have been so lucidly set out in the leading judgment by my learned brother Francois J.A. that I can spare myself of a repetition. Suffice it to say that, by the affidavits, the applicant’s name was entered on the National Register of Chiefs (hereafter referred to as the register) on 23 January 1973, and a report of his enstoolment as Asokorehene and Benkumhene of the New Juaben Traditional Area was made by the first respondent to the Commissioner under section 51 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), on 3 July 1973. The third respondent’s enstoolment was some three years later, and the entry was on 19 March 1975. The publication of the name of the third respondent as the Asokorehene-Benkumhene in the Local Government Bulletin dated 20 June 1975 in preference to the applicant’s was the cause of the applicant’s concern.

To found the remedy of certiorari there should be a breach of some legal authority in the first place. In the present case the legal authority alleged to have been breached is statutory. The relevant enactments relied on are sections 14 (4), 48 (2) and 51 (1) and (2) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 which respectively provide:

“14. (4) If the National House of Chiefs is satisfied after consultation with the appropriate Regional House of Chiefs that any person should, or that any person should not, be a member of a Traditional Council, the National House of Chiefs may amend the Register accordingly.”

“48. (2) Subject to the foregoing subsection (1) the name of any person who has been installed as a Chief shall be entered by the National House of Chiefs in the National Register of Chiefs not later than one month from the date of the receipt of the notification of such installation.”

“51. (1) All enstoolments, destoolments, abdications and deaths of Chiefs in any Region as well as all such other changes in the status of Chiefs as may be prescribed by regulations made under section 62 of this Act shall as soon as practicable after their occurrence, be reported in writing to the Minister by the Regional House of Chiefs of the Region through the National House of Chiefs.

[p.20] of [1982-83] GLR 10

(2) Subject to section 48 of this Act, the Minister shall upon receipt of any such report cause its contents to be published in the Local Government Bulletin for the information of the general public.”

The gist of Mr. Adumua-Bossman’s submission came to this, that although actions taken under sections 50 (2), 48 (1) and 51 (1) of Act 370, that is the keeping of the register and the consequent report to the commissioner, would appear prima facie to be merely ministerial, there is by reason of section 14 (4) imparted into the functions an investigatory duty. This he contends arises from the fact that the National House of Chiefs is required “to be satisfied after consultation with the appropriate Regional House of Chiefs” whether any person should or should not be a member of a traditional council—before amending the register. Consequently, it is said that having first noted the name of the applicant as chief of Asokore in the register, the failure to consult the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs before entering the name of the third respondent (a latter nominee) for the self-same Asokore stool, when there had been no recording of a destoolment, amounts to an amendment to the register, to the prejudice of the application, by the third respondent having a prior publication of his enstoolment in the Local Government Bulletin to the exclusion of the applicant’s name. In particular, it was submitted that in the circumstances, the National House of Chiefs must have been aware of the pendency of “actions” in the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs and the regional house of chiefs and at the High Court, Koforidua, challenging the occupancy of the stool, and therefore the failure to investigate or inquire into the propriety of an entry of the third respondent’s name on the register and the subsequent transmission of the report of his enstoolment to the Commissioner amounted to a breach of the duty to act with fairness.

On the view I have taken of the appeal, I do not find it useful to consider the merits of such a wide construction as to the meaning of “pending appeal” or of the term “amendment” as used in section 14(4), as to impose on the National House of Chiefs a consultative duty. Nor do I find it necessary for the decision, to discuss the merits of the enstoolment of either the third respondent or of the applicant himself; or to inquire into the matters which resulted in Nana Atweneboa II, previously destooled in his lifetime, being accorded full state honours and burial on his death, as the Asokorehene and Benkumhene, and its incidence on the claim of the applicant’s enstoolment as the Asokorehene.

My view of the matter is primarily that there was no legal duty on the National House of Chiefs or the regional house of chiefs to act judicially. In my view, the complaint cannot be lumped together [p.21] of [1982-83] GLR 10 under all the above-mentioned sections. In reality what is complained of is the exercise of their functions under section 51. Now, I observe a distinction between the provisions of sections 48 (2) and 51 (1). Section 48 (2) imposes a mandatory obligation on the National House of Chiefs to enter the name of such installed chief on the register. The section leaves no proviso for the exercise of any discretion. Under section 50 (2), besides particulars which the National House of Chiefs may enter as it thinks fit, there are also matters relating to chieftaincy which the National House of Chiefs is under statutory obligation to enter. One such mandatory entry for the purpose of the present case is the provision under section 48 (2); that is entry of the name of an installed chief.

By section 51 (1), the primary mandatory duty is on the regional house of chiefs to report all enstoolments, destoolments, etc. to the minister, but through the National House of Chiefs. As a forwarding agent, it seems to me that its function does not permit the National House of Chiefs to question the propriety of any such report. The provision for stating on Form C.D.F. 1B or 2 (exhibit A & B)—whether or not there was a “pending appeal” against the enstoolment sufficiently informs the minister, whether or not the contents of any report received by him, should be published under section 51 (2). Any discretion in my view, is left to the minister by law.

It is as well to note that the occurrences relating to chieftaincy required to be reported by the regional house of chiefs are not primarily meant for the benefit of the register; although it is conceivable that any such report by the regional house will become the source of furnishing material for the register under section 50 (2). But it is clear that the National House of Chiefs may use only such “particulars as they think fit”—except those particulars as by some enactment they are required to register.

Section 14 (4) then, in my opinion, has no application to any of the pertinent provisions under consideration. For under section 48 (2) the duty is mandatory—so long as the person has been installed—which matter is enjoined by section 50 (2) as a statutory obligation. It does not admit of the discretion “to consult”; or to hold up registration because an “appeal is pending”. So is the duty under section 51 (1), even if the regional house of chiefs and the National House of chiefs became aware of “pending suits”, they were obliged to state the fact of “pending appeal” on the appropriate form.

Now, in considering any grievance as to the performance of its functions under section 51 (1) (and for that matter under sections 48 (2) and 50 (2)) the question may now be posed as to the mode and manner in which these statutory functions under section 51 (1) (or even section 50 (2)) are to be exercised: administratively or

[p.22] of [1982-83] GLR 10 judicially? For the remedy of certiorari only lies against bodies which, besides having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens have the duty to act judicially: see R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 per Atkin L.J. at p. 204, C.A. In R.v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, Ex parte Haynes-Smith [1928] 1 K.B. 411, Lord Howart C.J. at p. 415, C.A. explained the origin of this criterion:

“The duty to act judicially is an ingredient which, if the test is to be satisfied, must be present. As these writs in the earlier days were issued only to bodies which without any harshness of construction could be called, and naturally would be called Courts, so also to-day these writs do not issue except to bodies which act or are under the duty to act in a judicial capacity.”

It is somewhat difficult to say what constitutes judicial act in a given situation. I find it to be a good guide, if the question, “Does the statute in issue permit the exercise of judicial discretion?” could be answered in the affirmative. That I think is deducible from a statement of the Law in R.v. Justices of Sunderland [1901] 2 K.B. 357, when Lord Justice Vaughan Williams stated at pp. 370-371:

“ . . . having regard to the general principles of the common law, I should have been disposed to think that, wherever a body such as justices have under the provisions of a statute to grant or with hold a certificate, such as a certificate for a licence, and it appears from the statute that they have to exercise a judicial discretion in so doing, a certiorari would lie to bring up the proceedings before them, in the case of erroneous exercise or excess of jurisdiction, whether they could or could not be said to have acted as a Court in the strict sense of the term.”

(The emphasis is mine.) By the affidavit of the Registrar of the National House of Chiefs, Mr. Clement, the reports “are examined by a committee of the house to see if all was in order.” The committee acts only under the provisions of the various sections: 48 (2), 50 (2) and 51 (1) of Act 370 as its legal authority. In my opinion, these statutory provisions do not admit of any judicial discretion. The committee is in effect confined to a clerical or administrative work of vetting and forwarding to the minister in a case under section 51 (1) the name of the third respondent or of entry in the register of his name in the case under section 48 (2).

It might well be an irregularity that the third respondent’s name and not the applicant’s was forwarded to the commissioner, but I am satisfied that the remedy is not by a certiorari; because there was no duty to act judicially. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

[p.23] of [1982-83] GLR 10

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

I find no merit in this appeal and I agree with my brothers that it should be dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

No order as to costs.

K. A. A.

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