S. O. K. O. MENSAH vs. ANDOH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 774
23 November 1979 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 7 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 68Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., In re [1921] 3 K.B. 560; 90 L.J.K.B. 1353; 126 L.T. 154;
37 T.L.R. 940, C.A.
(2) Liesbosch, Dredger v. S. S. Edison [1933] A.C. 449; 102 L.J.P. 73; 77 S.J. 176; [1933] All E.R.
Rep. 144, H.L.
(3) Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (The Wagon Mound)
[1961] A.C. 388; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126; 105 S.J. 85; [1961] 1 All E.R. 404; [1961] 1 L.I.Rep. 1, P.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for general damages for damage done to the plaintiff’s house as a result of a motor vehicle (owned by the second defendants and driven by the first defendant) running into the house of the plaintiff. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Duku for the plaintiff.
No appearance by or on behalf of the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.
The plaintiff is the owner of house No. A2, Subin Hill, Dunkwa-on-Offin. He is by trade a shopkeeper. He uses one of the rooms in the house as a shop and two others as storerooms for his merchandise. The whole house comprised seven rooms.
At about half past six in the morning of 8 September 1976, a vehicle, No. CR. 3053, which was carrying workers along Subin Hill street, reversed and entered the storeroom of the plaintiff at
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house No. A2, Subin Hill. The impact shook other parts of the house. The roof caved in and some damage was done to the plaintiff’s merchandise. The offending vehicle was the property of the second defendants and it was driven, at the material time, by the first defendant as servant or agent of the second defendants’ company.
On 15 March 1977, the plaintiff commenced these proceedings against the defendants by a writ indorsed as follows:
“The plaintiff’s claim against the first and second defendants jointly and severally is for ¢4,837 general damages for damage caused to the plaintiff’s house No. A2, Subin Hill, Dunkwa-on-Offin, by the negligent driving of the first defendant, servant or agent of the second defendants and in the course of his employment or agency while the first defendant was in charge of vehicle No. CR. 3053, the property of the second defendants.”
This writ was served on the defendants on 4 April 1977, with a statement of claim in which the facts above related were set out. By 27 July 1977, no appearance had been entered by or on behalf of either defendant, interlocutory judgment was duly entered for the plaintiff on 9 August 1977 on an ex parte application for judgment. The question of negligence having been settled, the matter was adjourned for an assessment of the damage sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendants.
At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that his house, comprising seven rooms, had only two rooms roofed with corrugated iron-sheets. Of the three storerooms, only one was roofed. When the defendants’ vehicle ran into the building, four rooms, one of which contained merchandise, were destroyed and the merchandise therein was damaged. One chainsaw machine, valued at ¢1,600 and cash, the sum of ¢37 were lost. The plaintiff also testified that he traded in merchandise such as kerosine, matches, robb, mosquito coil and towels, and was making a profit of about ¢200 a month; and that from the time the accident occurred up to the time he took action—a period of six months—he had nowhere to ply his trade. He tried to rent a room but could find none and in consequence lost the profit that he would have made for those months, which lost profit amounts to ¢1,200. To establish how much it would cost to restore the damaged building to its former state, the plaintiff wisely employed the services of a valuer by name John Yirenchi Abu. This gentleman travelled with the plaintiff from Kumasi to a village by name Atifieso-Kokwado near Dunkwa-on-Offin where the damaged property was situate to inspect it and assess the cost of replacing the damaged as well as the weakened parts. He prepared a detailed report of his
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valuation which he tendered on behalf of the plaintiff as exhibit A. The sum total of the valuer’s testimony was that at the time he valued the property he estimated that the total cost of restoration would be ¢4,650, but having regard to inflationary trends in the country, this amount, at the time that he testified in February 1979, would be doubled. That is to say it would now cost the plaintiff ¢9,300 to restore his property to its former state.
Turning attention first to damage to the building, it cannot be questioned that when property is damaged by a vehicle running into it due to the sole negligence of the driver of the vehicle, the owner of the property is entitled to recover a sum which will restore the property to its former state, so far as can be done by compensation in money, in the same position as if the damage had not been inflicted, subject to the rules of law as to remoteness of damage. If that damage to the property had been repaired immediately or within a reasonable period from the time of the accident, the cost of reparation, according to the valuer, would have amounted to ¢4,650. The want of funds, however, disabled the plaintiff from effecting immediate repairs, and up to the time that this action came on for trial the needed constructional repairs had not been carried out. Between the date of accident and the time of trial, inflationary pressures had, according to the evidence, doubled the cost of making good the damage to the building. It is the claim for this additional amount of ¢4,650 which brings the alleged damage of the plaintiff’s building to ¢9,300, that poses a problem. Should it be disallowed as not being reasonably foreseeable damage flowing from the direct consequences of the defendants’ negligence? Or should it be allowed as damage parasitic to the actionable item of damage caused by running into the plaintiff’s property? I do not, however, propose to embark on any academic analysis of the principles enunciated in such leading cases as In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd. [1921] 3 K.B. 560, C.A.; Liesbosch, Dredger v. S. S. Edison [1933] A.C. 499, H.L.; Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. [1961] 1 All E.R. 404, P.C. and allied cases, except to express the view that on the facts of this case I favour the application of the law as expressed by Lord Wright in the Liesbosch Dredger case.
There was no evidence before me that in the last quarter of 1976 there were no building materials in Ghana with which the plaintiff could have restored his property to its former incomplete state. The defendants could not have been aware that the economic policies of the oil-producing countries would set in motion a world-wide inflationary spiral which would double the prices of building materials within two years. This surely is not a case of the defendants
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taking their victim talem qualem, but rather one in which, not only the impecuniosity of the plaintiff but, the inter-play of unforeseeable intervening factors increased the damage sustained by the plaintiff with the passage of time. Here as in the Liesbosch Dredger case, the plaintiff’s actual loss in so far as it was due to his impecuniosity arose from that impecuniosity as a separate and concurrent cause, extraneous to and distinct in character from the tort; the impecuniosity was not traceable to the defendants’ acts, and was therefore outside the legal purview of the consequences of these acts. As a result, I would disallow the additional claim based on the impecuniosity of the plaintiff and the intervention of inflationary trends in the country, and award the plaintiff ¢4,650 under this head of damage. In doing so, I have also in mind the view of the law that an injured party is under a duty to take all necessary steps to minimise his losses and not sit back and watch the losses grow out of all proportion to the initial damage done.
The other heads of damage under which the plaintiff’s claims can be dealt with summarily as they are legitimate and are not contested. He claims that as a direct result of the accident, he lost a chainsaw valued at ¢1,600 and cash, the value of ¢37. I allow these claims. The plaintiff was also unable to ply his trade at his premises and was unable to find alternative accommodation for a period of six months, in consequence of which he lost the capacity to make his monthly profit of ¢200 for that period of six months. I allow this also. I therefore give judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants jointly and severally for the sum of ¢7,487 with costs assessed at ¢600.
I grant leave to the plaintiff to amend the claim indorsed on his writ of summons by the deletion of the sum of ¢4,837.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
S.O.
