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[1985] SLR (CA) 40Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

SARIMBE ALIAS OLALA vs. THE REPUBLIC (NO. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 17

11 October 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 4 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 40
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLASARIMBE ALIAS OLALA v THE REPUBLIC (NO. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 17 [1985] SLR (CA) 40
APASARIMBE ALIAS OLALA v THE REPUBLIC (NO. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 17, [1985] SLR (CA) 40 (Ghana).
BluebookSARIMBE ALIAS OLALA v THE REPUBLIC (NO. 2) [1984-86] 2 GLR 17, [1985] SLR (CA) 40 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a conviction for murder. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.

COUNSEL

N. N. Heward-Mills (with him R. G. O. Heward-Mills) for the appellant.

S. G. Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. The main facts of this case are not in dispute. The appellant was the husband of a young woman called Florence Abena Omina. She is now dead. Both husband and wife lived in a house in Nima. They apperently lived in a one room.

In or about May 1982 the deceased was seven-months pregnant. In the evening of that day there was some domestic difference between husband and wife. The prosecution witnesses saw the appellant fighting with his wife and when they went to separate them, he scared them with a knife. Soldiers were brought in and they rescued the wife. The appellant said he slapped her because she took possession of his ¢480 and would not give it up.

Shortly after her rescue, the deceased felt unwell and was taken to hospital. The appellant accompanied her there. On the next day, she died. On 12 May 1982. Dr. Dankwa performed an autopsy on the body. He set out his findings on which we will comment presently. His conclusion on the cause of death was haemorrhagic shock and intracranial heamorrhage.

The prosecution claimed that the appellant intentionally caused his wife’s death by unlawful harm and charged him with the offence of murder. He denied this offence, but the jury on 16 March 1984 convicted him of this offence. It is this conviction that he contests before us.

[p.19] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 17

In view of the medical evidence, we considered that the offence of murder was not established. This was conceded by the Republic which claimed the appellant was at least guilty of manslaughter. This alternative charge was expressly withdrawn by the trial judge from consideration by the jury. But if the evidence taken as a whole justifies that charge, we have power under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) to substitute this lesser offence for the one of murder on which the appellant was convicted. The Republic invites us to substitute that charge.

Section 51 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) defines manslaughter in these words: “Whoever causes the death of another person by unlawful harm shall be guilty of manslaughter.” So the prosecution must show that the harm which the appellant undoubtedly caused to the deceased resulted in her death. There is no eye-witness to the fighting. The appellant himself said he only slapped the deceased once. But the injuries noted by Dr. Dankwa suggest he may have done more harm to her than he was prepared to admit. According to Dr. Dankwa, the deceased suffered the following external injuries: (1) abrasion over glabella, (2) bruising of left angle of mouth, (3) abrasions on the left leg, (4) bruising of right pectoralis major, (5) haematoma of both temporalis muscles.

The question is, was it shown positively that the injuries caused her death? If the evidence is susceptible to her death being caused by some other cause, then clearly the prosecution would have failed to prove that the appellant inflicted the harm that resulted in the deceased’s death. Dr. Dankwa could not be sure whether the death was caused by natural or unnatural causes. Professor Laing, a well-known and reputed pathologist, was more certain. He expressed as his opinion: “The findings made by the doctor fits into a diagnosis of eclampsia complicated by intracranial haemorrhage.” He again said quite clearly that although severe beatings could hasten the death of a seven-month old pregnant woman, these were not severe injuries. Indeed, he said they were trivial. That being so, it is plain to us that the prosecution have failed to show that the deceased’s death was caused by harm inflicted on her by the appellant. That being so, we are satisfied that on the evidence neither murder nor manslaughter was established.

In our opinion, not only did the judge misdirect the jury on the question of murder, but he was in error in withdrawing the case of manslaughter from the jury. But having ourselves considered the evidence, we are not convinced that that offence was proved. Furthermore, had the judge invited the jury to consider in the light of the evidence whether the deceased’s death could have been accelerated by the injuries, we are unable to say what conclusion they would have reached.

[p.20] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 17

We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the verdict of the jury and substitute one of not guilty of murder. But since on the evidence the appellant admitted slapping the deceased, he was clearly guilty of assault within the meaning of section 84 of the Criminal Code, Act 30.

In exercise of our power under section 154 of Act 30 we substitute that verdict for that of murder and sentence the appellant to six months’ imprisonment with hard labour.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. A. A.

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