HIGH COURT, SEKONDI
Date: 25 JULY 1974
EDUSEI J
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a decision of a district court wherein the appellant was convicted and sentenced for failing to report an industrial accident contrary to paragraph 67 (1) of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
E. Bentsi-Enchill for the appellant.
G. B. Adinyira, State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.
This is an appeal against the conviction of the appellant by the District Court Grade I, Sekondi. The appellant was charged under paragraph 67 of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157). The charge reads: “For that you Mr. Ben Slippe, as employer, at Tanokrom in the Takoradi magisterial district and within the jurisdiction of this court, failed to report an industrial accident involving Mr. James Arthur in the course of his employment with you on 9 June 1973, contrary to paragraph 67 of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157).”
The facts of the case were sufficiently and adequately set out in the judgment of the district court as follows:
“The accused is charged with the offence of failing to report an accident, contrary to paragraph 67 of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157). The case for the prosecution is that the accused was the employer of the first prosecution witness, James Arthur. On 9 June 1973, the said James Arthur was injured while working for the accused in the production of coca cola crates. The accused failed to report this accident to the nearest labour officer, as required by law. James Arthur, the victim of the accident, gave evidence. He said that on 1 June 1973, he was engaged as a carpenter by the accused to manufacture coca cola crates. He was to nail the crates, tie them with wires and take them to the machine to perforate holes in them. He was doing this job at the accused’s own workshop at Tanokrom, Takoradi. On 9 June 1973, while he was cutting boards to make the crates the machine cut his right fore-finger and middle finger. He was rushed to the Effia-Nkwanta Hospital where he was admitted for two weeks. The accused was not in the workshop at the time of the accident, but he was informed of the accident …
The accused in his defence said that he is self-employed in a carpentry workshop at Tanokrom. He has permanent employees and at times he employs others on contract. He employed the first prosecution witness as a carpenter, but not as a machinist. He said under cross-examination that he did not report the accident because the first prosecution witness was not a person authorised to use the machine and to his knowledge the first prosecution witness ‘did it intentionally to cause injury to himself to have him [the accused] penalised’.”
[p.147] of [1975] 1 GLR 145
Learned counsel for the appellant argued the only ground of appeal filed on behalf of his client, namely, “that the judgment cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.” The substance of his submission is that the first prosecution witness was an independent contractor, that is, the relationship between the appellant and the first prosecution witness was not that of employer and employee and that was why he, the appellant, did not report the accident to the labour officer. He was therefore not guilty of the offence charged. Mr. Adinyira, counsel for the respondent, postulated three issues and added that if the answers to them were in the affirmative, then the case against the appellant was established and he was therefore guilty of the offence charged.
The learned state attorney posed these questions:
(i) Was the appellant an employer of the first prosecution witness?
(ii) Was the first prosecution witness a worker within the meaning of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C. D. 157), and
(iii) Whether the first prosecution witness was injured or incapacitated in the course of his employment for more than five days?
I think it is convenient at this stage to set out the provisions of paragraph 67 of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157). Paragraph 67 states:
“67. (1) If during the course of his employment a worker dies, or is incapacitated from work as a result of an accident or a prescribed occupational disease for more than five days, his employer shall inform the nearest Labour Officer of this fact in the prescribed manner.
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-paragraph (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on summary conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred New Cedis.”
The appellant who was convicted of the offence was sentenced to a fine of 050.00. The two important words in paragraph 67 are “employer” and “worker” and para. 74 of N.L.C.D. 157 gives the definitions as follows:
“ ‘employer’ means any person who has entered into a contract to employ any worker, and includes the agent, foreman, manager or factor of such person;” and “ ‘worker’…
(c) for the purposes of the other Parts of this Act, means any clerical worker, artisan or labourer but does not include a domestic servant.”
The definition of worker in paragraph 74 (a) is confined to Part I of the Decree whilst that in sub-paragraph (b) is limited to Part II of the Decree. The definition of “worker” in paragraph 74 (c) applies to the other parts of the Decree and paragraph 67 comes under Part X of the Decree. This means that the definition of “worker” in paragraph 67, the paragraph creating the offence, includes an artisan. The first prosecution witness was employed as a carpenter to make coca cola crates in the workshop of the appellant, and a carpenter is an artisan. The evidence also established that the appellant contracted with the first prosecution witness as a worker (an artisan) to make the crates for him and he therefore employed him as such. The appellant therefore employed the first prosecution
[p.148] of [1975] 1 GLR 145
witness as a worker and as such he, the appellant, was the employer of the first prosecution witness, a worker, within the meaning of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157).
The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the first prosecution witness was free to employ others to assist him in his work and was therefore an independent contractor does not detract from the fact that he was employed as a worker by the appellant as an employer and more so as the employment was carried out in the appellant’s own workshop.
The law imposes an obligation on an employer to report accidents in which his worker is involved to the labour officer, and this is the simple duty he is required to perform. The complainant, James Arthur, a worker, in his workshop, was involved in an accident in the course of his employment and was incapacitated for more than five days, and the law enjoins the appellant, as an employer, to report to the labour officer and his failure to do so constituted a breach of paragraph 67 of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157).
There is no dispute that the injury that the first prosecution witness received in the appellant’s workshop was in the course of his employment, and that he was incapacitated for more than five days. In fact, he was in hospital for two weeks. The answers, therefore, to the three questions posed earlier on in this judgment are of course, in the affirmative. And there is no escape for the appellant, for he was squarely caught by paragraph 67 of the Labour Decree under which he was charged.
The whole objective of the Labour Decree as gleaned from its several provisions is to seek the welfare of workers in the lower-income group, and it is necessary that accidents occurring in a work-place should be notified to a public officer who will protect the interests of workers who may be involved, and it is only reasonable and fair that the employer should be required to report such accidents. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1963 (Act 174), seeks to achieve the same objective for persons in the lower-income group, and it is not surprising that the definition of “workman” in that Act includes persons earning not more than £G625 (01,250) per annum.
In my judgment the conviction of the appellant was amply justified by the evidence, and I will accordingly dismiss the appeal.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
S. E. K.
