STATE FISHING CORPORATION vs. FYNN [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
1 January 1984 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 13 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 31Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Glinski v. McIver [1962] A.C. 726; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 832; [1962] 1 All E.R. 696, H.L.
(2) Praka v. Ketewa [1964] G.L.R. 423, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Sekondi awarding general and special damages plus eighteen and a half per cent interest thereon in favour of the respondent in an action arising from the unlawful seizure and sale of his crates of fish by the appellants. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.
COUNSEL
G. M. Quaye for the first and second appellants.
Mrs. Adusa-Amankwa for the third and fourth appellants.
I. Osei Bonsu for the respondent
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
The first appellant is a corporate body. The second appellant was a senior security officer in the employment of the first appellant. The third and fourth appellants were police officers.
In the forenoon of 26 October 1978, the area manager of the first appellant called the second appellant and told him that he, the area manager, had received information that a vessel belonging to the first appellant was discharging cartons of fish at Ngeresia near Sekondi and that the second appellant should proceed to Ngeresia to verify.
The second appellant left for Ngeresia with the accountant of the first appellant and in the car of the accountant. The visit of the second appellant and the accountant to Ngeresia, in the words of the second appellant, “did not disclose anything.” The second appellant reported back to the area manager. The area manager then instructed the second appellant to go to the respondent’s grocery at Takoradi. The second appellant, as an obedient servant, went to the respondent’s grocery where he saw (again to use the second appellant’s own expression) “red snappers being off-loaded into the cold-store and the vehicle which brought the same was moving away.”
[p.20] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
The second appellant then dashed to the police station and made a complaint. The substance of the said complaint as stated by the second appellant in his evidence is as follows:
“we had had information that one of our vessels had off-loaded fish at Ngeresia and we believe that the fish off-loaded into the plaintiff’s (the respondent’s) cold-store that same day belonged to the first defendant (the first appellant).”
The fourth appellant put the gist of the complaint which the second appellant made in a slightly different manner. According to the fourth appellant, the second appellant at the police station stated that he, the second appellant, suspected that the fish being off-loaded at the respondent’s cold-store had been stolen from one of the vessels of the first appellant. Following the said complaint the third and fourth appellants obtained a search warrant from a superior police officer. Armed with this warrant the second appellant led them to the respondent’s grocery— African Grocery & Cold Store— at Takoradi.
The respondent dealt in both fresh and frozen fish. That is he was buying and selling fish of all types. He used to buy some from the first appellant, from private fishing boat-owners and from other fish dealers. That morning the respondent, through his son and agent, had bought consignments of fresh fish, red snappers, from one John Tetteh Narh who was a fisherman and a fishing boat-owner.
The respondent had intended to sell that particular fish to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, Obuasi at ¢400 a crate and was getting more crates to pack the fish into when the appellants arrived at the respondent’s grocery with their search warrant. Customers who had come to buy fish at the grocery stood outside and looked on. In the course of the search, according to the respondent, and as found by the learned judge, 117 crates of fresh red snappers were found in the cold store. The second appellant claimed that the fish belonged to the first appellant. The respondent vehemently protested and told them that he had that morning bought the fish from one Narh, a fishing-boat owner. The second appellant turned a deaf ear to the respondent’s protests and insisted that the crates of fish should be taken away.
While the respondent was arguing with the second appellant, a van belonging to the first appellant arrived at the respondent’s grocery. The workmen of the first appellant were in the van. The second appellant then opened the respondent’s cold-store and asked the workmen to collect the crates of fish into the van because according to him the fish belonged to the first appellant. In short, all the 117 crates were loaded into the van in the full view of members of the public who had gathered near the grocery. The appellants drove away with the 117 crates and stored them in the first appellant’s cold-store.
[p.21] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
On 3 November 1979 the police wrote to inform the first appellant that after investigation nothing incriminating was found against the respondent and that there was nothing to prove that the fish was stolen or dishonestly received by the respondent. Despite the outcome of the investigation which was communicated to the first appellant, the first appellant held on to the fish. The fish was never returned to the respondent neither was its value paid. The respondent therefore sued the appellants at the High Court Sekondi claiming: (a) ¢47,115 being cost of the 117 crates of fish at ¢400 a crate; (b) interest on the above amount at the rate of eighteen and a half per cent per annum; and (c) general damages for “wrongful seizure, disgrace, inconvenience and ignominy brought upon the respondent.”
The learned High Court judge in a well considered judgment held that the information which the area manager gave to the second appellant was false and malicious, so also was the subsequent complaint made to the police by the second appellant; and that the second appellant did not merely lead the third and fourth appellants to the respondent’s grocery but that he actually directed them to seize the fish. In other words, the third and fourth appellants acted as the agents of the second appellant. Having found that the seizure was wrongful, the learned judge held all the appellants liable to all the reliefs sought by the respondent.
In this appeal, the appellants sought to question the basis of the findings of the learned judge as well as the various awards made in favour of the respondent. Both counsel who appeared for the appellants argued almost in the same vein. It must be observed that the issues agreed upon at the trial involved mainly questions of fact. It is therefore no wonder that the main ground argued before us was that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. It was submitted that the evidence of the appellants clearly showed that the second appellant merely gave information to the police and the police acted on it by going to the respondent’s grocery to seize the fish in the course of their normal investigation.
There is no substance in that argument, for there was also evidence from the respondent’s side to the contrary. In such a situation, the learned trial judge was perfectly entitled to decide as to which of the two versions was credible or reasonably, probable and should be believed. As expected, the learned trial judge made a penetrating analysis of the conflicting evidence before him and at the end of the day, he was constrained to accept the version of the respondent as the truth. It has been said that the wisest judges may differ on what is the surest guide to the truth. But the law in the fullness of its wisdom has decided that ‘this is a question of fact for the trial judge. And in such cases the appellate court should be very slow in reversing the trial court
[p.22] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
unless it is manifestly clear that the finding is wrong: see Praka v. Ketewa [1964] G.L.R. 423, S.C.
It was further contended that the area manager of the first appellant acted bona fide when he instructed the second appellant to act on the information which he, the area manager, had received; and that the information was not false as found by the learned trial judge. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances the second appellant had reasonable and probable cause for making the complaint to the police. We do not think this is a fair criticism of the judgment in view of the fact that the area manager of the first appellant could not even disclose the source of his so-called information. What was worse, the second appellant went to Ngeresia that morning to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the said information. That is to say to verify as to whether any of their vessels had landed at Ngeresia and was off-loading cartons of fish. He found none of their vessels at Ngeresia no fish was off-loaded from any of their vessels at Ngeresia that day. It was after he had satisfied himself of these facts that he, nevertheless, went to the police to make the complaint as stated above. Thus, at the material time the second appellant was making the complaint to the police, he knew his complaint contained nothing but falsehood. Since to his knowledge the complaint was not true, it meant he lodged the complaint without himself having an honest belief in the truth of the complaint and he could not therefore be said to have acted on reasonable and probable cause. In Glinski v. McIver [1962] A.C. 726 at 753, H.L., Lord Radcliffe said:
“I take it to be settled law that if the defendant can be shown to have initiated the prosecution without himself holding an honest belief in the truth of the charge … he cannot be said to have acted upon reasonable and probable cause.”
Indeed, the circumstances and the situation which presented themselves to the second appellant could not have led an ordinary, fair-minded, prudent and cautious man to conclude that the respondent was probably guilty of the offence that was imputed to him; and in our view, the complete absence of reasonable and probable cause was in itself strong evidence of the ingredient of malice. The behavour of the second appellant that day was very appalling.
As for the third and fourth appellants, we agree with learned counsel for the appellants that they had a statutory duty to perform and this includes receipt of complaints and investigations of such complaints. But before they left the police station on this particular occasion, they sought and obtained a search warrant which clearly set out what exactly they were entitled to do on the respondent’s premises. The search warrant specifically authorised them to search for fish in
[p.23] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
“cartons and in pans.” The search warrant stated inter alia: “€ to enter the premises, building or dwelling-house and search for . . .cartons of fish and pans containing fish for State Fishing Corporation.” (The emphasis is ours.)
The superior officer of the third and fourth appellants must have been aware that the respondent being a fish dealer, it was possible that other kinds of fish might be found on the premises. Hence he took the precaution of instructing them to look only for fish in “cartons and in pans” and not fish in crates, or in any other containers. Thus when the third and fourth appellants got to the respondent’s cold store and could not find fish in “cartons and pans”, as responsible officers, they ought to have withdrawn quietly from the premises and gone back to report to their superior officers for further directions. Instead, they chose to stay on the premises and to take orders from the second appellant. They seized the crates knowing fully well that the very search warrant under which they were supposed to act, never permitted them to do so. When they went back to the police station they made a false entry that they had seized “cartons of fish” when they in fact seized crates of fish. Their conduct was wrongful and they were clearly as liable as the first and second appellants.
Learned counsel also contended that the ¢47,115 found to be the value of the seized fish was wrongful. Counsel submitted that the controlled price of fish per crate, at the time of the seizure was only ¢65, and that the ¢400 per crate claimed by the respondent was illegal and that the learned trial judge should not have given his blessing to such an illegality. We may remark that the representative of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in the course of his evidence stated that his corporation was buying its fresh red snappers from the respondent at ¢400 per crate and the corporation never considered it illegal. Nevertheless, we thought at first that there was some substance in the contention. So we called upon learned counsel for the appellants to produce the executive instrument which contained prices of fresh fish published by the Prices and Incomes Board during the relevant period to enable us to appreciate the argument better. But contrary to expectation, learned counsel could not produce any. In the long run, learned counsel had to confess that they could not find any such executive instrument. All the same counsel invited us to rely on some correspondence between the first appellant and the Prices and Incomes Board as regards prices of fish at the material time and then to conclude that the ¢400 per crate charged by the respondent was illegal. We declined the invitation. These letters were not executive instruments, and they were not binding on the public or the respondent. They were of no consequence to the respondent or any other fish dealer.
[p.24] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
In the circumstances, we do not see any illegality in respect of the ¢400 per crate claimed by the respondent.
The appellants never returned the said 117 crates of fish. They deprived the respondent of all the crates and it is only fair that they should be called upon to pay the full value thereof as found by the trial judge.
It was again submitted that the interest rate of eighteen and a half per cent awarded on the amount by the learned judge was on the high side, for at the relevant period the rate of interest was twelve and a half per cent. This argument is not borne out by the evidence. The respondent in his amended statement of claim pleaded:
“That the plaintiff [the respondent] obtained a van from the Agricultural Development Bank for his cold store business and is paying an interest of eighteen and a half per cent on the said van though the defendant by their action locked up his money, and he has gained no profit on the said sum of money.”
The appellant never filed an amended defence to deny this allegation. In a sense, the interest was a monetary loss which the respondent had sustained and he therefore pleaded and particularised it in his said amended statement of claim. But the appellants did not deny it in their pleadings; neither did they make mention of the rate of twelve and a half per cent, or any other rate for that matter in their evidence. It was during the addresses before the trial court that learned counsel for the appellants for the first time introduced the rate of twelve and a half per cent. We think if the appellants had intended to challenge the rate of eighteen and a half per cent, they would surely have pleaded to the contrary and given evidence to support it. Counsel’s address cannot be substituted for evidence. It is a question of fact whether at the material time the rate of interest at the Agricultural Development Bank was eighteen and a half per cent or not. The learned judge on the evidence before him, found it was eighteen and a half per cent and the appellants have been unable to fault that finding.
The quantum of the general damages awarded to the respondent was also criticised as being excessive and punitive as the learned judge himself said so. But looking at all the circumstances of the case, and also having regard to the outrageous behaviour of the appellants which cast a slur on the respondent as a reputable fish dealer, we do not think the damages could be termed punitive. The expression “punitive” used by the learned trial judge could not aptly fit the award. In our view that award was reasonable.
However, even if the argument against the awards can justifiably be sustained as being excessive at the date of the judgment, the appellants not having satisfied the judgment debt in 1981, and taking
[p.25] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 16
into consideration the present value of the cedi, payment of the same awards in 1984 cannot be said to be excessive. In our opinion, the justice of the case demands that the respondent should be paid all the award without any variation.
Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the High Court, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
