STATE v. YAW PRAMANG [1963] 2 GLR 457
25 November 1963 · APALOO J · ≈ 8 min read
[1963] SLR (HC) 45Other citation styles and permanent link
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DIVISION: IN THE HIGH COURT, KUMASI
DATE: 25TH NOVEMBER, 1963
BEFORE: APALOO J.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
TRIAL on a charge of intentionally and unlawfully causing harm contrary to section 70 of the Criminal Code, 1960. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
J. B. Orleans-Pobee, Assistant State Attorney, for the State R. E. Oduro for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.
The accused is charged with intentionally and unlawfully causing harm to Osei Kwadwo by means of an offensive weapon. The complainant is an elderly man who is obviously about seventy years of age. His dignified bearing in court points to the fact that he is a respectable and well-respected man in his home. He comes from Kona, a town about fifteen miles from Mampong, Ashanti. He is a Methodist by persuasion and is one of the elders of that Church. For his living, he works as the cashier of the Farmers’ Council at Kona.
The evidence shows that members of the Methodist Church by habit hold evening religious service on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays and I think this fact is well known at Kona. As one of the adherents of that church, the complainant regularly attends these evening services. I find that about 7.00 p.m. or thereabouts on the 19th June this year, the complainant left his house for the church. The Methodist Church is a stone’s throw from his house. When he reached the precincts of the church, he realised that devotional worship was already in progress. I find that the complainant then got ready to enter the church. But before he could do this, he was suddenly slashed from behind by a man who obviously used a sharp cutlass. He sustained what Dr. Obiri described as a deep lacerated wound which commenced from the right side of the neck and stretched to the back. He raised an alarm instinctively and fell into the church. He bled so profusely that he soon lapsed into unconsciousness.
In this condition, he was put in a taxi cab and rushed to the Central Hospital, Kumasi. So much did he bleed that neither his pulse nor blood pressure could be recorded when he got to the hospital. He was soon put
[p.458] of [1963] 2 GLR 457 under anaesthesia and received blood transfusion and other surgical treatment. But for this, the complainant’s death, would by now, have been stale news. Although he has been discharged from hospital, he has lost the complete use of his right arm. He cannot now flex or extend the arm below the elbow arm or raise his right arm without assistance. When he gave evidence on the 19th November, his right arm was in sling. There can be little doubt that whoever caused the injuries to the complainant did so extremely savagely.
The prosecution claimed that it was the accused who inflicted the injuries on the complainant. This, the latter vehemently denied. The prosecution of course assumes the onus of establishing that it was the accused. That indeed is the only issue in this case. The question which I must answer is: Am I satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused who inflicted this grievous and savage injury on the complainant? The complainant was himself emphatic that it was the accused whom he knew very well. He said he in fact saw him standing by the side of the church in a matter of minutes before he sustained the injury. The evidence that he shouted his name upon being struck is well nigh unanimity. His son, Osei Kwasi, and Yaw Tawiah heard it. So also did Ama Kyaa and Afua Fanti. Osei Kwasi said he saw the accused pass in the direction of the church a short while before his father passed thither. Yaw Tawiah also said he saw the accused by the side of the church and in fact exchanged courtesies with him. Ama Kyaa was without dispute one of the persons engaged in worship in the church that evening. She said at about 7.30 p.m. she felt the need to empty her bladder and when she came out for this purpose, she clearly saw the accused not far from the entrance of the church. Counsel for the accused cross-examined these witnesses with a certain amount of ability. They seem to me to be wholly unshaken. The accused himself said he was on good terms with these witnesses and has not sought to suggest they had either singly or collectively any reason to involve him in a trumped up charge.
If these witnesses are correct, the question which naturally suggests itself is what was the accused doing there. He is not a member of the church and had no business to be there. If he went near the church, he must have gone there for some purpose. The complainant said with evident truth when he was slashed, he turned back obviously instinctively, and saw the accused running away. Both Osei Kwasi and Yaw Tawiah who arrived at the scene a few minutes after the attack said they saw the accused running away. The evidence shows that the injury to the complainant was caused about 7.30 p.m. or a little while after. The accused was not obviously at home at that time. He was out-doors when his mother heard about the injury from her grandniece Atta. The accused said about 7.30 p.m. he went out to the lavatory where he reached about five minutes afterwards. Kofi Tom was already at the lavatory when the accused got there but before going to the toilet Tom had heard about the complainant’s injury [p.459] of [1963] 2 GLR 457 and waited until the commotion in town subsided before going there. This at least shows that at the time the complainant was injured, the accused was neither at home nor in the lavatory. He must have gone somewhere which he dares not admit. I am bound to reach the conclusion that when he left home he went to the precincts of the Methodist Church. I also find that he was correctly identified by the witnesses. If the accused did not go there for any sinister purpose, I find no reason why he should seek to deny his presence there or take to his heels. It is not possible to reconcile the accused’s conduct with the innocence which he professes. I accept of course the evidence of the complainant that the accused took umbrage at a settlement he effected between the accused’s mother Yaa Kumah and her aunt Abena Dapaah about a cocoa farm. The accused often uttered threats and insults to the complainant and Banahene whenever he saw them. I am not prepared to say that it was a mere coincidence that the accused should not only be seen near the spot where the complainant was viciously attacked, but also to be seen running away immediately after it. Although the accused’s alibi is demonstrably false he set great store by what he claimed to be a fact that when the police conducted a search in his room later that night, his cutlass was found to be unstained. In this, he was supported by his mother, his wife Wusua, and a school teacher by name Yankyira. I do not scruple in rejecting their evidence. They are all plainly untruthful witnesses. I find that when constable Broni discovered this cutlass, it was wet all over and appeared to be newly washed. When he questioned the accused about it, he made no answer. This evidence was convincingly supported by Osei Kwasi. I draw the obvious inference that the accused’s cutlass was stained in a manner which was incriminatory of him and that was why he washed it.
I find myself in a position to answer the question which I have propounded as the only issue in this case. In view of the findings which I have made, I feel satisfied that I must answer that question very firmly in the affirmative. I find that it was the accused who inflicted the grave and savage wound on the complainant. I am satisfied that that harm was unlawful and that the accused inflicted it intentionally. Indeed I am entirely convinced that he ambushed the complainant for this purpose.
That leaves me with the only question whether the instrument used in inflicting the injury was an offensive weapon within the meaning of the Criminal Code. I am of course satisfied that the accused used the cutlass (exhibit A) in inflicting the injury on the complainant. There is no statutory definition of an offensive weapon. It is not necessary for me to enter into any elaborate enumeration of what I conceive to be offensive weapons for the purpose of this Code. It is only necessary for me to decide whether a cutlass is such a weapon. I think that it is. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines weapon as a “material thing designed or used or usable as an instrument for inflicting bodily harm.” Whatever other use a cutlass can be put to, it seems to me plain that it can be used for inflicting bodily harm.
[p.460] of [1963] 2 GLR 457
Indeed the examples which were given of a weapon in the dictionary include a sword. A sword is in the same generic class as a cutlass. A cutlass is, in my opinion, a weapon, and is an offensive one inasmuch as it can be used for an aggressive purpose and was in fact so used by the accused.
It follows that I find the charge proved. I therefore find the accused guilty of the offence with which he is charged and convict him accordingly.
DECISION
Defendant convicted of causing harm with an offensive weapon.
K. T.
