THE REPUBLIC VRS. THE HIGH COURT (GENERAL JURISDICTION 10) ACCRA EX PARTE: 1. KWABENA ADU BOAHENE 2. ANGELA ADJEI BOATENG -

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – AD.2026

CORAM: LOVELACE–JOHNSON (MS) JSC (PRESIDING)
AMADU JSC
KULENDI JSC
ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC
DZAMEFE JSC
ADJEI JSC
ACKAAH-BOAFO JSC

REVIEW MOTION
NO: J7/4/2026

28TH JANUARY, 2026
THE REPUBLIC
VRS.
THE HIGH COURT, (GENERAL JURISDICTION 10) … RESPONDENT
ACCRA

EX PARTE:
1. KWABENA ADU BOAHENE
2. ANGELA ADJEI BOATENG … APPLICANTS/RESPONDENTS

ATTORNEY-GENERAL … INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT

RULING

ADJEI, JSC:
The Applicant herein, the Attorney-General, was an Interested Party in the Application for Judicial Review in the nature of Prohibition filed by the Petitioners, who are the Respondents in the present application for review. The application for prohibition was dismissed by this Court, and the offending provisions of the Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings, which were relied upon by the trial High Court, were struck down.
The Attorney-General alleges that the decision of the ordinary bench of the Court has rendered it impracticable to conduct criminal cases because it has opened the Pandora’s Box of disclosures in every criminal trial.
The grounds for this review application by the Attorney-General are anchored on four main reasons, namely: the fact that the ordinary bench has departed from the previous unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Republic v Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Others [2017- 2020] 1 SCGLR 32, duly composed of seven (7) Justices solely for the purpose of interpreting the relevant constitutional provision whose decision is binding on the ordinary bench of the Court; the ordinary bench breached the rules of natural justice by not giving the parties the opportunity to be heard on the constitutionality of the Practice Directions; erroneous application of the law by the ordinary bench resulting in fundamental error of law when it applied the law on admission of evidence at trial to the consideration of a request for further disclosures; and finally, the decision has occasioned impracticable or unworkable results.
The review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is a unique one as it is the only court in Ghana that the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 conferred review jurisdiction on it to exercise in a unique circumstances as provided by the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16) with a minimum of seven justices of the Court. Article 133 of the Constitution of Ghana, which confers review jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, provides thus:
“(1) The Supreme Court may review any decision made or given by it on such grounds and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by rules of court.
(2) The Supreme Court when reviewing its decisions under this article, shall be constituted by not less than seven justices of the Supreme Court.”
The Rule 54 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16) has provided strict parameters for review as follows:
“The Court may review a decision made or given by it on the ground of:-
(a) exceptional circumstances which have resulted in a miscarriage of justice; or
(b) the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decision was given.”
The review jurisdiction is not an ordinary one and an applicant who seeks to file such an application must satisfy himself that it is within either rule 54 (a) or (b) of C.I. 16. An applicant who alleges that a decision must be reviewed on grounds of exceptional circumstances shall further demonstrate that it has also occasioned a miscarriage of justice as a proper interpretation of the text makes the two phrases conjunctive. Therefore, where a party proves that the decision of the ordinary court should be reviewed as a result of exceptional circumstances, that party shall further demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned to enable the Court to exercise its discretion; otherwise, the application shall fail. The two basic conditions for review must be met before the Court can exercise its discretion to grant a review, namely, that it is not a jurisdiction to make available to a party who is dissatisfied with every decision of the Supreme Court. The review jurisdiction, unlike an appeal, is limited to only parties who can meet the conditions precedent before a discretion to grant can be exercised.
The unique nature of review jurisdiction does not make it a jurisdiction that should be exhausted where an aggrieved party in a decision delivered by an apex court of a country, such as the Supreme Court of Ghana, decides to seek remedies from an international court, where an exhaustion of domestic remedies is a ground for admissibility. In international law, the ordinary jurisdiction of a country’s apex court decisions requires exhaustion, but the review jurisdiction, which is extraordinary and very difficult to meet the conditions precedent for its invocation. There are multiple cases from the international courts that have unambiguously stated that review jurisdiction is an extraordinary jurisdiction. In the case of Thomas v Tanzania (merits) (2015) 1 AfCLR 465 at 477, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that an application for review at the apex courts in the domestic jurisdiction is an extraordinary remedy because the granting of such an application is based on specific grounds and it is granted at the discretion of the Court.
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also in the case of Southern African Human Rights NGO Network v Tanzania (Communication 333/2006 28th Activity Report November 2009-May 2010, para 64) held thus:
“Furthermore, the remedies referred to in Article 56(5) include all judicial remedies that are easily accessible for justice. The Commission in INTERIGHTS and Others v Mauritania, declared:
‘The fact remains that the generally accepted meaning of local remedies, which must be exhausted prior to any communication/complaint procedure before the African Commission, are ordinary remedies of common law that exist in jurisdictions and normally accessible seeking justice.”
The Court shall proceed to determine whether any of the four grounds enumerated by the Applicant meets the grounds of exceptional circumstances, and further examine if any one of them could be said to have occasioned miscarriage of justice before the discretion to grant the application would be exercised. Any attempt by the Court to lower the standard for review application will diminish its extraordinary nature and bring it to equal status as an appeal, which would defeat the purpose for which review jurisdiction was created to make it unique from an ordinary appeal which is meant to be accessible for justice by any party who is dissatisfied with a decision of any of the national courts.
The first ground is that the Practice Direction is a product of the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Others, supra, and the ordinary bench in declaring part of the Practice Direction unconstitutional constitutes a tacit departure from the unanimous decision of seven justices of the Supreme Court when the ordinary bench is bound by the judgment of the seven justices of the Court. The Applicant made the above submissions without reference to any decided case; however, the legal issues alluded to by the Applicant would be addressed in the course of the ruling.
The Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, supra, came to the Supreme Court through a reference made by the High Court under Rule 67 of C.I. 16. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on 7th June, 2018. The Supreme Court in its decision rendered under article 19(2)(e) & (g) of the Constitution held, inter alia, that accused persons in both summary and indictable trials are entitled to fair trial but disclosure is not absolute and the prosecution may withhold materials on grounds of relevance and privilege, accused in summary trial is entitled to have access to copies of witnesses’ statements and copies of documents and exhibits in the possession of the prosecution including materials the prosecution does not intend to tender before trial, and the fact that disclosure may be made before the commencement of the trial or within reasonable time in the course of the trial before they are tendered. The Court further discussed the legal effect of failure to disclose. The Court, at page 355 of the record, proposed law reforms by the Law Reform Commission to overhaul Act 30, bringing the laws on disclosure in line with the 1992 Constitution.
The Chief Justice rather chose Practice Direction, which does not require parliamentary approval or consent, as an interim measure to bring the laws on disclosure to the forefront of the judiciary, providing a clear guide to stakeholders in criminal justice administration to minimise delays and miscarriages of justice. The Practice Direction on Disclosure and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings, which was made by the Chief Justice in place of substantive law by the Law Reform Commission, came into force on 1st November 2018. The Chief Justice, in issuing the Practice Direction, outlined the factors that guided her, drawing on article 19(1) of the Constitution, section 178(4) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), and the case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie and Others, supra. The long title to the Practice Direction, which forms part of it by virtue of section 13 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792), provides thus:
“ [ In exercising the functions of her office under article 125(4) of the 1992 Constitution, Her Ladyship, the Chief Justice, guided, inter alia, by article 19(1); section 178(4) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323); and the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie & Four Others [2017-2020] 1 SCGLR 327, directed as follows:]”
A recitals of the Practice Direction provide in clear terms that the Chief Justice was guided by the constitutional requirement of fair hearing which is inherent in criminal trials, the statutory requirement of law of evidence regarding just and expeditious hearing of criminal matters that will reduce cost in criminal justice administration, and informed by the case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Others on the obligation on the prosecution under article 19 of the Constitution to make disclosure to persons charged with criminal offences to ensure that criminal cases are resolved fairly, justly, efficiently, and expeditiously.
The case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie and 4 Others, supra, did not provide for the draft of the Practice Direction and the choice of words to be used in its drafting, and it cannot be said that it was the case that gave birth to the Practice Direction, and a correction made in it alters the decision of the Supreme Court. Where a Practice Direction is made contrary to the Constitution, Acts of Parliament, including the Evidence Act, and Rules of Court, it shall be deemed to have contradicted a higher source of law, and that higher source of law shall prevail.
The recognised hierarchy of laws in common law countries including Ghana are: Constitution/constitutional statutes (if any); primary legislation (Acts of Parliament); secondary legislations made under constitutional or statutory authority (subsidiary/delegated legislation; common law including decisions of the superior courts, practice directions and notices issued under enactments and judgments; local bylaws; and purely advisory such as guidelines, circular, and internal memoranda.
The English Court of Appeal in the case of R (on the application of Kaur) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 124, held that a practice direction is binding on the parties and the Court, but only to the extent that it is consistent with the source of law or a higher source of law.
The English Supreme Court in R (on the Application of Mercury Tax Group Ltd.) v HMRC [2015] UKSC 38 held that a practice direction cannot override a clear statutory provision merely because it is subordinate to statute and must align with it.
In the NSW Supreme Court case of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2003) 77 NSWLR 1, the Court held that practice directions are administrative instruments and must yield to the Rules of Court and to any statutory enactment that is a higher source of law. The Canadian Supreme Court, in Davis v The Queen, 2015 SCC 34, held that the Federal Rules and associated practice directions are subordinate to the statutory framework and cannot be used to defeat a clear legislative provision. The Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in the case of Warman v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 51, also held that a practice direction is binding on the court, provided it does not conflict with the Federal Courts Rules or the governing statute.
The settled position of the legal effect of practice direction is that it elaborates or clarifies a right created by law. The trite position of the legal effect of practice direction was discussed by the Supreme Court in Australia in the case of Mason v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 164, where it stated that a practice direction cannot create a substantive right that the legislation, including the rules that create it, does not provide.
The case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie and 4 Others, supra, did not state that the relevancy regarding materials of disclosure shall be made at the pretrial stage but it was an error committed by the drafters which is in conflict with section 6 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) which provides that an objection to the admissibility of evidence by a party affected by that evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered and it is at that stage that relevancy shall be determined. The Practice Direction is in conflict with section 6 of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323, insofar as it expects relevancy and admissibility to be determined at the pre-trial stage. The ordinary bench struck down the word relevant at the pretrial stage and substituted it with a phrase, “discoveries shall only be made in materials and documents which are connected with the case before the court,” to ensure that it conforms or aligns with the Evidence Act, NRCD 323, being one of the three sources of law for the Practice Direction. Therefore, whenever the word “relevant is struck out, it shall be substituted with “discoveries shall be made in materials and documents which are connected with the case before the court”.
It is therefore fallacious to state that the ordinary bench has acted contrary to or departed from the decision of the seven-member panel when the Practice Direction partly took inspiration from the Supreme Court case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie & four others, supra. The ordinary bench did not say anything about the decision of the seven-member panel, and the seven panel members did not discuss or mention the practice direction, but it was the Chief Justice who drafted it as a stopgap awaiting legislative reforms by the Law Reform Commission.
The Practice Direction in question derived its legitimacy through the Constitution, the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) and Republic v Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie and Others, supra, and once it is found to be in conflict with the provisions of the Evidence Act and the conflict is irreconcilable, and renders it void, the Supreme Court shall proceed to nullify the offending provision of the Practice Direction as void without waiting for the poisoned tree to infest the criminal jurisprudence in Ghana with its poisoned fruits.
This Court in its decision rendered in Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex Parte Afoda [2001-2002] SCGLR 786, stated in clear language that a court of competent jurisdiction may set aside a void or a decision which is void on its own initiative whenever it comes into contact with it, notwithstanding that the matter is not before it. The essence is to ensure that a void decision does not spread its tentacles through judicial precedent, to become entrenched through its poisoned fruits. By parity of reason, the Supreme Court cannot disregard to invalidate a void law such as practice direction which was issued by the Chief Justice without parliamentary oversight and scrutiny and has been cited by a party before it but to wait for another person in a foreseeable future to initiate a process to specifically invalidate it by which such time its poisoned fruits would have caused irreparable harm to the criminal jurisprudence in Ghana. It would have been disingenuous on the part of the ordinary bench to have folded its hands to await a future action to be brought purposely to invalidate the offending part of the Practice Direction when its invalidity was wholly unanswerable.
The first ground of review is frivolous and vexatious and does not meet the threshold of exceptional circumstances, let alone talking about a miscarriage of justice that has been occasioned by the striking out of the offending words from the practice direction.
The second ground is about the breach of natural justice by not hearing the parties on the issue of the offending words in the practice direction before striking them out. The supervisory powers of the Supreme Court conferred on it by article 132 of the Constitution and section 5 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459), empower the Supreme Court to supervise all courts and any adjudicating authority, and may issue orders for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory power. The Applicants before the ordinary bench of the Supreme Court had their application for prohibition against the High Court dismissed on the grounds that it did not meet the threshold for the grant of prohibition. However, the High Court Judge relied on the Practice Direction and held that the materials to be disclosed were not relevant, notwithstanding that it was at the pre-trial stage. The ordinary bench found that the error committed by the trial High Court Judge in using relevancy at the pretrial stage was not a ground for prohibition, but it was patent on the face of the record to be ignored, and could be addressed under the omnibus ground of the application, which provided for any further order or orders the Court may deem fit.
The ordinary bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v The High Court, Commercial Division, Accra Ex Parte: Kwabena Duffour v Attorney-General and Others (Civil Motion No. J5/05/2021) had to strike down the part of the impugned Practice Directions which permitted the courts to determine relevancy and admissibility of evidence during case management conference contrary to section 6(1) of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court in striking down the offending provisions of the Practice Direction referred to its earlier decision in the case of Republic v High Court ( Commercial Division) Accra; ex parte Electoral Commission ( Nduom Interested Party [2015-2016] 2 SCGLR 1091 in which it held that Article 132 of the Constitution and section 6 of the Courts Act, 1993 ( Act 459) empower the Court to act beyond the traditional supervisory powers under common law where prerogative writs were only issued under supervisory jurisdiction application to issue orders and such directions as will ensure prevalence of justice, equity and fairness. The ordinary bench of the Supreme Court then proceeded to direct any objections that is contained in a witness statement that makes it objectionable or inadmissible to be determined shall be determined during trial in accordance with section 6(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323) and not at the case management stage and proceeded to strike down the offending provisions which form part of the legislative framework and higher in rank than practice direction.
The substance of Duffour’s Case and the case in point are the same, but the only difference is that the former relates to the determination of objections and admissibility at the case management, while the latter is on at what stage relevancy in disclosures is determined. In both cases, the striking down of portions of the Practice Direction was made by the ordinary bench of the Supreme Court.
The Constitution of Ghana by its articles 2 and 130 provide for the invocation of enforcement or interpretation of the Constitution by a citizen of Ghana being natural or artificial. Article 130 (2) of the Constitution also provides for reference where an interpretation of the Constitution emerges from the proceedings pending before any court in Ghana other than the Supreme Court itself, and therefore whenever a constitutional issue emerges from its proceedings, it may proceed to deal with it as there is no procedure providing that it should be referred to any person or authority to increase its composition. The Constitution of Ghana, and the Supreme Court Rules, C.I. 16 having provided for the procedure for the invocation of interpretation or enforcement of the Constitution and being silent on the procedure where an interpretation or enforcement arises in the proceedings of the Supreme Court, the maxim inclusio unius exclusio alterius which means that a specific mention of an item is an implication of exclusivity is applicable. In effect, where a constitutional issue emerges from the proceedings in the ordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it shall proceed to deal with it in accordance with law. The ordinary bench of the Court was right in dealing with the constitutional issue which emerged from its proceedings. Judges shall not introduce anything that is not within the purpose of the Constitution or outside its spirit to adulterate its organic nature as the Attorney-General is urging this Court to do, and we shall fiercely resist such an invitation. There are a number of cases in which the ordinary bench of the Supreme Court was confronted with constitutional issues which first arose within its appeal proceedings and heard them, and these cases include Attorney-General v Faroe Atlantic Co Ltd [2005-2005] SCGLR 271, and Tema Development Corporation & Musah v Atta Baffour [2005-2006] SCGLR 121. There are several cases in which references that were made to the Supreme Court were heard by the ordinary bench of five judges, and they include Omaboe III and Others v Attorney-General & Lands Commission [2005-2006] SCGLR 579, and Ghana Lotto Operators Association & Others v National Lottery Authority [2007-2008] SCGLR 1088.
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal case of Warman v Canada ( Attorney General), supra, held that practice direction is binding on the court but only in so far as it does not conflict with the Federal Court Rules or governing statutes which is analogous to the High Court (Civil) Procedure Rules, and the other rules of the courts such as the Supreme Court Rules C.I. 16; The Court of Appeal Rules, C.I. 19; and the District Court Rules, C.I. 59, and acts of Parliament such as section 5 of the Evidence Act, Act 323.
The fact that the word relevancy was used to determine objections and admissibility at the pretrial stage under the Practice Direction is wholly unanswerable and does not require any input from any of the parties to resolve it, as it was similar to issues resolved by the Supreme Court in Duffour’s case. The Supreme Court in the case of Tindana (No.1) v Chief of Defence Staff & Attorney General (No.1) [2011] 2 SCGLR 724, where rule 6 (8) of the Supreme Court Rules, C.I 16 specifically provides that where the Court intends to rest its decision on a ground not set forth by the appellant in the notice of appeal, or on a matter not argued before it, the Court is required to afford the parties reasonable opportunity to be heard on that ground or matter without re-opening the appeal, the Supreme Court did not give the parties reasonable opportunity to be heard on the ground that, it was not raised in the notice of appeal but proceeded to determine the appeal and held that where an issue to be resolved is wholly unanswerable, the Court is not bound to take submissions from the parties. The ordinary bench of the Court rightly exercised its supervisory powers to ensure that the part of the Practice Direction which was inconsistent with the Evidence Act, and further violates the principles of fair hearing under the Constitution, was corrected without occasioning miscarriage to any of the parties.
The trite position of the law is that a court that is seised with the power to dismiss a suit for whatever reasons including capacity, jurisdiction, or merits has the jurisdiction to make consequential orders, but where a court dismisses an action for want of jurisdiction, capacity, or locus standi, it is prohibited from discussing its merits notwithstanding the fact that the party whose action is dismissed may have a cast-iron case. The consequential orders are made to tidy up the case and that was the exact thing that the ordinary bench embarked upon.
The litany of cases including Sarkodee I v Boateng II [1982-83] GLR 715, and Manu v Nsiah [2005-2006] SCGLR 25 reaffirm the position that where a court dismisses a case on grounds of jurisdiction, capacity or locus standi, it shall not discuss the merits of the case despite the fact that the party whose case is dismissed may have a cast-iron case. There is therefore the need to draw a distinction between the power of the courts to make consequential orders in all cases, and the lack of jurisdiction to determine the merits of a case which is dismissed on grounds of jurisdiction, capacity, and locus standi.
The Indian Supreme Court, in the case of M/S Bharat Aluminum Company v Kumar Madhukar (1990) 2 SCC 161, dismissed an application for lack of jurisdiction. It proceeded to issue a consequential order requiring the applicant to return the documents in its custody.
Similarly, in Australia, the NSW Supreme Court in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich (2003) 77 NSWLR 1, dismissed the proceeding for procedural defect but proceeded to make consequential orders to preserve the applicant’s costs and relevant records.
The English Court of Appeal in the case of O’Connell v Rollings & Others [2014] EWCA Civ 639, dismissed the appeal but awarded costs and ordered the return of documents that had been produced during the proceedings as consequential orders.
The courts across the common law world have held that a dismissal of a case does not strip the judge the power to make consequential or ancillary orders to tidy up the case as was seen in the decision of the ordinary court by striking out the offending provisions in the Practice Direction which is necessary to give effect to the dismissal to tidy up the case to avoid injustice being perpetrated through the Practice Direction. See the Canadian case of R. v B.(J), 2019 ONCA 513 where the Ontario Court of Appeal struck out the appellant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction, and in the same judgment made consequential orders to direct the respondent to pay costs and return any documents obtained on discovery. Ground 2 is also dismissed as unmeritorious.
Ground 3 is that the ordinary bench committed a fundamental error of law when it applied the law on admission of evidence at the trial to the consideration of a request for further disclosures. The Applicant, in its submission, stated as follows:
“14. The gravamen of this head of argument is based on two distinctions.
Firstly, the distinction is between (a) the time for considering a request for disclosures and (b) the time for considering admissibility.
The second pair of distinctions is the distinction between (a) the time for determining relevance, and (b) the time for determining admissibility.
Though related, there is a fundamental difference between the question of disclosures and the question of admissibility. The rules on disclosures are meant to avoid surprises and to facilitate the Accused person’s preparation for a defence…. On the other hand, the question of admissibility of evidence is to determine which evidence a judge may, at a trial, ultimately consider in deciding a question of fact before him. This means that admissibility determines what finally goes into the evidence box, while matters of disclosures simply determine which evidence helps the accused to prepare.
Thus, matters of disclosures are considered ahead of trial, while the question of admissibility is considered at the trial. This distinction is significant.”
The above distinction made by the Applicant is the true position of the law, but his analysis defeats the two distinctions made by him. Every material which is not excluded by privilege or law not to be disclosed, shall be disclosed where it has some bearing on any offence under investigation or any person being investigated, or on the surrounding circumstances of the case, unless it is incapable of having any impact on the case. The use of the word ‘relevant’ is a term of art that is used in both disclosures and admissibility as a threshold test to determine whether a material, piece of evidence, or a document is disclosurable or admissible. The power to determine the disclosure of relevant materials has been given to the prosecution by the Practice Direction to exercise when it is a term of art in the established jurisprudence in Ghana, to be exercised by the court.
The Attorney-General referred to cases from England, Canada, and South Africa where the word “relevant” is used in the laws on disclosure and submitted that the striking out of the word “relevant” was wrong as the meaning of the same word is different when it is used in objections and admissibility, and concluded that the ordinary bench misapplied the law without taking into account the context within which it is used. The Attorney-General referred the Court to the English Criminal and Investigations Act 1996, the Canadian landmark case of R v Stinchcombe [1991]3 SCR 326, and the South African case of Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of Transvaal and another 1996(1) SA 725, Constitutional Court of South Africa.
We shall demonstrate that the statutes and decisions referred to by the Attorney-General are inconsequential, as the cases were decided based on either constitutional or statutory provisions, which were not in conflict with a higher law. The word “relevant” used by the English in the English Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 has been given its technical meaning as a result of which it finds itself in the definition section of the Act. A natural or ordinary meaning of words, as the case may be, does not require a definition section or provision, and if the term used is technical, the author is required to provide a definition section to ensure that the meaning intended by the authors or the purpose is not defeated.

The Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Stinchcombe, supra, was decided in the context of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a substantive law enacted as a principle of fundamental justice. The right to make full disclosure was determined by the Supreme Court of Canada within section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides thus:

“7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

Disclosure under Canadian law is usually provided early in the court process, normally before the accused is required to plead guilty or not guilty, or elects the mode of trial, whether before a judge and jury or a judge alone, and the duty to disclose new information is ongoing throughout the duration of the trial. The Charter imposes a duty on the Crown to disclose all evidence, including exculpatory (information that will help the defence, whether it would be used by the Crown or not) and inculpatory (evidence that help the prosecution), and disclosure should occur as evidence is received to allow the defence to prepare. Sections 37, 38, and 39 of the Canada Evidence Act govern objections to the disclosure of sensitive or injurious information and the general exceptions to the disclosure. The case of R v Stinchombe, supra, which was determined within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Evidence Act, dealt with disclosures in the course of trial before the courts, which is different from the position in Ghana, which deals with disclosures to be made by police from the time of arrest and shall be ongoing throughout the duration of the trial. The case is wholly inapplicable as disclosures from Canada are wholly regulated by substantive Acts of Parliament, and the time to disclose commences in court before the accused is required to plead.

The South African Constitutional Court case of Shabalala v Attorney-General was decided within the context of section 23 of the Constitution of South Africa for the exercise of any of their rights to a fair trial which the Court held that an accused is ordinarily entitled to have access to documents in the police docket which are exculpatory or which are prima facie likely to help the defence of the accused. The position of disclosure of documents in South Africa is different from that of Ghana and other jurisdictions by the fact that it deals with only exculpatory evidence, while that of Ghana and other jurisdictions deals with both exculpatory and inculpatory, and the South African case cited above is inapplicable.

The Practice Direction, which is a lower law in terms of ranking, used the word “relevant” without defining it, as a result of which the trial High Court Judge held that the matter the Respondents herein are asking to be disclosed was not relevant when the trial process had not commenced. The power to determine what is relevant to disclose has been given to the prosecutor when the word “relevant” is a term of art, and its abuse is likely to occasion a miscarriage of justice for accused persons and would violate fair-trial principles. The Court only struck out the word ‘relevant’ and in its place substituted “materials and documents which are connected with the matter before the court” to ensure that the prosecutor does not use the word relevant which is a term of art, to assume the powers of the courts at the pre-trial stage to occasion miscarriage of justice. The practice direction is at variance with the Evidence Act and NRCD 323 and cannot stand; it should be struck out, and it was properly struck out.

The English Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (section 23 (1) Code of Practice Revised in accordance with section 25(4) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and presented to Parliament pursuant to section 25(2) of the Act has used the term relevance material shall be disclosed, and the Applicant referred this Court to appreciate that relevance is used loosely in disclosures. The Act, in its section 2, has defined what is relevant to an investigation as:
“material may be relevant to an investigation if it appears to an investigator, or to the officer in charge of an investigation, or to the disclosure officer, that it has some bearing on any offence under investigation or any person being investigated, or on the surrounding circumstances of the case, unless it is incapable of having any impact on the case.”
The Practice Direction used the word relevant without defining it, as a result of which the trial High Court Judge held that the matter the Respondents herein are asking to be disclosed was not relevant when the trial process had not commenced. The power to determine what is relevant to disclose has been given to the prosecutor when the word “relevant” is a term of art, and its abuse is likely to occasion a miscarriage of justice for accused persons and to violate fair-trial principles. The Court only struck out the word ‘relevant’ and in its place substituted “materials and documents which are connected with the matter before the court” to ensure that the prosecutor does not use the word relevant which is a term of art, to assume the powers of the courts at the pre-trial stage to occasion miscarriage of justice.
The Attorney-General, in making his submission in court, appreciated that the word “relevant” was struck out and replaced with “materials and documents which are connected with the matter before the court.” The Court should have added the phrase to the text of the Practice Direction whenever the word relevant was struck down. The submission by the Attorney-General cannot be justified, as the Court does not add or delete any text that is struck out as unconstitutional, or substitute it into the text after the pronouncement has been made. The ground is unmeritorious as it fails to meet the threshold of exceptional circumstances, and the Court shall not continue to discuss whether it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, as the condition precedent could not be met.
The last ground is that the variation made to the Practice Direction by the ordinary bench of the Court occasions an unworkable result. The Attorney-General’s justification is that the ordinary bench, by striking down the word “irrelevant,” forces the courts to allow every and any disclosure request, no matter how speculative or irrelevant. The submission has no leg to stand on, as the ordinary bench did not do anything to frustrate the workings of the courts; rather, it gave the prosecution the opportunity to determine whether the matter or document to be disclosed is connected to the matter before the court. This ground equally fails as misconceived.
The only instance under the Constitution of Ghana, 1992, where the Supreme Court shall be constituted of not less than seven justices of the Supreme Court, there is no law that the ordinary bench of five cannot take some decisions, except where there are more than five, as alleged by the Applicant. The binding nature of the decision of the Supreme Court, as provided by Article 129 (3) of the Constitution, is as follows:
“The Supreme Court may, while treating its own previous decisions as normally binding, depart from a previous decision when it appears to it right to do so; and all other courts shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law.”
The binding decisions of the Supreme Court do not matter, whether it is an ordinary bench of five, seven, or nine, except in the case of review, where the Constitution has provided for a minimum number of judges to constitute it.
The review application is without merit and same is refused. The Applicant failed to meet the threshold for review, and same is refused.
Notwithstanding that the application for review has been refused, the Court has a duty to clarify its orders when they are seemingly ambiguous. In place of the phrase “that/which is relevant”, which has been struck down, the court shall clarify it by substituting it with any materials or documents which are connected to the case before the court, especially exculpatory materials in possession of the prosecution, shall be disclosed unless their disclosure is forbidden by law.

(SGD.) D. ADJEI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) I. O. TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) S. DZAMEFE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) K. T. ACKAAH-BOAFO
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

DISSENTING OPINION
KULENDI JSC;
INTRODUCTION:
1. On the 17th of January, 2025 in the suit titled Michael Odai Lomotey & Anor v. Kwow Richardson & 3 Ors in Suit No. J7/21/2022, a ruling delivered in yet another review application, I noted, with positive intrigue, concerning Article 133, as follows;
“ A close examination of this article reveals that it is one of the very few instances in the Constitution where the exercise of a Constitutional prerogative is made subject to ‘such conditions as may be prescribed by the rules of Court.’ It therefore suggests to us that in the exercise of this Constitutional authority to ‘review our decisions’, premium must be placed on the conditions prescribed by the relevant rules of Court. Therefore, to act outside the ambit of these rules in the exercise of our review jurisdiction, no matter how well intentioned, or in pursuit of individual notions of justice, would be unconstitutional and in error.
In this wise, we are guided by the immortal words of Taylor J. (as he then was) in the case of Bonsu v. Bonsu [1971] 2 GLR 242 at 260 where he shared the following admonishment,
“There is always a real danger when vague ideas of justice undefined by statute or case law are propounded and brandished like a cure-all magic wand- without appreciating the actual position, namely, that the true legal notions of justice are circumscribed by the demands of the law and that in this court we administer justice according to three and only only three yardsticks: statute, case law or our well-defined practice.”

2. It is worthy of note that this oft flogged review jurisdiction of this Court, though it has come to attain a jurisdictional prominence, rivalled only by our supervisory and original jurisdictions, only found active expression in our Constitutional text in our 1992 Constitution. Prior to this, neither the 1960, 1969 nor 1979 constitutions articulated this head of jurisdiction.

3. Indeed, the issue of whether or not such a jurisdiction even existed as part of the repository of Supreme Court jurisdiction was a raging jurisprudential debate until the question was effectively settled by this Court in the case of Fosuhene v. Pomaa [1987-88] 2 GLR 105 S.C.G.L.R. wherein, despite the fiery dissents of the venerable Sowah CJ and Francois JSC, this Court nonetheless, speaking through Taylor and Adade JJSC crystallized the position that the Supreme Court indeed had the inherent jurisdiction to review its own decisions.

4. Article 133 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and comprehensive review of the current case law on the topic describes our review jurisdiction as a special, residual, and exceptional jurisdiction, exercisable strictly within the confines of Rule 54 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16), and not as a surrogate appellate process; it is invoked only where an applicant demonstrates, conjunctively, the existence of exceptional circumstances and that such circumstances have occasioned, or would occasion, a miscarriage of justice, understood as prejudice to the applicant’s substantial rights or that there has been a discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decision was given.

5. The Court’s intervention is therefore not triggered by mere dissatisfaction with the outcome, alleged errors simpliciter, or a desire to re-argue the merits, but by proof of a fundamental or basic error, such as a void order, a decision given per incuriam, or other exceptional legal infirmity, each of which undermines the integrity of the decision and compels the conscience of the Court to revisit it in order to avert injustice, subject also to compliance with the prescribed time limits.

6. In that sense therefore, the review jurisdiction is thus narrower and more exacting than appellate rehearing, and will not be exercised where the impugned decision can be sustained on other valid grounds and more importantly, where no miscarriage of justice is shown to flow from the alleged error.
[See the cases of Fosuhene v. Pomaa [1987-1988] 2 GLR 105; Nasali v. Addy [1987-1988] 2 GLR 286; Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd v. Nartey [1987-1988] 2 GLR 598;Ababio and Others v. Mensah [1989-1990] 1 GLR 560; Agyekum v. Asakum Engineering Construction Ltd [1992] 2 GLR 635; Republic v. Numapau & Others; Ex Parte Ameyaw II [1999-2000] 2 GLR 629; Arthur (No. 2) v. Arthur (No. 2) [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 569]

7. It is this jurisdiction that the Applicant in the instant suit invoked on the 27th day of November, 2025, praying for a review, in part, of the 29th October, 2025 ruling of the Ordinary Bench. Given the rather complex web of events that have coalesced into this application, I have taken the pains to provide insight into the factual antecedents that predicated and, in many ways, compelled the filing of this application.
BACKGROUND:
8. On the 22nd of October 2025, the Respondents, who have been charged with offences, the descriptions of which are irrelevant to the resolution of this application, invoked our supervisory jurisdiction praying for an order of prohibition restraining His Lordship John Eugene Nyadu, presiding at the High Court General Jurisdiction 10, from further adjudicating over Case No.: CR/0418/2025 entitled Republic v. Kwabena Adu Boahene and 2 Others.

9. Amongst other grounds, this application was precipitated by a ruling of the learned High Court Judge delivered on 7th July, 2025, by which the Respondents’ application for further disclosures was dismissed. In substance, the trial Judge held that the request was premature, irrelevant, and amounted to an abuse of the disclosure process, observing that it appeared calculated to delay the commencement of trial rather than to assist the Court in determining the issues before it.

10. The trial Judge further found that the documents sought, being missing pages of the Respondents’ own bank statements, were within the Respondents’ control and therefore could not properly be demanded from the prosecution. Additionally, the Judge rejected the evidentiary relevance of comparative conduct by other officials as a basis for disclosure, holding that such material would not aid the Court’s determination and could only be considered, if at all, after the close of the prosecution’s case and upon the opening of the defence.

11. According to the Respondents, the above ruling, when conjunctively considered with other actions of the Judge, clearly revealed the existence of a pattern of bias against them, thereby necessitating the filing of the prohibition application on the following grounds:
a. His Lordship is caught in a continuing operative bias demonstrated in his prejudgment and/or predetermination of the critical issues of the essence and import of exculpatory evidence in aid of fair trial as spelt out in Article 19 of the Constitution and judicially pronounced upon in the Supreme Court case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Others [2017-2021] 1 SCGLR 327.
b. The posture of His Lordship, John Eugene Nyante Nyadu, J., that he is determined to continue with the trial when he has judicially predetermined that the exculpatory evidence are not relevant to the case and the defence of the Accused persons/Applicants, amounts to a real likelihood of bias against the Applicants.
c. The Attorney-General’s stampeding of His Lordship, John Eugene Nyante Nyadu, J., relating to his time in delivering his own decisions and deferring to the Attorney General’s time dictates is real likelihood of bias against the Applicants.
d. A Court of General Jurisdiction having elected to hear the criminal case from 9am to 4pm when he sits has shown special extrajudicial interest in the case which is a real likelihood of bias disqualifying His Lordship from adjudicating the case as an independent justice delivery umpire.
12. Significantly, this prohibition application was dismissed by a unanimous decision of the Ordinary Bench and it must be clarified from the outset that the thrust of the instant review application does not in anyway, seek to impugn the decision of the Ordinary Bench, relative to the central issue implicated in the prohibition application; on whether or not the trial judge had exhibited a real likelihood of bias.

13. Instead, the application has been brought in response to what appears to be a definitive determination, and the consequential orders flowing therefrom, made by the Ordinary Bench concerning the scope of the prosecution’s constitutional duty of disclosure; in particular, as it relates to the disclosure of exculpatory material, the constitutionality of the Practice Direction on Disclosure and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings published as [2017-2020] 1 SCGLR 362 at 366 intended to operationalize that duty, and the appropriate metric to be applied in determining applications for further disclosure.

14. To put this review application in its proper context therefore, it bears repeating in extenso, those quintessential portions of the ruling that has “provoked” the State’s excursion into the very narrow corridors of our review jurisdiction:
“The part of the Practice Direction that addresses materials requiring disclosure gives the courts discretion to determine which materials are relevant. Paragraphs 2 (1) (e), (f), (g), and 2(a) of the Practice Direction require the judge to determine the relevancy of the materials to be disclosed, including used and unused ones. Used materials are the materials in the custody of the prosecution which they intend to use during trial, while unused materials are the materials in the custody of the prosecution in respect of the case in question, but which it does not intend to use, but may be used by the accused.
The determination of which materials are relevant is made at the time the evidence is offered, not at any other stage. The relevance of evidence is important as the law makes only relevant evidence admissible unless a law provides otherwise. Section 51 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) on relevant admissible evidence provides thus …
The right to a fair trial is to ensure that all individuals have access to a fair and public hearing by a court of competent jurisdiction established by law. The General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is relevant. Ghana ratified the ICCPR on 7th September 2000, guaranteeing fair trial principles by giving it a broader interpretation to ensure that no accused person suffers injustice from the time of arrest until the final appeal is filed and disposed of. A fair trial cannot be guaranteed where an accused person’s request for disclosure has to be determined at the pretrial stage by the judge alone, where no objection can be raised for a determination to be made. The Evidence Act makes provision for an objection to be raised and determined on the relevance and admissibility of evidence, and the practice direction shall occasion a serious miscarriage of justice where it permits judges and magistrates to determine admissibility at the pre-trial stage without the right to be heard on it. Under such circumstances, the accused person cannot be presumed innocent, as his right to a fair trial is denied …
Discoveries shall only be made in materials and documents which are connected with the matter before the court.”

15. This position, which articulated the unanimous opinion of the Court, speaking through my illustrious brother Adjei JSC. was affirmed by the venerable Adjei Frimpong JSC in his concurrence as follows:
“The phrases which are relevant to the case” appearing in Section 2(1) (e), (f) (g) and 2(2)(a) mean that, the respective materials bear consequences on the outcome of the trial. That is what being relevant to the case imports. In other words, they are relevant to the case because they make the existence of facts that are of consequence to the determination of the case more or less probable. They will therefore fall within the definition of “Relevant evidence” in Section 51(1) of the Evidence Act (NRCD 323) which states: “…”relevant evidence” means evidence including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, which makes the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. “If those materials are relevant within the meaning of Section 51(1) then they are admissible except otherwise provided in an enactment in terms of Section 51(2). And talking about admissibility, Section 6 of the Evidence Act has the following provisions:
6(1) In every action and at every stage thereof, any objection to the admissibility of evidence by a party affected thereby shall be made at the time the evidence is offered.
(2) Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be recorded and ruled upon by the court as a matter of course.
(3) Where a document is produced and tendered in evidence and rejected by the court, it shall be marked by the court as having been so tendered and rejected.”
From my reading of the provisions in Section 51(1) and (2) and Section 6 of the Evidence Act therefore, the determination of the relevancy of a material belongs to the trial proper and not pretrial. For, it is at the trial when evidence is being offered that the court can properly determine the relevancy of a particular material and hence its admissibility. At this stage, witnesses mount the box, the materials are tendered by or through them, both sides are offered the opportunity of being heard before a determination is made. Any proposition that relevancy and admissibility of a material can be determined at pretrial case management conference will be per incuriam the provisions in Sections 6 and 51 of the Evidence Act. It will be contrary to law and therefore impermissible.
This court in the case of REPUBLIC VRS HIGH COURT, COMMERCIAL DIVISION, ACCRA EXPARTE KWABENA DUFFOUR [2021] DLSC 10069 came to a similar position when it was called upon to decide the propriety of the High Court’s admission of documents at pretrial conference. In that case, in the course of a case management conference, the trial Judge purported to admit documents in evidence prior to the commencement of the trial and in the absence of the witness through whom the prosecution intended to tender the documents. An objection was raised against the admission mainly on the basis that it offended against the provisions of the Evidence Act. The trial Judge overruled the objection. Granting an order of certiorari to quash the ruling of the trial Judge, this Court per Tanko JSC stated:
“The statutory provisions on objections to evidence says in very certain terms and with clarity that in “an action” (regardless of whether it is a civil or criminal) “and at every stage of the action (including case management) an objection to the admissibility of evidence by a party affected by that evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered”. This without fear of contradiction whatsoever means that the only time an objection can be taken to the admissibility of evidence is at the time (not before, or after, or in between) “when the evidence is being offered”. The issue however gets more fatal than a statutory breach. It extends to a breach of an accused person’s right to fair trial as provided for under article 19 of the 1992 Constitution which among other things provides that “(1) a person charged with a criminal offence shall be given fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court” and (2). . . shall (c) be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty or has pleaded guilty and (e) be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and (g) be afforded facilities to examine, in person or by his lawyer, the witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on the same conditions as those applicable to the witnesses called by the prosecution.”
Fair trial or fair hearing, a universally guaranteed fundamental and inalienable right, captured in various international human rights instruments is one of the pillars of the rule of natural justice. It includes a broad range of attributes too wide to be captured in a single definition. On the authorities however it will encompass such matters as (i) that the court shall hear both sides on all the material issues in the case before reaching a decision (SHELLON VRS BROOMFIELD JUSTICES (1964)2 QB 573 at 578); (ii) that the court shall give equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned; (iii) that the proceedings be shall be held in public and all concerned shall have access to and be informed of such place and (iv) that having regard to all the circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must be manifestly done (R VRS SUSSEX JUSTICES, EX PARTE MC CARTHY (1924)1 KB 256 at 259. But another key attribute is that the trial or hearing shall be conducted according to all rules formulated to ensure that the parties concerned get justice.
Thus, where a court rules on the relevancy and admissibility of a piece of evidence intended to be used at a trial in a pretrial case management forum, a fundamental rule to ensure justice of the kind contained in the provisions in the Evidence Act (Sections 6 and 51) is breached and that occasions a dent on the right to fair trial. Not only that, when a determination of relevancy is made when the evidence is not being offered by a party or witness to prove or disprove an issue and where no party or witness has been sworn to be heard on the evidence in the determination of its relevancy, fair trial is compromised and a party, for our purpose an accused person affected thereby is denied a right to fair hearing. This is the sense in which I see the unconstitutionality of the phrases “which are relevant to the case” appearing in Section 2(1) (e), (f) (g) and 2(2)(a) of the Practice direction.
The provisions in their current form, allow a judge to make a determination affecting the right of an accused in the case at the time when he has not been heard and when he is still presumed innocent. The phrases clearly work against the very objective of the Practice Direction which, as contained in its preamble is “to ensure that criminal cases are resolved fairly, justly, efficiently and expeditiously. And being products of an act done under the authority of an enactment within the meaning of article 2(1) of the Constitution, they are liable to be struck down in exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130 of the Constitution. I shall accordingly strike down those phrases contained in Section 2(1) (e), (f) (g) and 2(2)(a) of the Practice direction. I adopt the reformulation of the provisions as captured in the lead judgment of Adjei JSC.”
16. Instructively therefore, it is against this portion of the Ordinary Bench’s ruling that the Republic has filed the instant application seeking a review, in part, of the said ruling.

APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS:
17. In urging on us, its case for a review of the decision of the Ordinary Bench, the State canvasses its arguments under (3) three distinct grounds and seeks to urge on us the view that the portion of the Ruling sought to be reviewed, can successfully be impeached under any one of the said grounds.

18. Firstly, the Applicant argues that the Ordinary Bench breached the Rules of Natural Justice when it took a decision without taking arguments from the Parties on the question of the constitutionality of certain portions of the Practice Direction on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings. The Applicant contends that the Ordinary Bench declared certain provisions of the Practice Direction as unconstitutional suo motu, without affording the parties an opportunity to address the issue as required by law. According to the Applicant, this approach violated the audi alteram partem principle of the rules of natural justice, especially when that specific issue was not implicated in any way by the prohibition application itself.

19. To reinforce this argument, the Applicant relied on Rule 6(8) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16), which provides as follows:
“Where the Court intends to rest a decision on a ground not set forth by the appellant in his notice of appeal or on any matter not argued before it, the Court shall afford the parties reasonable opportunity to be heard on the ground or matter without re-opening the whole appeal.”

20. In conclusion, the Applicant contends that, in purporting to strike down as unconstitutional specific provisions of the Practice Direction on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings without first affording the Parties an opportunity to be heard, the ruling of the Ordinary Bench, to that extent, was irremediably tainted by a fundamental or basic jurisdictional error. That error, it is argued, affected the rights of the State and all its prosecutorial agencies and thus constitutes an exceptional circumstance which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

21. Secondly, the Applicant avers that the Ordinary Bench committed a fundamental error of law by conflating the stage for considering requests for disclosure with the stage for determining admissibility, and further by failing to appreciate the distinction between the assessment of relevance and the determination of admissibility.

22. Under this ground, the Applicant submitted that requests for disclosure and the determination of the admissibility of evidence are two distinct processes. It argues that although disclosure rules exist for the benefit of the accused and are rooted in the doctrine of fair trial primarily to prevent surprises, the question of admissibility is a separate matter that determines what ultimately becomes part of the evidential record.

23. On the second head, the Applicant contends that, although related, the legal concepts of admissibility and relevance are distinct, with admissibility being the broader concept and encompassing relevance as one of its constituent elements. Accordingly, while relevance is a necessary prerequisite to admissibility, the two are not coterminous. It is therefore argued that, although the full and composite assessment of admissibility is properly deferred to the stage of tendering, there is no rule of law or of evidence which precludes a judge from assessing relevance as a threshold criterion in determining an application for disclosure.

24. The Applicant further contends that the Ordinary Bench committed a serious error of law by applying Section 6(1) of the Evidence Act, which borders on admissibility, to assess whether relevance should be considered when evaluating requests for further disclosure.

25. Finally, under what can be described as the Applicant’s most frontal attack on the ruling of the Ordinary Bench, it was contended that the Ordinary Bench’s variation of the practice direction occasions an unworkable and impractical result.

26. The Applicant contends that the Ordinary Bench’s variation of the Practice Direction on Disclosures which bars a trial judge from assessing even minimally the relevance of materials requested for further disclosure leads to an unworkable outcome.

27. The Applicant further argues that the decision of the Ordinary Bench effectively removes the relevance filter governing disclosure requests, with the result that prosecutors and investigators in criminal trials are burdened with an obligation to disclose virtually every material in their possession, regardless of whether such material bears any connection to the issues in dispute or to the guilt or innocence of the accused person. It is further contended that this approach fundamentally reconfigures the settled scope of the prosecution’s disclosure obligations by compelling the disclosure of vast quantities of unrelated materials encountered in the course of investigations, including information wholly irrelevant to the trial and potentially intrusive of the privacy and dignity rights of persons unconnected with the proceedings, as well as the broader public interest. This, they argue, undermines the constitutional mandate of a fair and speedy trial.

28. Finally, the Prosecution submits that by striking out or altering the relevant provisions of the Practice Direction, the crucial filtering mechanism has been eliminated, thereby crippling the pre-trial process and resulting in a waste of judicial time and resources.

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS:
29. The Respondents, predictably, are vehemently opposed to the instant application. They contend that, once the Ordinary Bench was confronted with what it considered to be the unconstitutionality of portions of the Practice Directions, it could not properly ignore them. In that regard, the Respondents submit that Article 1(2) of the Constitution establishes an automatic repealing mechanism which is triggered whenever this Court is faced with legislation found to be inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the particular head of jurisdiction under which the matter arises and that this jurisdiction can be exercised suo moto and need not necessarily be urged by either party.

30. In response to the Applicant’s contention that they were denied a hearing on the constitutional question, the Respondents argue that the second ground upon which the order of prohibition was sought necessarily entailed an interrogation of the merits of the Trial Court’s decision, including its constitutional compliance alongside other legal considerations. On that basis, they contend that, having placed the merits of the Trial Court’s decision in issue in the prohibition application, the Supreme Court could not properly determine the second ground without evaluating the correctness of that decision.

31. The Respondents further submit that this inquiry had the consequential effect of engaging the constitutionality or otherwise of the relevant portions of the Practice Direction, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Ors [2017–2021] 1 SCGLR 32, and that, having resolved the constitutional issue relating to portions of the Practice Direction in the negative, the Ordinary Bench’s declaration of those portions as void was an unavoidable consequential order which the Court could not have evaded.

32. The Respondents, on the relevancy argument, agreed entirely with the determination of the Ordinary Bench and averred that the decision of the Supreme Court makes for more transparency and better accords with fair trial rights and further that as a matter of sound public policy, an accused person ought to be given the opportunity to see all the materials or evidence in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement agencies to determine whether they are exculpatory or not.

33. Finally, the Respondents attack the competency of the instant application, arguing that the Applicant has failed to articulate any exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of this Court’s review jurisdiction.

EVALUATION:
34. It is trite learning that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court ranks among the most expansive heads of jurisdiction within the Supreme Court’s constitutional arsenal; it extends well beyond the traditional prerogative remedies in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto.
[See the cases of: British Airways v. Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 547, Republic v. High Court Accra(Fast Track Division), Ex-parte Electoral Commission (Mettle Nunoo & Others – Interested Parties) [2005-2006] SCGLR 514; Republic v. High Court Kumasi (Fast Track Division), Ex parte Bank of Ghana & Ors (Sefa &Asiedu Interested Parties) (No1); Republic v. High Court Kumasi (Fast Track Division), Ex parte Bank of Ghana & Ors (Gyamfi &Others Interested Parties) (No1) (Consolidated) [2013-2014] 1SCGLR 477 at 509 to 510.]

35. While the invocation of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction undoubtedly opens a wide field of remedial possibilities to a litigant, it remains significantly buffling that an application for prohibition, ostensibly lodged to arrest alleged prejudicial acts of a trial judge, should have transmuted into a far-reaching constitutional inquiry which traversed the constitutionality of a practice direction, the scope of the prosecution’s constitutional duty of disclosure and the threshold required to trigger that duty within the context of a criminal trial.

36. This is particularly so when viewed against the backdrop of this Court’s traditionally conservative posture in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. This Court has consistently maintained that the evaluative considerations applicable to an application for certiorari must not be conflated with an inquiry into the substantive merits of the case itself.

37. It was this disciplined separation that crystallized the now salutary principle that an application for certiorari may properly coexist with an appeal (as indeed had been done in the instant case) the latter being the vehicle specifically designed to interrogate the merits of the impugned decision. See the case of: Republic v. High Court, Cape Coast ex parte Ghana Cocoa Board (Apotoi III Interested party) [2009] SCGLR 603 at 612 where Dr. Date-Bah JSC. opined as follows:
“It is no answer to this want of jurisdiction to argue, as does the interested party’s counsel, that certiorari is a discretionary remedy and that because the applicant has filed an appeal against Ayimeh J’s refusal to set aside the garnishee order, this court should dismiss the application. The right to appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal and the right to apply for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this court are both constitutional rights and I see nothing in the constitutional provisions governing these rights that makes them mutually exclusive.”
[See also the case of Republic v. Keta District Magistrate; Ex- parte Hedo [1971] 2 GLR 459; Republic v. District Magistrate, Accra; Ex Parte Adio [1972] 2 GLR 125; Republic v. High Court Accra; Ex parte Komley Adams [2012] 1 SCGLR 111; Republic v. Judicial Committee of The Gomoa Akyempim Traditional Council Ex-Parte: Opanyin Pobee And E. R. Kojo Yoyoo Civil Appeal No.J4/40/2012; Republic v. High Court, Accra Ex-Parte Nii Nueh Odonkor Civil Appeal No.J5/26/2014].
38. Indeed, it is an elementary and well-settled principle that, in the exercise of its supervisory functions, this Court is not called upon to usurp the adjudicatory role of the trial court; rather, its mandate is to ensure that justice is administered within the jurisdictional and discretionary parameters prescribed by law.

39. It is for this reason that in the case of Republic v High Court, Accra EX Parte: Patrick Agudey Teye [2019] GHASC 80, the venerable Baffoe-Bonnie JSC. (as he then was) in delivering the ruling of this Court urged the following words of caution;
“the law is well settled that in an application founded on the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must confine or restrict itself to the decision or ruling complained of, and not the substance of the suit.”

40. Similarly, in the case of Republic v High Court, Kumasi : Ex Parte Bank of Ghana & Ors (Gyamfi & others- interested parties) [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 477, the erudite Dotse JSC., delivering the decision of this Court, pronounced as follows:
“it is well settled that certiorari was not concerned with the merits of the decision; it was rather discretionary remedy which would be granted on grounds of excess or want of jurisdiction and or some breach of rule of natural justice; or to correct a clear error of law apparent on the face of record.”

41. In my considered opinion, this circumscription of the Court’s supervisory duty was even more pronounced in the particular instance before the Ordinary Bench, where the application before it was one for prohibition, based exclusively on grounds of an allegation of the existence of a continuing operative bias. Properly understood, this application for prohibition was governed by a singular, tightly confined threshold; namely, whether the conduct or ruling complained of disclosed a real likelihood of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, such as to impair, or reasonably be perceived as impairing, the judge’s objectivity, neutrality, or judicial detachment.

42. To my mind, this inquiry could not practically have been concerned with whether the impugned ruling was right or wrong on the merits, nor with whether an alternative or even better conclusion could have been reached; it was directed exclusively at preserving the objectivity of the adjudicative process and the fitness of the judicial officer to continue to preside over the matter. In that sense, and in that sense alone, the threshold for prohibition was both narrow and uncompromising; bias or its reasonable apprehension ought to have been the beginning and the end of the inquiry.

43. In a judgment of this Court dated the 27th of May, 2025 in Civil Motion No. J5/48/2025 entitled Republic v. High Court (Criminal Division 4), Accra Ex Parte: Kwasi Osei Ofori and Misyl Energy Company Limited, this Court expounded on the writ of prohibition as follows:
“The prerogative writ of Prohibition is more particularly used in our jurisdiction to restrain adjudicators, exercising a function under public law, who exhibit bias or real likelihood of bias in the process of adjudication. The aim is to engender public confidence in the judicial process and, in particular, ensure trust in the parties who appear before the courts and adjudicators alike that their cases and disputes will be heard by persons who are neutral and uninterested in particular outcomes except to ensure that justice was done to the parties before them.
For these reasons, this court held in Republic v. High Court, Denu Ex-parte Agbesi Awusu III (No.2) Nyonyo Agboada Sri III (Interested Party) [2003-2004]. SCGLR 907 that:
“Where bias or real likelihood of bias has been satisfactorily established against a trial judge, both certiorari and prohibition would automatically lie to quash his judgment or prevent the biased judge from hearing a case in the supreme interest of justice so as not to bring the administration of justice into disrepute ….
…
Prohibition, as a prerogative writ and a public law remedy thus, serves to restrain any body or persons or any adjudicator with legal authority to determine matters or disputes or questions which affect the rights of others, with a duty to act judicially, from exercising that function where the adjudicator either proceeds with bias or exhibits real likelihood of bias and lack of impartiality or has an interest in the matter or where the adjudicator proceeds to act outside the jurisdiction circumscribed by the law.”
44. Given this close ended and highly delimited evaluative framework implicated by the prohibition application, it remains curious how the rather routine evaluation of whether an application had merit, within the parameters espoused above, could legitimately expand into a substantive interrogation of the merits of a ruling. This is especially so where the ruling in question was not brought before the Court for quashing, was not the primary subject of the prohibitive reliefs sought, and was relied upon merely as one among several factual strands said to ground the allegation of bias.

45. In my view therefore, to permit the Court’s inquiry to drift into a merits-based assessment of such a ruling, under the guise of a prohibition application, would be to conflate supervisory oversight with appellate rehearing. Consequently, with much deference to the revered Justices on the Ordinary Bench, I am of the considered view that this excursion into the merits and/or correctness of the ruling of the High Court judge, which quickly escalated into an evaluation of the constitutionality of otherwise of the Practice Direction ostensibly relied on by the said judge, overstepped the defined boundaries of this Court’s Supervisory jurisdiction.

46. Assuming arguendo that I am momentarily to disregard the overwhelming current of precedent which has crystallized the principle that the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction does not entail an examination of the merits of the underlying case, the position remains inescapable that the Ordinary Bench, having anchored a significant aspect of its decision on the constitutionality or otherwise of the Practice Direction, was in law bound to afford the Applicant a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard on that issue.

47. That question, in truth, lies outside the known and anticipated contours of the prohibition application; it constituted uncharted terrain, neither directly raised by the reliefs sought nor reasonably foreshadowed by the grounds upon which the application was predicated. In my view therefore, to determine so weighty a constitutional issue without inviting submissions from the affected party palpably and irremediably offended the elementary requirements of natural justice.

48. The Respondents have sought, rather disingenuously in my respectful view, to contend that the correctness or otherwise of the impugned ruling was canvassed under Grounds 1 and 2 of the prohibition application and that, by necessary implication, every issue subsumed within that ruling, including the constitutionality or otherwise of the Practice Direction, was thereby placed before the Court.

49. Flowing from this premise, they urge the conclusion that the Applicant was afforded the opportunity to address the constitutional question, and having apparently failed to do so, must be taken to have spurned that opportunity and is consequently foreclosed from complaining of a denial of hearing.

50. With respect to the Respondents, even a cursory review of these grounds plainly belies that submission. For the sake of clarity and emphasis, the said grounds are reproduced in full, for their true force and effect:
a. His Lordship is caught in a continuing operative bias demonstrated in his prejudgment and/or predetermination of the critical issues of the essence and import of exculpatory evidence in aid of fair trial as spelt out in Article 19 of the Constitution and judicially pronounced upon in the Supreme Court case of Republic v Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Others [2017–2021] 1 SCGLR 327.

b. The posture of His Lordship, John Eugene Nyante Nyadu, J., that he is determined to continue with the trial when he has judicially predetermined that the exculpatory evidence are not relevant to the case and the defence of the Accused persons/Applicants, amounts to a real likelihood of bias against the Applicants.”
51. Even to the untrained eye, a plain, literal reading of these grounds makes one point immediately apparent; they do not, in any sense, invite an evaluation of the merits of the ruling complained of, nor do they call upon the Court to embark upon a constitutional inquisition into the validity or otherwise of a Practice Direction relied upon in that ruling.

52. The obvious and glaringly apparent gravamen of the grounds is that the trial judge had prejudged or predetermined the utility of exculpatory evidence, and that this alleged “closed-minded” posture disclosed a real likelihood of bias, sufficient to render him unfit to continue presiding over the matter.

53. Indeed, the full scope of the Respondents’ own understanding of their grounds, particularly as it relates to the exculpatory evidence issue, was candidly articulated in the final paragraph on page 13 of their Statement of Case filed on 22nd October 2025, where they stated as follows:
“With respect, His Lordship is not time-sensitive when it relates to the disclosures that will enure(sic) to the benefit of the Applicants. Albeit, he is poised to foreclose their rights to exculpatory evidence and continue with the case. We respectfully submit, he is on the track of concluding the case without the Applicants ever having the exculpatory evidence. This posture is a predetermination and a close mind which violates Article 19 of the Constitution.”
54. There is nothing within this articulation, either expressly or by implication, that places the constitutionality of the Practice Direction in issue, nor anything that seeks to interrogate, define, or calibrate the constitutional scope of the duty of disclosure as a constitutional question.

55. It follows inescapably therefore, that it cannot by any stretch of imagination, be properly argued that issues relating to the constitutionality of the Practice Direction, or the broader constitutional architecture of the duty of disclosure, were implicated by these grounds. Accordingly, I find no force in the Respondents’ suggestion that the Applicant was afforded, and somehow declined, an opportunity to be heard on those questions.

56. I hold that these issues were not raised, whether expressly or by any liberal or expansive implication, as they did not naturally arise from the narrow and exclusive bias centered grounds that the prohibition application was contested under.

57. In Republic vs High Court, Accra; Ex parte Salloum & Others (Senyo Coker Interested Party) [2011]1 SCGLR 574, this Court pointed out that:
“The right to be heard in proceedings before a court of law-the audi alteram partem rule – was well-established in every common law jurisdiction. Thus, no matter the merits of the case, the denial of the audi alteram partem rule would be seen as a basic fundamental error which should nullify proceedings made pursuant to the denial. It should be taken away only when the rules of court or practice so permitted.”

58. Against this backdrop, it bears emphasizing that to the extent that the Applicant, being the Republic and, by necessary extension, the prosecuting agencies of the Republic, would be directly and materially affected by any constitutional evaluation of the scope of criminal disclosure obligations, as well as the threshold for invoking such obligations through applications for disclosures in the conduct of a criminal trial, the failure of the Ordinary Bench to afford the Applicant a hearing on those issues constituted a fundamental and unpardonable jurisdictional infraction.

59. The inviolability of the audi alteram partem principle was underscored in the judgment of this Court dated 6th June, 2023 in Civil Motion No. J5/08/2023 titled Republic v. High Court, Tema; Ex Parte Dorgbadzi, where the venerable Dotse JSC held that:
“There are quite a number of decent judicial decisions which establish the fact that failure to afford an opportunity to a party to be heard…where a decision is made affecting the rights or properties of a party, would entitle the said proceedings to be quashed for breach of the principles of natural justice… The courts from very early times placed a lot of emphasis on the principles of natural justice. This audi alteram partem aspect of the principle of natural justice i.e., to give the party an opportunity to be heard before he or she is condemned has become a hallowed principle of the courts in Ghana.”
60. Accordingly, to the extent that questions touching on the constitutional content of prosecutorial duties are not merely incidental or collateral matters, but carry practical implications to the conduct of criminal prosecutions throughout the country, to pronounce upon such questions, without hearing the very authority charged with the performance of those duties, offended the most elementary dictates of natural justice and constitutes a jurisdictional sin which cannot be permitted to stand.

61. In yet another attempt to salvage the ruling of the Ordinary Bench, the Respondents have contended that, given the constitutional tenor of the issues said to arise from the ruling of the Trial High Court and more particularly by the trial judge’s reliance on the Practice Direction, this Court, acting as the ultimate guardian of the 1992 Constitution, was entitled to raise and determine the issue suo motu, without the necessity of either party expressly broaching it. In aid of this submission, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Matekole & Azago Kwesitsu v. Electoral Commission and Attorney General (No. 2)* [2012] SCGLR 244, where this Court stated as follows:
“The Constitution of Ghana by virtue of articles 1 and 2 is the supreme and most fundamental law of Ghana and it is clear from articles 2 and 130 as construed by this court that subject to the High Court’s jurisdiction in the enforcement of private fundamental human rights this court is the Trustee of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Clearly then if a genuine break with the infamous case of In Re Akoto (1961) 2 GLR 253, SC is to be made by this court then this court cannot shut its eyes to breaches of the Constitution when they loom large in a case before it. This must be so because even at common law a court is bound suo motu to raise fundamental issues such as lack of jurisdiction (even after judgment), see Mosi v Bagyina (1963) 1 GLR 337 S.C. or illegality, by tracking it when it looms even faintly in a case before the court, see Napier v National Business Agency Ltd (1951) 2 All ER 264 C.A. It would therefore have been a dereliction of constitutional trust on the part of this court to have confined itself solely to the issue of whether one version of L.I. 1983 as opposed to the other was procedurally duly passed.” (emphasis supplied)
62. On the strength of this authority, the Respondents have urged the proposition that the Supreme Court may, in the exercise of any jurisdiction open to it, suo motu raise a constitutional question and proceed to determine same, without the requirement that the issue be raised and answered by any of the parties.

63. With respect, the facts and context of the Matekole case supra are plainly distinguishable from the case at hand. In the Matekole case, for instance, the original jurisdiction of this Court had been expressly invoked to determine, inter alia, whether the creation and specification of a new District Electoral Area by the Local Government (Creation of New District Electoral Areas and Designation of Units) Instrument, 2010 (L.I. 1983), made pursuant to sections 3(3) and (4) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), was inconsistent with and in contravention of Article 5 of the 1992 Constitution. The constitutional complaint centered on the effect of L.I. 1983 on the boundaries between the Greater Accra Region and the Eastern Region, particularly as they related to the Lower Manya Krobo District and the Dangme West District.

64. In the course of resolving that properly invoked constitutional question, the Court was necessarily confronted with the ancillary and inextricably connected issue of which region the disputed electoral areas belonged to. It was therefore in that narrow context, and within an already activated original jurisdiction, that this Court raised an additional constitutional question.

65. Properly understood, therefore, the Matekole case stands only for the uncontroversial proposition that a court is not rigidly confined to the precise formulation of issues as framed by the parties, and may raise such other relevant legal or factual issues that are implicated in a matter already properly before it.

66. In the case of Fattal v. Wolley [2013-2014] 2SCGLR 1070 at page 1076 Georgina Wood, CJ crystalized the principle as follows;
“Admittedly, it is, indeed, sound basic learning that courts are not tied down to only the issues identified and agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial. Thus, if in the course of the hearing, an agreed issue is clearly found to be irrelevant, moot, or even not germane to the action under trial, there is no duty cast upon the court to receive evidence and adjudicate upon it. The converse is equally true. If a crucial issue is left out, but emanates at the trial from the pleadings or the evidence, the court cannot refuse to address it on the ground that it is not included in the agreed issues.”
[See also the case of Rockson v. Ilios Shipping Company SA and Another [2010-12] 1 GLR 141] .
67. Quite clearly, the Matekole case does not support the far more ambitious claim advanced by the Respondents, namely, that this Court may, in the course of exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, unilaterally transform that jurisdiction into one of constitutional adjudication under its original jurisdiction, by raising a constitutional question suo motu and proceeding to determine it without hearing the party to whose prejudice the conclusion may inure.

68. In the Matekole case, the original jurisdiction of this Court had been properly invoked, and the additional issue raised by the Court was ancillary to, and inseparable from, the constitutional controversy already submitted for determination.

69. Here, by contrast, the jurisdiction invoked was the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, by way of an application for prohibition. As I have consistently maintained, the question of the constitutionality of the Practice Direction, and the broader constitutional scope of the duty of disclosure, were neither raised by the parties nor implied in any manner necessary for the resolution of the narrow, bias focused inquiry that the prohibition application entailed.

70. In my view, even if, for the sake of argument, it were to be conceded that this Court was entitled to raise the constitutional issue suo motu, it nevertheless remains beyond contest that once the determination of that issue directly affected the substantive rights, duties, and operational obligations of the Applicant in the discharge of its prosecutorial mandate, the Applicant ought to have been afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

71. In any case, I hold that this Court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction when it purported to suo moto raise a constitutional question for evaluation and determination at a time when its original jurisdiction under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) had quite clearly not been invoked.

72. In the case of Bimpong- Buta v The General Legal Council & Ors [2003-2005]1 GLR 738 this Court settled the point as follows:
“The jurisprudence of this Court is that there can be no recourse to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court unless the question presented calls for an authoritative interpretation of a provision of the constitution, 1992 pursuant to article 130(1), that is “enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution, 1992” or there is creditable allegation that an enactment or any act or omission “is inconsistent with, or is in contravention” of the Constitution, 1992 as under article 2(1) thereof.”

73. Additionally, in the case of Aduamoa II v. Twum II [1999-2000] 2GLR 409, the revered Acquah JSC (as he then was) opined that:
“…the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court under articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 constitution to interpret and enforce the provisions of the constitution is a special jurisdiction meant to be invoked in suits raising genuine or real issues of interpretation of a provision of the constitution; or enforcement of a provision of the constitution; or a question whether an enactment was made in ultra vires parliament or any other authority or person by law or under the constitution”.

74. Having previously determined that the question placed before this Court by way of the prohibition application did not invoke, and was never intended to invoke, the original jurisdiction of this Court, nor to raise or implicate any constitutional issue, it follows that, the Ordinary Bench, in raising a constitutional question suo motu and proceeding to determine it, exceeded the permissible bounds of its jurisdiction. That excursion into its original constitutional enforcement and interpretative jurisdiction, in the absence of a proper invocation of that jurisdiction, amounted to an excess of jurisdiction which cannot be sustained in law.

75. Notwithstanding my firm conclusion that this review application succeeds on the jurisdictional infractions already identified, namely, the improper excursion into constitutional adjudication without the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction, and the attendant breach of the audi alteram partem rule, i have nevertheless considered it prudent, out of an abundance of caution, to address the substantive correctness of the Ordinary Bench’s constitutional pronouncements on disclosure.

76. I do so because those pronouncements were expressed in definitive terms, and were accompanied by consequential orders intended to guide future criminal proceedings and judicial training. In that context, to dispose of the application solely on jurisdictional grounds, without clarifying, in my view, the proper constitutional and procedural position on the point, may leave uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice and invite repetitive litigation.

77. Accordingly, and for the purpose of bringing finality and clarity to the issue, I proceed to consider, in the alternative, whether the impugned constitutional conclusions can be sustained on their merits.
CRIMINAL DISCLOURES AND THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE:
78. The illustrious jurist and father of the utilitarian philosophy of law, Jeremy Bentham, famously said in Chapter 1 of his landmark book, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, concerning the issue of rights as follows;
“The interest of the community’ is one of the most general expressions in the terminology of morals; no wonder its meaning is often lost! When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body composed of the individuals who are thought of as being as it were its members. Then what is the interest of the community? It is the sum of the interests of the members who compose it. It is pointless to talk of the interest of the community without understanding what the interest of the individual is. A thing is said to ‘promote the interest’ (or be ‘for the interest’) of an individual when it tends to increase the sum total of his pleasures or (the same thing) to lessen the sum total of his pains.”

79. Turning therefore to the question of the substantive correctness of the Ordinary Bench’s pronouncement on the scope of the duty of disclosure, and the proper considerations to guide a court when confronted with an application for further disclosures, I am , with respect, unable to agree with the position adopted by the Ordinary Bench.

80. The Respondents, in opposing this application, have contended that the threshold for invoking the review jurisdiction of this Court is not met where the impugned decision, even if arrived at through identifiable errors of law, could nevertheless have been sustained on other valid and lawful grounds apparent on the face of the record. On that footing, they argue that although the reasoning or approach adopted by the Ordinary Bench may have been flawed, the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the correct approach been employed. Consequently, they submit that in this instance, there would be no miscarriage of justice, so as to warrant the exercise of this Court’s review jurisdiction.

81. Whilst the jurisprudential logic espoused is undoubtedly sound, i fear that this argument, in the context of the suit before us, suffers two main flaws; Firstly, as I have comprehensively elucidated above, the decision of the Ordinary Bench, to the extent that it pertained to discussions on the constitutionality of the Practice Direction and its ancillary issues, suffered from several jurisdictional defects which are simply irremediable and incurable.

82. Additionally, whilst the decision on the substantive prohibition application itself was sound and unimpeachable, it is painfully apparent that this Court proceeded to make certain constitutional determinations outside the scope of the said application, ostensibly on the strength of our original jurisdiction under Article 2(1) and 130(1), a development which we have deprecated as being too liberal a view of the reaches of our exclusive original jurisdiction.

83. Indeed, having exhaustively discussed what in the Ordinary Bench’s view, were the nullifying constitutional inconsistencies, in portions of the Practice Direction, the Court, speaking through Adjei JSC. proceeded to make the following orders :
“Finally, the Practice Direction, as discussed above, contains provisions that are inconsistent with section 5 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), and with the fair trial principles enshrined in article 19 of the Constitution of Ghana, and those provisions shall be struck out as unconstitutional under articles 2 and 130 of the Constitution.
The phrase “that/which is relevant” used in paragraphs 2 (1) (e), (f), (g) and 2(a) of the Practice Directions is inconsistent with the fair trial principles under Article 19 of the Constitution of Ghana, and section 5(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), consequently, it is hereby struck out under Articles 2 and 130 of the Constitution of Ghana as unconstitutional.”

84. The Ordinary Bench, cognizant of the juridical weight of its determinations, then proceeded to direct that these amendments, immediately be brought to the attention of the Director of the Judicial Training Institute, putatively to guide the Director in re-aligning judicial training on criminal procedure, along the remodified lines of this decision.

85. To answer the Respondents query therefore, the case of Michael Odai Lomotey & Anor v. Kwow Richardson & 3 Ors which espoused the “alternative approach, same consequence principle” is entirely distinguishable from this instance as unlike in that case, there is a constitutional injunction on every duty bearer, to adhere to and operationalize the constitutional determination reached by the Ordinary Bench. Indeed Article 2(4) mandates such compliance under threat of sanction as follows:
“Failure to obey or carry out the terms of an order or direction made or given under clause (2) of this article constitutes a high crime under this Constitution and shall in the case of the President or Vice President constitute a ground for removal from office under this Constitution”.
86. On the merits of this constitutional issue, the learned Justices of the Ordinary Bench found, unanimously, that the impugned portions of the Practice Direction contravened the fair trial rights conferred under Article 19 of the Constitution, where it enjoined trial courts to determine the relevance, and by necessary extension the admissibility, of materials for disclosure at the pre-trial stage.

87. The Court held that the Practice Direction required judges to assess the relevance of both used and unused materials before trial, notwithstanding that, under the Evidence Act, questions of relevance and admissibility properly arise only when evidence is formally offered at trial. Relying on sections 6, and 51 of the Evidence Act, together with the fair trial guarantees under Article 19 of the Constitution and Ghana’s obligations under the ICCPR, the learned Justices concluded that determining relevance at the pre-trial stage, without the tendering of evidence, the opportunity to object, or the benefit of hearing both sides, fundamentally undermines the presumption of innocence. On that basis, they held that the phrases in the Practice Direction which limited disclosure to materials “which are relevant” were inconsistent with the Evidence Act and the constitutional right to a fair trial, and were therefore unconstitutional.

88. Before I delve into an evaluation of the decision itself, it is necessary to set out in premise that although the ruling of the Ordinary Bench was framed in terms of the applicable considerations to guide a court when confronted with an application for disclosure, the decision, in its real and operative force, goes much further; it effectively articulates and defines the constitutional standard governing criminal disclosure itself.

89. It would be wholly untenable, indeed preposterous, to suggest that one standard applies where the prosecution voluntarily discharges its constitutional duty of disclosure, and yet another, qualitatively different standard emerges where that same duty is activated or compelled through an application by an accused person, and that it is this latter standard that the Court sought to regulate. Such a bifurcated approach, in my view, would offend the most elementary canons of constitutional interpretation, which mandate that the constitution must be interpreted in a manner that promotes coherence and internal consistency.

90. In the case of Opremreh v. The Electoral Commission & Anor, [2011] 2 SCGLR 1159 at 1165, the Court, gave judicial blessing to this principle espoused in the case of National Media Commission v. Attorney General [2000] SCGLR 1, as follows:
“Accordingly, in interpreting the Constitution, care must be taken to ensure that all the provisions work together as part of a functioning whole. The parts must fit together logically to form a rational, internally consistent framework. And because the framework has a purpose, the parts are also to work together dynamically, each contributing something towards accomplishing the intended goal. Each provision must therefore be capable of operating without coming into conflict with any other.”

91. Similarly, this same expression, was succinctly articulated in a ruling of this Court dated 3rd December, 2020 in Suit No.: J6/03/2020 entitled David Apasera & 42 Ors. V. The Attorney General & Anor thus:
“At the outset, it is important to reiterate that this Court has repeatedly said that in interpreting the Constitution we must not read the particular provisions in isolation but as part of a single document with a view to achieving coherence and or consistency.”
[See also the cases of: Asare v. Attorney-General [2003-2004] SCGLR 823; Hon. P. C. Appiah-Ofori v. The Attorney General (Civil Appeal No. J1/4/2007); Republic v. High Court, Koforidua, Ex Parte Asare (Baba Jamal and Ors. Interested Parties) [2009 SCGLR] 460 at 472]

92. Accordingly, criminal disclosure, properly understood, is a positive and continuing constitutional obligation incumbent on the prosecution. In the case of Republic v Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Ors [2019] GLTR 1, this position was affirmed as follows:
“The provisions under consideration are stated in mandatory terms and the prosecution is obliged to comply. It is therefore the duty of the prosecution to do disclosure voluntarily and it is to be made at all stages until the final judgment on appeal. The disclosure, whether in first instance or on appeal must take place “without undue delay.”
93. Where that obligation is not discharged, or is discharged incompletely or improperly, the Court may compel compliance at the instance of the accused through an application for further disclosure. This application cannot create a new duty, nor does it recalibrate the standard; it merely invokes the Court’s coercive authority to enforce an existing constitutional obligation. The standard governing disclosure is therefore singular and uniform.

94. The net effect of the decision of the Ordinary Bench, in striking out relevance as a qualifying threshold in the context of disclosure, is to pronounce that the prosecution’s constitutional duty requires the disclosure of any and all material, information, or documents in its possession to the accused person. Where an accused forms the view that this absolute disclosure obligation has not been satisfied, he is at liberty to apply for further disclosure, and even in that context, the standard remains unchanged; the accused is not required to demonstrate relevance, whether to the proof of guilt or the vindication of innocence. Per the determination of the Ordinary Bench, possession by the prosecution is only the operative criterion. This, in substance and effect, is the scope of the decision reached by the Ordinary Bench, and it is essential that this scope be clearly stated at the outset in order to properly contextualize our analysis that follows.

95. Having properly delineated the scope of this discussion, it is important to state at the outset that I am in full agreement with the Ordinary Bench’s general appreciation of the essence of disclosure and its inextricable link to the constitutional right to a fair hearing.

96. Indeed, that proposition is no longer open to serious dispute, having been firmly settled by this Court in the case of Republic v Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & 4 Ors [2019] GLTR 1, where the jurisprudential foundation of criminal disclosure was comprehensively articulated. In that decision, this Court, speaking through Adinyira JSC, anchored the duty of disclosure squarely within Article 19(2)(e) and (g) of the 1992 Constitution, which provide as follows:
Article 19(1), (2)(e) and (g):
“(1) A person charged with a criminal offence shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court.
(2) A person charged with a criminal offence shall—
(e) be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(g) be afforded facilities to examine, in person or by his lawyer, the witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on the same conditions as those applicable to the witnesses called by the prosecution.”

97. Given the extensive and authoritative treatment of disclosures, relative to the right to fair trial in Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie supra, I do not propose to restate, or reinvent, principles already settled. Rather, I shall extract only those passages which illuminate the overriding purpose of disclosure to properly frame my discussion.

98. In reaffirming the centrality of the right to a fair trial, the Court recalled its earlier pronouncement in In Re Effiduase Stool Affairs (No. 2); Republic v Oduro Nimapua, President of the National House of Chiefs; Ex Parte Ameyaw II (No. 2) [1998–99] SCGLR 630 at 670, where Acquah JSC, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:
“For one of the basic principles of any civilized system of justice is that a person is entitled to a fair trial free from prejudice. No system of justice can be effective unless a fair trial to both sides is ensured… This common law right to a fair trial is now elevated to a fundamental right in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.”
99. The Court further emphasized that the right to fair trial operates alongside, and is reinforced by, principles of equality of arms and equal access to justice, which require that neither party, particularly the prosecution with its institutional advantage, gains an unfair procedural edge. In that context, disclosure was described as a mechanism for leveling the playing field and safeguarding the integrity of the trial process.

100. Most critically, in elucidating the constitutional scope of the phrase “adequate time and facilities” under Article 19(2)(e), the Court stated as follows:
“The words ‘adequate facilities’ as used in our article19 (2) (e) is more or less a legal term commonly used in international conventions in relation to fair trial, Notable examples are found in article 6 of the ECFF supra and in article 14 of the ICCPR supra ‘Adequate facilities’ was clarified by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 32[CCPR/C/GC 32, of 23 August 2007] on Article 14 ‘on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial;’ in paragraphs 32 and 33 as follows:
32. “Subparagraph 3(b) provides that accused persons must have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence. This provision is an important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and the application of the equality of arms…
33. ‘Adequate facilities’ must include access to documents and other evidence; this access must include all materials that the prosecution plans to offer in court against the accused or that are exculpatory. Exculpatory material should be understood as including not only material establishing innocence but also other evidence that assist the defence (e.g. indications that confession was not voluntary).”

100. I find, on the strength of the foregoing authorities, that the overriding purpose of disclosure is to secure a fair trial by eliminating the risk of surprise and equipping the accused with adequate facilities to prepare and present his defence.

101. This Court in the Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie case supra settled that disclosure is not confined to evidence the prosecution intends to rely upon; it extends to all potentially inculpatory and exculpatory material in the possession of the prosecution, whether intended for use or not. In the said case, this Court found thus:
“With reference to Question 3 the answer is in the affirmative. Obviously, the constitutional right of the accused person to adduce evidence in his defence cannot be exercised properly unless disclosure of material includes all the evidence which may assist the accused even if the prosecution does not propose to adduce it. The accused person may discover potential witnesses from such disclosure.”
102. It must be emphasized, however, that the constitutional duty of disclosure was never intended to hold the criminal trial process hostage, nor to operate as a tactical instrument for delay. Its animating purpose is a practical one; to promote fairness by ensuring that the accused is not taken by surprise, is not placed at a disadvantage, and is afforded a genuine opportunity to prepare and present a defence. It is only when the said duty is deployed in this manner, the duty of disclosure serves its true constitutional utility.

103. John Staurt Mill in his book Utilitarianism said,
“To have a right, then, is to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector asks why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility.”
104. In the context of assessing the general or social utility of the constitutional regime requiring disclosures, the threshold requirement of relevance or materiality serves an inescapable protective function for both the accused and the State.

105. On the one hand, limiting disclosure to material or relevant information serves to restrain the prosecution from intentionally overwhelming the accused with a volume of unrelated or immaterial information or documents, calculated to distract the accused and divert his attention away from the actual material relevant to establishing his defence. In my view, therefore, to prefer a regime of absolute or indiscriminate disclosure risks burying genuinely useful information beneath a mass of irrelevant documents, thereby undermining the accused person’s ability to identify, prepare, and deploy material that meaningfully assists in his defence.

106. On the other hand, the standard equally guards the State against abuse as the accused is not entitled to demand, nor is the prosecution obliged to disclose, every item of material that may have come into the prosecution’s possession, regardless of how superfluous, extraneous, or immaterial it may be to the issues at trial.

107. In this way, the threshold requirement of relevance operates as a balancing mechanism, safeguarding the legitimate interests of both the State and the accused, and ensuring that disclosure remains a focused, fair, and functional process. It is trite learning that in the construction and application of constitutional rights, the Court is enjoined to strike precisely this balance; to protect and give full effect to individual rights, while at the same time ensuring that their enforcement does not impair the broader interests of justice, the effective administration of criminal trials, or the overall welfare of the State and society.

108. In the case of Raphael Cubagee v. Michael Yeboah Asare & Others [2018] GHASC 14 the erudite Pwamang JSC. affirmed this principle thus:
“Enforcement of human rights is not a one-way street since no human right is absolute. There are other policy considerations that have to be taken into account when a Court in the course of proceedings is called upon to enforce human rights…

109. The Court further continued at page 15 in relation to Article 12(2) of the 1992 Constitution that:
“This provision in our opinion is an explicit direction to the Court to undertake a balancing exercise in the enforcement of human rights provisions of the Constitution…The public interest to which all constitutional rights are subject to by the provisions of Article 12(2) in having a person who commit crimes apprehended and punished would require the court to balance that against the claim of rights of the perpetrator of the crime.
110. These sentiments were cited with approval in the Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie case supra.

111. Having established that the full purpose of the duty of disclosure is in its dual role to eliminate surprise at trial and to afford the accused adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence; I find that the first element of the removal of surprise is achieved through the prosecution’s constitutional obligation to disclose all material, information or documents it may, or may not, rely upon at trial in seeking to establish the guilt of the accused; accordingly, every item of potentially inculpatory material must be made available to the defence.

112. In the same vein, the second requirement of the provision of adequate facilities is satisfied by the prosecution’s duty to disclose all potentially exculpatory material, that is, material which may assist in vindicating the innocence of the accused or assisting in his defence.

113. Accordingly, I find that this necessary process of filtration, distinguishing between what is potentially inculpatory or exculpatory on the one hand, and what is wholly irrelevant on the other, cannot be exorcised from any assessment of the constitutional duty of disclosure.

114. Comparative jurisprudence from leading common-law jurisdictions confirms that, although criminal disclosure is constitutionally rooted in the right to a fair trial, it has never been understood as an unbridled entitlement to inspect all information in the possession of the prosecution. Rather, disclosure, especially in the nature of exculpatory material, is consistently confined to material that is relevant or material in its capacity to exculpate the accused, mitigate punishment, or materially undermine the prosecution’s case. This relevance threshold is treated as indispensable to the integrity and workability of the criminal process.

115. In the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court held that constitutional violation arises only where the prosecution suppresses evidence “favorable to an accused” and “material either to guilt or to punishment.” In language that squarely rejects disclosure as a matter of chance or tactical advantage, the Court stated that:
“A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant.” (emphasis supplied)

116. That materiality requirement was sharpened in Giglio v United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), where the Court emphasized, relative to the duty of disclosure, that:
“A finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady.”

117. Additionally, in the case of United States v Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the US Supreme Court held:
“The prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

118. Similarly, in R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326, the Supreme Court of Canada found as follows:
“As indicated earlier, however, this obligation to disclose is not absolute … discretion must also be exercised with respect to the relevance of information. While the Crown must err on the side of inclusion, it need not produce what is clearly irrelevant … The initial obligation to separate “the wheat from the chaff” must therefore rest with Crown counsel.”

119. Again, this relevance-based framing was reinforced by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Chaplin [1995] 1 SCR 727, where the Court held that disclosure is required only where there is;
“a reasonable possibility that the information will be useful to the accused in making full answer and defence.”
120. Taken together, these authorities establish that even across similar common-law jurisdictions, courts have insisted on relevance or materiality as an unavoidable threshold, precisely to ensure that disclosure serves its proper purpose of securing a fair trial, rather than devolving into speculative inquiry or procedural abuse.

121. On the basis of the foregoing therefore, I find absolutely no divergence between this constitutional duty and the practice direction which provides that materials to be disclosed must be relevant, whether directly or indirectly to inculpation, or to exculpation; if anything at all the said Practice Direction faithfully captures and gives practical expression to the constitutional essence of the duty of disclosure.

122. Additionally, I agree entirely with the Applicant’s argument that the Ordinary Bench appears to have mixed up two distinct concepts; the admissibility of evidence, which is governed by section 6 of the Evidence Act, and the assessment of whether material ought to be disclosed.

123. This confusion was largely triggered by the unfortunate and inaccurate description of the materials sought, in the context of a disclosure application, as “evidence” by the Practice Direction, the trial judge, and subsequently by both parties. The use of the word “evidence” was a misnomer, and it drew the Court into applying legal tests that are only relevant once evidence is being tendered at trial.

124. In truth, an application for disclosure has nothing to do with evidence in the sense contemplated by section 6 of the Evidence Act. Disclosure concerns documents, information, or materials which may or may not ultimately be relied upon by either party at trial. At the disclosure stage, these materials have not yet acquired the legal character of “evidence”. Section 6, which regulates objections to admissibility, is therefore inapplicable when a court is deciding whether material ought to be disclosed or discovered.

125. The Constitution mandates disclosure under Article 19, and this exercise necessarily occurs before trial begins. The applicable question at that stage is simply whether the material is capable of assisting the case, either by tending to establish guilt or by vindicating innocence, or by facilitating the preparation of either case. Relevance for disclosure is therefore assessed in advance, long before any decision is made to tender the material as evidence at trial. Only at the point of tender does the material assume the character of evidence and become subject to the admissibility rules under the Evidence Act, particularly, section 6 . In my view therefore, I find that the Ordinary Bench, with respect, erred in treating the test for disclosure as identical to and inseparable from the test for admissibility.

126. Disclosure and admissibility operate at different procedural stages and serve different ends. Disclosure is a pre-trial, fairness-driven obligation, constitutionally anchored in Article 19, and directed at eliminating surprise and affording the accused adequate facilities to prepare a defence whereas admissibility, on the other hand, is engaged at the trial-stage and is governed by section 6 of the Evidence Act, when evidence is formally offered.

127. Indeed, this distinction is neither novel nor controversial. In civil cases, courts routinely order discovery and inspection under Order 21 without determining whether the documents sought will ultimately be admissible in evidence. In such cases, controlling threshold is expressly articulated in Order 21 rule 11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2004 (C.I. 47), which provides as follows:
“An order for the production of any document for inspection or to the Court shall not be made under any of these rules unless the Court is of the opinion that the order is necessary either to dispose fairly of the cause or matter or to save costs.”
128. The relevance assessed at that stage, like in criminal disclosures, is therefore functional and preparatory, not evidential. A document may properly be ordered to be disclosed or inspected even though it may later be ruled inadmissible at trial. That distinction is well understood by courts and practitioners alike and has never been regarded as inconsistent or Section 6 of the Evidence Act.

129. By importing the admissibility framework under the Evidence Act into the pre-trial disclosure inquiry, the Ordinary Bench inadvertently elevated a preparatory constitutional obligation into a trial-stage evidential test and in so doing conflated relevance for disclosure, which is concerned with materiality, utility, and fairness; with admissibility.

130. While the integrity and inviolability of an accused person’s right to a fair trial must be jealously guarded, I must not be seduced into embracing strained or overly liberal interpretations of the Constitution which, in practical terms, add no meaningful value to this duty of disclosure or its proper discharge, and ultimately achieve nothing in force or effect. Our constitution must be interpreted in a way that protects rights in a manner that is coherent, workable, and consistent with the orderly administration of justice, rather than appealing to an imagined elevation of justice or rights that yields no practical utility.

131. On the paramountcy of utility as a threshold consideration for judicial interpretation of rights, we are fortified again by the words of John Stuart Mill in his book “On Liberty”:
“I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right… I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions.”
132. Consequently, our disclosure regime cannot be diluted into a speculative fishing expedition, where accused persons file applications merely to “try their luck,” cast wide nets, and hope that something of use emerges. I therefore reject the suggestion that some higher policy or social ideal is served by reducing the disclosure process to an exercise in chance or conjecture.

133. In the English case of R v H and C [2004] UKHL 3, relied on for its persuasive authority, the House of Lords explicitly found that disclosure is required only where material “weakens the prosecution’s case or strengthens that of the defendant.”

134. Further, in Rv. H and C supra Lord Bingham, opined as follows:
“The trial process is not well served if the defence are permitted to make general and unspecified allegations and then seek far-reaching disclosure in the hope that material may turn up to make them good.”
135. Similarly, in R v McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, the Supreme Court of Canada more definitively said as follows:
“It is important for the effective administration of justice that criminal trials remain focused on the issues to be tried and that scarce judicial resources not be squandered in ‘fishing expeditions’ for irrelevant evidence.”
136. At all material stages, an application for disclosure must be grounded in a request for a specific item of information or material. That request must, in my view, demonstrate a clear and rational connection between the material sought and the case at hand, whether in its capacity to inculpate or to exculpate the accused. Only by insisting on this threshold of material connection and for that matter, relevance, can the disclosure process remain principled, fair, and functional, serving its true constitutional purpose without degenerating into abuse or inefficiency.

CONCLUSION:
137. I have observed that, following the Ordinary Bench’s extensive analysis and determinations on the unconstitutionality of certain portions of the Practice Direction, my learned brother Adjei JSC who authored the decision seemed to have come full circle. This is evident in his concluding observation that:
“Discoveries shall only be made in materials and documents which are connected with the matter before the court.”
138. Quite clearly, in the context of a criminal trial, the “matter before the court” is singular and well defined; “whether the accused person is criminally liable for the offence charged”.

139. In substance therefore, that concluding formulation does no more than substitute the language of “relevance”, as employed in the Practice Direction, with that of “connection”, which is a distinction without difference and in substance amounts to the very same thing; denoting a prerequisite of materiality in relation to the matter before the court, assessed by reference to whether the material sought is capable of securing or facilitating either the inculpation or exculpation of the accused.

FINAL ORDERS:
140. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I would grant the application. The decision of the Ordinary Bench, insofar as it relates to the constitutionality of the Practice Direction on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings, together with all consequential orders founded on that determination, is accordingly set aside.

(SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

DR. JUSTICE SREM SAI (DEPUTY ATTORNEY-GENERAL) FOR THE INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT WITH HIM ESI DENTAA YANKAH (PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY) AND RAKIYATU ABDULAI ( ASSISTANT STAFF OFFICER, EOCO).

SAMUEL ATTA AKYEA ESQ. FOR THE APPLICANTS/RESPONDENTS WITH HIM PETER OSEI ASAMOAH ESQ., NANA NTI OFORI-DEBRAH ESQ. AND CHARLES BOAKYE ESQ.

Share on Facebook

Save